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


Graham

Legend

May 1917

1950



BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME VII.

(THIRD SERIES.)

LONDON:

Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company, Limited,

CHARLES DOLMAN, MANAGER,

61, NEW BOND STREET, & 6, QUEEN'S HEAD PASSAGE,
PATERNOSTER ROW.

1859.



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LONDON:

PRINTED BY COX AND WYMAN, GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S-INN FIELDS.

CONTENTS.

No. I.

ART.	PAGE
I. USURY LAWS 1. Governor's Biennial Messages to the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, December 7, 1857. "Message II., specially on the subject of the Legal Rate of Interest, and the Usury Laws of Virginia, against their Repeal." Free Trade in Money; or Note-shaving the great Cause of Fraud, Poverty, and Ruin. Stringent Usury Laws, the best Defence of the People against Hard Times. An Answer to Jeremy Bentham, by the Hon. JOHN WHIPPLE, of Rhode Island. 2. Usury, Funds, Banking, &c. By Rev. JEREMIAH O'CALLAHAN, Catholic Priest. New York: 1856. 3. Opinion of Chief Justice Taney on Usury and Usury Laws, in the November Term, 1854, U. S. Circuit Court for Maryland District, in <i>Dell v. the Ellicotts</i> .	1
II. CATHOLICITY AND CIVILIZATION Catholicity and Modern Civilization.	16
III. THE HUMANISTS The Humanists—A Chapter from History.	38
IV. PRIMITIVE ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT <i>Études Philosophiques : Ontologie ou Étude des Lois de la Pensée.</i> Par M. l'ABBÉ F. HUGONIN. Paris. Tomes I. et II. 8vo. Tome I. 1856; Tome II. 1857.	58
V. CONVERSATIONS ON THEOCRACY Conversations of Our Club. New Series. Reported for the Review by a Member.	90
VI. POPULAR AMUSEMENTS Popular Amusements.	129
VII. LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS	140

No. II.

I. THE CHURCH AND THE REVOLUTION Conversations of our Club. New Series. Reported for the Review by a Member.	145
II. POLITICS AT HOME AND ABROAD Politics, Foreign and Domestic, European and American.	191

ART.	PAGE
III. THE MORTARA CASE The Mortara Case; or, the Right of Parents to the Custody and Education of their Children.	226
IV. RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY Remarks on Religious Controversy, with some suggestions as to the manner of conducting it.	246
V. PÈRE FÉLIX ON PROGRESS Le Progrès par le Christianisme. Conférences de Notre Dame de Paris. Par R. P. FÉLIX, S. J. Paris, 1858. 2 tomes 8vo.	262

No. III.

I. THE CHURCH AND THE REVOLUTION Conversations of Our Club. New Series. Reported for the Review by a Member.	281
II. PUBLIC AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS Pastoral Letter on the Decrees of the Second Provincial Council of Cincinnati. By the Most Reverend J. B. PURCELL, D.D., Archbishop of Cincinnati. Cincinnati: Walsh. 8vo. pp. 16.	324
III. COMPLETE WORKS OF GERALD GRIFFIN The Complete Works of Gerald Griffin. New York: D. & J. Sadlier, & Co. 12mo., 10 vols.	342
IV. LAMENNAIS AND GREGORY XVI. Censure de Cinquante-six Propositions Extraites de divers Écrits de M. de la Mennais, et de ses Disciples, par plusieurs Evêques de France, et Lettre de mêmes Evêques au Souverain Pontife Grégoire XVI., le tout précédé d'une Préface où l'on donne une Notice historique de cette Censure, et suivi des Pièces justificatives. Toulouse, 1835. 8vo. pp 215.	372
V. NAPOLEONIC IDEAS Napoleonic Ideas. Des Idées Napoléoniennes, par le Prince Napoléon Louis Bonaparte. Bruxelles, 1839. Translated by JAMES A. DORR. New York: 1839.	396
VI. LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS	410

No. IV.

I. THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION 1. De Immaculato Deiparæ Conceptu Caroli Passaglia commentarius. Romæ, 1854, 1855. 3 tomi, 4to.	417
---	-----

Contents.

vii

ART.	PAGE
2. The Immaculate Conception of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, a dogma of the Catholic Church. By J. D. BRYANT, M.D. Boston, 1855.	
3. L'Immaculée Conception de la Bienheureuse Vierge Marie considérée comme dogme de Foi. Par Mgr. J. B. MALOU, Evêque de Bruges. Bruxelles, 1856. 2 tomes 8vo.	
II. CHARLEMAGNE,—HIS SCHOLARSHIP.	437
De L'Art Chrétien. Par A. F. RIO. Paris. 2 vols. 8vo. Tome I. 1836. Tome II. 1855.	
III. ECCLESIASTICAL SEMINARIES	456
1. Sermon on Ecclesiastical Seminaries. Preached by the Rt. Rev. M. J. SPALDING, D.D., Bishop of Louisville, in the Cathedral of Cincinnati, on the 1st Sunday of Lent, March 13th, 1859.	
2. Vie de M. Olier, Fondateur du Séminaire de Sainte Sulpice. Paris, 1843.	
3. Ecclesiastical Seminaries, Dublin Review, January, 1839.	
4. Considerations on the Sacred Ministry. Translated from the French, by Rev. B. S. PIOT. Baltimore, Kelly, Hedian & Piet, 1859.	
IV. DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LAWS	473
"Let not man part what God hath joined."	
V. ROMANIC AND GERMANIC ORDERS	493
The Condition of Women and Children among the Celtic, Gothic, and other nations. By JOHN M'ELHERAN, M. R. C. S. E. Boston: Donahoe, 1858, pp. 393.	
VI. THE ROMAN QUESTION	526
The Roman Question. By E. ABOUT. Translated from the French, by H. C. COAPE. New York: Appleton & Co., 1859. 12mo. pp. 219.	
VII. LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS	540



BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1859.

ART. I.—1. *Governor's Biennial Messages to the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, December 7, 1857. "Message II., specially on the subject of the Legal Rate of Interest, and the Usury Laws of Virginia, against their Repeal."* *Free Trade in Money, or, Note Shaving the great Cause of Fraud, Poverty, and Ruin. Stringent Usury Laws, the best Defence of the People against Hard Times. An Answer to Jeremy Bentham.* By the Hon. JOHN WHIPPLE, of Rhode Island.

2. *Usury, Funds, Banking, &c.* By Rev. JEREMIAH O'CALLAGHAN, Catholic Priest. New York: 1856.

3. *Opinion of Chief Justice Taney on Usury and Usury Laws, in the November Term, 1854, U. S. Circuit Court for Maryland District, in Dell vs. the Ellicotts.*

THE enlightened and independent Governor of Virginia, Henry A. Wise, has added to his claims on our respect by his strenuous opposition to dangerous theories on free trade in money, which were likely to receive support from certain members of the legislature. On the plea that the existing laws against usury were detrimental to the public interests, it was contemplated to abolish them, or at least to relax their force, by allowing higher premiums on the loan of money. The Governor felt it to be his duty to forewarn the Assembly against an experiment which, in other States,

had been followed by calamities; and he maintained, that the interest allowed by law, six per cent., was the highest that was compatible with the protection of the industrious and poor portion of the community, against the undue influence of the wealthy. In order to impress them with his views, he did not hesitate to embody in his official communication the sentiments and language of Mr. Whipple, of whose essay he caused a copy to be furnished to each member. The prudent counsels of the Governor, supported by his station and high personal character, prevented any change in the laws. This adds a new wreath to the laurel crown that encircles his brows, as the fearless champion of equal rights and religious liberty. To his generous and untiring efforts we owe the overthrow of the proscriptive party that threatened to extirpate Catholics from the land. Honor to the statesman of enlarged views, to the patriot of noble impulses, who, at the risk of his popularity and fame, and not without danger to his health and life, gave to narrow-minded fanaticism the first and fatal blow.

“ From amidst them forth he pass’d
Long way through hostile scorn, which he sustained
Superior, nor of violence fear’d aught;
And with retorted scorn his back he turn’d
On those proud tow’rs to swift destruction doom’d.

The essay placed second on our list, to which the Governor invited the attention of the Virginia legislature, was printed in New York in 1836, and subsequently inserted in the “American Jurist,” and in the “Banker’s Magazine,” in 1850.

An Irish Catholic priest, who for many years exercised the sacred ministry in the State of Vermont, and recently passed to Massachusetts, is author of the work bearing his name. In the early part of his clerical career in his native country, he incurred the displeasure of his ecclesiastical superior, Dr. Coppinger, the Bishop of Cloyne, by his denunciations of the practice of taking legal interest, which generally prevailed throughout Ireland, as in other countries. The Bishop suspended him from the exercise of the ministry, from which sentence the priest appealed to the Holy See. Cardinal Consalvi, the distinguished statesman who then acted as Pro-prefect of the Propaganda, wrote to him in the year 1823, and set before him the principles

laid down by Benedict XIV. in his Constitution of the year 1745, to which he required his adhesion, as a sure means of reconciliation with his prelate. We do not precisely know whether the zealous priest understood them to imply a condemnation of his own views, since he published them in his work, in which he still denounces "usury, fund, and bank speculation." To be candid, the question which gave rise to the investigation of which the Pontifical decree treats, namely, the lawfulness of investing money in business, and partaking of the profits, without sharing its risk by way of partnership, was not determined, the enlightened Pontiff being content with declaring, that no premium could be demanded for a mere loan, precisely in virtue of the loan, although extrinsic titles might justify it, and that money could be employed in various ways other than loans, so as to yield a legitimate profit. In the year 1822, the Congregation of the Holy Office, being consulted by a confessor, who doubted of the lawfulness of placing money at interest, in regard to a lady at Lyons, who was accustomed to do so, whether she could be absolved without abandoning the practice, and restoring the gain already acquired, answered in the affirmative, requiring, however, a declaration on her part, that she would abide by the final judgment of the Pontiff. Pius VIII., in the year 1830, advanced still further, forbidding confessors to be interfered with "*non esse inquietandos*," who allowed penitents to approach the sacraments, knowing them to be in the practice of receiving legal interest. It was also forbidden to withhold absolution from confessors who maintained the lawfulness of such practice. Gregory XVI. followed the same course, which is still pursued in the Roman tribunals. No formal decision has, indeed, emanated on this point; and, it has been declared that the good faith of the parties, that is, their sincere conviction of the lawfulness of the practice, is pre-supposed in those decrees that forbid interference with them. It is, however, clear that these measures are almost equivalent to a direct sanction, since few will hesitate to regard as correct a line of conduct thus protected against molestation.

Many of our readers may be astonished to find, that any doubt should have been entertained on this point in the nineteenth century, and that Rome, although prover-

bially slow, should have been so far behind the age. Yet a greater difficulty presents itself to those who are familiar with ecclesiastical antiquity; namely, how is the toleration or approval of legal interest consistent with the unchangeable character of the teaching of the Church, which, for so many ages, considered all addition to the capital of loans as usurious, and forbade it, under penalty of privation of the sacraments, and of Christian burial. It was an axiom of morality, that loans should be gratuitous, wherefore our great tragedian represents a Jew as thus murmuring against a Christian :

“ I hate him, for he is a Christian ;
But more, for that in low simplicity,
He lends out money gratis, and brings down
The rate of usance here with us in Venice.”*

The solution of this difficulty is, we believe, found in the altered circumstances of the times. The Church still teaches, that a loan, strictly so-called, or as Benedict XIV. styles it, a mere and simple loan, *nudum et simplex mutuum*, must be gratuitous, because it is an exercise of charity. *L'impiego del denaro*, as Maffei calls the investment of money, which Cardinal de la Luzerne designates *prêt de commerce*, is wholly different, although the poverty of language has caused them to be confounded. It was always admitted that persons lending money for commercial purposes, might share its profits, by putting it in partnership; and that all who parted with their money to oblige others, might require indemnification for loss sustained by the accommodation. Six centuries ago, this was expressly taught by St. Thomas of Aquin. The loan of money by way of investment, on security received, and a promise of moderate increase, was not probably practised in former ages, certainly not as generally as at present, and is not contemplated by the church decrees, or by the fathers, in their denunciations of usury; which, with them, meant the exacting of an increase for the mere exercise of charity to the distressed, or marked those enormous extortions which men of wealth practised, when giving to traders the means of pursuing their industry. Since commerce has filled the seas with merchant-vessels and the land with traders, and since a paper currency, with the credit system, has mul-

* Merchant of Venice.

tiplied the facilities of enterprise, pecuniary investments have become general, with great advantage to states and individuals, although not without some unfavorable results. Governments justly encourage and reward them for public utility, and to enable the industrious, by providential care, to prepare for themselves and for the helpless members of their families, a support in declining age and infirmity. Money is no longer a mere metallic currency, whose very care was a burden, and which was formerly buried in the earth, or hoarded in coffers for security, and became productive only by the industry and skill of its possessors.

“ Nullus argento color est, avaris
Abditæ teris inimice lænæ.”

It is now, to a great extent, a mere creation of society, an artificial medium which is productive by means of chartered companies, independently of any personal exertion on the part of the shareholders, whose contributions are encouraged and rewarded with a share of the profits. It has, therefore, a use and profit attached to it by the state which has given privileges to such associations. The law which regulates interest has reference to this state of things, and finds support and plausible justification in the general circumstances of society.

The change in the action of the Church, which is a consequence of the altered state of the world, implies no dereliction of principle. In assimilating to the ages through which she passes, she preserves her identity and consistency. It is a misfortune for an individual to take on him the task of combining the present with the past in matters which properly belong to the ecclesiastical authorities. What is done generally, even by practical Catholics, with the knowledge and implied approval of their prelates, cannot be regarded as opposed to sound morals, or the divine law, since, as St. Augustine observes, the Church neither dissembles nor approves of anything contrary to faith or good morals, still less does she practise it. We think, nevertheless, that those are sadly mistaken who count every loan an investment, and rigorously exact legal interest on small sums of money advanced to the necessitous. The law of charity is not abrogated by the law of the state. There still exists a divine command to lend

without hope of gain to our distressed fellow-man, who may be thereby rescued from suffering and ruin. If a wealthy man demand legal interest from one placed in such circumstances, he may violate the law of Jesus Christ, since this charge may ultimately bring on the ruin which for the moment is averted by the loan. Artisans and mechanics are thus sometimes reduced to beggary, the fruits of their industry being swallowed up by the payment of interest. Widows are turned out of doors, the mortgages which they give for temporary relief soon accumulating beyond their power to redeem their property. We have known young ladies of high attainments to toil for years to liquidate a small loan, which, by means of interest, had risen above their slender revenue. It is no easy task to determine in what circumstances the exaction of legal interest may be grievously repugnant to charity, if not to justice, but those who cultivate a Christian spirit will not insist too absolutely on legal rights where struggling industry or unmerited distress calls for gratuitous aid. The man of sordid mind, who, alike insensible to the cry of suffering and the claims of friendship, rigorously requires a premium on every loan, if he escape punishment, must not at least look for reward from his Divine Master. The amount of the loan does not determine whether it must be regarded as a business transaction or a mere exercise of charity. Ordinarily, benefactions are of small amount; but the social position and relations of distressed individuals may entitle them to large succours by way of charitable loans. These are matters which belong to the sphere of conscience, not to the domain of law; they are, however, worthy of the serious attention of those who wish not to be found guilty at the bar of Christ of having violated his precepts. We know of few characters more odious, without being plainly immoral, than the wealthy who refuse relief to meritorious citizens, unless they can secure not only the return of the loan, but the interest which they would demand for a regular investment. The hundred-fold promised by our Lord, together with eternal life, is not for them.

Essayists who brand past ages as superstitious on account of their abhorrence of usury, forget that the very principles on which the scholastic divines grounded their

views, are still advocated by those who support legal interest. Grotius, the great expounder of public law, denies that the state can justify by its sanction an immoderate premium, exceeding the risk or loss. "If the compensation allowed by law does not exceed the proportion of the hazard run, or the want felt by the loan, its allowance is neither repugnant to the revealed nor the natural law; but if it exceed those bounds, it is then oppressive usury; and though the municipal laws may give it impunity, they can never make it just."* Blackstone cites this passage with approval, and observes that exorbitant interest ought never to be tolerated in any civilized society.† He speaks in respectful terms of the good and learned men who entertained scruples on this point, whilst Paley, quoting the statute of James I., which intimates that the allowance of interest under five per cent. is not designed to justify in conscience its reception, sneers at the observation.‡ Yet the limitation of the interest plainly arises from the special circumstances of the country in which the law is made, and is grounded on loss and risk, such as our divines contemplated. The merchant in former ages who, to oblige a friend or a distressed person, parted with money which he had destined to employ in business, justly stipulated for indemnity, as St. Thomas expressly declares. The moneyed man whose wealth was dormant in his coffers, did not feel authorized to demand a premium for its use, if he lent it, because he suffered no loss or inconvenience. The courts of justice allowed any claim for compensation to the full amount of the damage incurred, on proof of it. At present the law fixes the same rule for all: it presumes the loss according to the general state of business, and it admits no claims beyond the amount determined. "The inconvenience" says Blackstone, "to individual lenders can never be estimated by laws; the rate therefore of general interest must depend upon the usual or general inconvenience." Our divines questioned the right of the state to give the premium in cases where no inconvenience was suffered; but the frequency of its occurrence in the actual state of society,

* *De jure belli et pacis*, l. 2, c. 12, § 22.

† *Comm.* l. 2, c. 30.

‡ *Mor. Phil.* l. 2, c. 10.

has at length produced the acquiescence of the ecclesiastical tribunals in the general regulation. It is extreme rigor to create difficulty where Rome, after mature investigation, has given liberty of conscience to persons acting in good faith. The wise man's admonition should not be forgotten: "Be not over just: and be not more wise than is necessary, lest thou become stupid."*

The different rates of interest are generally proportioned to the value of money for commercial transactions in the variety of local circumstances. Six per cent. is the most that can be allowed in a healthful state of business, according to the judgment of Governor Wise. This rate prevails in most States of the Union. Louisiana, however, allows only five, but permits contracts for eight. New York, Georgia, Wisconsin, and Michigan give seven. Alabama and Texas, eight. Mississippi, Ohio, Iowa, ten by contract, and Texas and Wisconsin twelve by contract. California allows ten by statute, and leaves contracts free, the result of which is that two or three per cent. per month is not unusual. The passion of the natives for horse races, bull fights, and various sports, sometimes leads them to give double the capital for a loan of money for a very short period of time, to employ in betting. Doubts may well be entertained of the justice and morality of contracts so ruinous, which we regard as decidedly sinful; but we are not prepared to pronounce on ordinary contracts contemplated and allowed by law in circumstances where the greatness of the risk may possibly justify the high premium freely agreed on by the parties. We consider, however, the social state very unsafe, where no legal restraint is placed on their will, and the necessitous man is left without protection against the exorbitant demands of his wealthy neighbor.

"Cum fas atque nefas exiguo fine libidinum,
Discernunt avidi."

The disciples of the celebrated Jeremy Bentham, who in the decline of the last century acquired notoriety by his work against the law restraining usury, regard them as an unwarrantable interference with the liberty of the citizens. These, say they, should be left to procure pecuniary accom-

* Eccl. vii. 17.

modation on such terms as they mutually agree. Mr. Whipple replies that the borrower does not stand on equal ground with the lender, and that his consent is the result of necessity. "In every case, and among all civilized nations, the law requires, as an indispensable prerequisite to every valid contract, that the parties should stand on equal grounds. If they do not, but one party (no matter to what cause owing) has an undue advantage over the other, both common law and common sense inform us that the bargain is void." The law wisely deprives the necessitous man of accepting ruinous conditions, forced on him by his wants. It also justly interferes to prevent wild speculations by means obtained by extravagant promises of reward, since these interfere with the regular course of business, and the success of the industrious citizen.

Governor Wise combats by facts, the allegation, that usury laws restrict the circulation of money, which would be poured freely into the market, if competition were allowed among lenders, and increase the premium, since the moneyed man withholds the desired accommodation, until a greater sum than the law allows is offered, and then demands a further sum to indemnify him for the risk of incurring the legal penalty. These results may follow in particular cases; but the general effects of restrictive laws are highly beneficial. Moneyed men rarely find any investment surer or more profitable than loans on legal interest, and, therefore, have recourse to them, without higher inducement. The fear of penalty often restrains them from exacting excessive premiums, when conscience fails to inspire respect for the laws. If no penalty were threatened, each one would seek to lend his money at the highest rates, and borrowers, urged on by impending distress, or by prospects of favorable employment of means, would accept loans at extreme rates. The competition would be among these, which of them could offer the highest premium; not among lenders, how they might find an opportunity of investment. Experience proves this. Wherever the usury laws were at any time repealed, the rates of interest soon became enormous. Judge Wick testifies that in Indiana, which for three or four years enjoyed the advantages of free trade in money, he rendered judgment upon contracts for the payment of 50, or 20 cents

per day, or per week, for a loan of 50, or 100 dollars, and in some instances the interest had become more than ten times the amount of the principal. Hon. J. P. Walker, U. S. Senator from Wisconsin, reports that in that State money had been freely taken at an interest from twenty to fifty per cent. The purchasers of farms who had not been able to pay at once the entire consideration, often found themselves so oppressed with the interest that they were forced to surrender them to their creditors after a great outlay of money.

Some insist that it is impossible by legislation to prevent the exaction of high premiums for loans. We fear that this argument would set aside all laws. If severe penalties, especially forfeiture of capital, were attached to the prohibition, and were enforced, we are confident that the laws would be found generally effectual. We, therefore, subscribe to the remark of Mr. Whipple: "If our penalties for violation are not sufficiently severe to protect the poor man, let their severity be increased. Above all, let the laws be executed." It must be admitted that the strictest legal provisions are often evaded. Lenders, in order to avoid the penalties of usury, include in the amount of the note or other obligation, the high premium promised them, so that it appears as part of the consideration, on the whole of which they receive interest. Some brokers and bankers, in discounting paper, give uncurrent foreign notes at their nominal value, and redeem them immediately at a reduced rate. Capitalists, not professed pawnbrokers, make feigned purchases of articles at a low price, which they agree to sell back to the original owner at a high price, within a limited time, thus, in reality, taking pawns at an exorbitant rate of interest. Feigned sales of stock are also resorted to, with a view to secure the same high premium. If it be hopeless to prevent all such transgressions of law, we may, at least, hope, that occasional exposure and loss will reach the usurer, and effectually prevent the general prevalence of the vice. Many citizens, besides, who pride themselves on respect for law, will abstain from its violation. Religious men will feel that they must confine themselves within the limits set by the public authority, which they obey for conscience' sake. If there be no law forbidding usury, even the pious will fall under the influence of perverse public sentiment and example.

The case in which the venerable Chief Justice pronounced judgment, regards the constitution and laws of Maryland. By an act of the colonial legislature, passed in the year 1704, interest beyond six per cent. was forbidden, and all contracts for a higher rate were declared utterly void, a heavy fine being also imposed for taking or receiving it. The State Legislature in 1845 repealed the sections of that Act which made void usurious contracts, and imposed penalties for receiving excessive premiums; but, nevertheless, it was still forbidden to take or exact the excess. In 1850 the State Convention enacted "that the rate of interest in this State shall not exceed six per cent. per annum, and no higher rate shall be taken or demanded, and the legislature shall provide by law all necessary forfeitures and penalties against usury. The point raised in the Circuit Court of the United States was, whether usurious contracts were void in virtue of this article, or whether the law of 1845 was still in force, the legislature not having, at the time of the contract in question, declared the forfeitures and penalties. The Chief Justice held them to be void. This opinion, however, has not met with acquiescence on the part of those interested, who have appealed to the Supreme Court, in which the Chief Justice is aided by eight colleagues. Lawyers of eminence think that the appeal will be successful. The opinions of the Chief Justice are, nevertheless, generally characterized by legal precision, notwithstanding his very advanced age, although, in this case, he is thought to have regarded too closely the purpose and intent of the Convention, rather than their formal enactment, which required the further action of the legislature.

"Nostrum non est tantas componere lites."

The general question of Usury Laws did not properly fall under examination in the Maryland case. Governor Wise treats it at some length, availing himself freely of the views and language of Mr. Whipple. The advocates of free trade in money contend that money is merchandise, and subject to the same variations in value as other matters of bargain and sale, and should be left to the free consent of the parties. The Governor denies the assumption. "Money," he says, "exists only by legislation; mer-

chandise is the product of individual labor, or of private enterprise. Money is the legal standard by which value is measured; merchandise is that which is valued by the aid of this standard." We fear that this denial will not be readily acquiesced in; for, as Bergier remarks, money has the character of merchandise, since commerce has increased, and banks have been created, besides the many chartered companies whose stocks and securities come into market. Originally, money was such as the Governor still conceives it; but we are free to admit that its nature has been changed by the artificial arrangements of modern society. We should rather assent to the premises, and deny the conclusion, since the same supreme power that gives to money the character of merchandise, can regulate and determine the conditions under which it shall be so employed. Mr. Whipple insists on its original use. "To treat money as merchandise, to give to the creditor the power of asking what he pleases for its use, is a desecration of its original and sole design. It was created by government as a test of value, as a medium of exchange." These distinguished statesmen may be surprised to find that they are repeating the very words of Aristotle, quoted by St. Thomas of Aquin: "Money was principally invented as a medium of exchange, *ad commutationes faciendas*; and, therefore, its chief use is its employment or expenditure for purposes of traffic."* For this reason, the Angelic doctor contended, that nothing could be charged for its use, over and above its precise amount, because it only served when used, and for the amount which it represented. We confess, however, that it assumes a somewhat different character in our day, in consequence of the varying credit of our banks, and of the rise and fall of the public funds, consequent on great political events or other public causes, and of the success or failure of chartered bodies, besides the general state of business, with greater or less security of individual solvency. Whoever attentively watches the course of things, and sagaciously calculates the variations of the markets, may employ his money in the purchase, not only of produce, but also of stocks, notes, and other securities, with great advantage. Money, or its equivalent,

* 2, 2, qu. LXXVIII. art 1 concl.

may be for him a kind of merchandise, which he buys and sells with a view to gain. Of this artificial money the profound theologian had no idea, and therefore he might well deny that the use of money was worth anything above its nominal amount; whilst in our day it may yield a fortune to a shrewd and yet honest speculator. We agree, however, that this is foreign to the proper purposes of money, and partakes rather of the nature of gambling, dangerous to those who are engaged in it, and detrimental to the interests of the industrious portion of the community. Whenever such transactions are free from fraud, and within the limits determined by law, we care not to dispute their justice; but they are altogether different from loans, and cannot be adduced to justify high rates of interest. If it be allowed that money, in such circumstances, becomes merchandise by the fluctuation of the money market, it may serve to excuse those purchasers of securities and stocks which are made with doubtful results of great gain or loss; but it does not thence follow that loans made on security, direct or collateral, should bear a high premium, still less a premium unrestricted by law.

The risk to which money lent is exposed forms a plausible plea for exacting a high premium from the borrower. A writer in the *Southern Quarterly Review* insists that the laws against Usury, by increasing the risk, give occasion to larger demands on the part of the borrower. Some risk is indeed inherent in every loan; but it is generally guarded against by good indorsers, or collateral security of some kind. In such circumstances the legal interest suffices for the supposed risk. If the lender shared with the borrower the contingency of loss, no doubt he would be entitled to a share of gain proportioned to his contribution to the partnership which would thus be formed. But an investment supposes that the receiver of the money guaranties to return it at all hazards, so that no risk exists, unless such as arises from his being unable to fulfil his engagement, or from his not caring to fulfil it. A man who without any security lends another a large sum, on which to speculate in stocks, or any perilous adventure, with a promise to share half the profits, may be entitled to this premium, on account of the extraordinary risk attendant on the enterprise; but the risk which arises from violating the law is no ground

for a higher rate, since it is criminal in its principle. Innocent X., in 1643, forbade those to be interfered with who receive a premium proportioned to the risk probably attached to the loan, but which is supposed to arise from the insolvency of the borrower, or his fraudulent delays.

We have not found in St. Thomas the famous principle, that money is barren, on which the admirers of Bentham make merry; which even in Aristotle is regarded as an interpolation; yet no doubt it was put forward by the Scholastics. It is not, however, quite so ridiculous as it appears, since it means that money is made productive only by the skill and industry of man, whence they reasoned that its increase belongs to him who is its rightful owner. If put in partnership, it is estimated together with the labor of the partner that has no money, and the profits are accordingly divided in just proportion. If hired out, the owner retaining his proprietorship and consequent risk, he may receive any stipulated price for its use. If invested, with the principal secured, our ancient divines taught that he could not share the profits, which wholly belonged to the individual whose industry made it productive. Yet Mastrofini, whose discussion on Usury was published with permission at Rome in 1831, maintains that the use of money is a fair matter of contract, and a title to compensation. The wealthy man who lends to a man about to embark in business, gives him a means of success, which is highly valuable, and for which he may justly claim a reasonable share in the profits, although he be not even a silent partner. He has no right to share the fruits of the personal labor, industry, or skill of the young merchant; but the profits of trade cannot be ascribed to these alone. They are chiefly the result of the large capital placed in his hands by one under no obligation to make him a gratuitous benefaction. Mastrofini insists then that the power of using money to advantage in business transactions of various kinds being afforded by the lender is a fair title to gain. His views, although strongly combated, have received support from several quarters, especially as they seem to explain satisfactorily the action of the Roman tribunals.

Mr. Whipple generously undertakes to vindicate the maxim of the ancient moralists that money is barren from the sneers of the disciples of Bentham. The obvious

meaning," he observes, "is, that the lender of money ought not to be encouraged, because he produces nothing; which is literally and substantially true. . . . The hirer, by his own industry, aided by this instrument called money, may produce a ship, or a thousand bushels of wheat, and thereby add to the previous stock. But the lender produces nothing. His money was the instrument which assisted the hirer to produce the ship or the wheat. So would the loan of a plough, a saw, or any other instrument, have been of service to the borrower; but that does not constitute the plough the producer of the wheat, or the saw the producer of the ship. Nor is the loaner of money any better entitled to the merit of being a producer, than would be the loaner of a plough or a saw. The plough is an instrument that aids but in one purpose; the saw is an instrument that aids in many purposes; and money is an instrument that aids in all: hence its commanding power." Whatever our readers may think of the aptitude of these illustrations, they are not likely to infer that the power of acquiring gain by the use of borrowed capital is not highly valuable; although they may assent to the author, who contends that it should not be estimated otherwise than as by law determined. The old divines insisted that as money did not grow, the borrower could not be obliged in justice to return more than he received. In our times it grows and multiplies amazingly.

It is not unusual for money-dealers to be sorely disappointed in their prospects of gain. Their avarice sometimes blinds them to the probable insolvency of the borrower, and the securities on which they relied fail altogether. Mechanics often lose by a rash investment what they had saved by hard industry, and stock-jobbers find themselves involved in difficulties by an unfortunate speculation after several successful enterprises. Mr. Whipple is correct in saying, that money was not originally designed to be an object of traffic, and that since it has become such, "it is a curse to society." The advantages of commerce to the world at large are undoubted; the energy and activity encouraged by the credit system, are manifest; but the general business relations are by no means safe, and the state of society is too artificial to be secure. From the enormous amount of paper issues an inflation of prices arises, which is from

time to time followed by social revulsions and crashes. Governor Wise states, that after the discovery of the gold mines of California, it was hoped that a gold currency would prevail, yet "seventy-eight millions only being left in the public depositories of the country, there was a multiplication of banks, a vast increase of banking capital, and an inflated paper circulation of two hundred and fourteen millions." The results are seen in the general uncertainty of business, in the unexpected bankruptcy of merchants of reputed wealth, and in the panic from time to time prevailing in the money market. Moneyed men avail themselves of all these circumstances to increase their capital, not scrupling to take from the struggling mechanic, or from the merchant in danger of bankruptcy, any amount of premium on a temporary loan. "In most other countries," says Mr. Whipple, "there exists a check—a *moral* restraint upon those excesses, which, under a free trade system, would be inefficacious here. *Individuals* have some regard to public feeling, and dread the stigma, which such exactions, sooner or later, fasten upon their characters. To be considered by all mankind an extortioner is what the moral sensibilities of most men cannot endure. This silent and unseen influence upon individuals is very extensive and efficacious." We presume to add that the *moral* influence which is wanting is that of the Catholic Religion. F.

ART. II.—*Catholicity and Modern Civilization.*

IN an article in our Review for last October, we laid down the proposition that the Catholic Religion is fitted to be the dominant principle of the nineteenth century, and of the most enlightened portion of mankind. In that article, the part of the proposition that relates to the present century was fully elucidated and defended in a historical way; we proceed now to take up the remaining part, and to discuss in a more philosophical manner the principle which underlies the historical facts adduced, and thus to show the intimate relation of Catholicity to enlightened civilization.

We may easily suppose a candid and intelligent objector to make the following reply to the statement by which the dominant influence of Catholicity in the nineteenth century has been proved: "Admitted, that the Catholic Church has to a great extent recovered her past influence, and preserved her power in the present age. But this is only to say, that the spirit of past ages still continues to *resist*, and in a measure to *check* and *repress* the spirit of the present age. The Catholic Church exists and is powerful in the nineteenth century, but she is foreign and hostile to it. The nineteenth century is not fully conscious of its own principles, and the spirit of the age has not yet gained its full expansive power, or succeeded in establishing its dominance over society and humanity."

In order to confront this objection, it is necessary to analyze carefully the spirit of the nineteenth century, and to reduce modern civilization to its constituent elements, so as to show that these elements are capable of being combined with and regulated by the principle of Catholicity. If there is any portion of the human race more advanced in this modern civilization than the rest of mankind, it is also requisite to show that the Catholic religion is adapted and even necessary to such highly civilized and enlightened nations. There are several nations claiming such a pre-eminence, and among them our own great American Republic holds a prominent and undisputed place. We need not claim for her an absolute superiority, much less disparage other nations. On this matter let every one enjoy his own opinion. It seems evident, however, that the free scope for the expansion of human nature afforded by our institutions, combined with the great natural advantages of the country, favors a high development of intelligence and activity, and the formation of a great and noble race of men. It is incessantly asserted that the intelligence of the American people, and the spirit of manhood and liberty with which they are imbued, are incompatible with the principle of Catholicity. Hence, we cannot meet the question of the fitness of Catholicity to dominate over the most civilized and enlightened portion of the human race more fairly, than by considering it specially in reference to our own country.

Another reason for doing so, is, that it is our own coun-

try, and more interesting to us as Americans than any other. In speaking of the American people, we use the word in a comprehensive sense, embracing our entire population without regard to the source whence their blood is derived, and with the distinct acknowledgment that the mixture of different races in the formation of this great people is one of its chief advantages. The close connection between this country and England, from whence the formative influence of our civilization and polity has proceeded, makes it requisite that we should also include the English people within the bearing of our remarks on America.

Let us try, then, to seize and analyze that subtle something which we call the spirit of the nineteenth century, and which pervades the civilization of the age, and especially of our own country. Cæsar Cantu calls it "a noble impetus towards any thing that can promote the intelligence and well-being of the people." That we can make a perfect analysis of it we do not pretend, but we hope to succeed in detecting some elements which all will agree in regarding as among the constituent elements of modern civilization.

The first is the principle that government is for the benefit of the people. The despotic and oligarchical maxim that one individual or a privileged class constitutes the state, is exploded. The idea that the people are only fit to be kept in a state of vilenage and serfdom, for the aggrandizement of their lords and kings, has become universally odious, and is considered as fit only for China and Central Asia. It is the people who are regarded as forming society and the state, and all political and social institutions are justly considered as framed for no other end than to promote the happiness and well-being of the whole collectively, and of each individual singly. Government is a trust, and all offices, distinctions, and privileges are committed to certain persons for the public good. This principle is the principle of liberty as correctly understood, in contradiction to the principle of tyranny, and it lies at the foundation of our American Institutions. Now this principle is not merely compatible with Catholicity, it has been actually derived by modern civilization from the Catholic Church. The Church has always taught that government

is a trust for the people, and has required kings to administer that trust for the good of their subjects. Despotism is not a creation of the genius of Catholicity. The Institutions of the Middle Ages were essentially free and liberal, and it was the Reformation that erected despotism on their ruins. The celebrated French Protestant writer, Guizot, asserts that the Reformation was not a religious but a political movement. Wherever it was established it was by the tyranny of the civil power, and resulted in despotism. In England, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, Wareham, weakly yielded to the dictation of Cromwell, when the heads of Cardinal Fisher and Sir Thomas More fell on the block, liberty passed away, and gave place to the most abject and servile submission to ecclesiastical and civil tyranny. If liberty has revived again in England, it has been because Magna Charta and the principles of freedom which came down from old Catholic times could not be entirely suppressed; it has been, in spite of the continued opposition of the English establishment, in the present century, and is in great part owing to Catholic Ireland and her great statesman, O'Connell.

In the North of Europe, it was the despotism of Christian the Cruel, the Nero of the North, and of the treacherous Gustavus Vasa, that overthrew the Catholic religion in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. In Prussia it was the perfidious Albert who overturned Catholicity in order to found for himself a kingdom in the usurped territories of the Teutonic knights. So, throughout Germany. Thus modern despotism was the creature of the Reformation, and has since been copied by Catholic sovereigns, who, in proportion as they have become despotic, have become the oppressors of the Church.* It is then only by a constant struggle against the Catholic Church that modern despotism has been established, and it is the spirit of Catholicity working in the bosom of Christian civilization that is gradually bringing things to their true and just level, when rulers will have to administer their governments as a trust,

* The state of society in the sixteenth century no doubt made a greater centralization of power in the hands of the Supreme Government necessary, and the illustrious Cardinal Ximenes labored for this end successfully during his entire political career. It is not this which we find fault with, but the abuse and perversion of it arising from the spirit of revolt against the Catholic Church.

for the good of their people. The Catholic Church will be the greatest gainer by the happy change; for she will free herself from the tyranny of the civil power, and thus be enabled to fulfil more perfectly her Divine mission.

The second principle of modern civilization is, that man is to be esteemed not on account of certain accidental distinctions of birth, &c., but simply because he is a man, a rational and immortal being. This begets the sentiment of equality and fraternity. It breaks down those insurmountable barriers which separate different classes in social and political life. It throws open the road to honor to all those who are able and inclined to enter it, and gives merit a fair field. Correctly understood, it does not destroy differences of rank, station, cultivation, or wealth, nor level society, as the fanatics of the French Revolution desired to do; but it creates a fellow-feeling, a mutual kindness and esteem, and a true sentiment of fraternity among all classes, based on respect for the dignity of man as a rational and immortal being. Its influence diffuses intelligence, virtue, education, and comfort to the widest possible extent among the people. This principle, also, is derived from the Catholic religion; it had no place in Pagan civilization. In Greece and Rome, the rich and enlightened few despised and hated the mass of their fellow-beings as an intrinsically degraded race; just as the Japanese of this day regard the poor as the victims of Divine anger and incapable of salvation, and the high-caste Hindoos consider it pollution to speak with a Pariah. The Catholic Faith first taught the equality and fraternity of the human race, as children of the same Father, redeemed by the same Lord, and destined to the same eternal happiness. The Church canonized the slave as well as her mistress, the shepherd as well as the monarch, and taught the great humility while she inspired the poor with self-respect. It is especially in the doctrine of baptism that the Catholic sentiment of equality and fraternity, which ought to exist among all classes in a Christian community, is exhibited. For, in baptism, the dignity of an heir of the kingdom of heaven is superadded to the rational and immortal nature of the human being. In addition to that bond of common fraternity which binds together the whole human race as redeemed by the same blood, a closer

tie unites all the baptized, as actually the children of God by the grace of regeneration. For, in the very language of the Protestant Episcopal Catechism, baptism "makes us children of God, members of Christ, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven." Therefore, the infant prince must be brought to the same font where the child of the peasant is regenerated. The same chrism marks the head of each, and the difference of earthly rank is thus merged in the higher dignity common to both as heirs to an eternal crown. The Catholic Church has always acted on this principle, and furnished a strong counterpoise to the too great predominance of the aristocratic element. She has always drawn her clergy from all ranks, from the children of the laboring class, as well as from those of the middling class and the nobility. The highest distinctions in the hierarchy have been thrown open to merit, without regard to birth and family connections. Even the Supreme Pontificate, which was refused to the Emperor Sigismund of Germany, and to Cardinal Wolsey, while he was Prime Minister to Henry VIII., has been several times conferred on the sons of country farmers and shoemakers.

The third principle of modern civilization is an improved tone of moral sentiment. For example, in regard to the manner of carrying on war. The outrages and barbarities which were perpetrated in former times are now regarded with abhorrence, and civilized nations are more disposed to settle their difficulties by amicable adjustment, less so, to engage in hostilities. It is well known how incessantly the Catholic Church has labored in former times to mitigate the horrors of warfare, to cultivate relations of peace and amity among Christian nations, and to protect the vanquished and prisoners from the cruelty of their conquerors; in a word, to inspire all men with that spirit of charity which sees a brother and a fellow-Christian, or at least a fellow-man, in any suffering and miserable individual, even though he be an enemy. As another example, we may take the slave-trade, now condemned by the public sentiment of the Christian world, and prohibited by the laws of all civilized nations. The slave-trade was condemned by the Councils of Lyons (566); of Rheims (625); of London (1102), and Coblenz (922): and by Popes Pius II. (1482); Paul III. (1537); Urban VIII. (1639);

Benedict XIV. (1741), and Pius VII. and Gregory XVI. in our own time. The Catholic Church labored for a long time against the opposition of the European Governments, to reform public sentiment and international law, on this point.

A fourth principle is the spirit of beneficence, as shown in philanthropic movements and institutions, for the relief of every species of human misery and suffering, as well as for the instruction and reformation of the ignorant and degraded portion of society. It is needless to say, on what a gigantic scale these works of charity have been and are maintained in the Catholic Church, especially as this subject has been recently handled in a masterly manner by the able and distinguished Dr. Ives, in the two lectures he has delivered on Catholic Charities, and which he has published.

A fifth principle is the spirit of scientific investigation, especially within the sphere of Physics, closely connected with which is the application of scientific discoveries to purposes of practical utility. It is this spirit of scientific enthusiasm which has impelled so many brave men like Parry, Ross, Franklin, and Kane, to encounter the almost incredible perils and hardships of Arctic voyages of discovery, and induced different governments to devote vast sums to enlarge the circle of science. The same spirit has inspired others, like Audubon, to penetrate the forests of America, in order to describe the countless varieties of birds, and to describe with accuracy the plumage and the songs of these *Prime Donne* of Nature's *Opera*. Others, like Lyell, and Agassiz, and Hitchcock and Hall, to pierce the crust of the earth, explore the mountain-gorge, wander over country after country, hammer in hand, and to investigate the wonderful fossil records of the past ages of our earthly globe. Animated by the same enthusiasm, others again, in the beautiful words of Humboldt, "turn with delight to contemplate the silent life of plants, and to study the hidden forces of nature in her sacred sanctuaries; or yielding to that inherent impulse which, for thousands of years, has glowed in the breast of man, direct their minds by a secret presentiment of their destiny towards the celestial orbs which, in undisturbed harmony, pursue their ancient and eternal course."* Turning in an opposite direction to the

* *Views of Nature*, p. 21.

hitherto inscrutable depths of the ocean, Maury and Berryman have given a chart of the submarine mountains, plateaus, and valleys of its bed, and Field has accomplished the great achievement of laying the Atlantic Cable, which may yet prove successful. It is needless to speak of chemistry, philology, ethnography, and many other branches of science, ardently and successfully pursued.

It is as clear as noon day that all truth is from God, that truth can never contradict truth, and, therefore, that genuine science and a veritable Revelation cannot possibly clash with each other. Unhappily, some men of eminent science, and a still larger number of scientific sciolists and theory-makers, are making great efforts to prove that the Christian Revelation is irreconcilable with the discoveries of modern science. Their hostility is especially directed against the Catholic Church, because they well know that if they succeed in overthrowing her authority, they have little to fear from any other quarter.

Now, what is the truth? Is there any real contradiction between Catholicity and Modern Science?

Certainly, the Church of Rome does not apprehend anything from this quarter. In the city of Rome, all these sciences are prosecuted with the greatest zeal by learned academies, in which cardinals and ecclesiastics are the prominent members. The Lectures of Cardinal Wiseman on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion, will show the liberal spirit reigning there in regard to science. Those ecclesiastics who are educated at the headquarters of Catholicity will be found to be well versed in the physical sciences and disposed to encourage their study.

The case of Galileo is frequently mentioned as a proof of the hostility of Rome to science. The incessant harping which is kept up on this name by the enemies of the Roman Church, is a convincing proof that they have a great paucity of materials, and are therefore obliged to ring their changes monotonously on the Florentine Astronomer and the Roman Inquisition. It is not a little discreditable to English literature that, after the full refutation given by Cardinal Wiseman, Archbishop Kenrick, and others, of the misstatements which have been made in regard to this matter, men of such high character as Edward Everett and the

North American Reviewers, should persist in repeating them, and even dragging them into the discussion of subjects with which they have no apparent connection. Even Macaulay speaks of the "Papal decision that the sun goes round the earth." These gentlemen are thoroughly acquainted with matters belonging to their own sphere, and on topics which they have studied they can speak with accuracy and precision. But this does not prevent their betraying an ignorance, a confusion of ideas, and falling into an inaccuracy of language, when they stray out of their sphere, which can only excite a smile on the lips of a Catholic theologian. The truth is, the Pope never made any such decision, or any other decision contrary to scientific truth. The action of the Inquisition was of a simply provisional and precautionary character. The heliocentric theory was not yet satisfactorily proved and definitely accepted by the scientific world. Its harmony with the language of Scripture had not been adequately examined, and its supposed contradiction to that language created a strong and widely-spread prejudice in the Christian world against it. In order not to shock this prejudice too suddenly, and to give time for more mature investigation, the Inquisition required Galileo to teach his system merely as a scientific hypothesis and not as absolutely true. But the absurd statement that his hypothesis was condemned is refuted by three facts: First, that it had been taught at Rome with the approbation of the Popes, for two hundred years before Galileo; second, that Pope Urban VIII., immediately after the decree, allowed two Jesuits to teach it publicly in Rome; and third, that the same Pope, a little before this, appointed Castelli, a disciple and defender of Galileo, professor of mathematics in the Sapienza. That Galileo's theory met with opposition from individuals of high standing among the Catholic clergy, is perfectly true and perfectly irrelevant to the question. Lord Bacon opposed it violently, and so did the most eminent of the Protestant clergy for a very long time. In our own day, Protestant clergymen, some of whom are dignitaries of the Established Church of England, have attacked the science of Geology in unmeasured terms; and Dr. Buckland, Dr. Pye Smith, President Hitchcock, and other *savans* of the Protestant clerical body, have had to defend themselves

from the charge, made by their own brethren, of betraying the cause of Christianity. If we are not mistaken, not a single Catholic priest has written anything of this kind in the English language, while confessedly the best book in defence of the harmony of Science and Revelation has proceeded from the pen of Cardinal Wiseman, and is made up of lectures written and delivered in the city of Rome.

We resort again, in support of our statements, to that eloquent antagonist of the Catholic Church, Lord Macaulay. Though he rejects the Catholic Faith, yet he cannot help seeing that there is nothing in the progress of physical science dangerous to its stability. He says:

“It matters not at all that the compass, printing, gunpowder, steam, gas, vaccination, and a thousand other discoveries and inventions, which were unknown in the fifth century, are familiar to the nineteenth. None of these discoveries and inventions have the smallest bearing on the question whether man is justified by faith alone, or whether the invocation of Saints is an orthodox practice. . . . One reservation must indeed be made. The books and traditions of a sect may contain, mingled with propositions strictly theological, other propositions purporting to rest on the same authority, which relate to physics. If new discoveries should throw discredit on the physical propositions, the theological propositions, unless they can be separated from the physical propositions, will share in their discredit. In this way, undoubtedly, the progress of Science may indirectly serve the cause of religious truth.”

Thus far Lord Macaulay: and we may extend his last remark so far as to include also chronology and metaphysical science.

The Catholic Church is in no danger from any of these sources. On the contrary, science is her best defender against all attacks from the scientific quarter. In physics, there is no theory in direct contravention to her decisions, at the present time advocated by men of eminence, except that of the plurality of the human race; and this theory, always rejected by the majority of men of science, is continually rendered more and more manifestly untenable by scientific investigations into the nature of species and varieties, and by microscopic examinations of the brain. In chronology, the antagonists of Christianity are striving to destroy the historical credit of the Books of Moses by researches into Egyptian records; but as yet they have

been baffled and defeated by Sir Joshua Wilkinson, Pond, and other Egyptologists. In metaphysics, the single instance in which the Church has connected a metaphysical definition with a doctrinal decision, is in the case of the dogma of Transubstantiation; and the progress of philosophical inquiry makes it continually more evident on grounds of pure reason, that we must distinguish between substance and its sensible qualities. On the contrary, Calvinism, which is the genuine Protestantism of the Reformation, has committed itself to the doctrine of the slavery of the will, and the system of necessity or fatalism; a system which can never stand the test of a metaphysical examination, and which must be overthrown wherever sound philosophy prevails. Hence, we see that in Newhaven, the high intellectual culture which has made it so justly celebrated, has driven out this irrational and gloomy system; the freedom of the will and the essential goodness of human nature have been nobly asserted; and one of the most refined scholars and acute philosophers of Yale College* has borrowed the *Scientia Media* of the Jesuits in order to overthrow the doctrine of predestination. From scientific investigation the Catholic religion has nothing to fear. On the contrary, since its doctrines are the truth of God in the supernatural order, while the doctrines of science are the truth of God in the natural order, the more both are studied, the more plainly will their mutual harmony appear. Indeed, there is something in the manner in which the great truths of science are established and incorporated with the body of certain and unquestioned knowledge, closely analogous to the definitions of doctrine in the Catholic Church. Those learned men whose authority is acknowledged by the scientific world decide all questions of science which furnish the requisite *data* for a positive decision. Their positive and ultimate decision, when given, is accepted as final by the world. Such a decision furnishes a ground of certitude in the natural order, within which order, reason is supreme and infallible. In the Catholic Church, the decisions of the Holy See sum up the result of the collective knowledge, investigation, and judgment of the theologian of the whole world, during ages. The matter of

* Professor Fitch.

definition lies, however, in the supernatural order, within which reason is incompetent ; and therefore God gives a special supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost to the Church, by virtue of which her decisions are rendered infallible. If it is suitable for an enlightened age to obey the decisions of an authoritative tribunal in regard to scientific matters, it is even more suitable to obey the decisions of the Church in regard to theological questions touching the faith.

The perfect compatibility of all the principles of modern civilization which were designated at the outset, with Catholicity, has, we trust, been satisfactorily proved. But these elements of good are not the only ones powerfully at work in the nineteenth century. There are elements of evil, elements antagonistic to civilization, to social and political order, and to the well-being of mankind, which it is necessary to point out, in order to show how the Catholic Church advances the interests of modern civilization by resisting and suppressing these evil and destructive elements.

The first of these evil principles is the denial of authority and of the duty of submission to every lawful government. This is the principle of the French Revolution, of Socialism and Red Republicanism. It is subversive of government, and thus of the whole political order of human society. The Catholic Church confers a benefit on society and civilization by resisting this principle and maintaining the principle of authority. We are devoted to the Republican institutions of our country, and regard them, in so far as they have not been tampered with and spoiled by our radical demagogues, as the best and the only possible institutions for America. Further than this, we believe that they have a certain consonance with the dignity of human nature, with the natural liberty of man, and with the great Christian doctrines of equality and fraternity in Jesus Christ, which makes them highly desirable where they can be legitimately introduced and maintained. It is not necessary, however, in order to be a patriotic American, that one should make himself a propagandist of democracy, or imagine that every nation must be profoundly miserable that has not a government precisely like our own. Other forms of government are legitimate as well as ours. The principles of the Red Republicans are as hostile to our Republican Consti-

tution as they are to the Imperial Constitution of France. The sentiments of these socialistic refugees from Europe have generally been couched in a foreign language, and thus have never become known to the mass of our citizens. But those who are familiar with the German language know well, that the newspapers, orations, &c., of the atheistical and radical outlaws who have sought refuge here in such numbers, breathe hostility and contempt towards our institutions, and that if this godless crew had their own way they would inaugurate a Reign of Terror in the United States.

What would become of civilization, if mob-law, the right of insurrection, the immediate sovereignty of the people, and similar doctrines should prevail? Let some of the scenes at the Baltimore elections answer. Battles in the public squares, rowdyism triumphant, violence at the ballot-box, cannons discharged in the streets, omnibuses fired on, women and children wounded in their own houses or walking home from church, pistol balls fired into the asylum of defenceless orphans, and no authority strong enough or faithful enough to quell such disorders. What would become of commerce, of the arts and trades, of social order and personal freedom, if such a state of things were to become permanent?

The Catholic Church serves the cause of civilization by upholding the authority of government and law. Although there are abuses and evils connected with the despotic governments of Europe which require a remedy, yet the evil of subverting government is far greater. The Church supports the authority of government, but does not sanction the abuse of power. Where she can exert her legitimate influence, she will correct these abuses and promote the cause of true liberty much better than Revolutions can do it. That triumph of the principle of Catholicity over the French Revolution and Red Republicanism described in our previous article, was then entirely favorable to the civilization of the nineteenth century.

Another destructive principle at work in the nineteenth century is the denial of the right of property. This is the doctrine of Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, and the other Socialists. All distinction of property must be overthrown, the rich must be stripped of their possessions, and

the whole structure of modern society subverted. It is easy to see that such a principle, if carried out, would lead society back to barbarism. No individual would engage in commerce, for the motive of acquiring wealth would be taken away. With commerce, railways, manufactures, and all branches of industry would be brought to a stand-still. No costly buildings, public or private, would be erected, for there would be no money to do it with. The cultivation of the arts and sciences would cease, for these are dependent on wealth. Education and the learned professions would disappear. All great cities and towns would go to decay. No human being could have more than the mere necessities of life, which he would secure in the easiest way by hunting, fishing, a little precarious tilling of the ground, or by robbery. In a word, the savage state would supplant civilization. It was such principles as these that Catholicity crushed, in crushing the socialism of the nineteenth century, and by so doing saved civilization.

Another evil principle at work in modern society is the denial of the sanctity and indissolubility of marriage. This principle subverts the family and all social morality. Its workings have shown themselves under the most revolting aspects in France, England, and the United States. We have now the disgusting moral cancer of Mormonism eating into one extremity of our Republic, and threatening our civilization as well as what little religion we have left. So far from Protestantism affording any sufficient barrier for the defence of marriage, the fatal facility with which divorces are granted by the civil power shows that the general tone of moral sentiment on this point has sunk very low. A still more startling fact is, that a large body of Protestant missionaries in India have determined to tolerate polygamy among their native converts, and this measure has not been reprobated by the Protestant press of the United States. The Catholic Church alone is able to repress this evil. She never allows divorce after the consummation of a valid marriage, and only permits of separation *a mensa et thoro*, on account of great criminality or cruelty. She conceded nothing to Henry VIII. or Napoleon on this point, and has never relaxed her strictness among the heathen, though she might have gained the Emperor of China, the King of Anam, and other

powerful princes, by doing so, and allowing them to retain several wives.

Another evil principle is the Atheistical principle, or the subversion of the reverence due to God and of the expectation of future retribution. We do not now speak of its effects on the eternal destiny of the soul, but simply of its effects on society and civilization. Take away the fear of God's law and of his justice, and there is no principle left, strong enough to keep the framework of society together. This will appear clearly if we consider two facts: First, that the natural goods which are desired by a man do not exist in sufficient quantity to supply the wants of all, that is, to give them the abundance which their insatiable appetite demands; hence, the greater number must always live a life of toil, of self-denial, and more or less of poverty. Second, that men are subject to violent passions, impelling them to commit outrages and crimes upon one another. Now, take away the fear of God, the hope of future happiness, and the dread of everlasting punishment, and man must look for the end of his being and his chief good in this life. The majority are sure to place their *summum bonum* in the gratification of their passions, consequently, they will never submit to see their neighbors in possession of any natural goods of which they are deprived. They will seize on them by force whenever they can; anarchy and mutual warfare will prevail, and there will be no law but the law of the strongest. It is necessary, in order to keep society together, and to reconcile the mass of mankind to their lot, that they should be convinced that they are created for the happiness of a future and eternal state, and then put up with the temporary evils of this world, as occasions of practising virtue and meriting an everlasting reward. Now, whoever will read the history of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, or even peruse the Review of Ranke's History of the Popes by Lord Macaulay, from which we have made several citations, cannot fail to see that the great struggle and the great triumph of Catholicity in Europe during that epoch, was a struggle against and a triumph over Atheism. It was the triumph of Religion and Christianity; a triumph which saved the cause of civilization.

We have now shown that the principle of Catholicity is

favorable to the development of all the constituent elements of modern civilization, and hostile to all those principles that are destructive of it, and, consequently, that its dominance in the nineteenth century is not the dominance of a foreign and unfriendly power, but of a benignant, genial, and fostering influence, beneath which the spirit of the nineteenth century has full liberty of expansion. It follows from this, that Catholicity is fitted to be the religion of the most civilized and enlightened portion of the human race in modern times. If so, it is fitted to be the religion of the American people, who belong to this famed portion of the family of man. It is asserted so frequently and so monotonously as to be as stale and wearisome as a last month's newspaper, that the Catholic religion is only fitted for a barbarous, feeble, or ignorant people. It is, indeed, perfectly fitted for the rude and savage tribes of North America, for the negro slave, for the ignorant and intellectually weak, the miserable Pariahs of India, and the degraded masses which lie buried in the cities and mines of civilized nations. The true religion must be adapted to such, for Jesus Christ is their Redeemer, and the gospel is emphatically intended for the poor and the lost. A religion which is only fit for the civilized, enlightened, educated, and refined classes of mankind, is not the true religion, and cannot have Jesus Christ for its author. The fitness of the Catholic Church for the degraded classes of mankind, is one proof of her divinity. But she is not adapted to these classes alone. She is equally adapted to the highest state of society, and to the most educated and elevated portions of the human race. She can convert an enlightened nation as well as a barbarous one, and civilize a barbarous nation, after converting it, if it have good natural elements in it. She has accomplished both these tasks, and thus proved that she can do it again, if necessary; for she has all the elements in her which she had in past times, and the material which she has to work upon is essentially unaltered.

She has converted intelligent, civilized, and powerful nations. She converted the Roman empire in the teeth of all that the Roman emperors could do to hinder it. She converted the eastern world, Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Byzantium, still more refined and intellectual

than the western. The chief part of this great work was accomplished before the year 325, the year of the Council of Nice. She converted the barbarous nations of Europe, and then civilized them. That wonderful work, modern Christian civilization, is her creation, as Balmes has shown in his great work on this subject. Whatever of peculiar excellence there is even in English and American civilization, is derived from the Catholic Church, and is the product of seeds planted by her, which have germinated in spite of the loss of faith and supernatural grace. The Reformation only marred and distorted the great work of European and universal civilization, commenced by the Church; and the great question of the age is, whether the Church will be able now to resume and complete her work, in spite of this interruption. If she is, then a glorious epoch (though it may be of brief duration) awaits Christendom, and the earth; if not, there is nothing more to be expected that is grand and sublime, and the dissolution of civilized society may be looked for at no distant period. England needs the Catholic religion to counteract those internal corrupting influences, which are eating out the heart of her strength, to civilize and Christianize the heathen and barbarous population, which exists in the very bosom of her own society, to repress that spirit of diabolical avarice, tyranny, and ferocity which she has recently exhibited in a way that would disgrace the Huns and Tartars of Attila and Tamerlane, towards the dark, colored races, and to enable her to Christianize her colonial possessions. Russia needs it to bind together the throne, the aristocracy, and the people, to moderate the slavish despotism of her government, to check the progress of infidel and socialistic principles among her intelligent youth, to enable her to fulfil her great mission as the civilizer of Central Asia, and to bind her to the great Christian family of nations, when she shall have transferred her capital to Constantinople and crushed out Mahometanism. The United States need it, to counteract the bitter sectional hatred, which is now arising, and preserve that union, which is so important to the civilization of America, to check the frightful increase of immorality and the progress of enervating luxury, to establish in the hierarchy a counterpoise to the despotic power of the oligarchy of wealth, to elevate and protect the poor and laboring class, and to direct the mind and energy of the

country to something more noble than mere commercial prosperity and material progress.

Whether the conversion of these nations will be accomplished, cannot be foretold. One thing, however, is certain, that the intelligence of the English and American people is no obstacle to their conversion. Macaulay, in giving his reasons why, even as a Protestant, he cannot see any reason to expect the downfall of the Church of Rome, by means of the advancement of human knowledge, cites the instance of Sir Thomas More. This great man, he argues, had all the honesty, the intelligence, and the means of arriving at the truth, that any human being ever will have, and yet he died for the Catholic faith. "We are, therefore, unable to understand why what Sir Thomas More believed respecting Transubstantiation may not be believed to the end of time by men equal, in abilities and honesty, to Sir Thomas More. But Sir Thomas More is one of the choice specimens of human wisdom and virtue, and the doctrine of Transubstantiation is a kind of proof-charge. A faith that will stand that test will stand any test."

The same reasoning may be applied in a more extended form to prove the probability of the conversion of England and America from the conversions that have already taken place in these two countries, as well as among persons of similar intellectual culture in Germany. The peculiarity of these conversions is their intellectual character. They have been produced by logical arguments, by historical researches, by profound theological study, and by philosophical reflection. A great number of those who have embraced the Catholic Faith have been persons of high intelligence, and some of them men of genius. It is impossible to invent any hypothesis which will account for their conversion by idiosyncrasy of character or the influence of any previous training. For such an hypothesis being framed to suit a particular case, will fail utterly in regard to others. Some have been clergymen and professed theologians, others lawyers, physicians, men of science, publicists, artists, and military and naval officers. Some have been men of poetical temperament, and others dry mathematicians and abstruse logicians. Some were young and others old. Some in full health, others on the brink of the grave. Some were recluses, others men of action and familiar with the world.

Some were Calvinists, others High-Churchmen, others Unitarians, and others infidels. With some the process was short, with others very long. One eminent lay-gentleman of this country passed thirteen years in the close study of the grounds of the Catholic Faith; the celebrated Hurter pursued thirty in the same study. Generally speaking, those who have become Catholics have given proof of their sincerity by making some sacrifices, and in a number of cases these sacrifices have been extraordinary. We have heard it stated by a gentleman who himself resigned a valuable benefice in the Church of England, that the aggregate value of the livings resigned by converts to the Catholic Church from that communion is equal to one million of dollars. The method by which these different classes of minds have been convinced is as various as their character and circumstances. Some have been convinced by the study of the Scriptures, others by tradition, and others by theology. Some have found in the Catholic Church the explanation of history, others the perfection of the fine arts, others the source of heroic deeds. Some have reached the faith on the soaring wings of metaphysical speculation, others by the microscopic examination of the minutest works of the Creator, animalculæ invisible to the naked eye. For, as Kenelm Digby, one of those whom I am describing, has beautifully shown, there are a thousand different roads converging towards the Temple of Truth. Now, these conversions prove all they are cited for the purpose of proving, that intelligence is no obstacle to the progress of the Catholic Faith, and that it is at least equally probable that it will be embraced by an educated as by an ignorant community. Besides, these conversions, representing as they do so many different classes of the community, show that there is no improbability of the conversion of any of these different classes. According to Macaulay's reasoning, there is no reason why other persons of similar intelligence, sincerity, and virtue, of similar views, habits, and pursuits, should not also, as well as these converts, be convinced of the truth of the Catholic religion. This is so evident, that the enemies of the Catholic Faith dread its progress in America even more than its friends hope for it. As an illustration of this we may cite the language of Mr. Dix, a Protestant Episcopalian of the city of New York,

in a work published during the late Crimean war, entitled "The Unholy Alliance." Speaking chiefly of New England, he says, "Reflecting men who can see the undercurrent beneath the superficial tide, are convinced there is more reason to fear of the Puritans journeying in a body to Rome, than of their remaining much longer in the icy chains that have bound them and their fathers for two hundred years. It is to be hoped, by the way, that the disciples of Cotton Mather and of Jonathan Edwards, if they once take in hand the pilgrim's staff, will stop at least for refreshment this side of the Eternal City, though the fear is that they will go straight on, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, going by Geneva on the run, stopping not until the dome of St. Peter's gladdens their vision," (p. 247). *Quid lachrymabile mugit.* According to a version attributed by a witty friend of ours to a learned and eminent clergyman, Mr. Dix has "*muged something lachrymable.*" His sorrowful forebodings are probably well-founded. As for the half-way-house of Oxford, some of us have tried its accommodations already, and it is not likely that many others will repeat the experiment.

After all, the paramount objection to Catholicity is that it is regarded as the religion of foreigners, the greater part of whom are poor emigrants. But what if it is so? That spirit of nationality which would exclude a religion merely because it is not indigenous to the soil, is a narrow and exclusive nationality. It is this spirit which makes the Russians cling to the lifeless old Greek Church, and fancy that they are the only orthodox people in the world, which makes the Chinese cling to Buddhism, and denounce the rest of mankind as "Western devils," and which has heretofore shut up the ports of Japan from all civilized nations. Nationality is an excellent thing in its place, but there is something still more noble and enlarged than the sentiment of patriotism, it is the recognition of the brotherhood of nations, the unity of the human race. Divine Providence, in order to hinder the isolation of races and peoples, has made them dependent on one another, not only for articles of commerce and exchange, but for the more precious commodity of truth. The faith is always first carried to a nation by foreigners, and the great apostles of a country

are often natives of another clime. An Asiatic converted Rome, a Frenchman converted Ireland, and an Englishman converted Germany. The Apostles of Christ were foreigners, and poor foreigners, as soon as they left Judea. It was the great objection of the Romans to the Christian religion that it was a foreign and anti-Roman religion. The government, the aristocracy, the wealthy, and the philosophers were against it, and so was the Roman mob. Indeed, there is a striking parallelism between the history of the Catholic Church of the first three centuries in Rome, and the history of the same Church in England and the United States in the present age, only that the humane spirit of modern times does not permit the same species of persecution to be carried on now as then. At Rome, the great majority of the first Christians were of the poor and laboring classes, many of them slaves, and a great proportion foreigners from all parts of the earth. But from the very beginning, the faith commenced taking root in some of the noblest and most virtuous families of Rome, and subduing to its sway the intelligent and the educated. The first of these was the Centurion Cornelius, of the patrician family of the Cornelii, and another was the Senator Pudens, in whose palace was the residence of St. Peter, and the first Christian church of Rome. The faith spread even into the palace of the Cæsars and the imperial families, and we find several of the early Popes and the clergy of Rome to have been of imperial, senatorial, or patrician blood. In this way Christianity struck its roots in the soil of Roman society, and began to blend and identify itself with all that was most venerable in the empire, and to draw the life-blood from its very heart for its own support. When Constantine declared Christianity the religion of the State, it was not an act of power, imposing a foreign institution upon the nation, but a simple recognition of the fact that it was the only living and powerful religion existing in the Roman empire. Just in the same manner the Catholic faith, which has already laid a broad and strong foundation in England and in the United States in the substratum of the social and political commonwealth, is making its way among the nobility, gentry, and educated classes in England, and among the corresponding classes in the United States, thus securing a permanent hold on the soil, and preparing itself,

like the aloe, to bloom out suddenly when its prescribed cycle of time has been completed. Cardinal Wiseman, in his exquisite work "*Fabiola*," describes St. Sebastian and St. Pancratius just before the outbreaking of the last persecution that immediately preceded the triumph of Christianity, looking out from a balustrade of the Lateran Palace, and talking together of the present and future prospects of the faith in Rome :

"As they were entering the palace, that part which Sebastian's cohort guarded, he said to his companion, 'Every time that I enter here, it strikes me how kind an act of Divine Providence it was, to plant almost at the very gates of Cæsar's palace, the arch* which commemorates at once the downfall of the first great system that was antagonistic to Christianity, and the completion of the greatest prophecy of the Gospel, the destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman power. I cannot but believe that another arch† will one day arise to commemorate no less a victory over the second enemy of our religion, the heathen Roman empire itself.'

" 'What, do you contemplate the overthrow of this vast empire as the means of establishing Christianity ?'

" 'God forbid ! I would shed the last drop of my blood, as I shed my first, to maintain it. And, depend upon it, when the empire is converted, it will not be by such gradual growth as we now witness, but by something so unhuman, so divine, as we shall never in our most sanguine longings forecast, but all will exclaim : "This is the change of the right hand of the Most High." ' " " ‡

Such is the language supposed to have been uttered by Sebastian in the year 302, eleven years before the accession of Constantine. We will not venture to make any similar prediction in regard to the great and powerful Republic we are proud to call our native country. All that we have proposed to do, we believe we have accomplished. We have shown that there is no antagonism between Catholicity and the intelligence of the nineteenth century, or of the American people ; and therefore that the Catholic religion is just as well fitted to be the religion of our own age and country, as it ever was to be the religion of any past age, or any other country. A.

* Of Titus.

† The Arch of Constantine.

‡ P. 48.

ART. III.—*The Humanists—A Chapter from History.*

THERE are epochs in history wherein the causes that have been silently but steadily working for centuries, suddenly combine, and by their united action bring forth results which influence the destiny of the human race for ages ; such epochs, standing out in bold relief, serve as centres, around which the various events of the period revolve, kept within their sphere by force of moral attraction, even when inclined, by their own nature, to rove as comets, unchained by law, through the sphere of history. And hence the necessity of studying and appreciating such epochs, in order to the right understanding of historical events. For if these events are viewed by themselves, detached from those that precede and those that follow them, we shall never know history. An amount of disconnected and useless information will be at best all that we can obtain. History, properly so called, must be philosophical ; that is, must show events in their principle, and in their relation of causes and effects. The historian, as the mathematician, must have the centre from which to describe the circumference. "Give me a point whereon to place my fulcrum, and I will move the earth," said Archimedes of old ; let the historian find the idea that colors the age, and he holds in his hands all the threads, minute and finely interlaced as they may be, that join together facts and events in a union, imperceptible to the casual student.

This fact is frequently lost sight of, and hence popular history is in general unphilosophical and untrustworthy. Some attempt to remedy the evil by writing what they choose to call the *Philosophy of History*. They are correct in principle, and would succeed if they really came at the hidden causes of the events in man's history. But for want of clear understanding of first principles, and of a sound philosophical education, they, in most instances, lamentably fail. Guizot undertook to write the history of Civilization in Europe, but he suffered religious and political prejudices to bias his judgment, and his work, far from elucidating the subject, tends but to lead into error those

who allow themselves to be dazzled by the brilliancy of his style, and the apparent depth of his views. There has been one glorious exception to this general censure, the great Bossuet, the eagle of Meaux, who, from the pinnacle of Catholic truth, surveying, with the eye of the Christian philosopher and statesman, the various nations of antiquity, has written their history with an accuracy and an eloquence that have remained as yet unrivalled. His *Universal History* alone would make his name immortal.

Much remains to be done in the field of modern European history. Particular periods have been treated in a masterly manner, such as that of the so-called Reformation, by the illustrious Balmes, the age of Gregory VII. by Voight, and that of Innocent III. by Hurter; but the philosophic history of the Middle Ages, or the period from the inroads of the northern barbarians to the time of Luther, is yet to be written. In default of a great work of the kind by the hand of a Christian and a philosopher, the subject has been treated either as a whole, or in parts, by men possessing talents of a high order, vast and varied information, a style to which a vivid imagination has imparted all its charms; in short, everything but a sound philosophy in harmony with Christian principles. Their works are read and accepted as the philosophy of history. Guizot, Cousin, Roscoe, Macaulay, and even Ranke, are examples in point. When the streams of knowledge flow from such infected sources, can we wonder at the prevalence of so many false notions of history? Historians writing for the people servilely copy these masters, and hence error is more and more widely propagated.

To the history of no period will these remarks so well apply as to that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These centuries, distinguished by two most important events, the Revival of Letters and the Protestant Reformation, have ever been favorite themes with the popular writer, whether historian, poet, or novelist. The Revival of Letters, an event of great interest to every man making any pretensions to taste or scholarship, has been treated by some among the most distinguished men in modern literature, among whom we may name Roscoe in his *Life of Leo X.*, and of *Lorenzo de Medici*, and Hallam in his *History of Literature*. To enumerate the writers and

books on the Reformation, would be an endless task. Appealing to all the passions of the human heart, interwoven from its very beginnings with all the political movements of Europe, it would be vain to attempt unravelling the web of European history, without understanding the character, the causes, and the effects of this great event. The Revival of Letters and the Reformation are closely connected both in time and character. Protestants claim the glory of the former event, but the Humanists* have as much right to glory in having aided the birth of Protestantism. The union between the Reformers and the Humanists was more intimate than is commonly imagined, more intimate than they themselves were aware of. They were often at war with each other about words and forms, but at bottom their principles were the same. If Erasmus sneered at the early Reformers, because their first step in the career of Protestantism was "the taking of a wife, he but showed his inconsistency by rejecting the practical consequences of his own principles. He, as well as they, was disposed to make too much of human reason as opposed to the authority of the Church, and the rejection of that authority, when followed to its logical consequences, leads invariably to the same result.

The Revival of Learning, as it is called, is a subject of peculiar interest and importance in an age which boasts of its transcendent progress in mental enlightenment, a subject whose very name tends to enlist our sympathies. The Revival of Learning! Is not learning opposed to ignorance? and is not ignorance the curse of the mind, the thick mist that shrouds its intellectual vision from the rays of truth, and leaves it to grope in darkness? But is there not, in the words of the inspired Apostle, "a knowledge, a learning, that puffeth up," that is opposed to Christian charity and truth? Was not this, after all, the learning, the Revival of which is so loudly boasted?

Before proceeding to the discussion of this question, we must be allowed to glance for a moment at the influence of authority in matters of faith, exercised by the

* The name *Humanists* is applied to the literary men of the revival of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with what justice my remarks will tend to show.

Church, on the human mind in general, and on literature in particular. We may thus obtain a clue to the character of the literature of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and its bearing on that of our own times.

God is true, is truth itself, and when he speaks, men must listen and obey, whether the things he speaks or reveals pertain to the natural order, or to the supernatural; whether within the reach of natural understanding, or mysteries lying beyond its comprehension, his authority is complete, is all that reason, without ceasing to be reason, can demand, and, therefore, exacts of reason a full and unreserved assent, a perfect and entire submission. But, aside from the body of truth divinely revealed, man is free to examine for himself, by the light of his natural reason, all facts, opinions, and theories he meets, and accept or reject them according to the evidence in the case. As God cannot reveal, in the natural or the supernatural order, what is not true, whatever varies from, or is repugnant to, his revelation must be false; for truth is one, and cannot oppose or contradict itself. Natural truth and supernatural truth proceed from the same source, and can never be opposed, in the slightest degree, one to the other. What is consonant to revelation or harmonizes with it, is true, and nothing is to be rejected as false, which is not repugnant either to it or to reason. The written expression of men's sentiments, convictions, and opinions, in accordance with revealed truth, constitutes a true Christian literature.

As God has intrusted to his Church the guardianship of supernatural, and to a certain point of natural truth, since the supernatural presupposes the natural, it follows, that to the Church belongs the duty of watching over men, in their intellectual operations, inquiries, investigations, to see that they do not pass beyond their legitimate province, that they do not arrogate to reason the right to decide, as supreme judge, on things which lie above her sphere, and substitute the fancies of mere private judgment for the truth of God. Literature, then, in all its departments, must be under the guardianship of the Church, or else, owing to the incapacity of reason by itself, to attain to truth of the supernatural order, and to the natural impatience of the human mind, under restraint of any kind, it will lose the supernatural and become purely natural and heathenish.

Nor is the free action of the mind impaired by this guardianship of the Church, for it extends only to the preservation of the truth which God has revealed. The history of literature shows, at least, as many glorious names among the devoted and submissive children of the Church, as can be found in the ranks of heresy. Did the principle of authority asserted and applied by the Church, impede the progress of philosophy? Let facts answer. Truth was the object of the ardent pursuits of the ancient philosophers, but ever did it elude their grasp. God, nature, man, and society, were problems which they agitated, which tormented them, and which they were never able to solve. But when revelation came to the aid of reason, and gave it a clear knowledge of God and his creation, human genius, enabled to perceive distinctly the sure *data* on which to work, reared the stately and well-proportioned fabric of Christian philosophy. St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas were great philosophers as well as eminent theologians, and tower head and shoulders above all in ancient or modern times. All true science in the natural order is contained in philosophy as in its germ, and if the germ or seed be preserved intact, the plant must needs be of vigorous and healthy growth. Hence history, philology, and even the natural sciences, have met with proper treatment at the hands of those only who have been humble and obedient children of the Church. And the fine arts, do they not owe all they possess of good and beautiful to the faithful copying of Christian truth? A firm belief in the truths of revelation reared the glorious cathedrals of the middle ages, whose lofty spires and pointed arches symbolize the aspirations of the soul for Heaven. Whence did the early Italian painters and sculptors draw their inspirations? The *Annunciation* of Cimabue, the *Last Supper* of Leonardo da Vinci, the *Judgment* of Michael Angelo, the *Transfiguration* of Raphael, and the *Dome of St. Peter's*, that wonder of Christian art, show that in every case, revealed religion alone imparted that degree of surpassing and almost superhuman beauty, for which they are so justly admired, to those grand efforts of human genius. All Italy is full of monuments, attesting how much the element of true, artistic beauty pervades religion.

It is vain, then, to say, that strict submission to religious

truth clips the wings and impedes the flight of genius. Literature and the arts can never suffer by being under the protection and guardianship of the Church. Without her, they fast degenerate, lose that grandeur and beauty which she alone can impart, represent the mere natural life of man, and lead him farther and farther from his end,—his Supreme Good. But while the Church exacts from those who form the literature of a period, or contribute to it when already formed, a strict adherence to her teachings, she allows and even encourages them to use all the graces and beauties of language, to press into their service every department of human science and learning, or, in the words of one of the Fathers of the Church, “to seize on the spoil of Egypt, to consecrate it to God, and to adorn, with its wealth, the tabernacle of the Church.”

At the period of the Church's foundation, literature was in one of its glorious eras. The notes from the harmonious lyres of Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, were yet lingering on the ear. Grecian Philosophy had taken up its abode in Imperial Rome, and the great masters of Grecian history and poetry had long since been known to the conquerors. But the Church could find no opportunity, during three centuries of bloodshed and persecution, of breathing into the lifeless, though beautiful form of Pagan literature, a Christian soul. And when she issued from the dark recesses of the Catacombs, and mounted in triumph the imperial throne, an age of literary barbarism was fast obliterating the traces of the Augustan period. Alexandria had succeeded Athens and Rome, as the capital of the literary world. To her schools flocked philosophers from the east and the west—the polished Greek, to whom Plato was *the philosopher*, by excellence, the *divine*, the *master*, and the dreamy Oriental, with his infinite variety of myths of every shade and hue, of Buddhism, Manichæism, or Zoroasterism. A common hatred of Christianity united elements so heterogeneous, and from their union sprang Neoplatonism, which, under the shadow of the imperial throne of Julian the Apostate, proved the most formidable antagonist that Christianity had yet encountered. It was the natural at war with the supernatural, human nature refusing to submit to any yoke, intellectual or moral. All the human learning that the world then possessed, was

banded together for the destruction of the Church; in a word, it was the first great struggle between intellectual paganism and Christianity.

Side by side with this pagan literature arose sacred literature, its direct antagonist. St. Justin, Origen, and Clement of Alexandria met and confuted on their own ground and with their own weapons the Alexandrian Philosophers; they adapted the Platonic philosophy to Christian truth, and with it, shattered at one blow the huge but imbecile fabric of Neoplatonism. Their works are treasures of Philosophy, and surpass those of their opponents as much in beauty of thought and style as in strength of argument. Their illustrious successors, St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzen, brought to bear on the contest a theological learning the most profound, and a thorough acquaintance with all the tenets of the schools, whilst they clothed their thoughts in the garb of a chaste classic style, fruit of a perfect familiarity with the great writers of antiquity. And hence they have ever ranked amongst the first and most eloquent of Christian poets and orators.

The schools of the Neoplatonists were closed by the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, but the spirit that they had evoked made its influence more or less perceptibly felt in every age. The old Alexandrian Philosophy was too flattering to human nature to be given up without a struggle. Proclaiming all forms of Religion to be good, and that from their amalgamation springs the one, true, and universal Religion, they brought religion within the natural sphere, and from being something supernatural, made it a mere system of Philosophy. The Alexandrian spirit lived on through the night of the Middle Ages, the representative of the human element in literature, waiting but the favorable opportunity of developing itself in a completely secular and pagan literature, which was to acknowledge no authority in intellectual matters but individual reason. It appeared in Scotus Erigena, Roscelin, and Abelard, who not content with expounding the truths of faith in philosophic language, would make Aristotle and not the Church the standard of authority, when they would make faith stand her trial at reason's tribunal.

The Church, whilst she swept over these errors of her children, faithful to her divine commission, condemned

their doctrine, — condemned the perversion they made of philosophy, not philosophy itself, as her adversaries would fain have us believe. Had she not availed herself of this very philosophy of Aristotle to arrange and teach systematically the body of Christian truths contained, but in no methodical order, in the Sacred Scriptures and in the writings of the Fathers? Is it not to this adaptation of Philosophy to Revelation that scholastic theology owes its origin and the terrible force it has against the enemies of truth? Many there were who abused the system, who delighting in subtle metaphysical disquisitions and crude speculations, made skill in dialectics the *summum bonum* of life. But the Church never acknowledged these idle subtle sophists, these hair-splitting dialecticians as her schoolmen, her scholastic theologians. She left them to their barren speculations and their interminable wranglings, for a higher and nobler work, of winning souls to Christ, of converting the yet semi-barbarian hordes who had founded their kingdom on the ruins of the Roman Empire. We cannot wonder then that theology was the only branch of literature to which the Church devoted her chief attention at the time, for it was the only one she needed in the work of conversion and civilization.

Meanwhile the perverters of true Philosophy and Theology, the disciples of Roscelin and Abelard, manifested the spirit which actuated them. It was not a zeal for letters, for true mental progress, but a desire of shaking off the yoke of wholesome authority, whereby the Church marked a line beyond which they could not pass with impunity in their rash inquiries. Whenever and wherever the secular power, in the persons of the princes of Europe, arrogated to itself a supremacy over the spiritual, thus inverting the order of God's providence, these proud, self-sufficient philosophers invariably espoused its cause. Who were the men that in the fourteenth century supported and encouraged Louis of Bavaria in bidding defiance to the Church in the person of three of her Sovereign Pontiffs, in setting himself above all law, but that of his own royal pleasure? Were they not Occam and his disciples, the revivers of Nominalism, that system of philosophy which Roscelin had taught more than two centuries before? Did not the French kings find too often, among the Doctors of the

Sorbonne, faithful friends and supporters in their iniquitous resistance to the authority of the Popes? When the proud Barbarossa dreamed in his wild ambition of wielding an authority, to which even the old pagan emperors, absolute as they were, were strangers; when he would have every knee on earth, of Priest and Bishop, of King and Pope, bow to HIM, whom did he find to sanction his monstrous assumptions, but the learned men of Italy, the Jurists of Bologna!

Such, during the Middle Ages, was the spirit of Philosophy, as separated from Theology, and cultivated solely for itself. Lighter literature was in no better state. If Philosophy was human and pagan, because it refused to recognize the Church as the guardian and judge of reason, the poetry of the Troubadours and Trouvères, of the Minnesingers and Meistersingers, was human and pagan, because it refused to recognize the Church as the guardian of morals, because it appealed to human passions unregenerated by grace, combining the sensualism and the voluptuousness of the Moors and Arabs with the fantastic and grim superstitions of the Scandinavians. It differed in nothing, but in want of the same classic style, from the poetry of the most refined and sensual of the Greek or Roman bards. These were the germs from which was to be developed in later times a pagan literature more polished, more captivating, and more dangerous.

Meanwhile the drama of European history was becoming more and more intricate in its plot, was acquiring every day deeper and deeper interest; causes that had long been silently working, began to manifest themselves, and produce their natural effects. The Papal See was removed from Rome to Avignon, during the pontificate of Clement V., in 1307, but the Papacy was never at home on French soil,* and like a tender, transplanted flower, drooped and pined for the more genial clime of Italy. Rome, deserted by the Popes, was shorn of half her glories, and knew too late, that all her fame, all her proud pre-eminence of power were linked inseparably to the Chair of Peter. Many and frequent were the deputations that solicited the return

* Avignon was not French soil, or within the kingdom of France, at that time.—ED. Q. REVIEW.

of the sovereign Pontiffs. But the storm of war sweeping with destructive fury over the plains of Italy imposed an almost imperative necessity for the prolongation of the French residence, or as it has been sometimes called, the "Babylonian captivity of the Church." When, finally, the Popes, in the person of Gregory XI., after an absence of more than seventy years, resumed their residence in the holy city, Rome had sadly dwindled down both in power and population. During the glorious pontificate of Innocent III., in the beginning of the thirteenth century, there existed of the monuments of antiquity twelve triumphal arches, eleven baths, and three hundred and sixty-one towers. When Gregory returned, the ruins of three or four of the baths remained. This fact alone speaks volumes for the influence of the Papacy upon the Roman States and upon all Italy merely in an artistic and civilizing point of view.

The effect of the long absence of the Popes upon the inhabitants of Rome was one of marked interest and importance. Day by day they saw the glories of their beloved city fade, her power decrease, each repeated and earnest request for the return of the Holy Father met with a refusal or vague and indeterminate promises. Cut off, as it seemed, for ever, from the hopes of future fame and power, founded on her being the capital of the Christian world, Rome turned with all the more fervency to the memories of her past glories. The monuments of pagan antiquity were around her; she remembered that she had been the imperial mistress of the world, and she indulged the fond hope of again becoming the queen of nations, even separated from the Apostolic See and in open schism with it. The history of Rienzi proved the fallacy of her hopes, and with the last of the tribunes the sun of Rome's political domination sank for ever. But the enthusiasm of the adventurer Rienzi for the glories of Pagan Rome, deposited a seed which was to produce the most pernicious and deadly fruit. The Romans became discontented with themselves, factious and impatient of all authority, whether of Pope or Emperor. They began to look upon the paganism, of which their city was once the political, literary, and religious centre, as something to be prized for itself, as something more glorious for Rome than the fact of being the See of St. Peter and his

successors. This thought once conceived and cherished, was developed by everything around them. The temples of heathen gods and goddesses, the arches, theatres, and baths which, when viewed with a Christian eye, were standing memorials of the glorious triumphs of the Church over the mighty fabric of paganism, of the divinity of Christianity, served now as incentives of an excessive admiration of paganism.

The reverence for authority, at which the career of Rienzi aimed so deadly a blow, was still more weakened by the unhappy schism of the West. To the true child of the Church, the contemplation of this sad period causes sorrow, not unmingled, however, with exultation and gratitude; sorrow for the wickedness and impiety of men who dared intrude themselves into the sanctuary of the living God, and even into the throne of the Sovereign Pontiff; exultation, at the glorious spectacle of the Church, coming unscathed out of the fiery ordeal, brighter and more beautiful, if possible, than ere she entered the purifying flames; gratitude, for the grace of being a member of this Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, so evidently upheld by the hand of the Almighty.

Such was the situation of Europe in the middle of the fifteenth century. The historic causes of the period were all tending to produce one grand effect, the full development of the natural as opposed to the supernatural, of paganism as opposed to Christianity. The fall of the Greek Empire of Constantinople, in 1453, before the arms of Mahomet II., was the last link in the historic chain of causes. The degenerate Greeks, separated, excepting brief intervals of partial union, for ages, from the communion of the Church, had become virtually pagan.* The works of the old Greek authors were known and cherished amongst them as souvenirs of the past greatness of their ancestors. The learned men of Greece, flying from the cruelty and oppression of their Moslem conquerors, were received with open arms by the princes and literary men of Europe, especially of Italy. They introduced a passionate admiration for the literature of ancient Greece, and aided the Italians in recovering and

* This remark needs qualification, save when applied to a certain number of Greek scholars.—ED. Q. REVIEW.

understanding the works of classic Roman antiquity. The superior acquirements of the refugees placed them at the head of the literary world, gave them admission to the courts of princes and to the first chairs in the Universities. Greeks were the lions of the day, in much the same manner as European red republicans are the lions of the nineteenth century. This is the event, this is the epoch, in history which is called the Revival of Letters.

To come to a right understanding of this most important subject, let us see what is conceded, what denied, by the partisans of the Revival. They grant that it directed the attention of the learned to the cultivation of Greek and Latin literature, to a predilection for Greek and Latin pagan authors, and to an imitation of their beauties. They stoutly deny that the Revival had anything but a most salutary and enlightening influence upon the human mind and upon the destiny of Europe. They also maintain that Christianity suffered nothing, but by that they mean fashionable or liberal Christianity, another name for heathenism. Now, on the side of truth, if we examine the philosophy, the system of politics, the belles-lettres, and the fine arts, to which the Revival gave birth, we shall find that its influence has been pernicious, and that with the style and manner of the heathen classic writers, things good in themselves, to which the Church has never objected, and never will object, it introduced their pagan thoughts and sentiments, and finally resulted in pure, unmitigated heathenism, not that which bows down before and adores gods of wood and stone, but that which makes man and man's passions and aspirations its God. For it savours as much of paganism and even of atheism to deny God as the final cause, as to deny him as the first cause.

At the period of the Revival, Aristotle was the oracle of the philosophic world; but his disciples were divided into separate and opposite classes; those who, with St. Thomas, adopted his method as the most convenient for the elucidation and explanation of Christian truths, and those who unhesitatingly subscribed to all the Stagyrice's philosophic doctrines, as explained by Arabian commentators. The latter class, to be consistent with the dictum of their master, "*Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu,*" must sooner or later have become empiricists, or

sensists, and materialists. The Greek refugees gave a new direction to the philosophic controversies of the day. Plato was their standard of excellence, as Aristotle was of the Latins or Westerns; but it was Plato as explained by Plotinus and the Alexandrians, or in other words, their system was that Neoplatonism, which we have seen make such a formidable stand against the Church in the early ages. Plato's doctrine of *ideas* gave full scope to the mind to indulge in wild and fanciful speculations concerning the pre-existing state of souls, and hence led to a mysticism, which must of necessity degenerate into rationalism, whilst his doctrine of the creation and of the soul of the world was purely pantheistic. The Greek Neoplatonists nowhere received a warmer welcome than at Florence. Gemisthus Pletho there established a Platonic academy, during the administration of Cosmo de Medici, which, under the reign of his successor, Lorenzo the Magnificent, became the centre of all literary movements and the oracle of the literary world. Marsilius Ficinus, a man as remarkable for his unwearied industry as for his genius, was its director. Marsilius, in his comments upon Plato, manifests the spirit which actuated the school of which he was the Master and the Representative. He sees in the Athenian philosopher, the foreshadowings of the great Christian mysteries of the Trinity, the redemption, and even of the Blessed Eucharist. Some years later, in 1512, we find the fifth General Council of Lateran, under Leo X., condemning the opinion that the immortality of the soul could not be proved by reason, or in other words, that what was true in theology could be false in philosophy, therefore that truth could be opposed to itself. This opinion when considered in connection with the legitimate deductions from the system of Ficinus, throws grave doubt on the doctrine of the immortality, and hence on the greatest sanction of the natural and positive law, and paves the way to anarchy and crime. Such was the result of the disputes of the Platonists and Aristotelians, and in this respect the philosophy of the Revival led immediately and of itself to the Deism of the English Philosophers, the materialism and eclecticism of the French, the Rationalism of the Germans, and the Transcendentalism of our New Englanders. Separate philosophy from theology, and it becomes a most potent engine of error and absurdity.

What was the system of Politics which the Revival originated and fostered? Consult the pages of Nicholas Machiavelli, the secretary of the Florentine Republic, who, like all the literary men of the day, was deeply tinctured with the spirit of classic paganism. His system of politics is essentially unchristian,—it is even *diabolical*. “The end justifies the means,” is his motto. The end is the aggrandizement of the prince; the means, whatever attains that end, whether it be good or bad. The prince is to play the virtuous man, the lion, or the fox, as best suits the occasion. He is to have no fixed principles, but is to change his principles and his actions with every shifting circumstance. In theory, men may detest political Machiavellism, but the history of modern diplomacy shows beyond a shadow of doubt, that statesmen follow in practice the maxims of the Florentine secretary, not those of our Blessed Lord and Saviour. As private gentlemen, they may be staid, regularly meeting-going Protestants;* as diplomatists, they are the veriest heathens, without the least idea of right or wrong; justice or injustice.

The only safety for the political or temporal order, as for the spiritual, is submission to legitimate authority. But the Humanists, the Revivalists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, opposed such submission both in theory and practice. Let us listen to one of their oracles: “Turn over the pages of ancient or modern history, scarcely in several generations will you find one or two princes whose folly has not inflicted the greatest misery on mankind. Let any physiognomist, not a blunderer in his trade, consider the look and features of an eagle, those rapacious and wicked eyes, that threatening curve of the beak, those cruel cheeks, that stern front, will he not at once recognize the image of a king, a magnificent and majestic king? Add to these a dark, ill-omened color, an unpleasing, dreadful, appalling voice, and that threatening scream, at which every kind of animal trembles. Every one will acknowledge this type, who has learned how terrible are the threats of princes, even uttered in jest. At this scream of the eagle, the people tremble, the senate shrinks, the nobility cringes,

* Unhappily nominally Catholic diplomatists do not seem to do much better than Protestant diplomatists.—ED. Q. REVIEW.

the judges concur, the divines are dumb, the lawyers assent, the laws and constitution give way; neither right nor religion, neither justice nor humanity avails. And thus whilst there are so many birds of sweet and melodious song, the unpleasant and unmusical scream of the eagle alone has more power than all the rest. Oh, race of the Bruti, long since extinct! — oh, blind and blunted thunderbolts of Jupiter!" This is the language of Erasmus, the greatest of the Humanists, the Voltaire of his age. Could the most radical of our modern liberals pen lines more bitter and sarcastic? They are aimed not only at the kingly form of government, but at the government of law as opposed to that of license. The civil and religious wars which devastated Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the rising of the Anabaptists in Germany and of the Huguenots in France, were but practical applications of the doctrines of the Humanists, and their friends, the Reformers.

With principles like these, we cannot expect to find the Humanists practising, to any heroic degree, the virtue of loyalty. History shows that they did not. When Ferdinand of Arragon, the lawful sovereign of Naples, was forced, in 1494, to abandon his throne to Charles VIII. of France, the members of the Neapolitan academy, one of the most celebrated in Italy, counting amongst its members the names of Sannazar, Pontanus, and Carateo, almost to a man, paid their servile court to the conqueror; an instance of unparalleled ingratitude, as Ferdinand had been one of the most generous patrons of letters. In fact, mere literary characters have never been remarkable for their loyalty. They have too often showed themselves inclined to prostitute their talents and their pens to his service who could best pay and patronize them, be he the lawful prince or a usurper, the father of his people or their tyrant.

Such was the spirit of the Revival in connection with moral and political Philosophy. Its effect upon art was not less characteristic. "Art," to use the words of a modern writer, "is the expression of the true and the good under the form of the beautiful." Truth is whatever is, since as God alone is Absolute Being, he alone is Absolute Truth, and therefore, he alone is the absolute object of art, in its relation to the true. Created beings are its object only relatively, inasmuch as they depend on God,

and copy him in their existence and operations, and hence the closer they are connected with God, and the more god-like they are, the more properly are they the objects of art. Hence, the sacred mysteries of our religion have ever been the favourite themes of all true artists. Truth is the object of the intellect, goodness of the will, and beauty of the imagination. Hence art, to be perfect, must unite truth, goodness, and beauty. When possessing these characteristics, it wonderfully tends to exalt and ennoble man's rational and moral nature.

Had the Art to which the Revival gave birth these qualities? In its very beginning, the intellectual movement of the fifteenth century departed, in a great degree, from truth, by rejecting even in matters of literature the principle of authority. It set it itself up as antagonistic to sacred art and literature, or, as the Humanists called it, to the barbarism of the Aristotelians. It excluded God and religion from art, and hence, narrowed its circle to created beings, thus separating truth, which is indivisible, and making relative truth absolute truth, or, in other words, asserting the total independence of the temporal order on the spiritual, or that the world, the creature, does not depend on God, the Creator. The muse no longer winged its flight to the throne of God. The uncreated splendor of the Divinity, the glory of the Virgin Mother of God, of the Saints and Angels, were themes too common for the paganized poet of the fifteenth century. Olympus was his heaven, and the Gods of Homer and Virgil, and the heroes of ancient fables, were his standards of excellence. Poor fool! why did he forget that whatever of beauty pertains to the heathen works of art, was the consequence of a faithful copying of religion such as the heathens had retained it? Take away the element of religion and their beauty disappears. Why did he not reflect, that if he had cast his work in the mould of religion, it would have come forth as far surpassing in true poetic beauty the works of the heathens, as Christianity surpasses heathenism? The Humanists discarded religion; hence, they had to fall back upon the natural order alone, and, as a necessary consequence, they had to appeal to that in the natural order which most interests and captivates. Their works became the expressions of human passions, unelevated and unregenerated by grace. Sensual love was the common

and, at the same time, the highest theme of the Latin and Italian muse. Hallam, speaking of the literature of the period, says: "The number of versifiers whom Italy produced in the sixteenth century was immensely great. Crescimbeni gives a list of eighty earlier than 1550, whom he selects from many hundred ever-forgotten names. By far the larger proportion of these confined themselves to the sonnet, and the canzone or ode; and the theme is generally love. A conventional phraseology, an interminable repetition of the beauties and coldness of, perhaps, an ideal, certainly to us unknown mistress, ran through these productions." In its infancy, Italian literature was sullied with the expression of a base and sinful passion. Petrarch, the father of Italian popular poetry, in his impassioned addresses to his mistress Laura, was one of the first to touch the string of love's lyre, whose soft and voluptuous vibrations have continued to our own day. His disciple, Boccaccio, performed in prose what Petrarch had effected in poetry. The shameless licentiousness of his thought, and the classic grace and elegance of his style, unsurpassed by any Italian prose writer, won for him an epithet before applied to the court poet of the Emperor Nero, "*auctor purissimæ impuritatis*." The Italian writers of later periods have but too often followed in the steps of their predecessors.

Amongst the Humanists, there were some for whom love possessed no charms. A less degrading, though no less tyrannic passion swayed them, pride. Puffed up with self-conceit, the baneful fruit, which an exclusive attention to literary labors often produces, they would have every knee to bow to them, as the oracles of the intellectual world, and viewed every successful production, every harvest of praise, of some fellow-*littérateur*, as a blow aimed at their own reputation. They made no efforts to conceal their sentiments, and their writings breathe spleen and envy on every page. The academies resounded with the angry altercations of the Humanists, and the press teemed with lampoons and satires. The greatest geniuses of the time indulged in these disgraceful squabbles, and thought it no loss of time or reputation to write entire books for the sole purpose of vindicating their own character, and lowering that of a rival. The quarrels of Erasmus and Budæus, of Valla and Poggio, and of the academies of rival cities,

are well known in literary history. In allusion to these disgraceful facts, it has been wittily remarked that the literary men of the period had two merits, "that they gave expression to the most truthful accusations in a most polished and brilliant style." The egotism of the Humanists led many of them to become fawning flatterers of the princes of Europe. What pages of manuscripts, what learned labor, how much aching of the brains, how many sleepless nights, has it not cost to trace some royal pedigree, or hymn the deeds of some petty Italian despot! These court poets received their full share of royal and princely patronage, but at the expense of their poetic fame and immortality, their cumbrous lines are no longer read, and their names are well-nigh forgotten.

Against this abuse of literature, and the consequent depravity of manners, the Church constantly raised her voice. Hence, the Rock of Peter became the mark against which the Humanists directed all the shafts of their wit, satire, and calumny. When not singing the praises of their mistresses, or abusing their rivals, they were exclaiming against the tyranny and abuses of the Papacy. And yet it would seem, that common gratitude should have silenced their lying tongues. Ill had they fared without the generous patronage of a Nicholas V. or a Leo X!

The Humanism or naturalism of the Revival was the effect of those causes the workings of which we have already described. Viewed as a cause itself, it tended to produce a still greater disregard for the authority of the Church, a still greater demoralization of manners. The Humanists faithfully depicted in their conduct the effect of the principles inculcated in their writings. If Hutten and Boccaccio were remarkable in an age of immorality for the disgusting licentiousness of their productions, it was because they, more than their compeers, were slaves to the demon of impurity. Hutten, the author of the "*Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*," a work as distinguished for its immorality as for its effect in hastening and extending the Protestant Reformation, died the victim of his criminal excesses. Florence was the centre of the Revival, but Florence, thanks to the Medici, and the paganism of the poets and painters, seemed no longer a Christian city. Her magnificent churches still existed, but their

altars and walls were desecrated by paintings breathing naught of devotion, and serving but to fix the mind and heart on natural beauty. Painters still represented the Madonna, but their model was not those features of unearthly beauty, whose dim outlines might have been stamped on pure hearts when dwelling in pious meditation on the glories of Mary, but the form and figure of the goddesses of Olympus, and—can we believe the sacrilege?—of worldly beauties, whose charms had involved many an incautious soul in the toils of Satan! An eloquent Catholic writer remarks that the “*Madonnas* which were placed in domestic oratories, so far from edifying the family that assembled in them to pray, often produced the most contrary effect; and if a pious citizen, out of paternal solicitude, expressed his dissatisfaction with these lascivious representations, and asked for a virgin whose expression and age and character should be a preservative against every thought of impurity, then the perverse artist painted him one with a long beard.”

These are some of the facts tending to illustrate the character of the Revival of letters. The spirit of revolt against the Church, joined to the coincident downfall of the Greek Empire and the reviving taste for classic studies, a taste pursued too far, led to pure unmitigated paganism in literature, art, and life. Men thought that they were made only for this world, and hence they lived and thought and wrote for this world only. The natural order was declared independent of the supernatural; literature became purely natural, and led man farther and farther away from the end for which he was created. The character that literature acquired in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it has ever since retained. Philosophy has become materialistic and pantheistic. History has ceased to be a vehicle of facts; it serves as a peg on which our modern sages hang their crude, dangerous, and infidel theories. Poetry appeals to the worst passions of human nature. Witness the works of Byron, Moore, and Shelley, modern England's favorite poets, or when it would soar higher with the muse of Wordsworth, it sings the beauties of external nature, of mountain, valley, ocean, brook, or sky, as if there existed no fairer, no more glorious world than this. And as for art, it has well-nigh perished

before the inroads of naturalism. They, in whose bosoms still glows the fire of true genius, must needs consult the models of Catholic Italy, before their productions can be called true works of art, and those models too which breathe nothing of the spirit of Revival. And what is the child of the Church to do, beset on his first entrance into life by these philosophic, poetic, and artistic errors? If he would become acquainted with the literature of the age, he must have a soul of iron, not to receive baneful impressions from the worldly uncatholic spirit which pervades it. Is he to jeopard his peace of conscience for *this*? Literature is never to be cultivated for itself, as an end, but solely as a means of leading the soul to heaven. When it conducts to the broad road to hell, it is bad and to be avoided, no matter how Christian or faultlessly artistic it may be in *form*. Young Catholics, captivated by the charms, and misled by the false maxims of a worldly literature, have become lukewarm in the practice of their religion. We must have a Catholic literature or none at all. Thank Heaven, the prospects are brightening, and if a few of the gifted minds that adorn the American Church were to devote their heart and soul to the noble work of creating a Catholic literature, it would be formed, and it would prosper. Are the friends of God to be less zealous than the friends of the Devil? Can religion no longer produce works characterized by at least as much genius as those of the world? Do our Churches and our tabernacles, in which our Lord abides in the Sacrament of His love, breathe less of the spirit of art than the polluted works of pagan antiquity? We will not believe it. Let Catholic writers draw their inspiration from their faith, instead of the profane literature of the day, let them fill their hearts and expand their souls with the truth, the love, the beauty, the grandeur which belongs to their religion, and they will produce works of art, which will attract the admiration of their countrymen, adorn their country, elevate and purify its civilization.

Every age has its own wants and its own modes of action. This age, above all this county, demands literature, and through literature lies the road to its intellect, above all to its heart. It is for us Catholics to take the lead in a literature that will counteract the false literature of the

day, that will free the mind and the heart, above all the imagination, from prevailing paganism, inspire noble and manly sentiments, enlarge the mental horizon, and fulfil the promise of our American civilization. We can do it; all we want is to feel that the work needs to be done, and to engage with earnestness and zeal in effecting it. We must open our hearts to the sun of truth which shines for us, contemplate the glorious acts of our long line of Catholic ancestors, and awaken in ourselves the heroic spirit that loves the combat with darkness and evil; we have, in a word, but to give fair play to the intellect and genius which God so freely gives to those who will employ them for just and noble ends, and we have literature, art in all its departments, not discreditable to our religion, and glorious to our country.

We shall have it. We see on every side of us proofs of a new and creative spirit moving in the heart of our Catholic community. Let each take heart and hope, and do the part God gives him to do.

W. J. B.

ART. IV.—*Études Philosophiques, Ontologie ou Étude des Lois de la Pensée.* Par M. l'Abbé F. Hugonin. Paris. Tomes I. et II. 8vo. Tome I., 1856; Tome II., 1857.

THE Abbé Hugonin is a professor of philosophy in l'Ecole des Carmes, Paris, and in these two volumes has given us the first division of his course. He defines philosophy, the science of thought, its laws and principal objects, considered as such, and divides it into four parts: 1. Ontology, which treats of the laws of thought, or that which makes thought such as it is and not otherwise; 2. Theodicea, which has for its immediate object God, and studies thought in its first and principal object; 3. Cosmology, which studies the world, or the secondary and mediate object of thought; and 4. Anthropology, or Psychology, which studies the soul considered as at once the subject and object of thought. In these two volumes, the only ones yet published, we believe, we have a very full, a very

elaborate, and a really learned treatise on Ontology, in the author's classification, the first part of philosophy. In it, and the general introduction which precedes it, the author, no doubt, shadows forth his whole system; but we can offer no final judgment on it, till we receive the treatises on the other parts, as he postpones to them the consideration of several important problems that we are in the habit of discussing in the prolegomena, before proceeding to the discussion of philosophy in its several divisions or subdivisions.

The Abbé Hugonin, whose name has hardly been heard in the philosophical world, possesses a philosophical genius of a high order, and various and profound philosophical learning. He deserves to rank among the very first living philosophers of his country. He is far superior to M. Cousin and his most eminent living disciple, M. Saisset, as a theologian, and his superiority as a theologian enables him to surpass them both by many degrees as a philosopher; for his theology gives him the true ontology, and serves as a touchstone to his ontological speculations. Though less remarkable than M. Cousin for the eloquence and brilliancy of his style, or the exquisite charm and grace of his diction, he thinks with depth and force, and expresses himself adequately. He writes with modesty, calmness, and candor, as a conscientious man and a sincere and earnest lover of truth and wisdom. His ultimate conclusions are in general sound and indisputable, whatever the judgment we may form of the process by which he obtains them. We own, however, that we should sympathize more fully with him, if we found him a little bolder, and less under the influence of the schools. He follows the method and adopts the language of the schools wherever he is able, and in deference to scholasticism raises and discusses a great variety of questions, which by a little care bestowed in correcting or amending its *principium* he might easily avoid or show to be simply no questions at all. No small portion of scholastic philosophy is an idle waste of thought, the consequence of adopting a false or erroneous point of departure, and serves only to perplex and mislead the student,—to conceal or obscure instead of disclosing and illustrating the truth. The learned and estimable author would, if he will permit us to say so, have greatly abridged his

own labors and those of his readers, if he had meditated more attentively the importance of settling the question of principles before proceeding to that of method. It is not the method that finds and settles the principles, but the principles that disclose and determine the method. It was M. Cousin's mistake,—a mistake which modern philosophy owes in great measure to René Descartes,—of making the question of method in the study of philosophy precede the question of principles, that has prevented him from taking rank with the greatest philosophers of ancient or modern times. But for that mistake, instead of an unscientific Eclecticism, sure to run into a more unscientific Syncretism, he would have given us a sound and living synthetic philosophy. Yet M. Cousin has great merits, and we should have taken it kindly in our author, if, while pointing out the errors of his illustrious countryman, he had shown himself more ready to recognize those merits, and to award him the honor he deserves for the services he has unquestionably rendered to philosophy in France.

In the classification of schools, the Abbé Hugonin is a decided ontologist, and like all the ontologists of his country we are acquainted with, too much under the influence of Père Malebranche to suit either our taste or our judgment. Malebranche was, we admit, a great philosophical genius, and in his theory of Vision in God revived a great truth, which the prevalence of Peripateticism had caused to be well-nigh forgotten. He was a great improvement upon Descartes, but he left philosophy one-sided as he found it. He did not, and could not with his theory, legitimately assert anything but a simply possible universe. He asserted essences but not existences, and left the vital question of the relation between essence and existence, *esse* and *existere*, unsolved. As an ontologist, the learned Abbé has in these volumes established that thought is not a purely subjective fact, that it is governed by laws independent of the subject, and that it depends for its production on the object. By a profound analysis of thought he has proved that it contains invariably and necessarily, as the very condition of its existence, an ontological element which is its law, and identically real and necessary being. In this he establishes the reality and objectivity of ideas or the ideal element of thought, and refutes at once both those who make the object

or the ideal the product of the subject, and those who maintain that being is no object of thought, and only phenomena are actually perceived. This, though it had been done before him, and is nothing new, original, or peculiar, is much, and we know of no one who has done it with greater depth of science, more thoroughly, or more conclusively. They who make philosophy purely subjective, or reduce it to mere phenomenology, denying all perception of the *noumenon*, are, in these volumes, so far as sound logic can go, reduced to silence for ever.

In the discussion of ideas, essences, universals, genera, and species, and the different theories respecting them, the author is learned, profound, and exhaustive. It may, perhaps, be a question whether he is quite just to Plato in reviving Aristotle's charge against him of regarding ideas as subsisting independently and outside of the Divine Being. From the little study we have been able to give to Plato's works, we think Aristotle either misunderstood or from rivalry wilfully misrepresented his theory of ideas. As we understand that theory, Plato held that ideas are the essences or realities of things, what in the variable and perishing things of sense we must know in order to have real science; that they are invariable, universal, and eternal, subsisting in the *λόγος*, the divine reason or wisdom, and independent of God only in the sense in which his essence, reason, or wisdom is independent of his power, or incapable of being changed by his will. They subsist necessarily and eternally in the divine intelligence, are that intelligence itself, and the law according to which the divine will or power operates. God may produce any existence he pleases, but no existence contrary to the eternal conception of his own mind, which is only saying he cannot, from the very perfection of his nature, contradict his own wisdom or annihilate himself. On this point St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and our author, in making ideas the uncreated forms or essences of things subsisting in the Divine mind, immutable, stable, universal, and eternal, are, we think, only strict Platonists. Plato's error was not, as we understand him, in making ideas which are necessary, invariable, universal, and eternal, distinguishable from God and independent of him, but in asserting the pre-existence of matter, and totally misconceiving the creative act of being.

In producing existences, God, according to Plato, simply impresses the idea, subsisting in his own mind, on the pre-existing matter, as the seal upon wax, and this too whether we speak of the production of the soul or of the body, which on the one hand asserts the Pythagorean dualism, and on the other denies the substantiality of existence, since the impression made by the seal has no existence in the seal, and no substantive existence in the wax, distinct from the wax itself, which involves a double pantheism, the one spiritual, the other material. If we trace Platonism in its historical developments, we shall find that, when unrestrained by Christian theology, it has invariably tended to dualism, pantheism, or both at the same time. But, however this may be, the author holds ideas to be objective, and the essences—*essenti rerum metaphysicæ* of the schoolmen, subsisting in God himself as the concepts of his own eternal reason, identical, since God is *actus simplicissimus*, with his own real, eternal, and necessary being.

The author distinguishes very properly between idea or essence and existence. The essence is being. It does not *exist*, it *is*, and is the Divine concept or conception of an existence, which may, but does not exist; or, in other words, of his own perfections, or the plenitude of his own being. From our point of view the essence or idea is simply possibility; from the point of view of being, it is the power or ability of being to produce existence. What the author means by existence, as distinguished from the idea or essence, is not very easy to collect, but he seems to regard it as the actuation of essence, or the concretion of the idea, and terms it limited being. Ideas or essences are possible existences, the eternal concepts of the Divine intelligence, and really the Divine being itself. We think them in the ontological element of thought, and really perceive them in perceiving being, as we perceive being in perceiving them. But essences are not existences, and the perception of them, which is the perfection of being, is not the perception of existences. What we perceive in the Divine Being is not existence, but the Divine being itself, and in perceiving the essence in God we make not the slightest advance towards the perception of existences. How, then, do we perceive existences or the physical essence? The author, if we do not mistake his meaning, holds that we

perceive them in or by their ideal or metaphysical essences; that is, the actual in or by the possible. But essences are not existences, for existences are not being. How, then, can we perceive existences even in or by their essence? Here is the difficulty.

The author takes his point of departure in thought, not in thought as a purely subjective fact, but thought in its contents, or the reality presented in it. Reducing thought to its simplest form, or simple perception, he finds that it simultaneously and invariably contains two elements, subject and object, subject thinking, and object thought. The object is distinct from, and independent of, the subject thinking. In perceiving the subject is passive, receives, but does not produce the perception. The object, in the act of thinking, is not produced, sought, or found, but presents itself as the necessary objective element of thought. It is precisely because it so presents itself that it is perceived, or rather its presentation of itself is the perception. Without the object there is nothing to be perceived, and therefore no perception; for to perceive nothing, and not to perceive, are one and the same thing. Then the law of thought, that which governs it, determines it, makes it what it is, and forbids it to be otherwise, is the object. We think the object such, because it is such, not because we are such. Hence what we will call the first law of thought, — the author calls it a fact of thought, — is that every thought must and does present the object, as well as the subject, and present it distinct from, and independent of, the subject.

The object, the author tells us, is idea, or the idea of being; and the idea of being, is being perceived or thought. Only ideas are immediately perceived, for only being is intelligible *per se*, and they are always perceived as universal, invariable, eternal, and necessary, and therefore are and must be the one real, universal, necessary, immutable, and eternal being; that is, if we consider it the Divine being itself. Hence the law of thought is ontological, is being: and therefore the second law of thought is, the direct and immediate object perceived in every perception, must be and is real and necessary being, or the Divine being itself, who is the truth perceived, and the light by which we perceive it and whatever else we perceive or know.

But here is the precise difficulty. The law of thought, as asserted by the author, is purely ontological, and he restricts the object of perception to being alone. Hence he says, positively, existences except the soul perceiving or receiving the perception, are not perceived,—are not perceptions. We perceive or have intuitive perception of being, the Divine Being, and our percipient soul. How, then, do we arrive at the knowledge of existences? We cannot know them in their metaphysical essences, for that would be saying that we know them in God; but we cannot know them where they are not, and, though essences are in God, existences are not. We cannot know them in the percipient soul, for the soul contains no existence but its own. We know existences, the author says, by their essence; not by perceptions but by a judgment, which, as he defines it, is not their act, but ours. But how explain a subjective judgment, which, with the perception only of essence or being, and our own soul, enables us to affirm scientifically existences distinguishable, on the one hand, from the essence, and on the other, from the soul? A judgment, to be a judgment, must have three distinct terms—subject, predicate, and copula. The copula at once unites and distinguishes the other two terms, and forms them into a synthesis, an organic whole. To be a valid judgment, the three terms must be perceived, and therefore be objective and real. We cannot understand, then, a real judgment, when one of its terms is unperceived and therefore unnoted. The author says the copula in every judgment, expressed by the verb *is* or *to be*, is being. We perceive, then, the copula in perceiving being, but what and where are the subject and predicate when it concerns affirming existences, of which we have no perception? He also makes being in every judgment the attribute or predicate. Thus the judgment would be, existences are being, which is as false as the judgment, being is existence, even if we had the notion of existence, which we are supposed not to have. In either case the judgment has but two terms; in the former the copula and predicate, in the latter the subject and copula are identical; the judgment, therefore, is no judgment at all. No judgment that affirms what is false, is or can be a real judgment, for the false cannot be affirmed, any more than it can be perceived,—

a fact, which the author seems not to have duly considered. In every real or synthetic judgment, there must be three distinct terms, and every false judgment is really no judgment, because in it one of the terms is wanting. Hence if we make simple, quiescent being the copula, the only possible judgment will be, Being is being. With simple being for the copula, the judgment can affirm only being, because in that case we must make either the subject and copula, or the copula and predicate, identical. This fact may possibly require a slight revision of the peripatetic logic, still taught in the schools. In maintaining, after Bossuet, that the copula simply identifies the subject and predicate, the author can hardly escape pantheism. The copula unites, but does not identify them, for while it unites it distinguishes them.

The author deserves great credit for asserting thought or perception as a synthesis of subject and object, but he seems to forget that for a proper synthesis, there is necessary a term which he does not include in the primitive perception, a term too without which, we venture to say, neither of the others is perceptible, namely, the relation between subject and object, the real *nexus* or copula that distinguishes and unites the subject and predicate in a real judgment. He adjourns, as we understand him, the discussion of this *nexus* or *copula* to his treatise on Cosmology, not yet forthcoming. How he will treat it there, we cannot say. He may, and we trust he will, accept it in its real character, and give it in its real place in his *principium*. Yet he must pardon us, if we say we see not how he can do it, without essentially modifying much he has said in the volumes before us. He has, so far as we can see, made no provision for it, for he restricts, or appears to restrict, thought to two terms, not only by naming and describing only two terms, but by denying the immediate perception of existences, and identifying the copula and predicate with being. He is bound by his own principles to take thought in its integrity, in all its real elements for his point of departure; and the third term, the relation between object and subject, between being and existence, is as real, as necessary, and as certain an element of thought as either of the other two. This relation, the real *nexus* of things, and therefore of the elements of perception, we

all know from our theology at least, is the creative act of being producing existences from nothing. We never perceive object and subject, being and existence, without perceiving them in their real relation, because in perception, as the author maintains, we are passive, and only the real is perceived. He denies, indeed, the perception of all existences, except the soul, but if he concedes the perception of the soul, he must concede the perception of existence distinguishable from being. Existence cannot be perceived in itself, for it has no being in itself, and it is agreed that only being is intelligible either *in se* or *per se*. Existences cannot be perceived in being, for what is in being, is being, and existence is not being, but distinguishable from it. It is perceived by being, we grant; but it can be perceived, for only the real is perceived, by being, only in the sense that it exists by being, therefore only in its real relation to being. Existence is by being because it is from being, and it is from being only *mediante actu entis creativo*, and therefore can be perceived only *mediante* that act, and consequently by the perception of that act itself, the real relation or copula between it and being.

The author has failed to see this, by failing to note that every perception,—*intuition* is the word we prefer,—is a real judgment, with the three necessary terms of a judgment, subject, predicate, and copula. He denies this, and maintains that in perception we are passive; in judgment we act. Every judgment affirms; perception simply apprehends without affirming. Without *our* affirming, we grant; but not without an affirmation on the part of the object, otherwise there would be no perception, since the affirmation of the object to us by itself is precisely what is meant by the perception, and it is this simple fact that gives objective validity to the perception, and saves it from being a purely subjective mode or affection. In perception the object presents itself, and to present itself to the subject perceiving is precisely to affirm that it is or exists. The judgment which is our act must be a reflective judgment, and as reflection supplies no element or term not included in the perception, however you distinguish between perception and judgment, you must concede that perception embraces all the terms essential to the judgment, and as there is no judgment without the three terms, subject, predicate,

and copula, you must concede that these three terms are immediately perceived as the three terms of an ideal or objective judgment. Without this objective or ideal judgment, we can form no subjective or reflective judgment, because without it we have not and cannot have the three terms essential to every judgment whether subjective or objective, since it will not do, as the author very well knows, to assume that the subject creates or supplies from itself the terms or any one of the terms of its judgment. To do that would plunge us into humanitarian pantheism. It was the error of Leroux.

The law of thought as defined by the author makes being the copula and the predicate of the judgment, and therefore, as being, not existence, must be the subject, he can affirm only being is, *ens est*, and there, as it seems to us, his philosophy begins and ends. Being contains all the terms of a judgment in itself, for who says being, says being is, and therefore being is the adequate object of its own intelligence. Hence God who is being contains the perfection of his own attributes in himself, and is, as the schoolmen say, after Aristotle, *actus purissimus*, most pure act, and has no need to go out of himself for his perfection or his beatitude. The law of thought is rightly defined to be ontological, in the sense that being supplies the copula, but not in the sense that being is it, for that would imply that the subject and predicate are identical, and the judgment would be either that existence is being, or being is existence, the soul perceiving is God, or God is the soul perceiving. The copula, since it cannot be being in itself, must as supplied by being, be being in its act, and therefore the copula must be the creative act of being, and the ideal or objective judgment, the law of every human judgment, will not be *ens est* nor *existens* or *existentia est ens*, but *ens creat existentias*, or being creates existences, a judgment that expresses the real order or the real relation of things, *ordo rerum*. The mistake is precisely in supposing that we perceive existence as *ens*, and in making *ens* simply, and not *ens creans*, or being in its creative act, the copula of the judgment. The judgment, as we state it, confounds none of the terms, but preserves them united indeed, yet distinct.

Certainly it does not enter into our head for one moment

to accuse the learned and estimable author of denying the creative act; all we mean is that he does not regard it as a primitive perception, or intuition, and fails to include it as one of the original and essential elements of thought. He omits it from his *primum philosophicum*, and thus fails to include in it all our primitive notions, without which philosophy is not and cannot be a science. Thought, as he presents it, is inadequate, and does not give us all our primitive notions in its synthesis. He is right in holding that only being is intelligible *per se*, and that existences are intelligible only by being, and by a real judgment; but we think he is wrong in supposing that the judgment by which they are affirmed is a judgment made by us in the light of being, and not a judgment made by being itself and simply perceived by us, or in supposing that it is being in itself and not being in its act that renders existences intelligible. Being creates existences, and in creating illumines them; so the medium of our apprehension of them is not our reflective judgment, as we understand him to hold, but the creative act itself, affirmed to us in simple perception as really and as truly as being or as our own soul as the thinking subject. Thought is then not a perception of one or even two terms only, but is, as M. Cousin, among others, has fully proved in his analysis of what he calls the fact of consciousness, "simultaneously and indissolubly composed of three indestructible elements, subject, object, and their relation." The relation he calls the form of the thought.

M. Cousin's principal merit as a philosopher, and by no means a small merit, lies in his assertion of thought as a synthesis, embracing at once, and indissolubly, subject, object, and their relation. He rightly called the relation the form of the thought, or the copula of the judgment, as we say, although he appears never to have suspected its real character. He made the synthesis, as he understood it, the basis of his Eclecticism, but misconceiving the form or copula, and failing to identify it with the creative act of being, or at least with that act in its real character, he failed to give us a true synthetic philosophy, and left his eclecticism to run now into pantheism, now into pure subjectivism, or to expire in an unscientific syncretism, which embraces truth and error without discrimination. Leroux, who deserves, as a profound philosophical thinker, more

credit than he usually receives from his countrymen, appreciated far better than M. Cousin the importance of the formula, and rightly conceived that the relation or the form of the thought, is the act of the force producing the thought; but, by a mistake, not unlike the one we have pointed out in our author, he confounded this force or being with the subject; regarded the individual man as merely phenomenal, as, in his language, *sensation-sentiment-connaissance*, and placed all productive power in humanity or the race, thus falling into a peculiar sort of humanitarian pantheism. The merit of Leroux consists in having identified the form with the act of being; his error consists in mistaking the character of the act, and placing the being, or the productive force, on the side of the subject, instead of the side of the object, which, logically, forced him to assert humanity as God. The Italian, Abbate Gioberti, a theologian, and a man of rare philosophical genius, followed, saw, and avoided the vagueness and uncertainty of Cousin and the fatal error of Leroux, detected and described the real character of the relation, the copula, or form of the thought—derived it, not, as did Leroux, from the subject, but from the object, and showed it to be the creative act of being, by which being produces all things or existences from nothing; or *sine causa materiali*, by its own omnipotent energy, thus identifying the synthesis of thought with the real synthesis of things, being and existence. He thus identified the *ordo sciendi* with the *ordo rerum*. Henceforth, philosophy was what it had never hitherto been, a possible science—the science of reality, not the science of mere abstractions, which, since abstractions are nullities, is no science at all.

It may seem a bold assertion, but we do not hesitate to say, that prior to the perfection of the Giobertian formula, philosophy was not, and could not be a science. Science is the reproduction in reflection of the real in its real synthesis, and before the recognition in its place of the real copula of being and existence, that was not possible. Science is science of the true, and not of the false, and the truth could not be scientifically asserted while its elements could not be asserted with their real *nexus*. In theology, we have and know the truth, truth itself; but we need only a glance at the history of philosophy, to be aware, that philosophy, as a separate science, has never accorded with the ontology

asserted by Christian theology. We find it always dualistic and pantheistic as with Pythagoras and Plato, or dualistic, sensistic, nihilistic, as with Aristotle and the peripathetics;—pantheistic with the mediæval realists and the modern ontologists;—sensistic, atheistic, nihilistic, with the mediæval nominalists and modern psychologists. Always do we find it when left to itself, when free to develop its own principles according to the natural logic of the human mind, running from one direction or another athwart the only ontology that accords with our faith as Christians; always has the great struggle in thinking minds been to accord philosophy and theology, and the great problem of our age, as all the world bears witness, is the reconciliation of reason and faith, so as to bring into mutual harmony all the elements of man's intellectual life. Out of the Church, men attempt this, by modifying their faith, so as to make it accord with what they call their reason; inside of the Church, there may be individuals who wish it were lawful for them to do the same; but they, who are *of* as well as *in* the Church, pocket their philosophical formulas when it comes to matters of faith; and believe what the Church teaches, because they know she is infallible through the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and cannot deceive them.

The fact cannot be denied, and hence we find men of strong practical good sense in every age, from St. Irenæus down to our own times, looking with distrust on all metaphysical speculations, and discountenancing them as far more likely to perplex the mind, and to generate doubts and difficulties which philosophy cannot solve, than to aid any one either in comprehending or in adhering to the truth. It is all very well to tell these men that what they set their faces against is a false philosophy, that there is no discrepancy between reason and faith, and can be none between true philosophy and Christian theology; but where is that true philosophy, or that exposition of natural reason between which and Christian faith there is no discrepancy? It is as unwise to reason against facts as to kick against the pricks. You may talk to me in grandiloquent terms of your pretended Christian philosophy, but though studying the question for no mean portion of my life, I confess, I have never yet been able to find your boasted Christian

philosophy. There is no such thing recognized in any of your schools, orthodox or heterodox, as a philosophy that accords with Christianity. Separate from theology, disjoined from the dogma, and taken as an independent science of natural reason, philosophy is Gentilistic, and remains to this day, unless the ideal formula be accepted, substantially, where it was left by Plato and Aristotle. Certainly, the great theologians of the Church, in setting forth, elucidating, and vindicating the Catholic dogma, reason justly, and use sound philosophy, but not one of these same theologians gives us, outside of theology, unconnected with the dogma, a philosophy, or science of reason, that is complete, self-coherent, and accordant with the Catechism. St. Augustine avoids the chief errors of Plato, and gives us much, more perhaps than any other Father of the Church, that must enter into every sound system of philosophy; but a complete and adequate system of philosophy, a full and complete science of natural reason, he certainly has not given us. St. Thomas, when he uses natural reason as a theologian in face of the dogma, seldom, if ever, errs, but when he leaves theology, and speaks *ex professo*, as an independent philosopher, he is a peripatetic, and can by no means be always followed with perfect security. No man, however ingenious, can free his philosophy from the charge of conceptualism, another name for nominalism, or reconcile his peripatetic maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, with the ontology presupposed by faith. That maxim logically involves the sensism of Locke and Condillac, which, as all the world knows, leads to materialism, atheism, scepticism, nihilism. No doubt, St. Thomas holds, as did Aristotle himself, that we have, through the intelligible species, extracted by the *intellectus agens* from the sensible species or phantasms, a real cognition of the intelligible or non-sensible, as Locke pretended to have in reflection another source of ideas than sensation; but this, in a systematic point of view, is no relief, because we have, in the way pretended, no real recognition of the non-sensible, and because if we had, it would only be in contradiction of the maxim assumed. St. Thomas was a great theologian, a man of rare gifts; he knew and loved the truth, and he would adhere to the truth, whether he adhered to his system or not, and much preferred contradicting himself to contradicting

that. If so much may be said of these two greatest theologians of the Church, we need name no others.

We know the ideal formula, asserted by Gioberti, is not in good repute in certain quarters, and we have read much, very little to the purpose however, that has been written against it. Men who follow the traditions of the schools, and who never suffer themselves to think beyond the cahiers of the master, or to look at things themselves, save through the blurred pages of their text-books, must find it really difficult to recognize the truth of a formula, which no hydraulic pressure can force within their own narrow and inexpansive systems, and which necessarily shivers them to atoms. Men of this sort deserve our sympathy, not our reproaches. If the formula be accepted, though strictly in accord with theology and the truth of things, their old formulas are useless lumber, and the greater part of their labor on abstractions, and to overcome difficulties created by their own speculative systems, must be confessed to have been so much labor expended for nothing. Yet, it seems to us that a moderate acquaintance with the history of philosophy would suffice to satisfy men who think for themselves—where free thought is not only permissible, but a duty—that unless that formula be accepted, and the real relation between being and existence be asserted in our *primum philosophicum*, it is idle to strive for a philosophical science that shall accord either with Christian faith, or with common sense. Without it, your philosophy will always either lose the object in asserting the subject, or the subject in asserting the object, and by losing either lose both, or, with Hegel, end by declaring the absolute identity of being and not-being. We undertake no defence of Gioberti as a man, a politician, or an Italian patriot, but we will never suffer our dislike of the person to prejudice us against the truth he asserts. We have no sympathy with his war on the illustrious Society of Jesus—a society we love and honor; we have never been able to read, without indignation, his *Gesuita Moderno*, or his *Del Rinnovamento civile d'Italia*; we find much in his *Del Bello*, his *Del Buono*, and in his *Del Primato*, that we cannot accept; we are far from clear in our own mind as to the faculty he calls *sovrintelligenza* and which he seems to make a sort of natural bridge between the natural and the supernatural, over which the

supernatural may pass and unite itself with the natural; we regret, for his sake, that he did not bear with Christian meekness and patience, the opposition he encountered, when, in his own judgment, he did not deserve to be opposed, instead of yielding, as he would seem to have done, to the dictates of offended pride and wounded vanity. But, we have nothing to do with anything of this sort. The whole contribution he has made to philosophy is in asserting the creative act of being as a fact of primitive intuition, as the copula of the divine judgment, which must be taken as our *primum philosophicum*, and which is the law, type, and model of every human judgment, in so far as the human judgment is a real judgment. This contribution he has made, and it were cowardly and ungrateful not to give him credit for it. Yet what Gioberti may have said or not said, may have done or not done, except so far as it bears on this point, does not concern us as a philosopher. It is true, he has asserted the ontological element of thought, and proved that the intelligible is real and necessary being, but this had been done before him, by Plato, St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Malebranche, Thomassin, Leibnitz, Fénelon, Gerdil, indeed by all the so-called ontologists. On this point, we needed little more than we had received from Plato through St. Augustine. Others had identified the ideal with the intelligible, and the intelligible with real and necessary being; but no philosopher before him had, so far as our knowledge extends, shown, or even asserted, that the being with which the ideal or intelligible is identical, is not being in itself, not simply quiescent being, being perceived or contemplated in itself, but being creating existence, thus presenting the ideal, not as a unity, but as a synthesis, embracing at once being in its act *ad extra*, and the act in its effect or product—being not as the essence of existence, but as creating existence. This may well be included under the head of being, because existence, that is, the creature, is being *mediante actu entis creativo*. Gioberti supplied the *nexus* between being and existence—not by supplying independently of the other two terms conceived to be known without it, the copula needed to unite them, but by showing that the copula is perceived with the other two terms in its proper relation, and that neither of these two terms is ever perceived without it. All Gentile philoso-

phy had overlooked or denied the creative act of being, at least had failed to include it in its *principium*. This was the grand defect of Gentile philosophy, that which ruined it. The Fathers asserted creation, but they borrowed the notion from theology, never included it in their *principium*, and, at best, made it only an *addendum* to philosophy, or a late deduction from principles subsequently taken up. The scholastics, no doubt, have long reasonings to prove creation, or the creative act of being asserted by faith, but they, one and all, omit it from their *principium*; and while, as theologians, they speak in due terms of Creator and creature, as philosophers they speak of *ens simpliciter* and *ens secundum quid*, *ens infinitum* and *ens finitum*, unlimited being and limited being, as do all our modern ontologists, even our author, Professor Ubaghs of Louvain, and the estimable author of *Prælectiones Philosophicæ*, reviewed some time ago in these pages, and really in its second edition, one of the very best manuals of philosophy we are acquainted with, thus making the difference between being and existence, or God and man, a simple limitation or negation. Defined *per genus*, as they say in the schools, God and man are the same: defined *per differentiam*, God is unlimited, and man is limited being. The *differentia* is in the limitation. It is not difficult to understand this in an Aristotle, who denied creation and asserted the eternity of the world, but I do not understand it in a Christian who asserts in his very *credo*, that God is the maker of all things, visible and invisible. It is to no manner of purpose to admonish us that *ens* when applied to man is not used in the same sense—*univoce*—as when applied to God, and therefore, that God and man are not included in the same genus, for the scholastic term *ens* has really but one meaning, and is always used, whatever may be said to the contrary, *univoce*. *Ens finitum*, in that it is *ens*, does, in no sense, differ from *ens infinitum*, and *ens secundum quid*, if *ens* at all, is *ens simpliciter*. Being, if being is always one and identical; and limited being, unless we use the term loosely for existence or *existentia*, is a contradiction in terms. All being is and must be unlimited, infinite, and therefore, to define existence, as so many do, to be the delimitation, or determination of essence or being, is to fall into the vice of pantheism, or rather, is simply absurd. The Abbé Hugo-

nin says truly, idea, essence, or being, is always thought as one, universal, real, and necessary. Then, how can we speak of *limited* being? Existence is the production or creation, not the limitation of being. Whether we speak of being in itself, or being as the essence or archetype of existence, it is the one real, infinite, and necessary being, and is as unlimited as the being of man, as the being of God himself, and therefore it is the Apostle tells us we have our *being* in God.

It is true, we may speak of essences, possibilities, &c., in the plural, but these terms express conceptions, not intuitions, and they are plural only in the respect that being, in which they subsist, and which they are, may create many existences. The plurality is in the existence, not in the essence, for there is no distinction *in re* between *essentia* and *esse*. The ideas, essences, essential forms of things, which, according to Plato, are the original types, models, or paradigms of things subsisting in the Divine Reason or Intelligence, are not in reality, or in simple perception, distinguishable from the Divine being itself. In intuition they are not distinguished at all. Conceived as types, or models of existences, they are the Divine intelligence; conceived as the possibilities of existences, they are the Divine power, omnipotence, or ability to create existences according to the eternal concepts of Divine wisdom. But as there is no real distinction, and in the perceptive order no distinction at all, between *essentia* and *esse*, neither *distinctio rationis*, nor *distinctio rationis ratiocinata*, between the Divine being and the Divine attributes, or between one attribute and another. Since God is *actus simplicissimus*, they are on the side of being one in the unity of being. The plurality, the diversity, the limitation, are then in the existence, and not in the essence.

The Abbé Hugonin distinguishes, though not with perfect accuracy, between perception and reflection, which is highly important, but we fear he falls into the common error of confounding them in the actual construction of his philosophy. All perception is synthetic; all reflection is analytic; perception presents the real and the concrete; reflection analyzes and represents the abstract and the possible. Reflection is, of course, the instrument of philo-

sophy, but it is necessary that it take its principles from perception or intuition, and that it take all the principles intuitively presented in their real relation. It is also necessary that it take care not to transport into the *principium*, or include among our primitive notions, any conceptions of its own. It is the neglect of this rule that has led philosophers to suppose that they could perceive being apart from the creative act, or existence apart from its relation to being, from which it proceeds and on which it depends. We can do this in the reflective order; we may abstract the notion of being, consider it by itself, and construct the science of ontology; we may abstract the notion of the creative act, and construct the science of cosmology; we may abstract the notion of existence and construct psychology and the natural sciences, or we may take the three terms in their synthesis and construct philosophy or natural theology. But because we can conceive the terms separately, we must not suppose that we *perceive* them separately, or that we derive by reflection the notions of creation and existence from the notion of being. Notions are always from perception, never from reflection; for reflection can add nothing to perception, or enable us to note anything beyond the matter intuitively presented or affirmed; a fact the philosopher must never lose sight of.

Yet it is precisely by losing sight of this fact and confounding the two orders, that the author is led to suppose that we perceive essences, and existences in or by their essences; meaning as we presume he does, not the physical or created essence, which is the nature of the thing itself, as distinguished from its modes or accidents, but the metaphysical essence, that is, mere possibility. We do not perceive the essence, and then proceed to the existence; first, because the existence is not in the essence, and in perceiving essences we perceive only being; second, because the actual is not inferable from the possible; since *argumentum a posse ad esse, non valet*; third, because we do not perceive the essence, or the possible as essence, or as possible at all, for we only perceive being in which is the essence or the power to create existences. Essence or possibility, formally such, is not a perception, but a conception formed by reflection from the notions of being and existence, as the author proves in a masterly manner in proving

that the perception is real, or that the being perceived is always real and necessary being, and in refuting Rosmini, who asserts *ens in genere*, or mere possible being, as the primitive notion. It is the same neglect to keep the two orders distinct, that leads to the supposition that we perceive being and existence without perceiving the relation between them. The relation between essence and existences, that is, between real necessary being and contingent existences, in plain words, between God and man, our author says, is a mystery. Between them there is a gulf natural reason can neither fill up nor bridge over. We see the two terms, but the *nexus* that unites them is shrouded in thick and impenetrable darkness. Why, then, talk of philosophy, and puzzle our brains and bewilder our understanding with subtle abstractions and wire-spun speculation, that do and can amount to nothing? It is impossible to perceive existence out of the creative act that produces it, for out of that it is nothing, and nothing cannot be perceived. Hence the author tells us in another place that existences are not perceived, that we perceive only being and our soul perceiving. Then we have only two notions, the notion of being, and the notion of soul perceiving. These two notions then constitute our *principium*, and nothing can be admitted to be or to exist not contained in these two notions. The notion of existence cannot be derived from the notion of being, unless it is contained in the notion of being, and if contained in the notion of being God must be necessarily a creator, and can be only inasmuch as he is a *cause*, and a cause *ad extra*,—the error of Cousin, which makes the universe a necessary, unfolding, development, or manifestation of God,—decided pantheism. Take, then, the notion of the soul perceiving. The soul perceiving conceived not as united to God and distinguished from him by the creative act, can be conceived only as *ens*, and then it is put in the place of God, and nothing can be asserted not contained in the radical notion of being. We are here forced to the same conclusion we were before, only in this case we identify the soul with being, and call ourselves God,—the doctrine of the Transcendentalists. The universe is then simply a progressive development of the *Ego*, *le moi*, the *me*, and we must claim the Incommunicable Name for our *Ego*, and each of us say of himself, I AM WHO AM.

Take the two notions without the notion of the *nexus* or relation, and you have simply the conception of two real, necessary independent, self-existing beings, each infinite, which we need not say is simply absurd.

It would surprise us, if we did not know the force of routine, after all our experience in every age and on every side, of the fatal consequences of attempting to operate with the ontological notion alone, or with the psychological notion alone, or with both without their real *nexus*, to find men who are deficient neither in acuteness nor in comprehensiveness failing to perceive that unless the two notions are united by a third in the *principium* or ideal judgment, so as to form a real synthesis, a living organism, philosophy is an impossible science, a vain, indeed a mischievous illusion, and that the conflict between it and theology must be interminable. Even making all allowance for routine, it strikes us as remarkable that philosophy, as taught in all our schools, orthodox as well as heterodox, should, as a separate and independent science of reason we mean, not in its connection with dogma, present, after two thousand years of Christian faith and instruction, the very gap it presented under Gentilism. If that gap in its *principium* be inevitable, if natural reason be unable to fill it up by including the creative act in the ideal judgment, why do we still look upon philosophy as a legitimate study, and why has it not long since been banished from our schools, and relegated to the dark regions of the occult sciences and the black art? Why perpetuate a miserable sham? Why not have the courage to look the truth in the face?

Certainly we are far enough from pretending that we can comprehend the mystery of creation. Natural reason cannot comprehend that mystery any more than it can the mysteries of grace. In creation, as well as in redemption, God works in a way incomprehensible to us; but that is not saying that we cannot by natural reason both apprehend and comprehend the fact that he does work. Certainly we cannot comprehend the creative act, but it does not therefore follow, that we have not an intuitive apprehension of it as the *nexus* that unites and distinguishes being and existence. There is no more mystery in *ens creans* than in simply *ens*, and it is only in or through *ens creans* or being creating our intelligence and presenting *ens* as its

immediate object and light, that *ens* or being itself is perceived by us, for otherwise there would be no *us*. We should neither exist as intelligent existence nor as existence at all.

We must beware of exaggerating our perception of being. We perceive being *by* itself indeed, but not *in* itself. *Ens* is intelligible *per se*, not intelligible to us in our present state, *in se*. To be intelligible to us *in se*, we must be able by our own act to see God in himself, which is not possible without that elevation of our nature, or that assimilation to the divine nature, which theologians call the *ens supernaturale*, and which is the reward of the Blest in heaven. In this state of existence, we cannot behold being face to face and see as we are seen. We perceive being *per se*, but to perceive being *per se* is to perceive it only by its affirmation of itself. Its affirmation of itself is an act, the creative act itself, creating and illuminating our intelligence, or the very percipient subject that receives the affirmation. It is being, as the learned Abbé admirably proves, that presents and affirms itself, and hence we know being only by the act of being. It is thus we understand the words of the great Apostle of the Gentiles: "*Invisibilia . . . ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas.*"* Not that either being or the invisible things of being are deduced, concluded, or obtained by reasoning from the things which are made, but *conspiciuntur*, are clearly seen by the creative act of being, since by that act they are *intellecta*, νοούμενα, or affirmed to our intellect or noetic faculty.

The learned author sees this and in reality asserts it, though he apparently does not appreciate the full force of his language, when he asserts that being which is the object perceived is truth, not a quiescent or sterile truth, but living truth, truth in its activity and fecundity. Where to us he seems to err is in restricting the object or the ideal to the purely ontological, which really gives him as his *principium* only the notion of pure being. From the notion of pure being he seems to us to derive the notion of essence or possibility; indeed at times he seems to confound the notion of being with the notion, or rather, conception of essences, the mere possibilities

* Romans, i. 20.

of things, which involves the radical error of Rosmini. But though being contains the essences of things, yet the notion of being is not itself the notion of essences. The conception of being as essence, whether we take the essence in the sense of archetype or possibility, is an abstract conception posterior to the notion of being and that of existence. The ideal must embrace more than the notion of pure being, and if restricted to the ontological, the ontological must be understood to include all that is affirmed ontologically, or by being in the primitive intuition. The notion of pure being does not contain either the notion of creation or that of existence, actual or possible. We therefore cannot accept the theory of Père Malebranche, that we see all things in God. We see things *per Deum*, not *in Deo*. We see *in Deo* only *Deum*. From the notion of pure being, we can obtain only the notion of pure being, and the notion, or conception rather, of essence, is obtained by reflection operating on the joint notions given us in the ideal judgment, and in a fact of experience, as is maintained by Aristotle against Plato. We cannot assume that the notion of being contains the notion either of creation or existence, actual or possible, without assuming that God is necessarily a creator, therefore that *being* is in *doing* or causing, and thus falling into the nihilism of Hegel, that creation is Infinite Possibility realizing itself, or progressively filling up the infinite void in its own being. Then to escape this ontological nihilism, if we may use the terms which exactly express the Hegelian contradiction, and also psychological nihilism, which would equally follow, if we were to take the notion of our personal existence with René Descartes for our *principium*, we must extend the object so that it embraces not only the *primum ontologicum* but also the *primum psychologicum* in their real synthesis, expressed in the ideal judgment, or judgment made not by us, but by being itself to us, that is, Being creating existences, which gives us the primitive notions of being, creation, existence, and therefore of all the *knowable*, since they are the notions of all the real. Nothing is knowable but the real, and all the real is being, being itself, its act, and the product of its act. What is not being is existence, and what is not existence is being. God and creature are the only two possible categories; what is not God is creature, and what is not creature is God. In

these two categories then, and their *nexus*, is necessarily included all the real, and therefore all the knowable.

This formula we call ideal, because it is the object of thought, or what is affirmed in thought; we call it ontological, although it includes the *primum psychologicum* as well as the *primum ontologicum*, because the affirmation is made by being and not by the soul, or subject thinking. The truth of the formula no Christian does or can dispute. The dispute is as to whether it is really given in the primitive intuition, or only arrived at by reasoning as the last word of philosophy. Some admit the notion of being to be primitive; some hold that the notion of existence or the soul is primitive; none, prior to Gioberti, so far as we are informed, have admitted the notion of creation to be primitive, that is, directly and immediately perceived. The only objection that we have to meet is, that the three terms of the formula, at least one or more of them, are not perceived or affirmed to us in direct and immediate intuition, and if entertained at all, are obtained from reflection. This object we have already met and refuted in showing, as we think we have done, that unless the three terms are given in immediate intuition, no judgment, no thought even, is possible. If you ask me to go farther and prove that we really do think, I must beg to be excused; for I have nothing but thought with which to prove thought, as happily you have nothing but thought with which to question, doubt, or deny thought. Thought thinks itself, and in thinking affirms itself. I cannot go behind thought, and from principles more ultimate than those given in thought demonstrate that I think. I can show that what I think is not myself projected, is distinct from and independent of me; I can show that I cannot think without thinking the object, and that the object is the very law of the thought, as the Abbé Hugonin admirably and amply proves; but I cannot prove that those notions I assert enter into every thought or are immediately perceived, except by proving that they are the necessary principles of thought, and that there can be no thought without them. Farther than this I concede I cannot go, but farther than this proof in no case ever does or can go, or is ever demanded by any who understands himself.

Principles are given, not found, not demonstrated.

Demonstration does not affirm its principles, for it always proceeds from them as already known, or assumed to be known. The mind cannot act or even exist without principles. It does not without principles go forth weeping and wailing, like the poor Isis, in search of principles, for till it has principles, it cannot act, cannot even exist, for the principles are the very elements of its life. All the principles essential to its existence as intelligent existence must be given it in the very instant of its creation, for without them there is not only no thought, no intelligent act, but no intelligence, no mind to think or perceive. These essential principles, the elements of all intellectual power and vitality in the soul, we have proved, are the three terms of the ideal formula, and the affirmation of these three terms by being creates and illumines the thinking substance itself, which is at once the product and recipient of the affirmation. Being creates the thinking subject in and by the very act by which it affirms itself its immediate object and light. The principles are not principles presented or supplied to a mind conceived as existing prior to the presentation and without them. Precisely what we mean is that without them the thinking substance is not created, does not exist. The affirmation is the creation of the soul itself, and the three terms in their living union are the elements of its intellectual existence and vitality. Unless, therefore, the three terms are given intuitively, in immediate perception, no perception, no thought, no intellectual operation, no human act of any kind is possible, for there is no intellectual subject, no *vis activa*. Having proved that these three terms are the essential elements of our intellectual life, and that there can be no thought without their immediate perception, we have proved that they are immediately perceived, if thought be a fact. The only point we have not proved is that there is thought, and that needs no proof, for it thinks or affirms itself, both apodictically and empirically.

Here we might stop, for our argument requires not another word; but we will add a few considerations by way of explanation and confirmation. We hardly need advertise the philosophical reader that in representing the three terms of the ideal judgment as immediately perceived, we are not speaking of an empirical perception, which is

the act of the subject, what the author calls a judgment, and which we form by means of a contingent fact taken from experience, and the apodictic element supplied by the ideal judgment; but we are speaking of a perception *à priori*, a perception which precedes our perceptive act, a perception which is the judgment of being, the principle of the ideal formula, and of which the subject is the simple spectator or recipient. It is the origin, the law, the necessary condition *à priori* of every empirical judgment or perception, in the same sense and for the same reason, that the creative act is the origin, the law, and the condition of existences themselves. What renders so many unwilling or unable to admit this *à priori* perception, is that they confound it with empirical perception, and recognize no perception which is not primarily the act of the percipient subject. Certain that they have no empirical perception in the case, they feel perfectly authorized to deny that there is any perception at all. There is no perception in their sense of the word, and which, we believe, is its ordinary and natural sense. *To perceive* is an active verb, and by its own force implies that we seize the object, rather than that the object affirms itself to us. We do not approve its use in the author's sense, and we rarely use it ourselves, except to express an empirical fact, for we admit no distinction between judgment and perception, and hold that every perception is a judgment. We use it in this article simply because it is the official term of the author we are reviewing; but the term we prefer is intuition, a *looking on*, which presents us not as actors, but as spectators, or the whole judgment as the act of being, and therefore apodictic, and nothing as empirical or subjective but the mere reception of the judgment. Understanding by the intuition the judgment of being which places the subject and renders it percipient, and carefully distinguishing it from the empirical judgment or perception, which is our act in union with the apodictic judgment, the difficulty will vanish, and every one who understands the problem will see that the three terms of the ideal formula must be given *à priori* or intuitively by the act of being itself, and therefore are so given since here the *must* and the *is* are identical.

When we say the creative act is immediately perceived or given in immediate intuition, we by no means pretend

that we perceive it in an empirical judgment. The difficulty felt by men not unacquainted with philosophical studies, in admitting our assertion, arises, we apprehend, precisely from their not making this distinction between the empirical judgment and the judgment *à priori*. Certainly the creative act is not empirically perceived, for it has been well proved by Hume, and more especially by Kant, that the *nexus* between cause and effect is and can be no object of experience or empirical perception, and yet we cannot make a single proposition, or utter a single sentence, without assuming it. How could this be, if there did not enter into every empirical thought the non-empirical perception or intuition of that *nexus*? To say with Kant that it is a subjective form, is nonsense, for that would deny alike all empirical and all non-empirical perceptions. Our philosophers, though they exclude the notion of cause from their *principium*, yet undertake, before ending their course, to prove that the universe is created, and that God is creator, creating all things from nothing, by the omnipotent energy of his word alone. How is it that they do not perceive that they have, prior to commencing their demonstration, the notion of creation in their minds, and have everywhere been using it as the principle of their demonstration? Given the notion of being, the notion of creation does not follow, for the notion of being suffices for itself. Being is its own adequate object, and has its perfection in itself; nothing in the notion of it implies that it must or does create or produce *ad extra*. It cannot be deduced from the notion of existence, because it is not in existence, and because the notion of existence itself is not possible without the notion of creation.

The attempt to derive the notion of creation by way of logical deduction from the notion of being, presupposes that being is necessarily a creator, and ends, as we have seen, in pantheism. The attempt to derive it from the notion of existences, the more common attempt in our days, ends in modern deism, as gross an error as pantheism, and even more offensive to the religious sentiment. Pantheism is the error of a religiously-disposed, deism of an irreligious-disposed mind; the one absorbs the act in the actor, the other the actor in the act; the one makes the creation a mode or affection of the Creator, the other withdraws the

creation from God, and assumes that the creation, when once created, stands alone, and suffices for itself. In order to suppose it possible to have the intuition of existences without the notion of creation, we must suppose them to be substances containing their own *substans*, or that which stands under and makes them *substantia* in relation to their own acts, affections, or phenomena. Well accredited philosophers do suppose this, and few suppose otherwise, except pantheists. They call existences substances, and define substance to be that which can be thought *per se*, not *tamquam in subjecto*. *Tamquam in subjecto* is, we suspect, an after-thought, and merely says the substance is not mode, affection, property, or attribute. If the existence is perceptible, *per se*, it exists *per se*; and if it exists *per se*, although it may have been created, it contains in itself its own *substans*, and is *substans* as well as *substantia*. This is what we call deism, the error directly opposed to pantheism, and is the doctrine of those who profess to believe in God and creation, and yet deny Providence and supernatural revelation. The doctrine is well known. It calls God an artificer, a mechanic, and likens him to a watchmaker, and the universe to a watch, which when once made, its springs and wheels properly adjusted, wound up, and set a-going, will go of itself—till run down. It forgets that the force or power that propels the machinery is independent both of the watch and its maker. The watchmaker creates nothing; he only uses materials and forces applied to his hand, only arranges his machinery, and adapts it to a force which is neither in him nor in his mechanism. It makes *actus creativus actus transiens*, producing its effect and passing from it or ceasing, leaving the effect, as it assumes, to stand alone on its own two feet, or the universe, as the amusing Dr. Evariste Gypendole would say, to go ahead on its own hook. It disjoins Providence from creation, and authorizes pure Epicureanism. Existences depended on God to be created, it concedes, but now that they are created they exist in themselves, and suffice for themselves, and scarcely a cultivator of natural science ever looks beyond them. The laws of nature are sufficient. Perhaps he who created existences may annihilate them, or rather change their forms; but as long as he suffers them to remain, they are independent of him in

their operations, need not his concurrence, want nothing of him, but to be let alone. They have no occasion to think of him, and they have no wish for him to trouble himself about them. He may go to sleep up above, find delight or amusement in contemplating his own handiwork, and observing how we carry on down here below, or busy himself in creating new worlds in the boundless regions of space. This horribly blasphemous doctrine, as unphilosophical as blasphemous, and which is pushed not unfrequently so far as to assert the inviolability of the laws of nature, and to deny the right and the possibility of supernatural intervention, is involved in the assumption that existences are perceptible by themselves without the perception of the creative act, or that the notion of creation may be derived, with our physico-theologists, from the notion of existence. We cannot derive the notion of creation from the notion of being; we cannot derive it from the notion of existence, and the only reason why people suppose that we can derive from the notion of existence is, that they adopt, consciously or unconsciously, the deistical view of existences. That view is false. Existence is not being or *ens*, but it is in its essential notion *from* being—*ex-stare*, the *ex* always denoting *from*, or *out of*. It then is not perceptible without the perception of its relation to being. The very notion of it is the notion of that which is dependent, contingent, which cannot stand alone, which is not its own *substans*. To say that it is its own *substans*, is deism; to say that being is immediately its *substans*, is to make it a mode, affection, or attribute of being, and therefore pantheism. The *substans*, while it is from being, must be distinguished, on the one hand, from being, and from *substantia* or existence, on the other. But as the notion of existence includes the existence in its dependency, its contingency, or its relation to the *substans*, since the real not the unreal is perceived, as we have shown, it follows that the notion of existence is not possible without the notion of the *substans*, which must be the creative act of being. Do not say this makes the creative act an inference, not an intuition. The inference is not that there must be a creative act, although that would suffice for our purpose, but that the creative act, which we call the *substans*, not the *substantia*, must be perceived as the condition of per-

ceiving existence, and therefore the notion cannot be derived from the notion of existence, and really is perceived, if existence is perceived, which last cannot be denied, because in every thought our own existence is affirmed, at least, as subject thinking.

The difficulty we experience on this point arises from the fact that we confound *substans* and *substantia*, just as we do *ens* and *existens*, being and existence. We call God substance, we call existence substance, and through nearly all our philosophical language runs the error that the *differentia* between being and existence, God and creation, is limitation, and that defined *per genus*, both are the same—an error not eliminated by the protest that is sometimes added. Hence we are perpetually vibrating between pantheism and deism, or between deism and atheism. May God forgive the philosophers! There is no calculating the amount of mischief they have done, and we fear that no little of the unbelief and shocking impiety we have everywhere to deplore must be finally laid to their charge. The *substans* is not being, for that would imply pantheism; it is not *substantia* or existence, for that would be deism. It is distinguishable from both, being and existence, and yet is not without being, nor is existence without it. It is the act of being creating existences. The error lies in regarding, on the one hand, the *actus creativus* as *actus transiens*, and on the other, in regarding it as *actus immanens* in the sense of producing only in the interior of the actor. The creative act does not simply produce its effect and pass over or from it, or cease with its simple production; for the cessation or passing over of the act would not leave the effect independent, or a *quasi-independent* existence, but would be the cessation or annihilation of the effect. Between being and existence there is only the creative act, and only the creative act between existence and nothing. Prescind the act, and existence is gone, is annihilated. Thus the creative act is not *actus transiens*, but is *substans*, substantial, that which stands under and supports the *substantia* or existence, that is to say, *actus creativus* is identically *actus conservativus*. Hence we say not only that God *created* existences, but that he *creates* existences, for his creative act is an ever-present act. The universe is created to-day as well as six thousand years ago, and is, in

one sense, as new, as young, as fresh, as "on creation's morn." Hence we call the creative act *actus immanens*,—not immanent in the sense that it produces only within the actor, for the creative act is essentially *actus ad extra*, but immanent in the effect, as that which produces and sustains it,—simply what theologians mean when they say God is present, efficaciously present, in all his works. God is *eminenter*, as say the theologians, all existence, and the only cause, and concurs in all our acts. This is what and all we mean when we say the *actus creativus* is *actus immanens*, not *actus transiens*. We do not mean that it is *actus immanens* in the sense in which the generation of the Word or the procession of the Holy Ghost is *actus immanens*; but that is an act that remains in its effect as long as the effect remains, as its *substans*, that which makes it from nothing what it is, and holds it from dropping into nothing again. The error of Spinoza was not in his terming God *causa immanens*, but in making him immanent as the substance, or, as we say, immanent in his being, not simply immanent by his act. By assuming the immanence to be that of God in his being, or substance, in his language, Spinoza placed existences in God, and made them merely modes, affections, or attributes of the Divine being. But to say that he is *causa immanens*, in the sense of *causa causarum*, or first cause, creating existences as second causes, involves no pantheistic conception. The word, however, has to some extent been appropriated by the theologians, and its use even in our sense is not to be commended. We have used it partly to avoid the error of the deists, and partly for the purpose of pointing out the abuse of it by Spinoza. All we wish to express is that the creative act is the *substans* of the existence, and that the act of creation is itself the act of conservation. Hence Providence is joined to creation, and proved in proving the Creator.

The creative act, taken as the *substans*, as every instant creating us, presents us in a most intimate and affecting relation to our Creator. Through his act we are brought from nothing and vitally joined to himself, and in him we live, and move, and have our being. We are not placed at a distance from God; nothing but his own act, vitally joined to him, as is the act to the actor, intervenes between

us and him, and that instead of separating us from him, joins us in the closest union with him. He made us yesterday, he makes us to-day, for our existence is a continuous creation. We cannot live, think, hope, love, or perform any operation without his act, his concurrence. He is not only beyond and above the world, but he is in the world, producing and interpenetrating all things with his life-giving and love-inspiring presence. We live from, we live in, we live by his presence, and it is with him our souls converse, whenever turning from the outward things of sense, they converse with the True, the Good, and the Fair.

Indeed, so intimate, so vital is the relation asserted between God and his creatures, that able men, men whose study is philosophy, and whom we cannot but respect for their devotion to principle, although mistaken, have even labored with earnestness and zeal to fasten the charge of pantheism on the formula, which is, after all, only the translation into philosophy of the first verse of Genesis. We impugn not their faith or their motives, but we find it difficult to understand how any one with a moderate acquaintance with theology, or possessing a moderate share of common sense, can dream of preferring such a charge; and they who prefer it, we must be permitted to believe either condemn what they have not taken the pains to understand, or embrace philosophical views of a decided deistical tendency. However this may be, we hold ourselves ready to defend the formula from the charge, or to reject it, whenever we find it preferred by one whose own formula we cannot fairly and logically convict of pantheism or of deism.

Several other questions, connected more or less intimately with the main subject of this article, such as the question of universals, genera, and species, the question of individuation, the *pons asinorum* of the schoolmen, and the question of empirical perception, on which we have but slightly touched, which we should like to take up and discuss at length, and perhaps we may do so hereafter, but we have for the present exhausted our space. Our main object thus far has been to reinstate the creative act in the *principium*, and to show that if we mean to have a philosophy that will accord with Christianity, we must include the notion of that act among our primitive notions. That, we think, we have done. In conclusion, we must beg our

readers not to suffer the occasional criticism we have offered on the Abbé Hugonin to prejudice them against him, for we are by no means sure that his views when he shall have fully developed them will not be found coincident with our own. He deserves honor and gratitude for his valuable philosophical labors, and we assure him that if we have misapprehended his doctrine on any point, it will give us sincere pleasure to make him the amplest reparation in our power.*

ART. V.—*Conversations of our Club. New Series.*
Reported for the Review by a Member.

CONVERSATION I.

“EVEN men of real ability and finished education,” observed Winslow, “are not always logically consistent. It is, in fact, seldom that you find a man who will carry out his principles to their last consequences, or who will abide by the same principles on all questions. The same man who complained of you yesterday for asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, complains of you to-day for asserting the authority of the state in matters purely secular. You may find any number of men who accept in general thesis principles which they deny the moment you give them a particular application, or who will assert in the particular application a principle which they will deny in general thesis. There are very respectable men, not unfamiliar with theological studies, who, when you are speaking of the mutual relations of church and state, and show yourself disposed to assert the rights of the spiritual, and to defend the prerogatives of Peter, will maintain that the spiritual and secular are two mutually independent orders, neither having any authority over the other, and each the judge of its own rights and powers, but who will, nevertheless, accuse you of being false to your faith and

* Our readers will find the ideal formula in some of its applications to morals and politics, developed in the following *Conversations on Theocracy*.

duty, if, for instance, you maintain that what is purely secular in the education of seculars, is the business of secular society. So, too, men who really believe in God, and do not hesitate to call him our first cause and our final cause, will shrink with a sort of horror from the word Theocracy, which really designates only the government of God, or a government which holds from him, makes his law the supreme law of the land, and governs under and in accordance with it."

"Yet," said Diefenbach, "theocracy, if understood according to the etymology of the word, is the only possible legitimate government. God alone hath dominion, and his dominion is absolute and universal. He is the creator of all things; all existences distinguishable from himself are entirely and exclusively the work of his hands, and, therefore, are his, and he is their proprietor or owner, since the thing made necessarily belongs to the maker. Hence the Apostle tells us, *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, which is both sound philosophy and good theology."

"Mr. Diefenbach founds, I perceive," said De Bonneville, "God's right to govern on his ownership, and his ownership on the fact of creation. His right to govern, then, rests on his creative act, not on his own eternal being and intrinsic justice, goodness, love. Does not this place his dominion in his omnipotence, and consecrate the principle, that might makes right?"

"I think not," replied Diefenbach; "God is most simple being and most pure act, and no real distinction between his being and his attributes, or between one of his attributes and another, is admissible. In him, might and right, power and justice, will and reason are identical, and creation is as much the act of his intrinsic justice, goodness, love, as of his omnipotence."

"But, suppose, if it be allowable," said O'Connor, who, on Mr. O'Flanagan's return to Ireland, had been elected to his place in Our Club, "that God were not what he is, or that his nature were the reverse of what we know it to be, would he then, although our Creator, have the right to govern us?"

"The supposition is not allowable," rejoined Diefenbach, "because God is necessary being, and therefore necessarily what he is: and also, because being and good, in the

real order are identical. Considered in themselves, the Supreme Good and the Supreme Being are indistinguishable, and are distinguishable at all only in relation to our faculties. Regarded specially as the object of the intellect, being is called the True, and as the special object of the will, it is called the Good, but the True and the Good are one in being. All good is in being, and all evil in non-being, or lack of being. Even Satan, in so far as he partakes of being, or is a creature of God, is good, not evil; that is, he is physically good, and only morally evil. We must be on our guard against Manichæism. There are not, and cannot be, two original and eternal principles of things, one good and one evil. There is, and can be, no positive principle of evil. Every principle must be real; if real, being; if being, good, and good cannot be the principle of evil. If the principle be not being, it is merely an abstraction, and abstractions are nullities. God being supreme and perfect being, being in its plenitude, is necessarily the supreme and perfect good, the Good itself, and in itself. Only being can create, for what is not, cannot act."

"The Transcendentalists, even the Hegelians, who assert the identity of being and not-being,—*das seyn und das nichts-seyn*,—will hardly concede that," interrupted O'Connor, "for they tell us that *being* is in *doing*, and that by doing we may enlarge and fill up our being. On this assumption is founded the modern doctrine of progress, which teaches that man may attain to the infinite, realize infinite possibility, and make himself God."

"Speculations of that sort," said Winslow, "were not uncommon a few years since in France, Germany, and the United States, the three leading speculative nations of the modern world, but they are out of fashion now, and seldom gain admittance into good society. What is not, cannot act, and nothing cannot make itself something. We act, because, through the creative act of God, we partake of being, and the limit of our participation in being is the limit of our activity. Only infinite being can have infinite activity, or create from nothing. The Creator, then, is and cannot but be good."

"If being and good are identical, and there is no original principle of evil," asked De Bonneville, "how can we assert that the distinction between good and evil, right and

wrong, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, is eternal, and founded in the very nature of things?"

"Evil, wrong, injustice, vice," answered Winslow, are not things. They have no physical existence, and therefore require no original or eternal principle. They are predicable only of creatures, and the distinction between them and good is not a distinction between two principles, but a distinction between being and no-being, between principle and its denial, between the presence of principle and its absence. It is called eternal, because the being or principle they deny, or of which they are the absence or privation, is eternal."

"There is and can be," added Diefenbach, "no positive evil. Evil has and can have no physical existence. If we suppose it to exist physically, we must suppose that it exists either as created existence, or as uncreated being. We can suppose neither. If uncreated being it is real, necessary, self-existent being, therefore not evil but good. If created, then being must have created it; but all being is good, and good cannot create evil. The only possible evil is moral evil, and that is not a positive existence, but simply a misuse or abuse of his faculties by a created moral agent."

"We are led into difficulties on this subject," said Father John, "by our want of philosophy that accords with our theology or the truth of things. The popular philosophy is a miserable sensism, which either denies the intelligible, or confounds it with the sensible, and identifies good with sensible pleasure, and evil with sensible pain. Whether the pleasure be or be not the effect of good, whether the pain be or be not the effect of evil, it is certain, the pleasure is not the good, and the pain is not the evil itself. The only possible evil is sin, and sin is not a creature, but simply a deliberate transgression of the law of God, or deviation from the line of rectitude by a free moral agent."

"To ask if God be good," said Diefenbach, "after having conceded that he exists, is absurd, not only because no distinction between good and being is possible, but also because we have no criterion, standard, or measure of good, except God himself. To ask if God be good, is simply to ask if God be God, or if he is what he is. When we say of any particular thing, it is good, we pronounce a judgment, and

every judgment is by virtue of some rule or standard of judgment."

"That rule or standard," replied De Bonneville, "is our intelligence, or our reason."

"Yet reason," rejoined Diefenbach, "must itself have some principle of moral judgment, or no moral judgment is possible."

"That principle," interposed O'Connor, "is the idea of good, of the good itself, a constituent element of reason, and one of our absolute and necessary ideas. What conforms to that idea we judge to be good, and what repugns it, we judge to be evil, bad, or not good."

"But that idea of good, or of the good itself, what is that?" asked Diefenbach.

"The question seems to me quite unnecessary," answered De Bonneville. "We cannot go back of our ideas, and all we can do is to show that they are inherent in reason as its constituent elements. We all know that we have the idea of good, and what conforms to it we judge to be good, and what conforms not to it we judge to be evil."

"Nevertheless," insisted Winslow, "the validity of the judgment depends on the validity of the idea. If the idea be invalid, the judgment is worthless. We must, then, determine the validity of the idea, the soundness of the principle of our moral judgments, or have no scientific basis either for our morals or our politics. We must understand by idea of good, the Good itself, an objective representative of good to the mind, distinguishable from good as the representative from the represented; or in fine, the simple mental perception or subjective judgment itself. If we say the last, we take ourselves as the standard, and good and evil will be simply what each one judges them to be. If we take the second sense, and understand by idea, with the peripatetics, not the objective reality itself, but a certain intelligible species or immaterial copy, image, or representation of it, we must determine, whether the idea really represents any thing existing *a parte rei*, and if it does, whether it represents it truly and adequately, two things which the interminable disputes of philosophers on the point prove to be for ever beyond the power of reason. Nothing remains for us, but to understand by the idea of good,

the Good itself as intuitively present by its own affirmation of itself in reason, as the very principle of our moral life. That is, we must understand that the ideal is the real, as Plato long ago taught."

"M. Cousin, whose view Mr. O'Connor seems to favor," said Diefenbach, "makes our absolute and necessary ideas,—the idea of the True, the idea of the Good, and the idea of the Fair,—inherent in what he calls the Impersonal reason, or reason operating independently of our personality or will; but unhappily, on the one hand, he makes this same impersonal reason, substantially our faculty of intelligence, which has a pantheistic tendency, and on the other, distinguishes it from God or real and necessary being, which tends to nihilism. He is very obscure on this impersonal reason, and I am not able to determine always his precise meaning. Reason operating spontaneously he calls Divine; operating reflectively he calls it human. Yet whether operating spontaneously or reflectively, it is one and the same reason. Is it the reason of God or the reason of man? Is the reason of both one and the same being? The latter would seem to be his doctrine. He asserts, and it is a great point, reason as objective, but he distinguishes even this objective reason from the Divine Being, and makes it representative of reality, rather than the reality itself. He calls reason operating spontaneously Divine, the λόγος, the Word of God, and yet shrinks from calling it God, as does Rosmini from so calling the idea of being into which he resolves all our necessary and absolute ideas. But absolute and necessary ideas, if not God, if not real and necessary being, are mere abstractions, and therefore nothing; for the necessary is not and cannot be creature, since creature is always contingent. If real and necessary they must be being, and therefore God himself, the only being. The λόγος, the Word, *Verbum Dei* is a distinction *in* God, not *from* God, for the Word *is* God. Reason then, when distinguished from our faculty of intelligence, which depends on it, is not something between necessary being and contingent existence, but is real and necessary being, or God himself, as Fénelon maintains, and therefore the idea of good must be the Good itself."

"The ideal," interposed Father John, "is the intelligible, and the intelligible is God himself affirming himself, and in the act of affirming himself creating and

illuminating our intelligence; and he is at once the Creator, the immediate object, and the light of our reason. The idea of good, which is the principle of our moral judgments, is God affirming himself to us as the Good itself. God, then, is himself the principle, the rule, standard, or measure of our moral judgment. When we judge this or that particular thing is or is not good, he is the term of comparison. We may properly judge whether this or that conception of God be true or false in the same way, but to ask whether God himself be good or not is absurd; for we can, in order to answer the question, compare him only with himself."

"We have not," added Diefenbach, "two distinct ideas, one of God, and another of good, between which we can institute a comparison, or which we can judge the one by the other. Two ideas in the real order are one and the same. God as being is identically God as good, for in God there is no distinction between essence and being, and none between being and attribute, or between one attribute and another."

"Therefore," said Winslow, "nothing is gained by the attempt to found the sovereignty of God on his intrinsic justice, goodness, love, distinguished from his omnipotence, or creative power. Goodness, justice, love, so distinguished, give the law according to which the sovereign power must be exercised, if you will, but they do not give dominion itself. If, *per impossibile*, some other power had created us, we might still love and revere God, for what he is in and of himself, but he would have no right to command us as a sovereign, for in that case we should not be *his* creatures, but another's."

"If, then, the Devil had created us, we should have been bound to obey the Devil," concluded De Bonneville.

"Give the Devil his due, is a maxim one often hears repeated," replied Father John. "If the Devil were an independent being and were really our creator, we should be his, and bound to obey his commands. But the supposition is absurd. The Devil could create us only on the supposition that he is not himself created, that he is real and necessary being; and if real and necessary being, he cannot be evil but must be good, and hence not the Devil but God. The Devil is a creature, the creature of God, and therefore, like any other creature, belongs to God in all he is, and in all he can do. Whatever the power he

may have he has received it from God, and owes it to him. God owns him, owns his power, and therefore all that by that power can be brought forth, as he who owns the parents owns the offspring, as we believe is asserted by the laws of every civilized State."

"M. De Bonneville," said Winslow, "is a French royalist, in exile for his loyalty, and he, I presume, holds that he is bound to obey his legitimate prince, precisely because it is his prince who commands. The same command, however just and good, issued by another, would not be a command for him. How then is it that he fails to perceive that the obligation to obey God does not depend on what is commanded, but on the fact that he who commands it is his sovereign. It is not precisely because what is commanded is just and good that God's commands are obligatory, but because they are the commands of him who has the right to command."

"God's commands bind our consciences because they are just and good," said O'Connor.

"Rather," replied Winslow, "they are just and good because they are his commands. I love the law of God, I delight in it, because it is just and good; I obey it because it is the command of my sovereign."

"The dispute arises," said Diefenbach, "from not distinguishing between the real sovereign and his deputy or representative, between him who is sovereign in his own right, and him who is sovereign only by commission. God is sovereign in his own right, and we owe him unconditional obedience; we can make no inquiry into the intrinsic nature of his commands before obeying; we can only inquire what is commanded, and whether it is really He who commands. The real sovereign is not and never can be a tyrant, for *tyrant*, by the very force of the word, means a usurper, one who commands without the right to command. Every tyrannical act is a usurpation of power, and an unjust command is tyrannical, because no one has legitimate authority to command injustice. Human sovereigns, even the most legitimate, are only delegated sovereigns, and possess no sovereignty in their own right. Into their orders we may inquire, for they have no authority beyond their commission, and that commission never authorizes them to command what is intrinsically unjust. But when

we know the command is from God, to inquire if it be just or not, is not only irreverent, but absurd, for it is simply asking if the command of God be the command of God."

"But that, though it may give us rights in face of the delegate or human representative of power, gives us none before God," said O'Connor. "The law of justice is universal, and God himself is no more exempt from it than the meanest of his creatures. He has no more right to do injustice than I have; I have then before him the right of justice."

"The law of justice," said Diefenbach, "is universal, not because it is distinct from God, above him, or anterior to him, but because it is God himself. He is bound by it only in the sense that he is bound by his own being, or the perfection of his own nature. He can apply the law to his creatures, or create existences that shall come under it, but he cannot alter it, because he cannot alter or annihilate himself, or his own real and necessary being. God is, and is necessarily what he is. He only is, and whatever is distinguishable from him is not being, but existence, created by him, and having its being in his being, 'for in him we live and move and have our being.' Abstractions are nullities, and an abstract law is simply no law at all. The law of justice must be real, then being, and if being, God. Hence St. Augustine identifies it with the eternal reason or will of God. The nature of things, the contrary of which cannot be done, is not something distinct from God, and subjecting him, but is precisely his own eternal and immutable nature. The nature of things is what it is, because he is what he is, and cannot make himself other than he is. To say such or such a thing is impossible in the nature of things, is simply to say that it is repugnant to the nature of God, and what he, from the perfection of his nature, cannot do. God cannot be subject to any law but that of his own being. He cannot be placed under obligation; we then can have no rights before him, and no rights at all except from him, and under him, for rights on the one side are obligations on the other."

"But by placing the law in the very being of God," said De Bonneville, "in his eternal and immutable being, Mr. Diefenbach returns to my doctrine, which he denied, that the right of God to command is in his essence, and not in his creative act."

“By no means,” answered Father John, “for the creative act is a free, voluntary act of God, and not a necessity of his being. That he should have dominion over his creatures in case he creates, is the law of his own being; but that he has dominion over *me*, rests on the fact that he has made me, and I am his; by virtue the principle, the thing made belongs to the maker. That the thing made belongs to the maker, is implied in being; but that God has made me, and I therefore belong to him, depends on his act, because that act is on his part a free act. If you ask why has God dominion over me, I answer, because he has made me, and the thing made belongs to the maker. If you ask why the thing made belongs to the maker, I answer, because the thing made is the maker, *mediante* the act of making. God is eternal being, self-existent, independent, and therefore belongs only to himself. His acts are his acts, proceed from his being, are vitally joined to it, and subsist only in it. The creature subsists in the creative act alone, and by it is vitally joined, as the act itself, to the Creator, and therefore pertains to his being as the effect to the cause, and is nothing save in the cause.”

“All existences,” added Diefenbach, “proceed from God, and have their being in his being,—the truth pantheism sees and asserts. The only being they have is his being, and they are only in him. He then is their being. But not immediately, for that is the error of pantheism. Then mediately, and then they have their being in his being, *mediante* his creative act, which not only produces them from nothing, but sustains or keeps them existences. God is universally, efficaciously, creatively present, creating them every instant from nothing, the truth deism denies. There is nothing between the eternal being of God and existences but his creative act, and nothing but his creative act between them and nothing, and hence they are really his being, *mediante* his creative act, and through that act vitally joined to it.”

“But to avoid another error of pantheism,” said Winslow, “we must understand that the creative act which creates existences and unites them to God as his acts, creates them not as modes or affections of his being, but as activities or second causes, able in the order of second causes to imitate or copy his creative act. He is immanent or present in his

act, but as first cause, creating second causes. So great is his creative energy that it makes its effects, themselves, a sort of creators in their own order, in relation to their own effects or phenomena."

"Hence," said Diefenbach, "the ground of moral and political obligation. The creatures of God are created activities, and man and those above him are created free activities, free agents, and capable, though in a feeble sense, of imitating his free activity as First Cause. But as they are made such only by his creative act, they owe even this free activity to him, and are bound to render it to him freely and voluntarily. As he owns our voluntary activity, he has the right to its product. Through his creative act he becomes the law to us, our sovereign, and we his subjects. As our law he is our Final Cause, as by his creative act he is our First Cause. As we proceed from him by his free, voluntary act as First Cause, so we must return to him as our Final Cause by our own free, voluntary act, or obedience. He is our first and our final cause, our first beginning and last end. Hence we have and can have no rights before him; rights, I mean, which we can plead against him; we have before him only duties, and what we call our rights before him are only the excess of his goodness, the rewards he freely offers us."

"The only right man has before God," said Father John, "or can pretend to have, is, that since he has willed us to be free agents, he must have us free agents as long as he wills us to exist, and govern us accordingly. But this, in reality, is his right, not ours; for it is simply the right in him to be what he is, and not to contradict his own essential nature. Being created activities, free moral agents, we have rights in regard to one another, but only duties before God."

"As we are bound to obey God because he is the law or our final cause," said Winslow, "and as he is our final cause only by virtue of the fact that he is our first cause or Creator, his dominion is, and must be, founded on his creative act, and we are his, and bound to serve him, because he is our Creator, and therefore our final cause. His right to govern us, is in the fact that he has created us, and owns us. In obeying him, we are giving him only what we owe him, only discharging the debt strictly his due."

"In this we see," said Father John, "that both atheism and pantheism deny all moral conceptions, for denying the Creator they can assert no sovereign, and, unable to assert a sovereign, they can assert no law, no justice, therefore, no rights on the one hand, or duties on the other. We see also, here the real atheism of those—and they are many—who scorn to serve God from a sense of duty, or because commanded, but profess to be willing to serve him from love. They deny that they owe a debt to God, which they are bound in strict justice to pay him, but are willing to make him, from their boundless generosity, a donation to the same, or even a greater amount. This sort of *love*, so attractive to our superficial, immoral, unbelieving, sentimental age, is no service of God at all, because it contains no act of obedience, no recognition of the divine dominion or sovereignty, of his right to us and to all we can do. In it there is no acknowledgment of his proprietorship, and it implies no act of submission to him as the law or final cause of the will. It is the invention of a heart capable of feeling indeed, but too proud to acknowledge its dependence, too proud to own a superior—a master—even though that master is its Maker. Certainly, we are commanded to love God with all our heart, mind, soul, and strength, but not with a sentimental love that excludes, but with the rational love that includes, the sense of justice, of stern duty. We love and adore God for what he is in himself; we give him thanks for what he has done for us, both in creation and redemption; we hope in him and confide in his promises, as our supreme good, but we obey him because he is our sovereign lord and master. Not to obey him because he is our sovereign lord, and we are his by his right of property, is not to obey him at all, and we only follow our own sentiments and impulses, and obey ourselves. It is to deny his relation to us as our beginning and end, and to set ourselves up in his place. The morality, based on sentiment, impulse, or interest, is no real morality at all, and is, in the last analysis, only self-love, or the adoration of self. We are moral, only in so far as we act in obedience to the will of our sovereign, and in acting, acknowledge his right or authority to do with us as he pleases—to command us what he chooses."

"Hence," said Winslow, "they who do even the things

commanded by the law, if they do them not because the law ordains them, fail to honor the lawgiver. In order to give God his due, we must keep the commandments because they are *his* commandments, so that in the act of keeping them, there shall be an acknowledgment of his dominion, and of our subjection to him. We must in it perform an act of real, downright submission, and make a full and unreserved confession of the truth that we are his, and not our own. It is this, not the thing commanded, that makes obedience so humiliating or so distasteful to our pride. It is far pleasanter to be generous than it is to be just, and sacrifice is less humiliating than obedience. In obedience, we deny ourselves. In generosity, in sacrifice, except sacrifices made for the sake of God, we assert ourselves. We may be generous from pride, we can be obedient only from humility. The English and Americans, the so-called Anglo-Saxon family, are generous, and are inferior to no people on earth, in nobility of sentiment, and manliness of character; but they are deficient in humility, lack that true loyalty of heart which loves and obeys the law because it is the law. They will submit to no authority, because it is authority. They are proud, and claim to be their own lords and masters. They can brook no superior, and what they do they will do because it is their pleasure, because it comports with their own self-respect and personal dignity."

"Mr. Winslow is too sweeping in his expressions," said Father John. "Those traits of character, when confined to our purely human relations, the relations of man with man, and of man with society, are not unreasonable, and, up to a certain point, are even commendable. They give to the individual a personal dignity and manly bearing; they found free governments, favor republican institutions, and provide safeguards for individual freedom and independence. They cease to be commendable, and become sinful only when transferred to the relations of man with his Maker. As God's dominion is founded on his creative act, through which, if we may so speak, he becomes our final cause, as he is in his eternal essence his own final cause in creating, he is the end or supreme law of all our free, voluntary activity. As his dominion is universal and absolute, since he is sole first cause as sole final cause, it excludes all other dominion and denies all dominion of man over man, and of society in its

own right over individuals. No creature has an inherent right over another. What we call the rights of man and of society are really the rights of God. I have no rights before him, and owe him the most absolute and unreserved submission, but as the necessary converse of this I do and can owe submission to no one else. Before him I can make no assertion of self, for I have no self independent of him, but before others, before all creatures, I have the perfect right of self-assertion. No creature can bind me by his own authority, and the debt I must pay to my neighbour, I owe not to him, but to God, and I must pay it to him only because such is the will of God, my sovereign. The obedience, the submission is in all cases due to God alone, and where his law does not exact it, I owe no obedience at all. Theocracy, then, frees us from all authority but that of God, and while it exacts entire submission of man to his Maker, it asserts his entire freedom and independence in all his relations with his fellow-men, both individually and socially. No individual, no king, no emperor, no aristocracy, no democracy has any power to bind me, save as the delegate, vicar, or representative of God, appointed and commissioned by him, and even then, only within the terms of the commission. Theocracy is, therefore, the basis and the only basis of all true or desirable liberty."

CONVERSATION II.

"If the dominion belongs to God, and his dominion is absolute, universal, and exclusive," remarked O'Connor, "every government except his is a usurpation, and founded in robbery and violence. Theocratic government, then, must be the only rightful, legitimate, or just government. But how can we assert this without denying the great political doctrine of the modern world, namely, the sovereignty of the people, and therefore the legitimacy of the political institutions of this country, which are professedly founded on that doctrine. The sovereignty of the people, as explained by the most accredited organs of the Democratic party, asserts that the people or a majority of them, are in their own native might and right the sovereign. So wrote Mr. O'Sullivan some years since in the *Democratic Review*, and this appears to be alike the doctrine of the American

Democrats and of the European Liberals. Mazzini and his followers speak of the people not only as people-king or king-people, as Virgil called the Romans, but also as PEOPLE-GOD, and go so far as to claim for them the absolute and exclusive authority even in matters of religion,—dogma, discipline, and worship. Can it be pretended that this doctrine is compatible with Theocracy, or the absolute dominion of God, founded on his creative act ? ”

“ Certainly not,” replied Winslow, “ and therefore I regard democracy as only another name for pantheism or atheism ; ‘ an illuminated hell,’ as Fisher Ames called it.”

“ It certainly, wherever it has had sway, has justified the strong expression of that most eloquent and enlightened of American orators,” said De Bonneville. “ Its very essence is to make war on the throne and the altar. I cordially endorse all that can be said against democracy, and am the last man in the world to assert that blasphemy the sovereignty of the people.”

“ The sovereignty of the people, *in the sense alleged*,” remarked Diefenbach, “ no Christian, and indeed no philosopher till his brain is addled, can assert. It is atheism and blasphemy. But God having created man with an active nature, as a cause in the order of second causes can delegate to him authority, and can, if he chooses, delegate the political power to the people collectively as well as to the king or the nobility, and if you only understand that the people hold their power as a trust from God, there is no more blasphemy or atheism in calling the people than in calling the king or nobility sovereign.”

“ I am,” said Father John, “ no democrat in the popular sense of the word, but I see no incompatibility between Theocracy and the real principles or constitution of the American State. The assertion of theocracy does not exclude human governments, in the sense of delegated or divinely commissioned governments, any more than the power given to an agent denies or excludes the power of the principal. The sovereignty of the people, when asserted against the sovereignty of God, is atheism, pantheism, blasphemy ; but when asserted only against the sovereignty of the king or the nobility, as it was by those who first asserted it, and also by the fathers of the American republic, it is nothing

that may not be rightfully asserted and defended. It then means simply that the political power delegated by the divine sovereign vests in the people or the body of the nation, and that kings and nobilities hold from and are accountable to the nation. It identifies the state and the nation, denies that the king is the state, and regards him simply as the first magistrate of the nation, and justiciable by it. If he abuses his office, perverts it to base and selfish ends, enslaves and oppresses the people, the nation, on this supposition, has the right to depose and punish him as the English nation did Charles I. and the French nation did Louis XVI."

"I do not," said De Bonneville, "accept the doctrine that kings hold from the people and are justiciable by them, for I hold with Louis XIV. that the king is the state, not simply its first magistrate, and I could not explain the consecration of our ancient French kings with holy oil, if I did not. But it is not Theocracy in that it asserts the dominion of God and that all power is derived from him—for that every Christian does and must hold—but Theocracy in that it vests the sovereignty, in temporals as well as in spirituals, in the priesthood who claim to be the exclusive oracles of God, and to have the divine sanction for whatever they command, that the world has very generally agreed to regard with horror, and to repulse as a tyranny which crushes at once both soul and body."

"It would seem then," said Winslow, "that it is Hierocracy rather than Theocracy, that is so odious to the world. But the priestly government is held to be odious, because it professes to govern in the name of God, who only hath dominion. So the odium, after all, really attaches to Theocracy. In point of fact, priestly governments are regarded as odious, because they assert the Divine dominion, and the sacredness of power, thus making obedience a matter of conscience, and because they aim to govern in reference to spiritual and eternal rather than in reference to mere sensible and temporal good,—the very things which should make them loved and respected! But God is sovereign, and may delegate power to whom he pleases; and if he chooses to delegate it to the priesthood and thus establish a Hierocracy, what right have you or I to object? Has he not the right to do what he will with his own?"

"There is no doubt," said O'Connor, "that as a matter of fact, the world very generally holds sacerdotal governments in temporal affairs to be the worst governments possible. The world, appealing to the ancient priesthoods of Egypt, Syria, Assyria, Phœnicia, Gaul and Brittany, Mexico at the time of its discovery by the Spaniards, and to modern India, Thibet, Tartary, and Japan, in justification alleges that these governments are opposed to social well-being and national prosperity; that they oppose the progress of science and the diffusion of intelligence, keep the people in ignorance and wedded to routine, repress all free thought, and all original development of genius, debase and besot the people with superstition, and enervate their very souls by an all-pervading, vigilant, and inexorable despotism."

"Those were or are heathen priesthoods," answered Winslow, "and it is not lawful to conclude from them what are or must be the influences of the true Christian Hierarchy. Yet even in the nations mentioned, I do not find the priesthood, unless for brief moments, the only governing power. Always, at least since Nemrod, the mighty hunter before the Lord, I find the prince or civil power by the side of the priesthood, and not unfrequently usurping its functions."

"Not only so," said Father John, "but the most really flourishing periods of the so-called sacerdotal nations of antiquity, were precisely those in which the power and influence of those priesthoods were the greatest. In every age and nation the priesthood is the depository of its highest wisdom, its most sacred traditions, and its purest morality. In all ages and nations priests have been the civilizers of the race, and the representatives of intelligence and moral power. Even in Protestant nations the preachers are above the average of the people, and represent for them intelligence and moral power, and so far the Divine. The moral, intellectual, and material degradation of the people in ancient sacerdotal nations did not originate in the fact, nor were they prevented from being remedied by the fact, that the sacerdotal governed. The priests of Egypt and of the old mystic East, low as they fell, degraded as they became, preserved better than any other class the primitive wisdom, or tradition of the primitive revelation made to our first parents, and it was from them

that Greece received the elements of her civilization, and Plato drew those parts of his philosophy which have made him called even by some Christians the *divine* Plato. However numerous and lamentable their short-comings or their positive errors, the Gentile priesthoods kept alive in the hearts of men the religious sentiment, and asserted always the supremacy of moral and intellectual power against brute force, represented by the warrior caste. Certainly they had false, horribly false conceptions of God and the Divine government, but they, nevertheless, asserted the Divinity and the obligation of moral and religious service. Certainly superstition mingled in all their religion and worship, but superstition bears witness to true religion, and is less debasing and brutalizing than atheism. The Pagan Greek or Roman was far above the atheistical Chinese."

"The ancient Gentile priesthood, I think," said Diefenbach, "had their origin in good rather than in evil. God has established for the human race two powers, the priestly and the kingly. In the beginning these powers were not detached the one from the other, but were both united in the person of the patriarch or *pater-familias*, the *patriarchian* of early Roman history, who was both priest and king for his own family, household, or *gens*. This order, the patriarchal, was the original or earliest form of government, and is that from which all other forms have been developed. It was in the early ages of the world universal, and we find traces of it among all nations ancient and modern, especially in the *gentes* of the Romans, the *hordes* of Tartary, the *septs* of Ireland, the *clans* of Scotland, the *tribes* of the American Indians, and in the *village* of the Hindus and Russians. In this order originally, as I have said, the two powers were united, but in the time of Nemrod, as I read the Biblical records, the kingly power detached itself from the priestly, and erected itself into a separate power. Nemrod would build cities, found a mighty empire, and reign alone as absolute lord and master. The priesthood still remained in the *pater-familias*, till gradually it became confined to certain priestly families, who in process of time became priestly corporations, and in some nations a priestly caste. The separation was not sought or effected by the priestly power, but by the kingly, and the union continued in the Biblical patriarchs till the establishment

of the Levitical priesthood, and the consecration of Aaron. With the Gentiles, that is, the people who broke from the patriarchal order and apostatized from the patriarchal religion, the separation took place at a much earlier date, and by violence, not as in the Levitical priesthood, by Divine authority and arrangement. But even in these apostate nations the Gentile priesthoods were, in some sense, the continuation, though in a heterodox line, of the primitive and true priesthood, which God had originally established among men. They succeeded, in some sort, to the patriarchal priesthood, and represented for the Gentiles the ideal or the Divine element in human life and affairs. They did not all at once lose the primitive doctrine, or even their original character, and all the great states of antiquity were, most likely, founded while they were comparatively pure. They became corrupt and corrupted doctrine and worship only by degrees, and all the historical records bearing on the case go to prove that while they remained comparatively pure their power was greatest, and precisely while their power was greatest their respective nations were the most moral, laid the foundations of their grandeur, and made their most rapid strides in civilization. To the superficial observer these nations may seem to have become more resplendent as the influence of the priesthood declined, and as the lay power became more and more predominant; but it is only with a phosphorescent splendor, indicative of their increasing rottenness. The decadence of a nation dates from the decadence of the power and influence of its priesthood. The heroic ages of Greece and Rome are the ages when the sacerdotal order exerted the most influence, and the nation was most careful to observe the worship of the Gods. The philosophers came afterwards and undermined the belief in the popular religion, taught the people to speculate, to doubt, and to ridicule the popular worship, and Greece fell before the invader and ceased to be an independent nation. Rome, founded by a colony not yet become idolaters, became gradually corrupt, and the power and influence of her priesthood declined, the piety of her people, so renowned during her ages of progress, disappeared, and the mistress of the world entered upon her long agony under her Cæsars. The decline of the influence of Protestant ministers in this country is visibly attended by

an increase of luxury, crime, immorality, and corruption, in which we already nearly rival pagan Rome or Babylon, and the speedy fall or ruin of our young republic might be safely predicted, did we not see transplanted here, taking root, and springing up with a fresh and vigorous growth, the true Catholic priesthood, in living union with its Chief."

"The corruptions of the ancient priesthoods did not originate wholly in the priesthoods themselves, for the detaching of the kingly from the priestly functions, the first great act of Gentile apostasy, was not their act, but the act of the Nemrods," said Winslow, "and their corruption, which followed, was owing not to their power, but to their relative weakness before the growing power of the lay sovereign. The arts they are said to have practised, the frauds they committed, and the tricks they resorted to, originated not in their possession of power, but in efforts to retain their constantly-declining influence in face of the lay authority, which labored to subject them to itself, and to make them the instruments of its ambition, as Napoleon I. sought to subject and use the Papacy. Wherever they retained their independence of the lay power, the Gentile priests were, even in the worst of times, the *pars sanior* of the nation, and the least unfitted to be the depository of power; and in no instance I can find, in ancient or modern times, has the nation gained in real strength, virtue, or true glory by the passage of power from true or false priests to the lay chiefs of society."

"This view of the ancient Gentile priesthoods, that they had their origin in the legitimate priesthood established by God himself, and that they became more and more corrupt as time went on, is not in accordance with the doctrine held by the scholars of France and Germany," remarked De Bonneville. "These scholars suppose the lowest point in the Gentile religions was their starting point, and that they were gradually purified, enlightened, and elevated by the natural progress of the human mind, till they rose to the sublime conceptions of Hebrew and Christian Monotheism."

"That is because they suppose darkness is older than light, and error older than truth," replied Father John; "and because they wish to be able to destroy the authority of Christianity, by making it appear that it has been

attained to in the natural religious progress of the human mind. They assume against all history and all philosophy, that the earliest religion of the human race was the lowest and most disgusting form of fetichism. They take the juggler or medicine-man of the North-American savages, as the incipient priest, instead of taking him as the degenerate priest. The medicine-man of the savages is the last faint reminiscence of the priest, not the germ from which the priest is developed. The savage is not the primitive state, but the deteriorated state of the human race, the lowest state to which the race ever falls. The Gentile priesthoods in their origin and early stages were comparatively pure and enlightened. They started with the patriarchal religion, as the patrimony of the human race, but, like imprudent heirs, they gradually squandered or lost it in their wild and reckless speculations."

"That patrimony," said Winslow, "included not only natural reason, but also the primitive revelation made to our first parents in the garden, which contained, in substance, St. Thomas tells us, the whole revelation which God has made to man."

"There has never been," added Diefenbach, "but one revelation from God to man. We must not suppose that God made no revelation to man till about two thousand years ago, or that he made a revelation only to the little Jewish people enclosed within the narrow limits of Palestine. He made his revelation in the beginning, to our first parents, and in making it to them, he made it to the whole human race. The ancient patriarch and the modern Catholic belong to one and the same religion; as believed the one so believes the other. Faith never varies. The patriarchs believed in Christ as we believe in Christ, only they believed in him as to come, and we in him as having come."

"The present tendency in a certain class of scholars," said Father John, "to deny the supernatural origin of Christianity, is a reaction against an untenable hypothesis, originally started, I believe, by Philo, the Jew, and revived and generally held by the learned of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The mediæval scholastics knew doctrine, faith, theology, and philosophy as well as we, if not better; but they knew less of history, and therefore

made little account of the coincidences of doctrine and worship in remote Gentile nations with Christianity. In the latter part of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after our missionaries had visited India, China, and Japan, and explored the regions of the New World, the subject attracted more attention, and the learned, overlooking or not duly considering the primitive revelation made to mankind, and it not occurring to them that it might, in a broken and corrupt form, be transmitted in the Gentile world through an independent, though heterodox line, agreed very generally to regard whatever they found in the Gentile religion coincident with Christianity, and not derivable from natural reason, as borrowed from the Jewish scriptures, or learned from intercourse with the Jewish people. The hypothesis was too narrow to meet the exigencies of the case, and moreover was not sustainable by history. There is scarcely a dogma, a moral precept, or a usage common to the Jews and Christians, or regarded even as peculiarly Christian, that cannot be found in some form, pure, corrupted, mutilated, or travestied, in Gentile religions older than the Hebrew Scriptures, though not older than the Hebrew traditions, and which were the religions of nations who we cannot reasonably suppose had any intercourse with the Jews,—an isolated, agricultural, and pastoral people. The learned of the last century and the first part of the present, seeing this, and taking it for granted that the heathen had no revelation, or reminiscences of a revelation, asserted a contrary hypothesis, made Christians the borrowers, and brought these very coincidences to prove that Christianity is not a revealed religion, but the natural production of the human mind.”

“The error on both sides,” said Diefenbach, “is in assuming that the Gentiles had only the simple light of natural reason, and that the Mosaic law was, what it was not, a revelation of dogmatic and moral truth. The dogmatic and moral truth presupposed, implied, or prefigured in the Mosaic law, was simply the dogmatic and moral truth held by the patriarchs, and contained in the revelation made to our first parents. Even our Lord himself did not come to reveal new truth, truth before unrevealed, or to make a new revelation of dogmatic and moral truth. He came to fulfil the promises made to the patriarchs, and to do those

things without which the faith of the patriarchs would have been vain and illusory; for their faith pointed forward, as ours points back, to the Incarnation of the Word, or second Person of the Trinity, to the Atonement, the Redemption of the human race, through the life, passion, death, and resurrection of the God-man, 'the Word made flesh.' No doubt the faith was rendered more explicit by the preaching of our Lord and his Apostles than it was before. New provisions for the preservation, administration, and application of the truth were instituted; but the matter of faith was not extended, no really new dogma or new moral precept was added. Strike out, as Unitarians do, the Incarnation, and what depends on it, or grows out of it, and you make the mission of our Lord at best only the work of an ordinary reformer, who labors to recall men to the practice of truths and virtues which they have obscured, neglected, or forgotten. His mission is significant only when regarded as fulfilling the faith, or doing those things which are promised in faith."

"The Christian revelation, as distinguished from the doing of the things by the Word, on which the redemption of the race and the elevation of human nature to be the nature of God depend," added Father John, "was made to our first parents, and a worship was instituted for them, on their expulsion from the garden, in accordance with that revelation, and adapted to their state. This revelation the father was commissioned and commanded to teach his children, and of this worship he was instituted the priest for his own family or household. This order, the patriarchal order, prevailed with the whole human race before the deluge, and even after the deluge with the faithful patriarchs, till the institution of the Levitical priesthood. It prevailed everywhere till the apostasy of the Gentiles. After the building of the Tower of Babel, the confusion of tongues, and consequent loss of unity of speech and unity of communion, there took place a schism in the human race, and the Gentiles or Schismatics then dispersed into separate nations, as we see Protestants formed into separate and often mutually hostile sects. From that time there have been two lines, the one orthodox, the other heterodox, through which the primitive revelation and worship have been transmitted. Through the orthodox line,

the faithful patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Church, they have been transmitted in their unity and simplicity, their purity and integrity ; in the heterodox line, that of the gentile priesthoods and the sects, ancient and modern, they have been also transmitted, but in an impure, corrupt, broken, mutilated, and sometimes in a travestied form. Nevertheless the heterodox line has always transmitted something of the true religion. There is not a dogma or precept of the Catholic Church, some traces of which, either as denied or asserted, as pure or perverted, cannot be found in some one or all of the Protestant sects. The Gentiles, the Protestants of the old world, took their point of departure in the primitive tradition which had been transmitted to them through father and son from Adam. All their dogmas, precepts, superstitions, rites, ceremonies, even those evidently demoniacal, are reminiscences, corruptions, perversions, imitations, or travesties of the true faith and worship. They did not borrow directly from the Hebrew Scriptures, or from the Hebrew people, but drew from the same original tradition, corrupted with them by the loss of unity of speech at Babel. The ancestors of the ancient Gentiles, as the ancestors of the Hebrews, were orthodox believers and worshippers, as the ancestors, and not very remote ancestors, of modern Protestants were orthodox Catholics, and lived and died in the communion of the Church. Among the Gentiles the priests succeeded to the priestly functions of the patriarchs, and were the depositaries of the primitive religion as it was retained in Gentilism, and though heterodox in the beginning, and growing more and more heterodox as time went on, they really did represent religion, as far as it was represented at all, in the Gentile world, as Protestant preachers represent it among Protestant nations, and would represent it far more truly if they were less under lay influence, and more independent of the civil government and their congregations. I do not think it a misfortune that the Gentile priesthoods had power, but I do think it a grievous misfortune that the Gentile nations had not the true and divinely protected and assisted priesthood. I do not think Protestant nations suffer from the power and influence of their preachers, but they suffer from not having true, legitimate, orthodox priests, to feed

them with pure doctrine, and to offer up the true sacrifice for them."

"There are," said Diefenbach, "true priesthoods and false priesthoods, and nobody can expect the false to equal the true. The human mind cannot act without the ideal, that is, God, who is the apodictic element of all human thought, and of all human life. Men in the reflective order may or may not reproduce their intuitions truly, but they always reproduce them in some sort. Hence, they have always some conception of the Divine in human affairs, some sort of a *credo*, some sort of religion, which is for them the supreme law—a law that binds *in foro conscientæ* as well as *in foro exteriori*. The priesthood is the representative of this law, that is, the Divine in human life. Since all authority is from God, and he only hath dominion, or the right to govern, it follows that whatever governing power he delegates to man is a trust vested in the priesthood. It does not, of course, legitimately vest in a false priesthood, as became the Gentile priesthoods, but for those nations who have no true legitimate priests, these false priests are the least illegitimate depositaries of power they have. Their right is good as against all other claimants, and yields necessarily only before the right of the true priesthood. Representing the Divine, though imperfectly and untruly, they yet represent it, for their nations, and for these nations to rebel against them, save at the command of the true priesthood, would, in their minds, consciences, and in the practical moral effects, be to rebel against God and to refuse all acknowledgment of the Divine government. To reject a false religion for none at all, is atheism, and atheism is worse than heresy or superstition. The government of false or heretical priests will be false in the face of the true priests of God, but relatively to that of the laity, who are equally removed from the truth, it will be legitimate and good."

CONVERSATION III.

"I hope," said De Bonneville, "that I have due reverence for the ministers of religion, and I would never countenance the adherents even of a false religion, in treating their ministers with disrespect. The minister of religion, even when the religion is heterodox, has for me something sacred, and I would never treat even a

Protestant minister as if he were the same as a Protestant layman. But I look upon the orthodox clergy, or my own Church, as having received authority only in spirituals, and I hold the interests of religion are best promoted when the clergy let secular matters alone, and confine themselves to their own spiritual functions."

"If we accept the principle that all authority in morals and politics as well as in religion comes from God, who through his creative act, is the law to all his creatures," said O'Connor, "I see not how we can make any valid distinction between authority in spirituals and authority in seculars. If the clergy represent the ideal element of thought, I see not how we can say their authority does not extend alike to all departments of life, to seculars as well as to spirituals."

"The question," replied De Bonneville, "is not one of reasoning, but one of authority. Our Lord says, 'My kingdom is not of this world,' and therefore, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.'"

"That the clergy, in union with the Sovereign Pontiff, their chief, are a spiritual society, and possess only spiritual authority, or have only spiritual functions is, I suppose," said Winslow, "agreed on all hands. The real question is not whether the spiritual society has secular authority or not, but whether the spiritual authority itself, by its own nature, subordinates the secular authority. The government, in both spirituals and seculars, belongs to God, who only hath dominion. The spiritual society is instituted as his minister in the government of human affairs. It represents the spiritual law, and the spiritual law is the supreme law, from which all so-called human laws derive their force. The spiritual society, then, is not merely the superior of secular society in dignity or rank, but its superior in authority, as the Creator is superior to the creature. All authority belongs to God; all dominion is his; the spiritual society represents on earth his supreme dominion; therefore, secular princes must hold from God through the spiritual society, or the Church, and be amenable to that society, and justiciable by it. The texts M. de Bonneville cites do not sustain him. When our Lord says his 'kingdom is not of this world,' he does not mean that he has not authority over this world, for he says, 'all power in heaven and in earth is given unto me,' but that his kingdom is not

of this world, not derived from it, or not founded on its principles and maxims, in the old sense of the word *of*, which is the sign of the genitive, answering to the Latin *de*, and the Greek *ἐκ*, the preposition used in the original. The other text spoken by our Lord, in answer to a captious question put to him by the Jews, does not affirm that Cæsar owns any thing or has any rights. It was the Jews, not our Lord, that said the image and superscription on the tribute money are Cæsar's. Our Lord simply replies, if Cæsar's, as you say, then render to Cæsar what is Cæsar's, and render unto God the things that are God's. He does not answer the question, 'Is it lawful to pay tribute to Cæsar?' put by the Jews to entrap him, but merely asserts the general principle, that we must give to every one his due. That he did not acknowledge Cæsar's right to the tribute, at least from the priesthood, is evident, from his telling Peter to pay it, not as an act of justice, but as expedient, in order to avoid scandal."

"But conceding all authority is from God," asked O'Connor, "why may not God have made the spiritual society supreme in spirituals, and the state or secular society in seculars? Both would then hold from him, and be compatible with the assertion of his exclusive dominion."

"God can do," answered Winslow, "whatever is not incompatible with his own eternal being,—any thing but deny or annihilate himself. But he can found no order in which the spiritual is not supreme in authority, because he is himself the spiritual in itself, and as the dominion is his alone, the supreme authority is and must necessarily be spiritual. He cannot make the division of authority contended for, because the spiritual representing him, the distinction between it and the secular must copy or imitate in the order of second causes his creative act. The sovereign Lord is one and indivisible, and as his authority is by its own nature spiritual, the spiritual which represents him must include all the authority he delegates, and by its own nature extend to all creatures in all their acts, words, and deeds. It, if it represents the Divine authority at all, must then represent it in its universality and exclusiveness, and stand to the secular as representing the relation of creator and creature."

"But even that," rejoined O'Connor, "concedes a

radical distinction between the spiritual and the secular, for the distinction between creator and creature is radical. If then God can delegate power at all to a creature, why not to the secular society as well as to the spiritual, since the secular society is no less his creature than the spiritual society."

"Secular society is the creature of God, indeed," replied Winslow, "but his creature *mediante* the spiritual society, and therefore he can delegate power to it only through the medium of that society. All power is spiritual, and the secular holds from God through the spiritual."

"That denies all original secular power," said De Bonneville, "and makes the secular the mere creature of the spiritual. It supposes the prince does not receive his authority immediately from God, but receives it from God only through the medium of the Pope,—the theory of Gregory VII. and Boniface VIII., but which the Christian world has rejected."

"Which temporal princes and their lawyers and courtiers have rejected, M. de Bonneville should say," replied Winslow. "But if the two great Popes named asserted it, they asserted it not as a theory of their own, but as the law of Christ, whose vicar they were, and to oppose it is to oppose Christ himself. The Pope is the highest authority for declaring what is or is not the Divine order."

"But the Church herself," replied O'Connor, "has always recognized two societies and two distinct powers. Pope Gelasius asserts it in writing to the Emperor Anastasius, and admonishes that prince, that as the spiritual does not encroach on the rights of the secular power, the secular must not encroach on the rights of the spiritual power. In all her relations with temporal princes, the Church has recognized a distinct secular authority, independent in its own province, and all she has ever claimed has been her own freedom and independence in spirituals."

"The Church," rejoined Diefenbach, "has always recognized the two powers, I grant, but never as two mutually independent powers. In the letter of St. Gelasius referred to, the Pope represents the spiritual as having to answer to God for the secular, which could not be if the spiritual had not power over it, for where there is no

power there is no responsibility. There are two orders, and the one is not absorbed in the other; but the secular depends on the spiritual, and is sustained by it, not as a power in relation to the spiritual, but as a power in relation to the secular, as the creature, created a second cause, is a power in relation to its own acts."

"That is all very true," interposed Father John, "if we take care to distinguish properly between natural society and the Church. The Church certainly recognizes two societies, but the distinction between them is not precisely the distinction between the spiritual and the secular. The original order, as was seen in our last Conversation, was the patriarchal, which vested all authority in the father of the family, who was at once priest and king. This order was propagated or perpetuated by natural generation, and therefore is called natural society, and its law the law of nature. The Jewish priesthood, type of the Christian, was restricted to an elect people indeed, but as it was perpetuated by natural generation, did not lift even that people out of the order of natural society. The Christian priesthood is Catholic, instituted for all men and nations, but the society it founds is propagated by grace, not by natural generation, and therefore is called supernatural society. The patriarchal society included the whole human race, and was commensurate with natural society; the Jewish included only a single nation, but was commensurate with natural society within the limits of that nation. The supernatural or Christian society, as perpetuated by grace, includes only those who are born of grace by baptism, and is commensurate only with the baptized, or regenerated humanity. The supernatural does not destroy, abridge, or annul, the natural. The Church therefore leaves natural society standing, in full possession of all its original rights under the patriarch. All authority comes from God through the spiritual, but not necessarily through the Church or supernatural society. Princes may hold from God under the law of natural society, and though they would not hold from the Church, they would still hold from the spiritual."

"But though the supernatural," objected Diefenbach, "does not abrogate the natural, it includes it. The law of the patriarchal or natural society included not merely the dictates of natural reason, but also the primitive reve-

lation containing in substance the whole Christian revelation; it is therefore substantially the law of the supernatural society and not radically or really distinguishable from it. The Church succeeds to the patriarchs, and has authority in both societies, and therefore the same authority over princes holding from God through natural society as over those holding from him through supernatural society."

"According to the law under which the prince holds, and in relation to princes who belong alike to both societies, conceded," replied Father John. "In natural society, as in the supernatural, the dominion belongs to the spiritual, however the spiritual may be constituted, or by whomsoever it may be represented. But the Christian society, or the society that is perpetuated by the election of grace, does not create or found natural society, but presupposes it, and fully recognizes its existence and rights. Natural society holds its rights and powers from God, but not through the medium of supernatural society, which only recognizes and confirms them. The prince then, who by the constitution of the state, holds from God only through natural society, holds only under the law of that society, and is officially bound by it alone. The Church, then, even though he is in her communion, can judge him in his principality only by that law, and if not in her communion cannot judge him at all, or exert any authority over him."

"The Church, since the coming of our Lord," said Winslow, "represents on earth the Ideal, the Divine, and therefore the Divine government or authority in all human life, public and private. As the legal successor of the synagogue and the patriarchs, she has all the authority of the Jewish high-priest, and of the father of a family, prior to the separation of the priestly and kingly functions; for that separation was made by violence, and without the Divine approval. The Church is one and indivisible, and therefore must have the same authority in both societies, and in all orders. True, the supernatural does not destroy or annul the natural, but since the Church succeeds to all the authority of natural society, she must have full authority under both laws, and therefore the same power over princes who hold under the law of natural society that she has over princes who hold from the law of the supernatural society. The super-

natural society may have more, but cannot have less power than had natural society."

"Mr. Winslow, in his zeal to magnify the authority of the Church, forgets," remarked O'Connor, "the doctrine we have established, that dominion is founded in the creative act. God's dominion rests on his creative act, as first cause; the dominion of the delegate or representative must then rest on the creative act of that delegate or representative as second cause, and thus really copy or represent the Divine dominion. As grace does not create nature, but presupposes it, the supernatural society cannot ever represent the Divine dominion over the natural, and can only recognize and confirm its rights and powers. In regard to what pertains to the natural, she, as succeeding to the synagogue and the patriarchs, may judge it indeed, but only by the law of natural society."

"Mr. Winslow's doctrine," objected De Bonneville, "absorbs in the Church, not only the rights and powers of the prince, but all the rights and powers of the father, and gives to her the whole management of all public and private life."

"I concede willingly," said O'Connor, "the plenary authority of the Church in all that pertains to religion, or to the interests of religion, and she, not I, is the judge of what does or does not, pertain to religion, and what is or is not for or against the interests of religion. If she tells me such or such a school is dangerous to religion, and *therefore*, I must not send my child to it, or if she says, my religious duty requires me to send my child to such or such another school, I hold myself bound to obey her. She interprets and defines my rights as a father, but does not create them, and can neither abrogate nor abridge them. But when and where only temporal interests, by her own judgment, are concerned, I may take the advice of my pastor, but I do not recognize his authority to command me. So in all the affairs of private and domestic life. The Church defines what is or is not secularity, but within the limits of what she defines to be secular, I am bound only by the law of natural society. It is the Theocracy that denies all natural liberty, that intermeddles with one's whole life, tells authoritatively to what professions or callings, irrespective of religious considerations, we shall breed our children, when we may buy or sell, what we shall eat

or drink, when we shall lie down, or when we shall get up, that has become so odious to mankind. It was Theocracy in this odious sense that Calvin established in Geneva, and that the Puritans in England, Scotland, and the early New England Colonies attempted to establish. If you wish to destroy the remaining influence of the clergy, and render religion universally odious, you cannot do better than to insist on a system by which Calvinists and Jansenists have plunged a large part of Europe into pure naturalism."

"I have nothing to do with consequences, if what I assert be true," replied Winslow. "Truth is not mine; I can neither make it nor unmake it. If God has given his Church the full powers I allege, neither you nor I can make it otherwise. All truth is good, fair, and amiable, and if men find it not so, the fault is in them, not in it."

"Mr. Winslow, I perceive," said Father John, "has not as yet cast out all the leaven of the Pharisees, and retains some traces of his puritan birth and breeding. He has not yet learned, it seems to me, to appreciate the theological maxim, *gratia supponit naturam*. If grace supposes nature, supernatural society, founded by grace, supposes natural society, and can annul, alter, or abridge none of its original rights. The plenary authority of the spiritual I assert without qualification or reserve, whether in supernatural or in natural society; but the Church, presupposing natural society, recognizes it as co-existing with the supernatural in Catholic or Christian society. She governs the natural in the bosom of the supernatural, indeed, but by the laws of the natural, and denies that grace releases us from a single one of the duties imposed, or revokes or abridges a single one of the rights conceded by that law. She can, then, deny none of the rights or powers of princes holding from God through natural society."

"Otherwise," said O'Connor, "we should be obliged to deny all legitimate government outside the Catholic society, to maintain that all legitimate authority is conferred by grace, and thus fall into the heresy of Wicliff and his followers. We should be obliged to maintain that infidels, or non-Christians, cannot have lawful government, and that every infidel prince is a usurper, without right, whom no one is bound to obey, and whom every one is free to resist as he pleases. This the Church does not

and cannot concede, for she has condemned the error of Wicliff as a heresy. St Paul writing under an infidel government, under Nero the Pagan Emperor of Rome, at the same time that he says, *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, adds *quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinatæ sunt. Itaque qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit.** Thus plainly teaching not only that infidel princes may have legitimate authority for his unbelieving, but even for his Catholic subjects. The government of this country holds from God through natural society alone, and no Catholic doubts or can doubt that he is bound in conscience to obey it, precisely as he would be were it a professedly Catholic government."

"Infidel governments are legitimate," said Winslow, "because the Church legitimates them."

"The Church can legitimate them," answered Father John, "only for their Catholic subjects; whence, then, derive they their legitimacy for their infidel subjects?"

"Nobody, not even the most inveterate Papist," said O'Connor, "maintains that all princes hold from God through the Church, or denies that princes may, and that some do, hold legitimately from him through natural society."

"But the Church includes both societies," answered Winslow, "and has jurisdiction under both laws, and therefore may take cognizance of offences against the one as well as of offences against the other."

"In the case of those who are members of both societies, I concede," said Father John, "but not in the case of those who are members of natural society only. The Church takes cognizance of offences against either law, but she judges only those persons who are in her communion, or are joined to regenerated humanity by baptism. She can take cognizance of public as well as private offences, of the offences of the prince as well as of the subject; but as her authority extends only to regenerated humanity, her jurisdiction is necessarily restricted to Catholic princes, and in the case of infidel princes to their Catholic subjects. The infidel prince, neither as a prince nor as a man, is within her jurisdiction. He holds under the law of natural society, and within the limits of that law he is the legitimate prince for all his subjects, Catholic or non-Catholic, not because the Church legitimates him, but because, as the Church

* Romana, xiii. 1; 2.

teaches her children, admission into the supernatural society, or aggregation to regenerated humanity, absolves from no duty or obligation imposed, and abrogates no right or power conceded by the law of natural society, as I have just said. Antinomianism is a heresy. If the infidel prince transcends his legitimate powers, and ordains what is contrary to the law of God, natural or supernatural, the Church forbids her children in the matters thus ordained to obey him, and she would do the same were the prince a Catholic, for we must obey God rather than man."

"Princes and nations outside of Catholic society," said O'Connor, "are in precisely the condition of the Gentiles before the coming of our Lord. The law of grace changes nothing in the condition of individuals or nations till they come under it by the new birth, the birth of grace, which introduces them into supernatural society."

"But God commands all men and nations to hear the Church," said Winslow, "and none of them has his permission to remain out of her communion. The law does not cease to bind because men refuse to obey it, or the court lose its jurisdiction because the criminal refuses to acknowledge it."

"Yet it does not follow," said Father John, "that our Lord has given his Church authority to judge those who are without, or to punish all offences against his law. We know he has not given her authority to compel any one to come into her communion or to be baptized, because he has willed that the reception of the faith should be a voluntary act. She has no authority over those without, and has only the right of self-defence against them, and to compel them, not to come into her communion, but to leave her free to fulfil her apostolic mission."

"But as the natural survives the supernatural, and subsists in all its rights and powers, as well as duties and obligations under it," said De Bonneville, "natural society in Catholic society must hold to the supernatural the same relation that it holds to it outside of Catholic society. Since natural society is represented by the State, princes, even when Catholics, hold independently of the Church, and can, in respect to their principality, in no case be accountable to her or justiciable by her."

"It only follows that those princes who hold under the natural law can be judged only by that law," said Diefen-

bach. "The fallacy is in assuming that the State represents the whole natural society; it represents the kingly not the priestly functions of the patriarch, and therefore represents the secularity, not the spirituality of natural society."

"Princes," said O'Connor, "who hold from God through natural society alone, even though personally Catholic, are not justiciable by the Church as princes, but only as Christians. She may judge and punish them as Christians, but she cannot deprive them of their principality, for she has not conferred it."

"Say she does not, not that she cannot," said Father John; "for it is more becoming in us to leave her to define her own powers, than it is to undertake to define them for her. I have found in her history no instance in which she has ever deprived a prince who, by the constitution of his State, holds from God through natural society, and not through the supernatural society. But I am not prepared to say she cannot deprive even such a prince. With regard to princes who hold from God through the Church, and who by the constitution of their States and their own coronation oaths, are bound to profess, protect, and defend the Catholic religion, there can be no question. They hold under the law of supernatural society, and the Pope, as the supreme justiciary in that society, may undoubtedly deprive them for cause, as he has done more than once. The prince, though he hold under the law of natural society, holds from God through the spiritual, and as the Church, for all Christians, represents the spiritual element of natural society originally represented by the patriarchs, and as the prince may forfeit his right to reign under the natural law as well as under the supernatural, I do not see very clearly, since she has jurisdiction under both laws, why she has not the right to declare for the faithful the forfeiture, if it has been incurred, under the one law as well as under the other. But her uniform practice throughout her history inclines me to believe that she does not interpret her powers as extending to the deprivation of the prince who, by the constitution of his State, holds only under the law of natural society."

"However that may be," said O'Connor, "if the supernatural recognizes and confirms the natural, the state in

the bosom of the Catholic society, must have all the rights and powers, as well as all the duties and obligations it has in natural society."

"Therefore," said Father John, "Theocracy does not introduce the intermeddling and vexatious system of Calvinism, and one which makes religion a burden too great to be borne. I have indeed only duties before God, for I am his creature, and belong to him in all I am, in all I have, and in all I can do. But this absolute dominion of God is my absolute freedom. None but God, or one really commissioned by him to declare his will and represent his authority, can bind me to obedience. I obey the Church, only because in obeying her, I am obeying him; I obey the State when it commands me nothing repugnant to the law of God, because it is his minister; but no man, of his own right, can bind me, or lay me under the moral obligation of obedience. It has pleased God to institute two societies, the one natural and the other supernatural; in both societies the spiritual, that which represents the Creator, is supreme. He has delegated to the spiritual—in regenerated humanity, to the Church, and therefore to the Supreme Pontiff, who possesses the ecclesiastical power in its plenitude, and is, under God, the source from which all authority in the Church proceeds, all power that he does not reserve to himself; but to the spiritual in neither society does he delegate all his power. Our obligation to obey the delegate is limited by the power delegated, and this limitation of the power delegated is the basis and measure of our liberty, which is not freedom from the authority of God, but freedom from the authority of his representative. In being elevated by grace to supernatural society, we retain all the rights and powers we possess in natural society, and this is what we call our natural liberty, which the Church does not abridge, but recognizes and confirms; she declares it sacred, defends it, and suffers no one without her disapprobation to infringe it. In the supernatural society, the father, the prince, the citizen, or subject, has all the rights and duties he has in natural society, only he must take both as she, the supreme teacher and judge, defines them."

"In the Catholic Society," said O'Connor, "the family and the State are, in their own order, as free as in natural society, only neither interprets the law under which it holds

for itself. Each must take the law as infallibly declared by the Supreme Pontiff, chief of the supernatural society, and head of the Church, sole representative of the spiritual in regenerated humanity. Within the limits of the law so declared, the father may educate his children where and how he judges best, and the prince may govern his subjects as seems to him good. The Church defines the secular, tells us what is or is not secular, but within the secularity, as she defines it, she leaves the father and the prince, the family and the State to their own wisdom and prudence."

"The rule for our guidance in both public and private, social and domestic life," said Father John, "is that there are no rights against God, or even against his representative. I have no will that I may set up against the Church, nor has the State any rights that are valid against the spiritual authority. But from this it by no means follows that there is no will, no judgment, no autonomy but hers. She defines the secular order, and the secular order has no rights against her, but this is not saying there is no secular order, or that the secular, in face of the secular, has no rights, no powers. What really are the rights of the father, the family, the school, the State, the secular society, are simply what God has willed they should have, and these the Church, as his faithful Spouse, must recognize, confirm, and with all her power protect and defend when assailed."

"But I do not see," remarked De Bonneville, "that Father John's doctrine is much more liberal than Mr. Winslow's. Neither will allow the Church can ever be in the wrong, or recognize in the State any independency in face of the Church. Neither concedes it any rights which it may hold up before her, and say, These are mine; touch them at your peril."

"I think that is very likely," said Diefenbach; "and I have no desire to belong to a Church that ever can be in the wrong. Individual bishops and priests may be in the wrong, may act from their own judgments or passions, instead of following the law of the Church, which is as determinate and as strict for them as for the humblest believer; but the Church, acting in her integrity, can never be in the wrong. M. De Bonneville wants what, as a

Catholic, he cannot have. He wants a doctrine that will justify the Byzantine emperors, the German kaisers, the French and English kings with their courtiers, juriconsults, and apostate monks, in their bitter and protracted struggles with the Sovereign Pontiffs, and permit him to say, Cæsar was right, and Peter was wrong. He may find it in the four articles of the French clergy in 1682, drawn up by order of his Most Christian Majesty of France, but he will not find it in Catholicity; so he may as well make up his mind at once to say Peter was right, and Cæsar was wrong."

"God's dominion is absolute," said Father John, in conclusion, "but he governs man as a free agent, and in all his treatment of us respects the freedom of the human will, not because free-will is a power that limits his power, or a right that limits his right, but because it enters into his purpose that man should be a free moral agent, and he cannot take away that free-will without destroying man's nature, for free-will is not a mere adjunct to our nature, but is essential to its existence. The same principle runs through the whole moral government of God. His whole moral government proposes, while asserting his own dominion, the preservation of the activity or autonomy of the creature, or the maintenance of the activity of the creature, as second cause. The spiritual represents the Divine, the Ideal as first cause, and the relation between it and the secular copies in the order of second causes the relation between Creator and creature. All civilization is historically hierocratic, and it is the spiritual that makes the State, and without it there were no State, because there were nothing fixed and permanent. But at the same time that the spiritual in the order of second causes creates or founds the secular, it sustains it as an activity distinct from itself, and no more absorbs it than God in creating absorbs the creature. So when God, in the excess of his love and mercy, institutes the Church, founds supernatural society, the new creation, as St. Paul calls it, he so constitutes it that it leaves the natural without abrogating or absorbing it. God is not the destroyer of his own work. His name is not Apollyon. His act is creative and conservative. The supernatural may add to, but it cannot take from, the natural. It gives a new order, but it leaves the old its autonomy. The secular

can do nothing against the spiritual, but it is of the very essence of the spiritual to sustain it in all its natural rights and vigor. Hence I assert for the secular its autonomy, its full and free activity in its own order according to the law of God, as declared by his vicar, or representative on earth."

"This, if I am not mistaken, relieves Theocracy of the odium so generally attached to it, and shows that it preserves instead of destroying our natural freedom. I pretend not to say, that under a false system of religion, with an illegitimate priesthood, it may not have been abused, and perverted to the destruction of every free motion of the soul or free movement of the body. I know no security men have, or can have, for anything under a false religion, under false priests, or no priests, and exposed to all manner of errors, and subject to the lowest and most debasing passions. The first want of man is true religion, administered by true God-ordained priests, who receive from him their mission, and are his anointed. The attempt to get on with a false religion, or no religion at all, with priests who run without being sent, or simply man-made priests, however much it may be boasted by short-sighted mortals, has always proved and always will prove a miserable failure.

"Neither do I pretend that no abuses here and there, or now and then, have obtained under the true religion. The history of the Church proves clearly enough that if she stood in human wisdom, human virtue, and human sagacity alone, she would long since have fallen through. But these abuses are local and temporary, and the Church, when not interfered with by the secular authority, has always in herself the power to correct them. The Church, moreover, must deal with men as she finds them, and if she finds them enslaved, their manhood crushed out by the superincumbent weight of civil despotism, she cannot treat them as freemen, capable of standing up like men, and yielding her the homage of a manly and intelligent obedience. Catholic tradition is true, divine, the revelation of God, but the traditions of Catholics are affected by the mediums through which they have been transmitted, and unhappily bear the taint of the civil despotism which has so long prevailed and still prevails in Catholic nations. But while we are bound to receive Catholic tradition, we are under no obligation to receive or

to defend the traditions of Catholics any farther than they are accordant with the teachings of the Church. Individuals in the Church may, no doubt, misunderstand and misuse the theocratic principle, but after all, true Theocracy is the only government suitable to a free man, for it is the only government which enables him with truth to say, 'I bow or bend my knee to God alone.' "

ART. VI.—*Popular Amusements.*

ALL of us, who are entitled by position, education, or experience, to speak on the right and the wrong of popular amusements are doubtless agreed upon two points: We wish the people to amuse themselves whenever they can do so innocently and rationally, and we wish to persuade them not to indulge in irrational and immoral amusement. Yet whilst all agree harmoniously in general principles, there is a want of uniformity in practical decisions. One parent is determined not to allow what another, equally honest, sees no reason to forbid, and sometimes one clergyman opposes his influence, where another is satisfied to remain a passive, at least, if not an approving spectator. In the same family, we find that mother and daughters are very fond of dancing, while the father denounces the practice as fraught with danger and full of harm, or at best, as foolish and useless.

If some practical view could be arrived at that would prevent disagreement among those especially whose province it is to watch over the moral training of the young in matters of this sort, a great advantage would be gained by all parties concerned. Let us then try to ascertain what are the differences of opinion which exist on this important subject, and how far they do really agree, who, at first sight, may seem to be opposed to one another in their judgments. There must be rules to guide all of us who honestly wish to be right in this matter of popular amusements: whereby we may determine what we can allow and what we must oppose and condemn. There are three different classes of amusements: there are some which are certainly bad and condemned by the law of God, there are some which are certainly innocent and permissible, some which are doubtful, and not to be easily classified as decidedly good or decidedly bad. No one doubts that it is sinful to join in conversation of such a nature as to excite laughter at the expense of modesty, and fill the soul with improper images and the heart with prurient desires. It is no excuse for such a pastime to say, that it is indulged in only for the sake of amusement, for that amusement itself is forbidden by the divine commandment. The sin thus committed is also, in the case supposed, a certain occasion of farther and graver transgression, and he who wilfully exposes himself to such danger is guilty, for as he wishes the cause, he wishes also its inevitable effects. No one again doubts that it is an innocent and permissible entertainment to indulge in conversation with virtuous persons

engaged in discussing pleasant topics, or to listen to remarks that provoke harmless and decorous mirth. But how can a direct and immediate reply be given to one who should ask abruptly : Is it any harm to go to the theatre ? Is it a sin to read story-books ? It is sinful to go to a party ? The moral principles which must be applied in the third instance are the same that guide the judgment so clearly in the first and second, but the actions on which judgment is to be passed ; are not yet clearly presented. The cap is ready, according to the homely illustration, but it is yet to be seen whether it fits or not.

There are two ways of arriving at a judgment in the case : the first is to examine carefully the circumstances of the instance adduced, and decide by the light of the moral law whether these circumstances render the amusements in question lawful or unlawful ; and the second is to settle the question by one's previous experience, or information in reference to similar instances. When little son or daughter asks me if it be lawful to read a certain story-book, I may examine it, and from my knowledge of the book and of the character of the child, I may determine whether it is proper for it to read or not to read. But, again, I may remember that I have examined four or five story-books, and that they were all filthy and corrupting, and I may hastily decide that it is a sin to read any story-book. But then another person may have read four or five story-books, and found them unexceptionable, and may decide that every story-book is good and proper reading. The mind should go from the principle down among the facts and examine them calmly and dispassionately ; but very often the mind wanders among the facts first, and sickened and disgusted at their vileness, escapes from them to proclaim its indignant denunciation of such doings, and everything that in the slightest degree resembles them. It is evident that under excitement of this kind, a pure and honest intention cannot prevent the ardent opponents of any particular practice, deemed to be an abuse, from being influenced by prejudice, imperfect information, enthusiasm, haste, and passion.

We think we have pointed out the cause which leads to disagreement among those who are looked to for guidance in cases where amusements are concerned, and we desire to do it with all the respect for both sides to which they are entitled by their unquestionable purity of intention. The best of men may sometimes fall into that philosophical error which draws general conclusions from particular premises, and however exalted our motives may be, we cannot watch our feelings too closely, even when working, fighting it may be, on virtue's side.

If we would serve God by reforming men, the first and greatest consideration must be to get his law precisely as he has made it before the people. Wherever his word goes his grace follows it. If through want of information, or warmth of temperament, we thrust forward our human passions to force the word to produce its fruit, we shall thwart the operation of his grace, and not assist it. The wrath of man worketh not the justice of God ; God's work must be done in God's way, without admixture of self. Zeal, meaning simply energy and ardor of the human will engaged in the pursuit of an object, at the very moment it goes far enough to be a virtue, is in danger of going farther and becoming a vice. Indeed, whenever zeal manifests itself so strongly as to cease to be simply a *power*, and to become an *effort*, it may be suspected. Its apparent strength is too often nothing but real weakness. When Moses smites the rock with his rod, he is the prophet of God about to work a miracle ; when he strikes it more

forcibly the second time, he is, alas! the victim of poor weak human nature, and incurs the displeasure of his heavenly master. Zeal is a good thing, but let it be temperate, humble, and above all, let it be according to knowledge.

These remarks will seem to apply in the main to persons who have others under their charge, especially when they expound and apply the moral principles which determine what is right and what is wrong in popular amusements. We, nevertheless, deem this a proper place to enter a protest against the practice which exists of throwing all responsibility connected with such matters on the clergy, or even on the spiritual director. The lips of the priest must keep wisdom; he must explain and inculcate the rules of conduct by which parents, superiors, and their young people shall be guided. But is there no practical conscientious light to guide the individual, when the question arises whether he shall engage in a given amusement as proper, or abstain from it as improper? Good Father Anthony, my pastor, has explained to his hearers and to his penitents what behaviour a Christian is expected to follow in assemblies of young persons of different sexes, or in public places of entertainment, or in the training and guiding of the imagination. Is it strictly his duty to tell Mademoiselle whether the polka-redowa, or the mazourka are dances more or less worthy of approbation, than the old-fashioned quadrille and the Virginia reel? Must he be prepared not only to say that works of fiction of an immodest character are to be avoided, but also to inform Master Charles whether he does well in reading *Dunderberg's Belial* and *Dearman's Loves of the Fairies*?

"*Mon Père*," said a young lady to an old Jesuit father, "do I commit a sin if I go to the opera of *Les ————*?" "*Mon enfant*," answered the good father, "that is a question which you yourself should answer."

We were once present when the following question was put to a renowned preacher and popular Director in a European city, where theatrical representations were subjected to a thorough censorship; "Father, what is the rule about people going to theatrical representations?" "The rule is," answered the priest and gentleman—we can see him now as he spoke; may God rest his noble soul—"the rule is, first, that some people must not go to the theatre, because it is a sin for them to go there; secondly, that some people must go to the theatre, because it is a sin for them to stay away; thirdly, that some people may go or stay, just as they please, for there is no sin, whether they go or they stay away." When called upon to name the people he had spoken of in each case, he said, that there were young ladies and gentlemen who could not witness the comedy without finding in it a temptation, and a sure occasion of sin; that there were young ladies who would be free from danger by going to the amusement with their papas and mammas, and who would be exposed to danger by receiving, alone, visits at home, while their papas and mammas were at the theatre; and finally, that his own elder brother John—a gray-haired old bachelor, and a regular communicant—might, *semoto scandalo*, go or stay as he pleased, for he was certain that the old fellow would know how to take care of himself, and be perfectly safe, whether in the theatre or in his own home. We conclude that it is unfair to expect the clergyman, even if we regard him as the moral law speaking itself practically, to make statements

in reference to matters of feeling, habit, experience, and idiosyncrasies. He is the judge of what facts are presented to him, and of the bearing thereupon of the moral law; he is not a witness of the facts and their circumstances as they occur in the daily history of a lawless or thoughtless and frivolous world. Let parents instruct their children, let children study their own hearts, and look honestly and conscientiously on the effects likely to be produced in their souls by indulging in entertainments which may not be necessarily conducive to evil of themselves, yet which may, in their case, be occasions of sin, and as such, must be shunned as not permissible.

There are good people who are continually asking for some rule to guide them in reference to the positions in which they are apt to find themselves in their intercourse with the rest of mankind, and they seem frequently to feel chagrined when they find that there is not a clear moral statute made and provided to fit every incident of life in which they may be concerned. It seems to us that the nearest approach to what they desire will be a clear appreciation on their part of what is taught by sound authorities on the subject of the occasion of sin. Such teaching may be briefly stated in a general way, but the instructor of the young and uneducated can amplify and expand it, and develop and bring it home to his hearers with a thousand familiar instances, details, and practical illustrations.

An occasion of sin is anything that induces one to commit sin. Certain circumstances act as an inducement to sin so evidently and so generally, that they may be set down at once as absolute causes of sinful actions. He who wills the occasion, in such cases, wills the sin which is its consequence, and is guilty of sin when he exposes himself to such clear danger of committing it. Now it is not always necessary that the circumstance in itself, and on its own account, shall act as a clear inducement to sin in order to rank it as an immediate or certain occasion. A given circumstance may act forcibly on one man which will give rise to no sinful thought or desire in another. There are certain circumstances again which impel the mind towards sinful thoughts, and the heart towards sinful emotions and affections, yet this they do weakly and from afar off as it were, and experience can only enable us to say that one may sin when thus influenced, yet it is quite probable that he may not. There are certain occasions of sin that are necessary, —unavoidable; there are others that it is in our power to shun, if disposed to take proper precautions. Then again among the occasions which we have called necessary, some are not physically inevitable, yet morally speaking they are necessary on account of many grave considerations which render it exceedingly difficult to remove or avoid them. There are persons and places which, if visited, are sure to act as necessary occasions of sin, but which one is perfectly at liberty to avoid. These principles can be readily applied to circumstances and combinations of circumstances in common life, and quite readily to the subject of popular amusements.

We may find an instance of a necessary occasion of sin in the company of depraved associates. He who knows that intercourse of this kind is certain to lead him to the commission of improper actions, is guilty by simply exposing himself to it. He who loveth danger, shall perish therein, and God has promised to assist those who avoid sin, not those who wilfully court it. Yet take again the instance of a place where ardent spirits are sold. This place is not necessarily an occa-

sion of sin, for there are many bar-keepers in our cities who are strict cold water temperance men, and who are employed only on condition that they shall remain so. They handle the poison from morning until night, yet they never taste it themselves. Still it may be that more than one of their customers is positively unable to enter the bar-room without drinking, to drink without doing so immoderately, and to drink immoderately without being guilty of blasphemy and other heinous transgressions of the Divine Law. We may quote cards or dice as an instance of the remote occasion of sin. There is many a quiet old gentleman who sits down to his rubber of whist or his game of backgammon of an evening, and who is more good natured at that time, than when keenly engaged in the business of his calling; while another may occasionally get ruffled and feel angry while playing, and will need to be on his guard so as to avoid showing temper to those around him. One may find a necessary occasion of sin in some person who is employed at service in his family, and he is free to remove the occasion. But suppose an occasion of sin to exist in a prison, or on board of a ship on a three years' cruise, however good may be the disposition of the person exposed, it is clear that the danger is not simply a matter of choice. One may be perfectly at liberty to go to a place where gambling is practised, or to stay away from it. If he go there, he may know from experience that it is absolutely impossible to avoid partaking in that ruinous excitement, and being guilty of the sins to which it exposes its victim. Here are a few clear principles and a few practical illustrations. Do they not involve much that may throw light on the subject of popular amusements? We think they do, and in order not to treat our subject in too gingerly a manner, not to appear desirous of treating it as if we were afraid to name it, and did not wish to commit ourselves by saying anything about it one way or the other, we will plunge *in medias res*, and proceed at once to say something on the subject of dancing.

"Dancing!" exclaim at once several dozens of our young lady and young gentlemen acquaintances, "are you in favor of innocent, healthy, and rational popular amusements, and are you going to condemn our pet entertainment of dancing?" "Dancing!" exclaims the Abbé Hulot, "do you call yourself a Catholic Christian Quarterly Reviewer, and are you going to sanction that heathenish practice of dancing, by which many millions of souls are hourly plunged into hell?" "Dancing," we can hear our reader remark, as he thoughtfully strokes his chin, "is a subject upon which a great deal is said every day *pro* and *con*, and not all of it very sensible. Primarily to dance, means to leap or spring; hence to leap or move with measured steps, regulated by a tune sung or played on a musical instrument; to leap or step with graceful motions of the body corresponding with the sound of the voice or of an instrument. This definition, we will confess at once, to avoid the charge of plagiarism, we have taken from a popular work, namely, Webster's Dictionary. The author quotes as an illustration, the words of the Holy Ghost: "There is a time to mourn and a time to dance." (Eccles. iii. 4.) A little work on Dancing, the author of which we have named above, opens with this definition or description, slightly different from the first: "Dances are assemblies of persons of different sexes, principally young men and women, who move in measured pace, according to rule, to the sound of musical instruments, for the sake of procuring and imparting pleasure. Dances

trace their origin from the rites of Paganism, of which they formed the principal attraction. Men and women, heated by wine and lust, spent their time in revelry in singing hymns in honor of Bacchus," &c. (Hulot, ch. 1st.)

Here we have a fair specimen of the manner in which those who speak of dancing form in their minds an idea of the thing itself. In the one case it is mentioned as a series of movements regulated by music; in the other it is viewed in connection with circumstances which give these movements significance and effect. We think the best way for us to proceed is to hold the mind of the reader for a moment in suspense, and to prevent his forming an opinion until he shall have examined the two statements of what dancing really is, and compare them one with the other. We therefore give fair notice that for the space of about ten or twelve lines we mean to philosophize. To begin, we will say that dancing may be considered in the first place in the abstract, and in the second place in the concrete. The inspired writer says that there is "a time for dancing." He speaks of dancing unaccompanied by any circumstance that must influence, sway, or warp the dancing motion into the service of sinful thought, word, or deed. It is not impossible to dance without sinning. It is possible to dance in such a way that the dance shall be a pure exercise, healthy, innocent, recreative, proper, and praiseworthy. Comes then the Abbé Hulot, and he presents to you dancing accompanied by circumstances which add to what the authority first quoted had approved of. He describes the mode and manner of the dance; he alludes to the motives of the dancers; he speaks of the uses to which the dance was applied by Pagan men and women; he makes out a case to be judged by us as Christians who cannot approve of an amusement innocent in itself, if it be indulged in an unchristian manner, and under conditions which are of themselves sinful, and worthy, therefore, of condemnation. Dancing, considered in the abstract, in itself, is not sinful. Dancing, accompanied by sinful circumstances, is sinful. We have done philosophizing.

The reader may think that we have not fairly met the questions which are commonly asked on the subject of dancing; but we beg him to consider the necessity of settling some principle as the basis for the whole discussion. We think we have done this briefly but clearly, and now we are ready to state that the questioners we have met with have not, as a general thing, asked us to philosophize. On the contrary, while coming in contact with them (for they do not always meet us in our quality of Quarterly Reviewer), they propose such questions as the following: Is it any harm to go to a ball? Is it right to go to parties? Is it a sin to dance the schottische? What do you think of waltzing? We have even been asked in another sphere of usefulness: "Do you think it wrong for a young fellow to go to the *Jardin Mabille*, or the *Chateau d'hiver*, or the *Chateau des fleurs*? I went last night to ——— and saw the *Jota* and *Cancan*—do you think that was wrong? I would not do it in New York, for mother and Dr. ——— our minister would be down upon me, but they are all good Roman Catholics in these diggings, so I don't suppose you will object." What answer can be given to such questions as these? We can apply the general principles we have stated above to the fact alluded to in each separate question. We can determine which particular amusement must be considered as unlawful, and which lawful under the circum-

stances. But we cannot lay down one brief rule which will apply to all persons under all circumstances, in all places, and at all times. We cannot relieve individual conscience of all responsibility. We have known the polka, the mazourka, the waltz, the schottische, and the lancers to be danced by young people who were in our opinion innocent and pure both before and after dancing them. We have known of cotillons, Virginia reels, quadrilles, minuets, and other orderly good old-fashioned dances, to have been indulged in by people half-maddened with wine and excitement, to the detriment of their immortal souls. We have known an Irish jig to be danced by a family where the old father and mother joined in, and where Dr. Webster with his Dictionary under his arm, or even the Abbé Hulot, might have been present without witnessing anything but innocent and childlike joyousness and mirth; and we have known the same dance to have been injurious to those who did not understand that dancing *in abstracto* is harmless enough, but that it may be a very wicked affair *in concreto*.

We are not writing a treatise on dancing, but we are trying to show forth the principles which common sense, enlightened by moral theology and by knowledge of the world, must obviously apply to all kinds of popular amusements, including dances, balls, parties, pic-nics, excursions, fairs, novel-reading, scenic representations, and all the social and popular gatherings where the object in view is relaxation and entertainment. Let us recollect the evil done in the teaching of the science of morals by heads of sects, preachers, writers, enthusiasts, reformers, doctrinaires, lecturers, and sometimes even learned, well-meaning moralists. The great men, the heroes and Saints of the Christian World, knew the law of God and taught it wisely, they understood the world and rebuked it honestly. The others vibrated between a rigoristic and austere doctrine that made men hate the Gospel, and a lax and loose permissiveness that sacrificed the law of God to human weakness and human passion. It is the duty of every teacher who is not selfish to make known the commandments of our Master in their purity and fulness, not understating the truth, nor overstating it. We think that some advocates of temperance injure the good cause they endeavour to serve by straining the principles involved. They make statements which are designed by their alarming nature to force their way into the soul, and take it by storm. Loudness is not a sure indication of depth and volume. A pewter whistle can outscreeam any prima donna in existence, and the peal of a large organ may be drowned by a tin fish-horn or a Chinese gong. Mankind has always danced, dances now, and will it is likely dance to the end of time. You may correct the sad abuses of which dancing-parties are the occasion, by proper moral education, and by appeals to reason, religion, and experience. But you cannot scold dancing out of the world. By making sweeping statements in angry language, unsustained by full and convincing proofs, you indispose those who most need correction to listen even to seasonable and just advice.

The work of the Abbé Hulot, recently translated and published in this country, proves great zeal and purity of intention on the part of its author, and this no doubt has obtained for it the approbation of its esteemed and reverend American editor. Still we should be better pleased if some similar treatise had been selected more exact theologically, however popular in its language. In the second chapter, where the thesis to be proved is that "dancing is condemned by the Holy Scrip-

tures," we find only one text bearing directly upon the subject, and that is against the author's assertion, for it implies that dancing may be used provided it be done sparingly. "Use not much the company of her that is a dancer, and hearken not to her, lest thou perish by the force of her charms, for the conversation of these women burns as fire" (Ecclus. ix. 4). The other texts are handled in a way that is generally avoided by good theologians; for cumulative proof, when faint and inconclusive, detracts from, rather than adds to, the strength of the point asserted; does not clinch the argument, but rather loosens its rivets. Take for instance this: "St. Paul commands us 'not to deliver our members to sin' (Rom. vi. 13); but do we not act contrary to his command when we employ the feet in dancing, which God has given us to walk decently?" &c. (Hulot, ch. 2, p. 47). The author is equally unsatisfactory when he undertakes to prove that "dancing is condemned by the Fathers," among whom we find St. Charles Borromeo and that ecclesiastical Warwick, Gerson. It is generally understood that a few isolated texts from the Fathers, especially if taken from their sermons on special occasions and local subjects, as in this book, cannot give the weight of their testimony. Then also they generally speak of dancing as practised among the heathens, where excesses of cruelty and impurity were not only allowed, but were quite commonly matter of obligation, where the worship of idols and devils was always brought in, and where the most degrading actions were considered as religious ceremonies. To quote St. Augustine as speaking in his work *De Civitate Dei* about dances where all this is left out, is to quote him as speaking on a subject which he did not mean to treat. His long and detailed descriptions of heathen filth and brutality are too full and faithful to allow of any doubt on this head. This applies to many remarks against public spectacles and other popular amusements in the Fathers, and even in the early councils. Under the head, "dancing is condemned by the councils of the Church," the author places among them the famous council in Trullo, Pope Sergius to the contrary notwithstanding. His other authorities are from particular councils, yet, strange to say, not one of them as quoted by him condemns dancing, but all bear upon publicity, indecency, scandal, or the profanation of the Lord's day, by which the particular dances they speak of were accompanied. The chapter purporting to prove that "dancing is condemned by the bishops and the theologians of the Church," is made up of extracts from the sermons of St. Antoninus, and Cardinal Bellarmine, from Gerson, Petrarch, Bussy-Rabutin, a celebrated old hypocrite and libertine, and some edifying anecdotes about certain good French Bishops. The rest of the book is composed of advice to parents and young people, and of severe comments on the many abuses and scandals which are caused by dancing-parties and balls. They will be read with advantage, and we sincerely wish that the wise maxims they contain were better understood and more commonly applied in practice by the numberless persons who learn in similar promiscuous assemblies the first lessons of iniquity, and take their first steps in the road to eternal death. What the Abbé Hulot says of his own is needed, well meant, and he had a perfect right to say it; the mistake he makes is in the attempt to prove that the Church has committed herself on the subject, and that she has gone as far as he, in the ardor of his zeal, would have her go.

We all have our plans and specifications for the amelioration of our

neighbourhood, and for the correction of the vices, follies, weaknesses, and abuses which most annoy us, or with the miseries of which we are best acquainted. But we must recollect that the Church is universal in her mission as a reformer, as well as in her mission as a teacher. She cannot stop all her other work to give herself up to the work of civilization, of philanthropy, or devote herself exclusively to the practice of mercy, temperance, or even the suppression of balls, dances, and assemblies. Although intemperance is opposed to the cultivation of all religion and virtue, still temperance is not the whole of religion and virtue. Although he who is devoid of charity for his neighbour cannot please God; yet he who is charitable towards his neighbour may need to be looked after in other things, without which he cannot save his soul.

We wish our space would allow us, and that we possessed the necessary information to treat our young friends to a dissertation on athletic sports—on boating, swimming, ball-playing, cricketing, gymnastics, riding, and all the various out-door amusements that invigorate the health of body and of mind. How much better for the young to seek amusement and exercise in this hearty and healthy way—even in walking in the open air—than to coop themselves up in hot and stifling rooms to dance until after midnight; to dance away colour, digestion, health, and sometimes their immortal souls into the bargain. The nature of our climate shows particularly the necessity of frequent exposure to the fresh air, and of out-door exercise. It is only by this means that we can face the sudden and frequent changes of temperature with impunity. And yet we confine ourselves in a poisoned and heated atmosphere in our amusements, we eat too much, and do not sleep enough, and this is the kind of relaxation we give a body and a brain out of which we have been forcing the largest amount of work attainable, with the smallest amount of fair-play possible.

Our mention of theatrical entertainments must be necessarily brief. In a moral point of view we have said enough already of the rules by which one is to be guided in judging when they may, and when they may not, be sinful. Some gifted pen should give the history of the rise and fall, the glory and the shame, of the modern theatre. It came to light in the Middle Ages, and served its apprenticeship as an agent of religious instruction. It was fostered and developed by the care of priests and monks, who, as it often happens, were repaid with ridicule and contempt by their pupil when he came to think that he no longer needed their assistance. We next find it devoting its energies to the reproduction of Latin and Greek dramatic poetry, and aiding and abetting the semi-heathen spirit which mingled with the revival of art and literature, and paved the way for the splendor and havoc of modern infidelity.

But the theatre undertook a more useful task and accomplished a nobler work in the formation of modern languages. Epic poetry was the highest test of literary excellence in the estimation of Greece and Rome, and in that of the most polished nations of the East. But in most modern languages the noblest efforts of genius have generally been put forth in dramatic poetry. Witness old English dramatists forming our language and preparing the way for Shakespeare. Witness Metastasio, not inferior to Tasso or Ariosto, and Alfieri, far inferior to Dante alone; witness Corneille, Racine, and Molière, Schiller, Calderon, and Lope de Vega. These are the classic authors of modern

nations, the great masters of poets, orators, statesmen, and scholars; and while they have done more perhaps than any other class of writers to form the language, they have had also an immense influence on the thought, principles, and character of their fellow-countrymen.

Alas! for the drama, what has it come to now? Where it is not a mere panderer to the morbid tastes of the people, it reverts to the puerilities of the early romances of chivalry, and astonishes grown-up children with grand shows of serpents, elephants, dwarfs, giants, and devils, cataracts of muslin, and mountains of canvas, and all the grandeur and horror of sky-rocket lightning and tin-pan thunder. That it might do good service in educating and refining the public taste and sentiments, is certain; that it fails to do it, is equally clear: and we are too little conversant with the present state of the case to say whether it will grow worse in the future, or whether there exists still some faint hope of amendment.

The opera is supposed by its admirers to furnish a greater amount of entertainment than any other form of dramatic representation. It unites in itself every quality and kind of tuneful sound, both vocal and instrumental; it blends poetry with music, and both with elocution and action; and while it delights the mind with a plot, and the ear with choice language and sweet music, it fills the eye with the gorgeous productions of architecture, painting, and sculpture. Its fable again may be either serious or amusing, and gratify the sense of the ludicrous by incidents taken from ordinary life, or awaken elevated sentiments by reproducing the noblest incidents of national history. The opera has taken its place among the amusements of our large cities, as a permanent institution; we hope that just public sentiment will preserve to it its classic purity and dignity, and not allow it to become, as it is in some places in Europe, a mere appendage to ballet dancing.

The concert and the public lecture are two forms of rational amusement, highly popular, as they deserve to be, among us. The first, when properly got up, is free from almost every objection that can be brought against other public amusements and mixed assemblages, while at the same time it furnishes, in a moderate degree, the attractions upon which they depend for their popularity. It is perhaps the noblest and purest form of amusement which can be made to subserve the cause of charity. The public lecture seeks to instruct and improve, while it entertains. Depending for its resources upon science and art, it is destined to last for ever, for we can imagine no state of society, however rude, or however polished, where one man will not sometimes have something to say to his fellow-men, and where the others will not be disposed to listen if they think he can talk cleverly and pleasantly. Lecturing meets with ups and downs like other human institutions; it is like beef, sometimes underdone, sometimes overdone; it is taken up at times like a violin, by some one who thinks he can perform only because he has never tried, and like much other brain-work in this world, it is frequently paid for with the understanding that an article of the best quality is expected to be received, and the very lowest price to be given for it. This is all well enough when charity is the object in view, and the individual whose services are required is in a position to give his time for nothing. But there are able laymen among Catholics, and under a different system there would be more, who are not free to give their time and labor for nothing, and those who get up lec-

tures will consult their own interest by making it worth the while of such parties to give ample time and thought to the preparation of their public addresses.

The character of a people and the degree of civilization they have attained is easily inferred from their amusements, and from the manner in which they behave while amusing themselves. In public gatherings among us, a certain rowdy spirit is apt to manifest itself, not, by any means, on the part of the greater number, but on the part of some whose boldness and recklessness enable them to disturb all the rest. The very fact that the greater number are quiet and orderly, surrounded, perhaps, by their families, and each unwilling to become prominent, even for the sake of quelling an unpleasant excitement, encourages those who are bent upon mischief. What is the cause of this? The persons who are guilty of disturbance can surely find no pleasure in behaving in a manner which is foolish, shameful, and dangerous, and defeats all the reasonable purposes and expectations of a public assembly. The cause is to be found sometimes in the loose manner in which these parties have grown up amidst the alternate laziness and excitement of a large town; more frequently it is caused by the sickening, unreasonable, inexplicable and outrageous guzzling at all hours and places of fiery and poisoned liquor. We do hope that the time will come when we shall learn to move in crowds, without this scandalous circumstance arising to disgrace us. But up to the present, Americans, which means all of us, Germans, Irish, English, &c., who are encamped in America, seem to have the faculty of learning how to march in single file, and taking care of ourselves as individuals; but when we have to march in ranks, and to take care of, and be taken care of by others, we all, and especially, it is said, those Americans who are not such by birth, want to be captains, and to have everything our own way. When America gets to be as old as Europe, probably, we, too, will be able to sit down peaceably and quietly, as the people do in the parks and public places of France, Italy, Germany, and England, and enjoy ourselves like good children. We shall give up poisonous brandy for light wine and *eau-sucrée*, and as there will then be policemen enough to see that we behave ourselves, we shall make a virtue of necessity, and behave well, because we shall get to understand that it pays better than behaving badly. It certainly does require some education, some training, for people to know even how to amuse themselves without bickering and rowdiness. In the meanwhile those who get up public amusements should remember that they are responsible for their being conducted in an orderly and proper manner. They should, therefore, adopt proper rules and organization beforehand, and be ready promptly and effectually to put down the very earliest indication of anything like an attempt on the part of individuals to disturb the peace and harmony of the greater number.

We know that much has been left unsaid in this article, which the title might seem to call for. Still we dare hope, that it may do some good by suggesting, and this is all it aims at, that there are principles which should guide and control popular amusements, and that it is important that all of us who attempt to instruct the people, should understand them well, agree upon them, and assist one another by enforcing them in a harmonious and consistent manner.

J. W. C.

ART. VII.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Marian Elwood; or, How Girls Live.* By One of Themselves. New York. Dunigan & Brother. 1859. 12mo. pp. 360.

THIS work is by a new aspirant to popular favor, and though not faultless, we discover in it sufficient merit to give it a hearty welcome. It is evidently written by a young lady who has no large experience of society, but who is endowed with very keen powers of observation, and not unaccustomed to reflect on what she observes. Her book is a genuine production, fresh from her own mind and heart. It is not remarkable either for the intricacy of its plot, or the variety and novelty of its incidents, but it indicates wit and feeling, earnestness of purpose, freedom of thought and expression, and quietly, and at times happily, satirizes the insipidity and frivolity of the ordinary life and conversation of the class to which the author professes to belong. Marian Elwood, the heroine, is in some respects, a character new in our literature, marked by originality of conception, and very well sustained throughout. She is by no means a model character, but she is a frank-hearted, high-spirited, and noble-minded girl, truthful, generous, brave; with a deep woman's heart and a Christian's conscience under the veil of her light, gay, frivolous, and coquettish manners. She is intellectual, earnest, with a worthy ambition, but repressed and nearly extinguished by her surroundings, and the empty, weary, and heartless life she fancies she is compelled to lead. She has longings for something higher, better, less hollow and unsubstantial, but sees no escape, no opening for anything worthy of her efforts. She has her caprices, her foibles, her faults, her false views of men and society, but they bring their own punishment with them, and are in great measure corrected by humiliation and sorrow, long before she is dismissed to happiness. Whatever you may think of many things she says and does, you are forced to admit that she is a genuine girl, and excusable in the least defensible parts of her conduct; for even in them, though gravely mistaken, she acts from unselfish and disinterested motives.

Mrs. Merton and her "darling daughter" are less original, but their characters are well hit off, and seem drawn from the life. Lucy Merton presents a fine contrast to Marian, while in poor Carrie Sibley, half-neglected, is gently satirized the weak, sickly, sentimental, novel-reading young misses, who are always pining to be loved, and never finding any one able to understand them. Seymour Scott is not an every-day character, and more might have been made of him. He is a singular compound of strength and weakness, vehement alike in love and anger, equally stiff and inflexible, taciturn and voluble, equally cold and hot, equally gentle and rough, and enlists our respect only when, after his marriage, he resolves to be master in his own house, sends away his mother-in-law, goes quietly to his office, and leaves his little wife to recover from the hysterics, by the help of her maid, the best way she can. The characters of Mr. Weston of Westonsville, and of Ernest King, are happily conceived, and Mr. Weston's character is very well brought out. King is, undoubtedly, a noble fellow, but the author has not brought out those strong and manly qualities which could have really

won the heart of such a girl as Marian. These two characters prove that the fair author has the ability, when she has learned her strength, to rise to a higher order of literature than she has dared attempt in *Marian*. Her evident sympathy with Squire Weston should prove to her that Ernest King by no means comes up to her ideal.

Marian Elwood is, undoubtedly, a love story, or rather a series of love stories, and it could not have told us "how girls live," if it had not been. We are not fond of love stories; but it is useless to attempt to keep from our daughters all books which treat of love. Love is in their heads and their conversation before they are in their teens. We cannot, do our best, prevent them from thinking or talking of love, and we must seek to protect them by doing our best to idealize love for them, and informing it with the pure and disinterested spirit of Catholic morality. Such seems to have been the aim of the author of *Marian Elwood*. The love which she portrays with innocent frankness and maidenly modesty, is not a love that enervates, inflames, or corrupts; it is ideal rather than sentimental, and might be contemplated without offence by the most rigid ascetic.

The author entertains some views which are one-sided or exaggerated, and which time and experience will correct, but we have found nothing approved in her book offensive to Catholic morality. The author lives and breathes in the atmosphere of Catholic morals; and Catholicity, without being obtruded, pervades her whole book, but as a life, rather than as a dogma. She never dreams of denying, concealing, or apologizing for her religion, but she treats it as a thing with which she is familiar, and does not appear to fear that it will escape her unless she is constantly asserting it. She introduces her religion when it is proper she should, but her story does not turn on it. *Marian Elwood* is not a love story mixed up with theological controversy. It is not even a religious novel, but its tendency cannot fail to be religious. Under several points of view, it accords better than most novels by Catholic authors, with the kind of light literature we have so often recommended, a literature that may be read by Catholics without injury, and by non-Catholics without offence.

Marian Elwood is very well written, in good English, in a free, easy style, natural and graceful, in some passages attaining to rare strength and beauty. We have no disposition to conceal our deep interest in the success of the author, who certainly is not unknown to us, but we wish the work to be judged on its merits, and to be taken by the public for what it is worth. For ourselves, personally, we esteem the book as a promise rather than as a performance; we think we see in it the promise of an original writer, who, if she lives and cultivates her gifts, will make valuable contributions to our literature, and take an honourable rank among the better writers of her sex.

2. *The Trial and Conviction of Count de Montalembert.*

WE have barely space to allude to the government prosecution of this illustrious Catholic orator and statesman, and to enter our protest, in the name of intelligence, civil liberty, and religious freedom, against it. Montalembert, with all deference to the petty police justices who have condemned him, had committed no offence, not even technical, against the laws of his country, and had done nothing more than he had a

legal right to do. His condemnation in the police court proves that justice is administered in France according to the pleasure of the sovereign, and that the present sovereign feels that his safety and that of his dynasty depend on suppressing all free thought and free speech, and crushing out the intelligence, which, for so many centuries, has made the glory of France. Count de Montalembert is condemned to six months' imprisonment and a fine of three thousand francs, and by his condemnation is placed under the infamous law of Public Safety, passed last February, and rendered liable, without trial, to be imprisoned or deported to a penal colony, at the arbitrary will of the police; but the disgrace is not his, it is that of the government of Louis Napoleon, the *quondam* Carbonaro, and conspirator against the Pope, and of the French people, who, in a moment of panic, threw away their freedom, and prostrated themselves as slaves at the feet of a master. We hope Louis Veuillot and his party are satisfied. They have succeeded in enabling the government to render no middle ground between despotism and red republicanism tenable in France. Poor fools, infatuated and blind, they have not been able to see that the interests of the Church are as much compromised by the one as by the other; that her true element is liberty, not despotism or license. Montalembert is as much the victim of his devotion to the interests of religion as of his devotion to political freedom. The Catholic party, led on by Louis Veuillot, are digging their own grave, and preparing for Catholics in France, when the day of reaction comes, a persecution, to which that suffered under the old French Revolution was no more than the prick of a pin in comparison with being flayed alive. The reaction will come, and come with its chief rage against religion. This Montalembert labored with all his power to put his Catholic friends on their guard against. He knew such a despotism as that of the present *régime* could not last, and he did all he could to prevent Catholics from allying the cause of religion with it. He receives as his reward fine and imprisonment, if not exile and death, and we listen in vain for an indignant protest from Catholic America. Are we determined to afford the Know-Nothings every argument needed to prove that we have no sympathy with liberty? Have hatred of England on the one hand, and idolatry of France on the other, deprived us of our common sense? Let others be mute, we, at least, will speak. The condemnation of Montalembert is a condemnation of freedom, a condemnation of thought, and a condemnation of intelligence in France; and the man whose soul does not swell with indignation at the outrage offered by that condemnation to our common manhood, is fit only to be a slave. Free, intelligent France is imprisoned with the illustrious confessor, and it will yet be seen that Catholic France is also struck, in his person, a blow, from which it will not easily recover.

The policy of Louis Napoleon is to give the friends of religion and order no alternative but Despotism or Revolutionism. Are Catholics fools enough to aid him in that policy, and to regard him as the champion of Catholic interests? What will be the condition of the Church in France when he falls, as fall he will? The prestige acquired by the bravery of an army he found disciplined to his hand, in the Crimean war, has been lost by two years of peace and diplomacy. He has not been able to achieve a single diplomatic victory, and has been defeated by England and Austria on every point. Indeed, he holds his throne only by the grace of Great Britain, who could send him into

exile to-morrow, if it suited her purpose. He has come too late to extinguish intelligence in France, and to compel the noble French people to submit to his miserable system of enslaving the soul as well as the body. When he falls, when the Socialists with envenomed fury against the Church occupy his vacant throne, the Catholic defenders of despotism will perhaps remember the words of the noblest Catholic statesman and orator of our age. Let them then build monuments with the bones of slaughtered priests and nuns to Louis Veuillot and his dupes. We ask not Catholics to conspire against Louis Napoleon, but we do ask them to exercise a little common sense and common prudence, to acquire a little understanding of the age, and not deserve by their mole-eyed policy the judgments that are hanging over them.

3. *New American Cyclopædia; a Dictionary of Knowledge.* Edited by GEORGE RIPLEY and CHARLES A. DANA. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1858. 8vo. Vol. IV. pp. 766.

A VERY wise and learned journalist says, this new volume of the *American Cyclopædia* is, in a Catholic point of view, all that can be desired. The said journalist would do well to read his Catechism, and not meddle with matters which are beyond even his wisdom and learning. It is all we could expect, and far more than we usually receive from non-Catholics. The work, regarded as one which treats Catholic subjects with fairness and candour, or on which a Catholic may rely in historical or dogmatic questions, is very objectionable; but regarded as a work really and avowedly Protestant, we think well of it, and consider it in some respects less objectionable than most works of the kind. We never thought of disparaging the work regarded from a non-Catholic point of view, though, even so regarded, it is no marvel. We only advised our Catholic friends that the more important Catholic articles are not written by Catholics, as some persons had been led to suppose, and that while Catholic writers in it can express no judgment unfavourable to Protestantism or even Atheism, Protestant writers are free to express the most unfavourable judgments against Catholicity. We say not this by way of complaint, for we never had any right to expect anything else. It is written in the spirit of modern non-Catholic literature, and is just as hostile to us in fact, whatever it is in intention, as it can be without rendering its scholarship ridiculous. It avoids the coarser calumnies against us, and does not absolutely exclude us from good society. We state this simply as a fact, not as an objection. The editors never promised us a *Catholic Cyclopædia* and were they less uncatholic their work would be a very bad pecuniary speculation. We have no remarkable admiration for the work, but we have no hostility to it, and we are sure we have said nothing to injure its success. Our praise, not our censure, might hurt it. We are thankful for the comparatively respectful tone in which it speaks of Catholicity, but our gratitude is not unmeasured, nor so very profuse as to blind our judgment. Take it for what it really is, it may be commended as the cheapest and best *Cyclopædia* originally published by exclusively American editors, for we believe it is the first and only one. Save in the departments of natural science, it is superficial, and deficient in solid erudition. Its great merit is that it brings a great variety of matters down to the present time, and is in several respects

less out of date than the *Encyclopædia Americana*. It is, however, chiefly made up from preceding works of the same class, and to a great extent repeats their errors. As a popular Dictionary of Knowledge for the use of persons of limited information it is very well, but we hope our friends in Europe will not consider it as a fair index to American science and scholarship.

4. *Portraits of my Married Friends; or, a Peep into Hymen's Kingdom*. By UNCLE BEN. New York: Appleton & Co. 1858. 12mo. pp. 343.

THERE is a later edition of this work than the one now before us, and by other publishers. We are late in noticing it, for the publishers neglected, till a few days since, to send us a copy. We have read it with much pleasure. The only fault we find with Uncle Ben is, that he gives us spirited sketches of his married friends, instead of finished portraits. Each one of the stories in this volume has capabilities the author has not developed. It is perfectly natural that Uncle Ben, an old Bachelor, and therefore a little envious, should, in almost all cases, be more sparing of his lights than his shades. In a word, we hope that the fate of every one's married friends is not so sad and gloomy. But the sketches are all life-like, and indicate talent and genius. The book is upon the whole excellent, and one of the very best books of the kind we have seen for a long time. The story of Ringold Hopkins and his Girl-wife is written with a truthfulness and power sufficient to make the reputation of a novelist of the higher class. We most heartily commend the volume to all who have not yet read it.

5. *Blonde and Brunette; or, the Gothamite Arcady*. New York: Appleton & Co. 1858. 12mo. pp. 316.

THIS work is anonymous, but we will not affect to be ignorant of the author's name. This is not his first appearance before the public, nor the first time he has been noticed in this *Review*. We have sometimes found fault with his works on the score of taste, but we have never questioned his genius or ability. He is fitted to rank, after Cooper, among the very best writers of fiction our country can boast. The present work is not remarkable as a story, but is beautifully written, and unrivalled in some of its descriptive passages. It is lively, brilliant, amusing; but it is also something better. It is a work of rare moral beauty, and inculcates, in a pleasing manner without preaching, or set moralizing some highly important lessons, which our Catholic community especially very much need to learn and weigh well. We have read the work with unmixed pleasure, and we hope, after this publication, the rare merits of the author will be freely acknowledged, and his efforts to create for us a literature in accordance with our religion will meet with that generous encouragement that is due to them and to us. The author is a man who has faith, purity, honesty of purpose, nobleness of aim, and the earnestness and ability which will enable him, if treated according to his merits, to elevate our literature, and to advance the cause of religion and morality.

BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1859.

ART. I.—*Conversations of Our Club. New Series. Reported for the Review by a Member.*

CONVERSATION IV.

"WE departed," said Winslow, "from the original design of Our Club, in permitting our conversations to be reported and published. We thus converted it from a private Club for the mutual pleasure and improvement of its members, into a sort of public debating society, in which it will hardly do for one to throw out a remark or offer an opinion which he is not prepared to do battle for, as for an article of faith. We lose our freedom and unreserve, and can no longer talk at our ease."

"The public," added O'Connor, "will not understand conversations in which each speaker says simply and frankly what he thinks for the moment, and which are designed to stimulate thought and mature opinion, not to express thoughts and opinions already matured. Our purpose is to examine rather than to settle questions; and if each one of us is careful to say only what he really thinks, we none of us feel that we are bound either to ourselves or to others to stand by what we here say, but are as free to think otherwise as if we had not said it."

"No man," added Diefenbach, "has the right to dogmatize anywhere or on any subject. Only the Church has that right; and even she can establish as a dogma, only

what Almighty God has revealed to her. That she authoritatively declares or defines; and whatever she declares or defines to have been divinely revealed and committed to her is of faith, and must be accepted and believed, without questioning, by all Catholics. In matters of faith there are and can be no differences of opinion. Faith is true, is certain, and must be taken as so much ascertained truth, and used as the mathematician uses his axioms, or the geometrician his definitions. But the definitions of the Church do not cover the whole field of human thought or speculation, for faith was not given to supersede reason or to restrict its sphere. Under faith we have all the reason and all the scope for its exercise we could have were faith not given. Reason in its own sphere, according to its own laws, is always equal to itself, its own co-efficient, and as free in the Catholic as in the non-Catholic. All the difference between the Catholic and the non-Catholic in regard to reason is, that the Catholic does not attempt to do by reason what reason cannot do, and asserts its insufficiency in relation to matters which are above its power, while the non-Catholic asserts that reason is sufficient for all that man needs to know or believe, and thus undertakes to do by reason what reason cannot accomplish, or to eliminate from his belief whatever transcends the scope of reason. In the broad field not covered by faith, we Catholics hold that reason is free and our only authority; and that freedom of opinion is not only allowable, but desirable, since in that field, and that only, progress is possible, and no progress is possible without freedom."

"But unhappily," said O'Connor, "even all Catholics do not always properly appreciate that freedom, and we find not a few among them who seek to transfer to matters of opinion, the rule that governs us in matters of faith. As faith is fixed and unalterable, they would have even opinions fixed and unalterable; and as they receive their faith from tradition, they would receive their opinions from tradition, and neither suffer themselves nor others to depart from the opinions any more than from the faith of our predecessors. These fall into routine, suffer their minds to run in grooves, and look with distrust upon every one who is really a thinking and living man. The

world outside the Church takes advantage of this, and charges their lack of mental activity and energy to their faith, and thus enlists no small portion of the active, progressive intelligence of the age or country on the side of our enemies. The Club permitted its own conversations to be reported and published with the hope that their freedom and occasional boldness might force the minds of those who should read them out of their lethargic state, and exert an influence in compelling the Catholic public to think freely and independently on the questions raised. The Club did not presume to tell the public what it must think, or what it ought to think; its end was gained if it only induced it to think at all."

"But that was an end we might have known the public would misconceive," interposed De Bonneville. "The public was not likely to suppose that we were laboring only to render it a thinking public, and not to induce it to accept and swear by our conclusions."

"It was no matter whether it misconceived our purpose or not," replied O'Connor; "we were sure to gain our end, if we only induced it to examine the questions we raised, though it should do so only to condemn the opinions we advanced."

"The public," rejoined De Bonneville, "wants conclusions, not processes; to see opinions already formed, and hear them asserted as fixed and unalterable, not to be amused or perplexed with the process of forming them. The people are averse to the labor of forming their own opinions, and wish always to be saved the labor of making up their own minds. If you aim simply to quicken their mental activity, to force them to look at all sides of a question, they will either meet you with their mental inertia, or abuse you for holding unsound opinions, because holding opinions they are unfamiliar with, or different from those put forth by their ordinary leaders. If you escape with your labor for your pains you may think yourself fortunate. However orthodox you may be in your faith, however submissive you may be to authority in all things where authority claims the right to decide for you, to command, or to direct you, you will be regarded as an innovator, as a restless, turbulent spirit, against whom all good Catholics should be on their guard. In the bosom of Our

Club, when what we say is to go no farther, we may speak freely, and even crudely, without harm, and with mutual profit; but to suppose we can do so with any advantage before the public, Catholic or non-Catholic, is to prove that we know very little of mankind. The public will not tolerate or profit by free speaking. Catholics will tolerate the freedom we exercise in this Club less than others, not because it is incompatible with anything in Catholicity, but because they are less accustomed to it, because they are more in earnest, because they attach more importance to opinions publicly expressed, and because they fear the habit of free speaking and free inquiry on matters even not of faith, may, by an easy and not unnatural transition, be extended to the discussion of matters of faith. The private judgment asserted by Protestants is to be avoided, for it reduces faith itself to mere private opinion; but it is not every one who can distinguish between that private judgment, and the free, untrammelled use of reason the Club practises. Private judgment in matters of faith, as asserted by Protestants, is a misuse of reason, and really the most unreasonable thing in the world; but only men of disciplined minds, possessing more than ordinary analytical powers, can discriminate between it and the free use of reason in matters not of faith, or in the understanding of the various articles of faith in their relations to one another and to our natural faculties. Hence there is always danger that the habit of free thought and free expression may injure faith, and end with the mass of the people in rationalism. The Catholic aversion to free inquiry is therefore not unreasonable."

"The people," added Winslow, "do not and cannot be made to understand what is unfamiliar to them. They do not and will not think for themselves. There is not one man in a thousand who does or can be made to think freely, and form opinions for himself, even in the sphere of opinions. Men must receive their opinions cut and dried, and labelled. They hold the tradition of opinions hardly less sacred and obligatory than the tradition of faith. Their minds not only run in grooves, but can run nowhere else. The power of free original thought is the rarest thing on earth; ages on ages roll away without any one appearing to make a new application of long and

well-known principles. The art of Printing was known and practised when men first stamped coins, and yet it was not till the middle of the fifteenth century of our era, that the well-known art was applied to the printing of books by means of movable types. A slight step in advance would lead to a most important application of universally received scientific principles, and yet centuries elapse before any one appears to take it. Do not, then, think to make all men thinkers, or that you can by any means at your command force them out of routine."

"What is still worse," said De Bonneville, "they who never think freely and independently themselves can never appreciate free and independent thought in others,—never really thinking themselves, they take it for granted that nobody else ever thinks. They measure all minds by their own. It never enters their heads that a speaker or writer can have any meaning which lies too deep for their comprehension, and the more really original and profound he is, the more shallow and commonplace he appears to them. A worthy priest some time since published a book entitled *The Atheism of Brownson*, in which he concludes Brownson makes God a mere scenic personage or theatrical personation, because he says, 'God is *actus purissimus*, most pure act.'"

"That is bad enough," said Diefenbach, "but a recent writer in a Catholic Journal, criticizing our conversations on Theocracy, represents Father John, who states the doctrines of Our Club, so far as doctrines it has, as maintaining that under the New or Christian dispensation the prince or the state holds from God through the Church or supernatural society."

"The precise doctrine I denied," said Father John, "and did my best to refute. Such an opinion was broached in the Club, but it was refuted, and we all finally agreed, that unless otherwise ordained by the constitution of his state, the prince holds from God through natural society. We all agreed that infidels may have, and in fact do have, legitimate government, and that Catholic subjects of a non-Christian prince, are bound to obey him in like manner, and to the same extent, that they are bound to obey a Catholic prince. It was conceded that the government of this country holds from God through natural society,

and yet that it is a legitimate government, and that we as Catholics owe it the same allegiance we should in case it held from God through the supernatural society."

"But it was maintained by some of us," said Winslow, "that all governments ought to be Catholic governments, and hold from God through the Church."

"Very true," replied Father John; "but whether so or not, we all agreed that the Church has no power to force any government to become Catholic and hold through the supernatural society, against its will. To the question raised the Club gave a *transeat*. In the Middle Ages the greater part of the governments of Europe held by their own constitution and the coronation oaths of the sovereigns from God, in some sense, through the Church; but there are none that so hold now, and we maintained that it is not necessary that a government should so hold in order to hold from God and be a legitimate government. Whether the change is for the better or the worse we did not even inquire, for it has taken place, and must be submitted to whether we like it or not."

"But did not Father John assert the right of the Church to judge the prince and deprive him of his principality for cause?" asked De Bonneville.

"When the prince holds from God through the Church, yes; when he holds from God through natural society, no," replied Father John. "I simply refused in the latter case to say she has *not* the right, for she is the judge of her own rights and powers, and I am not aware that she has ever decided whether she has or has not the right. But I maintained that she never has deprived, and never does deprive, the prince who holds through natural society. In the case of such princes, if in her communion, she judges the sin, but not the fief or principality, as Innocent III. says in a letter to Philip Augustus. I went no farther, except to give it as my opinion, based on the uniform practice of the Church, that she does *not* interpret her powers so as to make them extend to the deprivation of a prince, even though a Catholic, who holds under the law of natural society alone. It would seem the clever journalist failed entirely to understand the drift of the conversations he criticized, or to read the plain English placed before his eyes."

"Almost as gross a mistake was made," said De Bon-neville, "by some persons as to the views of Our Club in regard to Education, especially in regard to Common Schools. We were understood to advocate the public schools, and to discourage the establishment of parochial schools for our Catholic children. Great indignation was expressed at the alleged feeble manner in which Mr. Winslow and Mr. O'Flanagan opposed the public school system, and defended that of separate Catholic schools."

"Great injustice, then, has been done those gentlemen," said Father John, "and I should like to see their critics defend their side of the question better than it was done by them. They said all that has been said by the ablest of our Catholic journals; and if they failed it was not for lack of ability, but because the ground on which the public schools are usually opposed and separate Catholic schools defended, is untenable. The Club did not pretend that the public schools, as they are managed, can meet the views and wants of Catholics with regard to education; and with the acquiescence of all its members I stated expressly, that considering the manner in which the schools are in many places perverted to sectarian purposes, the impossibility of giving positive religious instruction in them, and the fact—owing to various causes—that a large proportion of our children will receive no religious instruction at all, unless they receive it in the school-room, it is necessary, wherever we have the ability, to establish separate schools of our own. I am not aware that the authorities of the Church have gone any farther. It is true I did not condemn the system of public schools as established in the majority of the States of the Union; I only condemned its management. That system, I believe, is in itself just and equitable, and the best system ever devised. The evils that flow from it are not inherent in it, and result solely from the fact that the community is a mixed community of Catholics and non-Catholics. If the community were all Catholic, the public schools would be all we could desire. As this country is one of these days to become Catholic, I think it poor policy to condemn the system, and to labor to pull down to-day what it may cost us much labor and expense to rebuild to-morrow. The early Christians established some famous catechetical schools of their own, but they also used the

schools founded by the pagan Emperors, and the colleges of the whole civilized world are even to-day modelled after the schools of the pagan Roman Empire. Why shall we seek to destroy what we are to inherit? Wait a little while, and the educational and all the other institutions of this noble country, will peaceably pass into the hands of an enlightened and virtuous Catholic population.

"Furthermore," continued Father John, "I do not like decrying what I must use. To a great extent Catholic parents must, for the present, at least, send their children to the public schools, or do worse, for we have not established, and for a long time to come cannot establish, a sufficient number of suitable schools of our own for all our children. Why then shall we destroy the good faith of Catholic parents and children by teaching the parents that it is uncatholic for them to send, and the children that it is uncatholic for them to go, to the public schools? I am far from believing that the public schools are as bad as some of our zealous friends represent them; and I know constant efforts are made to guard against the immorality which in some instances has threatened to invade them. Should we not do more good by bringing our wisdom and virtue to aid in improving them, than by standing off and denouncing them? After all, these non-Catholic Americans are our countrymen, our brethren, with whom we do and must live, and whose temporal lot is inseparably bound up with ours. Catholics and non-Catholics are all alike Americans; and as men, as neighbours, and as citizens, have the same wants and the same interests. A policy of complete isolation is as impracticable as it is undesirable; and nothing would tend more to give us the confidence of our fellow-citizens, and to diminish the petty annoyances and vexations to which as Catholics we are subject, than to show that we really do feel ourselves an integral portion of the American people, identified with the country, and anxious to improve and preserve its institutions. Let us establish and support, wherever we can, such schools for our children as our pastors recommend or require, but let us refrain from denouncing or making war on the public school system, which is evil only because not in the proper hands. This, if I understand it, is the view taken in a recent lecture on Education, by the illustrious Archbishop of New York."

“But these misapprehensions and misrepresentations of our reported conversations,” concluded Winslow, “prove that the policy some neo-Catholics insist on of bringing all things into the arena of public discussion, and of endeavoring to induce all men to think freely and independently for themselves, is a very unsound and a very dangerous policy. The people at large can never have anything but a blind faith, or any better reason for believing than that so they have been taught. They must have, and will have, leaders, and the only real question is who shall lead them,—pastors divinely appointed and assisted, or self-appointed teachers,—prophets who run without being sent. What we want is docility, reverence for authority, not freedom or independence of thought, wild speculation, the agitation of theories which settle nothing and unsettle everything. Men who like myself have been brought up among your free and independent thinkers are unable to respect them. All in our religion rests on authority: and if we would enter into the kingdom of heaven, we must become as little children, and believe and obey because the father bids.”

“But our precise difficulty,” replied Diefenbach, “is that the respect for authority, the child-like docility, Mr. Winslow demands, this age and this country have not. Men though childish are not child-like. They have the ignorance, the petulance, the changeful humors, and the impatience, but not the candor, the docility, the simplicity, and the trustingness of the child. They are puffed up with a vain conceit of themselves, and speak with contempt of the ‘Governor.’ Authority they regard as an impertinence. They demand a reason without being able either to give or to receive a reason. They are filled with the spirit of unbelief, even when not actual unbelievers; and our Lord cannot do many mighty works among them, on account of their unbelief. These are the men we have to deal with; it is this proud, impatient, head-strong, supercilious, doubting, cavilling, rebellious spirit, that we have to exorcise; and how are we to do it? Tell men to be docile, respect authority, believe and do as they are bid, or they will never enter into the kingdom of heaven? What care they for that, since they really believe neither in heaven nor hell, neither in God nor the devil?”

“You see in that the sad effects,” said Winslow, “of your Common Schools, and your insane efforts to educate

the people. Universal education is the maddest dream of this maddest age and country. The mass of the people cannot be educated so as to be able to think or judge for themselves, and the modern system educates them only just enough to render them vain, proud, captious, indocile, rebellious. It all comes from attempting to do what Providence never designed should be done. The pastors, the chiefs, the leaders of the people, should be well and thoroughly educated, but we should never undertake to educate the people beyond their prayers and catechism. We do them an immense injury when we attempt more—when we make them feel that it is a degradation to be led, and that they must aspire to lead themselves. We then place before them the primal temptation, presented by Satan to our first parents, ‘Your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,’ that is, knowing them as God knows them, without being taught them by the law or command of a superior.”

“There is truth in what Mr. Winslow says,” added O’Connor, “and the evils we deplore result from the attempt to follow the Satanic spirit, or from yielding to the Satanic temptation. The education of the people, since they can at best be only half educated, is, no doubt, a great source of evil. It generates this very rebellious spirit we complain of; and till we can exorcise that spirit, we can do little for the religious amelioration of society or individuals even.”

“Whether ignorance be really the mother of devotion, or whether an ignorant and besotted people, who can hardly discern their right hand from their left, are more likely to be docile and submissive to legitimate authority than an educated and enlightened people we need not inquire,” replied Diefenbach, “for the attempt at universal education has been made, the people in most civilized countries have been to school, and a return to that blessed Eden of ignorance which Mr. Winslow regrets is no longer possible. We have been driven forth into the world to gain our bread by the sweat of our faces, and the Cherubim, with flaming sword, guard the gates of the garden against all return. We can effect nothing by fighting against the inevitable. We have adopted the policy of educating the people, and we cannot now abandon it; we must do

the best we can with it, and henceforth rely on intelligence, imperfect as it may be, instead of the ignorance some seem to deplore."

"I am not so certain of that," said De Bonneville. "It may not be impossible to return to the state of things which it is thought we have not done wisely in deserting. Not a few of our friends in Europe have good hopes of being able by education to undo the ill effects of education, or of making education itself the means of restoring lost ignorance. It would do no good to wage open war against the education of the people, and to suppress forcibly the schools established and supported for them. It is better to take possession of these schools, and use them against all education that quickens the mind, stimulates thought, or trains children to exercise freely their own faculties. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is as easy to teach ignorance as it is to teach knowledge; and it is not difficult, if you have the control of the schools, and are so minded, to make education the means of stifling thought, and enervating the mind. Let an absolute government establish a rigid censorship of the press, and prohibit all free speech, and all public discussion; let it prevent all movements of intelligence by its omnipresent police, or punish with fine and imprisonment every manifestation of mental activity, not devoted to the support of power, or to the purely material order, and suppress the expression of every aspiration after freedom or manly independence; let the clergy join with the government, uphold it in its war on intelligence, and second it with all their spiritual power and influence, and then let both unite in training the rising generation in accordance with the principles and wishes of the government, and you will have the ages of ignorance restored, and the people as docile and as little disposed to think or act for themselves as they were before the modern attempts to educate them. It is not education that needs to be opposed, but the education that induces thought, and quickens the spirit of freedom and independence. I am a Bourbonist, and do not like to see Louis Napoleon Bonaparte sitting on the throne of St. Louis; but I am charmed with his policy, which subjects to his authority both the Church and the School, and uses both as the means of extinguishing all dangerous intelligence, and exorcising the

revolutionary spirit which has so long possessed the French people. His Uncle complained that the Pope left him only men's bodies to govern; he means to govern both their bodies and their souls. If his Holiness protests, he has an army in Rome, just reinforced, to snap him up and whip him out of the Papal States, and clap him into a French prison; and if the French people grow restive, he can with his matchless police and his army of five hundred thousand of the finest troops in the world, very speedily reduce them to order. His imperial and royal majesty of Austria understands and practises the same policy with equal skill, and with more than equal success."

"But we should bear in mind," said Diefenbach, "that

'The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft a-gey.'

The policy of the European *oscuranti* is very fine, but its success is more than doubtful. The clergy, from their Chief downward, are, no doubt, opposed to the false notions of liberty now rife in the populations of Europe, and willingly throw their influence on the side of order; but they know that order is threatened as much by despotism as by revolutionism, and, save in a moment of panic, very few of them will knowingly consent to aid the monarchs in moulding the people to be the peaceable victims of despotic rule. The clergy, too, are and always have been on the side of intelligence,—real, genuine, not sham intelligence,—and must be duped before they co-operate with the political power in suppressing it. It is only up to a certain point that absolute governments can count on the co-operation of the clergy, and if they wish to go beyond, they will find them with all their moral and spiritual influence against them."

"Then," added Father John, "the sovereigns overrate their own power as well as that of education, or rather, they err in supposing they can ever get that complete control over education demanded by their policy. They may control the schools, and the lessons taught in them, but it is the least part of the education which moulds and determines character; that is acquired in the school-room. Society educates, and, do what we may, will educate her children, and give them her own opinions, aspirations, con-

victions, aims, and tendencies. You can never effect any radical change in the character and tendency of society by beginning with the children, for it is always the adult generation that educates the rising generation, and in educating forms it to its own image. The man is father of the child, not as Wordsworth sings—

‘The child is father of the man.’

The generation that in the sixteenth century made the Protestant Reformation, and the generation that in the eighteenth made the infidel revolution in France, had been educated in Catholic schools, under the pious care of the clergy or teachers approved by them. The Italian Carbonari, the Mazzinians, all Young Italy, so hostile to the Pope and the whole Catholic religion, are all graduates of Catholic schools. It is with the adult generation you must begin your reform, as it is through the adult generation only that the seeds of doubt, unbelief, irreligion, rebellion, are sown. While the adult generation remains what it is, bent on liberty, and animated by the revolutionary spirit, however the outward manifestation of its thoughts and aspirations may be suppressed, you can never, without a miracle, train up your children and youth to be contented under the *regime* of despotism and ignorance. By no power in Church or State can you render the character of the new generation essentially different from its predecessor. You must begin with the parents, and change the character of the adult generation, and that you can never do by fines and imprisonment, by penal statutes, or armed force. Bayonets are impotent against the impassible spirit of man.”

“The adult generation is already convinced,” interposed Winslow, “that it has been following a false light, and aiming at the impracticable, and even the undesirable.”

“I doubt if such is the case to any great extent,” replied Father John. “There has been a reaction against the revolutionism of 1848, but it is more the effect of panic or despair than of conviction. There is not a throne on the continent of Europe that can safely trust for its support to the convictions and affections of the people, or that is not upheld by armed soldiery. Every continental government depends for its support on its army

not only against foreign aggression, but also against its own subjects,—a remarkable fact, as far as my reading goes, unknown in the previous history of the world. The governments of Europe are or tend to be centralized despotisms, while the great body of the European populations are virtually republican, in favor either of a republic such as ours is conceived to be, or of a constitutional monarchy like that of Great Britain. There is no harmony between the governments and their subjects, and there can be none without such political changes as accord with the wishes of the majority of the people. You may declaim against the wickedness and danger of secret societies as much as you please, but they have their origin in the dissatisfaction of the people with the political order which obtains, and their determination at the first opportunity to effect a change. Even Russia is covered all over with secret societies, and we need not be surprised to witness before long strange movements in that vast empire, which has the misfortune of being rotten before being ripe.”

“Undoubtedly,” said O’Connor, “the dominant sentiment of the populations of Europe is in favor of what we call self-government, or the government of the nation by itself. It is therefore opposed to foreign domination on the one hand, and to Cæsarism on the other. It is alike in favor of national independence and of republican freedom. Thus we see the same uneasiness in Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Italy, and France. Ireland regards herself as a nation, and struggles for a national government; Hungary would recover her independence, and Italy would drive out the Austrians, and resume her nationality and her autonomy. Against the just aspirations of these nations, the despotisms of Europe are leagued together, and the people everywhere see that political liberty and the relief of oppressed nationalities do and must go together, and that they constitute one and the same cause. The Irish in Ireland, in England, and in this country, no doubt have sympathized with Napoleon III., but only because they have trusted that he would humble the pride of England, and become the liberator of Ireland from foreign domination.”

“Drowning men,” replied Diefenbach, “catch at straws, and are excusable for so doing. His imperial majesty will never interfere to liberate Ireland from English rule,

unless it be to annex her to his own dominions, and to make her a province to be ruled or misruled by some debauched prince of the imperial family. The hope of the Irish in him is vain, for he is more likely to become as his Uncle became the prisoner of Great Britain than the humbler of British pride. Even if not so, how could Ireland content herself with being a province of France, since her principal happiness is in having a good grievance, and in declaiming lustily against the government? Of all people on the face of the globe, the Irish are the least fitted by habit or temperament to sit down contentedly under the Cæsarism which now reigns in France. The mingling of the cause of oppressed nationalities with that of political and civil liberty, is one of the chief obstacles to the settlement of European society on some permanent basis. Most of these nationalities are hopelessly lost, or too much weakened, or too much torn by intestine divisions, to be able to sustain themselves as independent nations. Irish Patriotism sighs for an independent Ireland, governing herself, and rivalling her old enemy, but it can only sigh for it. Ireland is really an integral part of the British Empire, and it is only as such that she can subsist. As such she can develop her resources, and command the respect and admiration of the world. She is not subject to England, but is one of the great constituent elements of the British State, and of British glory. Let her be separated from the British Crown and Parliament, and set up a government of her own, whether republican or monarchical, she would be torn by intestine factions, by rival claimants, and be unable to carry on the ordinary business of government. Her true interest is to submit with the best grace she can to the connection she already has with the British Empire, to labor to become reconciled to it, and to derive from it all the advantages it is capable of affording, as has been done by her sister kingdom of Scotland. Italy looks with some hope to Louis Napoleon to liberate her from Austrian rule and preponderance, but with no better reason. Italy is, after all, a geographical expression, not a nation, and is incapable under any possible domestic power of being moulded into a nation. A united Italy could recover and maintain its independence, whether assailed by France or Austria; but there is and

can be no united Italy. Drive out the Austrians, and Lombardy and Venice become separate states; Tuscany will unite neither with Lombardy nor with Piedmont. The South of Italy and the North will not act together; and the old divisions, and the old wars of city with city, and principality with principality, would soon revive and devastate the Peninsula. Free any of the oppressed nationalities of which you speak, the old causes which reduced them under the dominion of their neighbors would revive, for though suppressed they are not extinct, and soon reduce them under a foreign domination again,—would make them again a prey to foreign powers, and much impoverished and demoralized they would soon be once more where they are now. Why seek to accomplish impossibilities? For myself I do not feel much sympathy with oppressed nationalities, unless the oppression touches the rights of man, and takes away that freedom of the individual without which man is no longer man. Let the struggle be for substantial freedom, a reasonable and just freedom, to be gained by honest means, and it must sooner or later prove successful. I do not sympathize with the European revolutionists, but I do sympathize with the cause of freedom, of self-government against Cæsarism, and for that cause my voice shall ever be raised."

CONVERSATION V.

"We might sympathize with the cause of European Liberals," remarked Winslow, "if it were really the cause of freedom. But the so-called Liberals are struggling for absolute democracy, and absolute democracy is as hostile to true freedom as is absolute monarchy. It simply puts the people in the place of the king, and renders the rule of an ill-informed, thick-headed, capricious, and irresponsible majority, changing with each election, absolute and irresistible. Under it there is no uniform policy of government. One legislature enacts laws, and the next repeals them. Laws, too, when they would restrain, become a dead letter. Nobody regards a law that is in his way; and no court or jury can be found to enforce an unpopular law, or a law highly displeasing to a numerous and influential class of electors."

"Your experiment of popular government, just in proportion as it becomes democratic, fails everywhere in the Union," said De Bonneville. "The order and prosperity you have hitherto enjoyed are, so far as government is concerned, due to the principles, laws, and institutions you inherited from England, not to the additions or alterations you yourselves have made. As the spirit of democracy acquires strength, as it pervades your society, and moulds your constitutions, laws, and institutions to suit itself, you lose the advantages of government, grow corrupt, and cease to have honest men enough left to look after the rogues; corruption eats into the very heart of your community, and such a thing as political honesty can hardly be found amongst you. Your whole government, State and Federal, is a job, and the public interest is everywhere sacrificed to private speculation."

"I am," said Father John, "as all my friends are well aware, no democrat, either in a party or any other sense. I concede the terrible corruption that is creeping into all our political parties, and the shameful profligacy of the men we intrust with the management of our public affairs; but I am not prepared to admit that we are, even in these respects, unrivalled by the despotic States of the Old World. The Members of the various Spanish, French, and Russian administrations are much belied, if they are not more than a match for our public men in jobbing. With all the evils which flow from the excesses of liberty, and I have no wish to extenuate them, we suffer far less than they who are exposed to the excesses of power. It is no small advantage even to be able to publish criticisms on ourselves, and to point out and publicly denounce the misdeeds of government, without being arraigned before the police and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. Thought is an important function of man, and the free expression of one's honest convictions is one of the strongest necessities of a rational nature. The worst of all tyrannies is that which strikes at free thought and free speech. The body is not the whole of man, and you have done little even though you have provided for its comfort, if you have stifled thought, imposed silence on intellect, and extinguished the soul. I care little for the tyranny which touches the body, if it leave the soul free, thought and speech unfettered.

We may war against Red Republicanism as warmly as we please, but we should take care that, in doing so, we be not found fighting for Cæsarism."

"Between Red Republicanism and Cæsarism," said O'Connor, "there is a third party, alike free from the despotism of the king and that of the mob. I call this party Republican, and distinguish its doctrine from both monarchical and democratic absolutism. It defends what is called representative, constitutional, or parliamentary government. It advocates self-government, that is, the government, through its estates or its representatives, of the nation by itself, sometimes with a king as in Great Britain, sometimes without a king as in the United States. A very considerable portion of the European Liberals belong to this party, and seek to restrain without abolishing government. They are not opposed to a limited monarchy, they war not on dynasties, and seek not to bring kings or Cæsars to the block. They only seek to restrict power within just limits, and to secure to the nation in some form a preponderating voice in the management of public affairs. With these I confess I sympathize."

"So do I," added Father John; "and my complaint of a portion of our Catholic friends in Europe is that they do not recognize the importance of this party, that they war against it, and seek to discredit every man who adheres to it. This, as I often repeat, is the ground of my quarrel with M. Louis Veuillot, the able editor of the *Univers*. M. Veuillot, who carries with him a portion of the French Episcopacy and a large part of the rural clergy of France, and who in this country, where few read him, is regarded as a sort of lay Pope, was, while it was popular, attached to this party, but now wages a fierce war against it. He joins the winning side, and now aims studiously to combine the defence of the highest-toned Catholic doctrines and practices with unceasing opposition to parliamentary government, and especially to the men, if Catholics, who regret its loss in France, and would gladly see it restored. He thus gives a false direction to the public thought of the Catholics who confide in his guidance, and does more injury to the cause of religion than the vilest Voltairian journalist in Europe. I blame him not for giving to the actual government of his country a loyal support, but I do blame him

for endeavoring to enlist Catholicity on the side of Cæsarism, and doing all in his power to place the Church in a false position before the world. I blame him for endeavoring to use the sound papal doctrine he asserts with even unnecessary ostentation against the Gallicanism of the old French court, to protect the political Cæsarism he seems determined shall be fastened on all Catholic States. The high papal prerogatives he seems to recognize were asserted and used by the Popes themselves only in defence of the laws, of popular and national rights, against the invasion and usurpations of Cæsar, never in his support. They are compatible with liberty, and are in a proper state of society among its most efficient safeguards, as no one knows better than the Emperor of the French, who has absolutely refused to repeal the infamous Organic Laws annexed by his Uncle on his sole authority to the Concordat of 1802, and declared in force the edict of Louis XIV., respected even by that monarch himself, commanding all professors in colleges and seminaries to hold and to teach the Four Articles of the French clergy in 1682. I blame Louis Veuillot, who occupies an important position as editor of the first Catholic journal in Europe, for laboring constantly and with all his might to prevent the establishment of any check on power, and to leave the friends of religion and society no alternative between Cæsarism and Red Republicanism."

"The policy of the Emperor of the French evidently is," said Diefenbach, "to break down and utterly annihilate the constitutional or parliamentary party, and to leave the friends of order and religion no alternative between supporting Cæsarism and joining the ranks of the Red Republicans. He appears to think that when driven to this alternative they will rally under his drapeau, as they did after his famous *coup d'état*. Sure of their support, he appears to trust that, by means of his army and his admirable police, and by coquetting with the Red Republicans, leading them now to hope that he will make war on the Austrians in Italy, or use his troops in Rome, there, it is understood, against the consent and the will of the Pope, to destroy the autonomy of the Papal government, under pretence of reforming the administration of the Papal States, he will be able to sustain his power and establish the Napoleonic dynasty on the throne of France, and per-

haps also on the thrones of the Italian and Spanish peninsulas. The fault of Louis Veuillot and the Catholics he leads or represents is, that they have aided him in this policy, labored to render perpetual the dictatorship he usurped in his *coup d'état*, instead of laboring to put an end to it at the earliest practicable moment, to make the Emperor assume the character of a constitutional prince, and to secure adequate guarantees of the rights of the nation and of the citizen. I complain, not of the Church in France, but of some half a dozen French prelates, who, counselled perhaps by their fears, took the occasion when the press was gagged and no voice could be raised to contradict them, to desert the cause they had previously defended, to pronounce undeserved eulogiums on the Prince-President, and to invite him in the name of religion to revive the Empire, and re-establish the Napoleonic dynasty. I complain of them because they thus compromised their brethren, who could not oppose them without endangering their heads, or provoking the vengeance of power on the Church in France, and because they place the whole French Episcopacy in a false position before the world, and make it, apparently, responsible for the base surrender of the rights of the Church and of the nation to the arbitrary will of the new Cæsar, who had proved himself no friend to either. They have done all that they could do to link the cause of Catholicity with that of Cæsarism, and to give the lie to all of us who, in constitutional states, have to combat the standing objection, that Catholicity is unfavourable to political and civil liberty, and naturally sympathizes with despotism."

"The evil," added O'Connor, "is far more serious than our narrow-minded and short-sighted publicists suspect. They have confirmed, as far as the bishops and clergy of a single nation can confirm, the standing charge of the enemies of the Church, that her existence in a state is incompatible with its political and civil liberty, and that her real sympathies are with Cæsarism,—a fact which the American Know-Nothings will be sure to remember, and to make the most of against us. By breaking down and annihilating the constitutional party, they have left in Europe only Cæsarists and Red Republicans, with no mediator between them. They have thrown the Church

on the side of Cæsar, and stirred up the wrath of the insurgent democracy against her even more than against him. They have deprived the Church of the vantage ground she held in 1848. Then she was understood to be on the side of liberty, and opposed to the despotism of the government. When the revolution in France proclaimed the Republic, nearly all the French bishops and clergy hastened to declare their adhesion to it, and to avow themselves in favor of freedom. The Republic confided in their good faith, refrained from attacking the rights of the Church, and men who all their lives had warred against her, vied with one another in rendering her homage and in protecting her liberty. Indeed the revolution, in freeing the people, freed her from the thralldom in which the temporal sovereigns for centuries had held her, and she moved and spoke with a freedom she had not enjoyed before since the great Western schism, nay, since the time of Philip the Fair. But she has lost all she had gained by the liberal policy with which our present glorious Chief Pontiff inaugurated his pontificate, and which for twenty years had been advocated by Catholic bishops, clergy, and intelligent laymen throughout the world, except in Austria, where obscurantism is at home. In the new Red Republican revolution, which seems likely, sooner or later, to break out, she will hold a far different position and be regarded with far other sentiments. The bishops and clergy may again declare their adhesion to the Republic, but the triumphant democracy will no longer trust them. It will respond to their overtures, We cannot trust you. You would desert us on the first opportunity as you did in 1852, and applaud the usurper who would mow us down in the streets, or send us by thousands to die of pestilence in the swamps of Guiana. You have no sympathies with us; you detest us, and love only Cæsar. Cæsar you choose, Cæsar you have served, go, and share the fate of Cæsar."

"But the *coup d'état* by which the Republic was overthrown, and the Empire was virtually re-established," Winslow contended, "was a necessary step to save religion and society from the threatened attacks of socialism, and even liberal Catholics in Europe and America generally approved it."

"After Louis Napoleon, by a bold stroke of policy,

dissolved the Legislative Assembly, arrested and imprisoned its prominent members, and usurped the entire power of the State, they," replied Diefenbach, "without approving what had been done, very generally believed that the best thing left for them in the circumstances in which it placed them, was to accept it, and to legitimate the power the President had grasped, as it would be better that he should exercise it by a legal than an illegal title. But the *coup d'état* left them really no choice in the matter, for the President had usurped the power, and could not be made to relinquish it. Yet there never was any necessity for that *coup d'état* itself, except what was created by the President and the Bonapartists themselves, in order to have an opportunity of reviving the Empire and re-establishing the Napoleonic dynasty. The danger from the Socialists had been defeated. True, Kossuth, the champion of oppressed nationalities, had formed an alliance with Mazzini, the leader of Young Italy, and the pantheistic democracy; but their combined movement could effect nothing serious, for the necessary 'material aid' was not forthcoming, and the party of order were everywhere victorious, well organized, and on the alert against them. The Republic itself had defeated the Socialists and broken their power, as early as June, 1848, without aid from Louis Napoleon, and the revolution had known how to set bounds to itself. It is a fact that should not be forgotten, that throughout Europe the victory for order had been fought and won under Republican or Liberal auspices. The French Republic put down the Triumvirate of Rome, and restored the Holy Father to his temporal throne; Austria proclaimed a liberal, virtually a republican constitution for her motley empire, and under its prestige triumphed over her enemies in Hungary and Italy; Prussia was liberal till the Socialists were used up, and it was not till the cause of order had been everywhere successfully vindicated, and a decided reaction in the public mind against socialism and Red Republicanism had taken place, that Cæsarism dared leave its hiding-place, and not till after liberalism had proved its ability to put down anarchy and protect religion and society, did Louis Napoleon attempt his *coup d'état*, or the movement to re-establish Cæsarism, under pretence of sustaining order and religion,

fairly commence. Cæsar was terribly alarmed at the danger after it was over, at anarchy after the Republic had suppressed it. There never was the danger pretended, and there was not the slightest necessity, in order to save religion and society, of the *coup d'état*, or of the surrender of both to the fostering care of a despot."

"It seems never to have occurred to our good friends," said O'Connor, "that to surrender religion and society to Cæsar is really to abandon both, or, unless men have become slaves in their souls, is really to sow the seeds of a new and fiercer revolution against them. It would not be easy to conceive the evils that would follow a new and successful revolution against the governments of Europe."

"There can be again no such revolution," said Winslow, "if Catholics are only loyal in the support of power, and therefore, I side heartily with the *Univers* and its friends. The Church is free in fact now in both Austria and France, and she can, wherever free, grapple successfully with the revolutionary spirit, and exorcise it, as every other evil spirit."

"The Church can nowhere grapple successfully with the revolutionary spirit, if she appears as the ally of despotism, or not as free to war against Cæsarism as against revolutionism," replied O'Connor. "This is a point our friends do not sufficiently consider. The European populations, especially in the Catholic States, are deeply imbued with the sentiment of liberty. That sentiment, as they hold it, may not be pure or truly enlightened, but such as it is, it rules them, and is with them a fixed idea. In that sentiment, too, is an element of truth and goodness which consecrates it to their minds, and gives it its terrible power over them. Let the Church be really or apparently placed in opposition to that sentiment without discriminating, accepting, and defending what is true and good in it, and she at once becomes powerless over those who are under its domination, and instead of exorcising the revolutionary spirit that possesses them, or winning them back to her embrace, will drive them farther from her, and render them still more hostile both to her and to all legitimate authority. The Church, to be able to control them, must be free not only to preach submission to them, but to recognize their rights and the duties of power ;

therefore, while she upholds just authority, to defend true liberty, and this she is not free to do either in France or Austria. She can be free to do it only in a free state, under a constitutional government which recognizes and protects free thought and free speech in the citizen. The Church is free either in France or Austria only so long as she offers no opposition to Cæsarism."

"I wish our Catholics, who have eyes only for the past, and who can never understand their own age and their present duties, would tell me," said Diefenbach, "why it is in Italy, in France, indeed in every Catholic State, we find the young, active, living intelligence of the age almost exclusively anti-papal, nay, anti-christian. The fact is undeniable. It is very easy to ascribe it to diabolical pride and wickedness, or to trace its remote cause to the prevarication of Adam and the corruption of human nature, but something more specific than that is needed as an answer. Children born of Catholic parents, in a Catholic country, and educated from infancy in Catholic schools, do not, as they grow up, as their intelligence unfolds, and their views expand, lose their affection for the Church, and become her sworn enemies without at least some pretext, and I will say never, without some blame on the part of Catholics themselves, never unless the policy they are led to believe is approved by the Church, outrages their sense of justice, or their sense of the rights and dignity of men, and the progress of society. Explain or disguise it as we will, it grows out of the fact that the Church is believed to be hostile to the sentiment of liberty, and pledged to the cause of despotism, which is simply a social death; that they who are looked upon as Catholic leaders, are obscurantists, with no sympathy with the down-trodden millions, and anxious only to uphold arbitrary or oppressive power. They hear everywhere these movements in favor of liberty denounced, but seldom hear power rebuked for its excesses or abuses. A man full of generous sentiments, with no thought of doing or saying anything uncatholic or disloyal, sees the sufferings of the people, sympathizes with them, and says simply that he thinks the government might be better administered — that there might be a more beneficent exercise of power, and a wider scope allowed to the activity of the citizen. His words are

reported, and from that moment he is a marked man, placed under the surveillance of the police, thrust into a dungeon, or banished from the realm. This was the offence, and the only offence, of the Abbate Gioberti, for which he was exiled from Piedmont, to which he was permitted to return only when that kingdom resolved to become a constitutional state. When a man is thus treated by a professedly Catholic government, supported and applauded by the clergy, who hold it up as a model government, and its sovereign as a model prince, what wonder that he commits the mistake of supposing the Church is irrevocably wedded to despotism, and is more intent on upholding power, than meliorating the condition of the people—more devoted to authority than to justice—and that he includes her in the wrath he feels, and justly feels, against the government that wrongs him and abuses its most sacred trusts?"

"But we must be just," said O'Connor. "The Church is not implicated in such transactions. There are old fogies amongst Catholics as well as amongst non-Catholics—men who are steeped to their eyes in Cæsarism, and who would make war on the Church herself were she to favor a liberal and just policy. We saw it in the beginning of the pontificate of Pius IX. There was a class of Catholics in every country that opposed and labored in all ways they could to thwart the liberal policy he inaugurated. He attempted to cut the Church loose from the chains with which the despotism of the courts had bound her, to assert her freedom and independence of the sovereigns, and to enlist all the generous sympathies of the European populations in favor once more of religion. But he everywhere encountered the *oscuranti*: everywhere they opposed him; and it is said, I know not how truly, that the prelates of Austria, inspired not unlikely by the court, admonished him in a formal letter, that if he persevered in the policy he had inaugurated, the Church in Austria would withdraw from his obedience. The opposition from Catholics, playing into the hands of the Mazzinians, defeated his generous intentions, and he is now held to keep the peace by the armies of France and Austria, who occupy his states under the pretence of protecting him against the disaffection of his temporal subjects, whose just demands he was not and is not now permitted to satisfy."

“I know very well the Church is not implicated in the war upon the just rights of individuals and nations,” replied Diefenbach. “I am, I trust, a Catholic; and God forbid that I should do or say anything to cast the slightest shade of suspicion upon the Church of God, the representative of his kingdom on earth. But I do know and say that Catholics—and Catholics in influential positions—are implicated, are even foremost in supporting Cæsarism. Nobody can deny that the more influential Catholic statesmen in Southern and Central Europe, under pretence of maintaining order, uphold Cæsar in his war upon thought and speech, and oppose with all their might the introduction of liberal institutions. Have we not read long wearisome essays in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, published at Rome, against modern representative government? Do we not read the daily diatribes of the *Paris Univers* against the men who remember the tribune, regret the loss of free institutions, and wish their re-establishment—men of unimpeachable Catholicity, unimpeachable loyalty, men who defended the cause of Catholic freedom in the French parliament, with masculine eloquence, to which the world listened with admiration and conviction, when Louis Veuilot was spouting infidelity or writing obscene novels? Have we not all seen the first Catholic orator and statesman of the age, of whom any age or nation might be proud, traduced for his devotion to civil and religious liberty, prosecuted and sentenced by a police court to fine and imprisonment for daring to express his admiration of the parliamentary government of Great Britain, and his regret at the loss of a similar government in his own country? Have we not found every Catholic journal in free, enlightened America, except those written in the German language, denouncing him, and with only a single exception, if I recollect aright, that of the *New-York Freeman’s Journal*, defending the government of the new Cæsar, and grossly abusing the only Catholic in America who has had the courage or manliness to protest publicly against the outrage committed, in the person of the noble Count Montalembert, on free thought, on free speech, on just liberty, on historical truth, and on manly intelligence? These facts do not to the Catholic implicate the Church, I very well know; but they do implicate her in the minds of

non-Catholics, who are not in the habit of drawing nice distinctions between the action of Catholics and the action of the Church. The Catholic press in this country, in its treatment of M. Montalembert, has shown what its professions of attachment to liberty and of loyalty to American institutions are worth. The majority of Catholic journals are published with the approbation of the Ordinary, and they furnish a fruitful text to American Know-Nothings, which may one day be handled against Catholics in a way that will not be advantageous to our cause in this country. How can these journals expect to combat successfully the Know-Nothings, when they take pains to confirm their objections? It is well to think before speaking, and to look before taking a leap. As far as it is in the power of your Catholic press to commit the Church to the cause of Cæsarism it has done it, and confirmed the standing charge against our religion, that it is incompatible with republican institutions, with civil and religious liberty, and is the grand support of despotism."

"But Mr. Diefenbach makes too much of the slips of the American Catholic Press," said Father John. "That press, for the most part, has very little character and less influence. Even the enemies of the Church seldom take it as an index to the real sentiments of the Catholic body, and rather ignore than consult it. The Catholics of this country, from causes not necessary to mention, have, almost to a man, a great hatred of England, and a strong attachment to France. M. Montalembert has not lost his Catholic position among them by his attachment to self-government, but by having outraged their deep-seated prejudices in praising England, and in intimating that her government is better than that of his own country. American Catholics have no special attachment to Louis Napoleon, but they have been in the habit of maintaining, as necessary to the defence of their religion, the superiority of everything in Catholic States, and they suppose the French bishops and clergy are the best judges of what is most favorable to religion in France. Finding, or supposing they find, them all but unanimous in supporting the Imperial Government, they very naturally conclude that any one who is not satisfied with it, is under the influence of some worthless political theory, and to be regarded only as

a disappointed politician, or a political agitator. The whole matter in their view pertains to the political order, and Catholics as such have no occasion to trouble their heads about it. That this is the view generally taken by our Catholic journals is unquestionable,—that it is the true view I by no means concede. The prosecution of Montalembert by the imperial government, is in my view a gross outrage upon liberty, and should excite the indignation of every Catholic throughout the world, because *that liberty which it was attempted to strike down in him, is in our times and the present constitution of society the indispensable condition of that freedom and independence, which every intelligent Catholic demands for his Church.* The experience of every Catholic in America ought to teach him that the freedom of the Church cannot now be maintained on the ground that it is *her* right, for no government can acknowledge it to be *her* right, without acknowledging her to be the Church of God, and that no government in our times will do, or be permitted to do. The freedom of the Church can now be maintained only as the right of the citizen, included in his right to choose, profess, and propagate his own religion. This is the view taken by M. Montalembert, and that was defended with so much energy and brilliancy for twenty years by what was called the Catholic party in France, adhered to by nearly all, if not all, the Catholic bishops of the American Union. The state now professes no religion, it professes none even in France and Austria, and therefore can recognize and protect the freedom of no religion as such. Consequently where the citizen has no rights recognized and protected by the political constitution of the state as is the case under Cæsarism, the Church has and can have no freedom, no recognition and protection of her rights. Louis Veuillot and those who oppose Montalembert and his friends overlook this fact, and wish the state to recognize the rights of the Church as hers, that is, to make the state profess the Catholic religion, and exclude or at least only tolerate other religions. This, even if desirable, is henceforth, I take it, absolutely impracticable. The state has ceased to be Catholic, and public opinion throughout the world refuses to permit it to profess any religion, and demands that it recognize all as equal before the state. Any

one who knows the age and its fixed ideas, knows that it is idle to struggle against this demand. France and Austria, Sardinia and Belgium, have yielded to it, and so far as the state is concerned, we must make up our minds to leave error as free as truth, heresy as free as orthodoxy. Citizens must settle their religious controversies among themselves, without calling in the aid of the civil power. This is the American system which all nations will be forced to accept. The state here does not recognize the Catholic Church as such; it simply recognizes and protects my rights as an American citizen. But in my rights as a citizen is included my right of conscience, my right before the state to choose, profess, and propagate by moral means my religion, whatever that religion may be, provided it is not *contra bonos mores*. This right, being my right as a citizen, the state must recognize and protect. In the exercise of this right I choose the Catholic religion, the Catholic Church, and therefore the state must recognize and protect the Catholic Church, and defend her freedom in relation to all who are or who wish to become Catholics, against all external violence, not because she is the Catholic Church, but because she is the choice of free citizens. This suffices, for it in fact leaves the Church wholly free and independent of the state. It is just and equitable, for it only asks the Catholic to respect in others, who may differ from him, that freedom before the state which he asks them to respect in him. But it is easy to see that on this ground the Church can have no guaranty for her freedom and independence except in a free state, which asserts and maintains the equality of rights, and an equality of rights which the state does not grant, which are anterior to the state, and which the state must recognize and respect. The citizen having no rights under Cæsarism, or none that he can defend, for Cæsarism denies all rights which do not emanate from Cæsar, the Church can have none, nor means of defending the rights God gives her. Hence the question involved in M. Montalembert's prosecution does interest us Catholics, for it is fundamentally the question of religious freedom, and of the right to profess, defend, and maintain the Catholic religion. The age is not wrong in always coupling civil and religious liberty together. They are inseparable, and they have the same basis and conditions.

Deny religious liberty, and you can no longer assert civil liberty, because to deny it is to deny a civil right, which is tyranny. Deny civil liberty and you cannot assert the freedom of religion before the state, for then you deny all right before the state. We must then support civil or political liberty as the condition of supporting religious liberty, and religious liberty as the condition of supporting civil or political liberty. England and the United States have both discovered this; the United States have fully conformed to it, and England finds herself forced to conform nearer and nearer to it, and will find herself forced ere long to conform wholly to it, and give up her Church Establishment.

CONVERSATION VI.

"My friends seem to me," said Winslow, "to take a very false view of Catholic Europe, and of the sentiments of leading European Catholics. In fact, they seem to me to have derived their views from the anti-Catholic press of England. There is no doubt that the better part of European Catholics, including the majority of the bishops and clergy, rally to the support of the governments,—not because they are in favor of Cæsarism or opposed to genuine liberty, but because the revolutionary party, the so-called Liberals, are alike the enemies of religion and society. There is no formal alliance between the Church and the governments, but the Church sustains the sovereigns simply because their cause and hers happen to be, just now, one and the same. The Church wants for herself social order, and social order demands stable and efficient authority. Shaken as European society has been by a century of revolutions, broken loose from all its old moorings, afloat on a tempestuous sea, the sport of every revolutionary wind that blows, its first want is order, and till authority is re-established, and able to protect itself and command the respect of the people, there can be no order, no social melioration, no advancement of religion even."

"The Revolutionists," added De Bonneville, "are not, as they would have us believe, the friends of liberty; they are not moved by a sincere and earnest desire to get rid of bad governments, and to redress real grievances under

which the people no doubt suffer. Their real motive is the possession of power for themselves, and freedom from all restraint, religious and political. None of the Catholic governments are really tyrannical or oppressive, and the only real complaint the English press brings against any of them is, after being stripped of its verbiage, that they are not disposed to remain quiet while the conspirators cut their throats, or that they treat as criminals those lawless spirits, whatever their rank, education, or refinement, who conspire and lead others to conspire against them. They commit the sin, unpardonable in this age, of holding treason to be a crime, and of regarding as treason the overt attempt to assassinate a sovereign, or to overthrow the legal government of a country. I know nothing worse to be said against either the Emperor of Austria or the King of the Two Sicilies, called, in the slang of the day, King Bomba. No sovereign can justly be blamed for regarding himself as a sovereign, and acting as a sovereign must act, unless he abdicates his power, or for endeavoring to preserve the authority with which he is clothed by the constitution of his realm."

"The revolutionary party," resumed Winslow, "have no excuse, no pretext even for seeking to overthrow the government in any Catholic state. I will not say that no revolution is ever justifiable; I will not say that, when rulers abuse their powers, oppress their people, and there is no other means of redress, the people may not, appealing to God for the purity of their motives and the justice of their cause, take up arms and liberate themselves by force from their oppressors. So the Popes have always taught, and they have more than once deposed the prince who oppressed his subjects. But a revolution for the sake of carrying out a theory, or in obedience to some political crotchet, the only pretexts for a revolution the European Liberals can allege, — is never allowable. The revolutionists have no excuse, for they have no real grievance to redress except that the Church does not choose to surrender her rights at their bidding, and the governments will not suffer themselves to be overthrown. In Italy the party pretend to be national, and attack the Pope, because they regard the Papacy as in the way of Italian unity, of driving out the Austrians, and regaining for

the peninsula the primacy among the nations she held in former times. It is Pagan Rome, Pagan Italy, they want to re-establish, and as they cannot do that with the Pope, they cry, Down with the Pope. Elsewhere and everywhere they attack religion itself, and the whole order of civilization that has grown up under the fostering care of the Church. They war especially against the Church, because they have sense enough to perceive that without her Christianity ceases to be a religion, and becomes merely an idea, a philosophy, a morality, a sentiment, or an opinion. I cannot understand how any Catholic can see anything good in them, or make the slightest concession to appease them."

"I should be sorry to be thought capable of disputing the general truth of what Mr. Winslow and M. De Bonneville allege," replied Father John. "I am opposed alike to the Cæsarists and to the Revolutionists. Both parties are wrong, though each has an element of truth which we should disengage, accept, and defend. Precisely what I complain of is that our friends in Europe do not do this, and have suffered a false issue to be made before the public. The true issue is not between Cæsarism and Red Republicanism. Cæsarism, in so far as it simply supports order against anarchy, is right, and Red Republicanism, in so far as it opposes tyranny, demands liberty, or free scope for the normal activity of our faculties, is also right; but the Cæsarists, in that they deny free scope for our rightful activity, suppress intelligence, and make the prince the fountain of all right and all law, are wrong; and the Red Republicans, in that they war against just authority, and demand freedom from all restraint, or in that they seek to substitute the despotism of society for that of the prince, are also wrong. Between the two parties it is hard to say which a wise and good man should prefer. The victory of the Red Republicans would be attended with unheard-of violence,—would drench the land with its best blood, and people heaven with martyrs; but their first fury spent, the natural sentiments of humanity and the instinct of order and justice, common to all men, might, unless Cæsarism stepped in to thwart them, force them to reorganize society, and to provide, better or worse, for the protection of the rights of life, property, and conscience.

The triumph of Cæsarism would be less violent, but it would be a slow lingering disease, enervating society, depriving the individual of his natural energy, and rendering the people tame, servile, and helpless. Under it society would stagnate and rot."

"Both parties," added Diefenbach, "are virtually Pagan. The Red Republicans would revive Cæsarism under the form of Democracy, and the Cæsarists under the form of Imperialism. Both are equally enamored of classical antiquity, and inveterately hostile to the civilization introduced by the German conquerors of the Roman empire, and developed and matured under the fostering care of the Church. The attempt to resuscitate Imperial Rome was made by the Hohenstaufen emperors of Germany, aided by the lawyers and Ghibelines of Italy. Frederic I., commonly called Frederic Barbarossa, regarded himself as the successor of Augustus, and spoke of Crassus and Antony as the generals of his predecessors. Misled by his pride and ambition, but still more by the juriconsults Romanized by the study of the Theodosian and Justinian codes, he claimed to be the absolute sovereign of the whole earth; or, as one of his lawyers told him, 'on earth what God is in heaven;' the source whence emanates all authority, all right, all law. With these lofty pretensions he demanded submission from the Pope, bishops, princes, dukes, free cities, and all orders in Church and State. He did what he could to Romanize Germany, and invaded Italy, made war on her free cities, her independent principalities, and for twenty-five years devastated that rich and beautiful country with fire and sword. But the time had not come for the complete triumph of Roman Imperialism. Pope Alexander III., at the head of the Lombard League, armed in defence of the German order betrayed by the Kaiser, defeated him, and as a penance compelled him to join the Crusade, and lead his army against the Saracens in the East, where he perished before reaching Palestine. But neither the doctrine nor the attempt was abandoned by his successors. The doctrine found always subtle defenders in the crown lawyers, and had a celebrated advocate in the poet Dante, in his *Monarchia*, if not in his *Divina Commedia*, and the attempt always found soldiers in the Ghibelines of Italy.

"The struggle between the Popes and emperors in the Middle Ages," continued Diefenbach, "is, for those who understand it, a struggle between the German monarchy introduced by the German conquerors of Rome and sustained by the Popes, and the Imperial Roman monarchy, revived in Western Europe by the study of the Roman law, and sustained by the German Kaisers, who desired to inherit the empire of the Roman Cæsars, and to hold it by the same title. The German monarchy that sprung up after the conquest, and which culminated in Karl der Gross, or Charlemagne, a Frank, and therefore a true German, was a monarchy compatible with freedom. It left nations, principalities, and cities their autonomy, their local independence, laws, manners, and customs, and the Church her freedom and independence as the representative of the kingdom of God on earth. The Popes had cherished it, lavished on it their protection, and they defended it as long as they were able, as that which best comports with the freedom of the Church, the rights of nations, and the well-being of the people. But shaken under the immediate successors of Charlemagne, chiefly remarkable for their imbecility and their vices, by the growth and consolidation of feudalism, and by national animosities and national ambitions, it finally fell before the continued advances of Roman Imperialism, what I call Cæsarism, which has triumphed on nearly the whole continent of Europe. Germanism has been able to preserve itself in comparative purity and vigor only in the British race, in Great Britain and her Colonies, and this great Republic. Charles V., Philip II., and Philip V. very nearly extinguished it in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas; Louis XI., Henry IV., and Louis XIV. struck it down in France, and the Protestant Reformation put an end to it in Germany and Scandinavia; Ivan IV. and Peter the Great wiped out all traces of it from Russia. The Plantagenets, the Tudors, and the Stuarts carried on a fierce war against it for centuries in England, but without complete success, because in England the civil or Roman law, the Theodosian and Justinian codes, had never become the law of the land, and the people had the good sense to preserve their own Common Law, derived from the customs of their German ancestors, and developed and perfected under Catholic influences. The

English are, as to race, a mixed people, with a large infusion, no doubt, of Celtic blood; but their institutions, their laws, their civil customs and usages, their monarchy, their civilization, are of Germanic origin, and pertain to the Germanic order, not to the Græco-Roman, which the Germans had vanquished. It is to this fact, not to difference of race or blood,—which counts for nothing, since God has made of one blood all the nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth,—that we must ascribe that invincible energy, that enterprising, robust life, which we remark in the British and American people, and which is so superior to that of the Latinized races. Although unhappily separated from Catholic unity, the British race, using the term in its largest sense, represents to-day, far better than any other people on the globe, the Germanic order of civilization, that took the place of the Roman after the conquest of the empire. Their superiority is in the fact that they are less Romanized, less Latinized, and remain more German than any of the continental families—than even the Germans themselves. The struggle between Cæsarists and Red Republicans, two branches of the same family, both hatched from the spawn of Pagan Rome, is one in which humanity can take no serious interest. The real issue is between the two orders of civilization, the German and the Roman, as it has been ever since the eleventh century. The revival of Pagan Rome, whether under the Imperial or the Democratic form, will prove impotent to restore European society, and save the continental nations from the doom which threatens them. A new Germanic invasion and conquest is demanded, not this time by armed soldiery, but by the old Germanic spirit, the principles and institutions introduced by the conquerors of the Roman empire, and accepted and developed by the Roman Pontiffs, and which to-day are best preserved and represented by the British race.”

“Whether the British and American civilization is of Germanic or Celtic origin,” said O’Connor, “I will not undertake to decide. Most of my Celtic countrymen have decided for themselves that whatever is good is Celtic, and whatever is evil is Germanic or Gothic, which is learnedly proved to his own satisfaction, I presume, by the amiable author of a recent work on the Goths and Celts,

I am an Irishman, and believe that Ireland was a civilized state when England was barbarian, and that Irish scholars and Irish missionaries may claim an honorable share in the work of recivilizing Europe after the downfall of the Western Empire. Yet I agree that the British and American civilization is the living progressive civilization of our days, and that the British and American people,—to a great extent Celtic however,—are the really leading people of the modern world. Their order of civilization rejects Cæsarism whether under the democratic or the monarchical form, and combines, better than any other the world has any knowledge of, the liberty of the citizen with the stability and efficiency of power. Its grand defect is in the fact that the people who have the working of it reject even more strenuously Papal than Pagan Rome. Let the British and American people return to Catholic unity, let them have Catholicity to purify their manners and ennoble their sentiments, and their civilization would triumph over every people and tribe, and become the universal civilization of the race."

"Therefore," said Father John, "while as Catholics we labor with all our power to restore these nations to Catholic unity, we must resist every attempt to weaken their order of civilization, or to substitute for it the civilization of Pagan Rome, whether under a republican or an imperial form. The Red Republicans are as hostile to it as are the Cæsarists; and the attempts we see made to introduce both into England and this country the theories of continental democrats on the one hand, and of continental imperialists on the other, threaten its very existence. The Germanic order of civilization, which is the boast of the British race, is opposed alike by continental democracy and continental monarchy, and the error of our Catholic friends, trained under continental influences and brought up in continental ideas and habits, is that they incline either to the one or to the other, and war against what, for distinction sake, I call the British system, either from the point of view of democracy or from the point of view of imperialism. This is wherefore they are so ill able to appreciate the position of that illustrious champion of civil and religious liberty, Count de Montalembert; why they are so ready to sneer at him, and to take sides with

the Emperor against him. They do not see that the noble Count has studied history to a far better purpose than they have; that he makes himself the advocate, against Pagan Rome, of that Germanic constitution of society, which remains in vigor only in England and her Colonies, and in the United States, and which is the only constitution of society that affords any tolerable guaranty of political and religious freedom. England is heretical, and Catholics are not willing to praise even her civil constitution, though it dates from Catholic times; she has in past times persecuted Catholics, and outrageously oppressed Catholic Ireland, whence the majority of American Catholics have emigrated; and their feelings are naturally hostile to her. Hence whoever attempts to recommend her political and civil system as superior to and even more in accordance with the real wants of Catholicity than that which obtains in Catholic States themselves, can hardly fail to be regarded as false to his Catholic brethren, and even to his Church. He is looked upon as making fatal concessions to the enemy, concessions which imply what Englishmen maintain, that a higher order of civilization obtains in non-Catholic than in Catholic States. Even *Brownson's Review* has fallen more than once into the common mistake, and attempted to prove what really is not provable, the superiority of the continental civilization over the English and American. No doubt the Catholic populations of Europe are better off than the Protestant population of England or the United States, but that is because they have the true faith, not because they have a better or more desirable civilization. Catholicity softens the asperities of despotism, and neutralizes many of the worst effects of a bad civilization, by its sublime charities and its rich spiritual consolations."

"But if people are Catholic," interposed Winslow, "it matters little what is the civil order that obtains. Leave us the Church, it is all the Catholic needs. She will regenerate a vicious civilization, or create a new civilization adapted to her wants."

"That," replied O'Connor, "is a sentiment one does not like to combat, because it is hard to do so without appearing to underrate the power and efficacy of the Church, and because it is a very common sentiment among

Catholics of all countries and ages. But it nevertheless is a false and dangerous sentiment, though seemingly pious. The Church is divine, but she works through human agencies, in accordance with human free will. She cannot give men faith or virtue against their will, nor change the morals or manners, far less the laws and institutions, of a people without their concurrence. She converted the Roman people and inspired them with that heroic spirit which led them with joy to martyrdom; but she did not and could not regenerate the Græco-Roman civilization, or save the Roman Empire from destruction. She did not herself create a new civilization, when the old was demolished by the conquest, for the elements of the new civilization that took its place were brought in by the German conquerors. These conquerors, who were barbarians to the refined, lettered, disciplined, but weak, effeminate, and corrupt Romans, had before the invasion and conquest an original civilization of their own, rude and undeveloped, no doubt, but in many respects more in harmony with the purity and freedom of Catholicity than the Græco-Roman under the Emperors, pagan or Christian. It is a mistake to suppose that civilization was destroyed by the Barbarian conquest. An old and effete form of civilization, with its despotism and cynicism, was exchanged for a new, fresh, and vigorous civilization, adapted to the future of the world."

"The Church," added Diefenbach, "gained more than she lost by the exchange. The Germanic conquest gave her a new people and a fresh field for her operations, and the most glorious period I find in her history is that from the sixth to the tenth century, when the Western world was Germanic, and Pagan Rome survived only in the Cæsarism of the Byzantine Empire. She did not create from absolute barbarism that new civilization, but she took it under her protection, fostered, developed, and matured it. This is all that she can do in any case, for civilization lies in the natural order. Her special work is not that of civilization, which is properly the work of natural society. She aids indirectly civilization by the virtues she fosters, the lofty principles she inculcates, the noble sentiments she inspires, and the purity of life and manners she insists upon as indispensable to eternal salvation; but she always works and does the best she can with the civilization she finds.

She sends out missionaries to evangelize the nations and to teach them, whether civilized or uncivilized, the faith as she has received it. These missionaries are civilized men, and they aid civilization. But the only civilization they can carry with them is that to which they are accustomed, and under which they have been trained. They nowhere create a new civilization; they take that of the country to which they are sent, or introduce that under which they have been born and bred. Thus the Catholic missionaries and colonists from France and Spain in the sixteenth century brought to the New World the civilization of their respective countries, which was no longer German, but had become Roman, and hence the difficulty French and Spanish colonies have, when cut loose from the mother country, in establishing and maintaining their *régime* of freedom. The English missionaries and colonists who founded the colony of Maryland, although Catholics, brought with them the German civilization then in vigor in England, consequently the elements of a free state; and no State in the Union at the time of American Independence was more thoroughly imbued with the principles of liberty, or better prepared to take her rank as a free commonwealth. After the revival of the Civil Law on the continent, and the extended study of the Theodosian and Justinian codes, ecclesiastics born or educated on the continent, labored to introduce that law into England, and would have done so, very innocently, and destroyed English liberties, if they had not been resisted by the sturdy German spirit of the nation, as Ximenes did the Spanish.

"Nor is the Church always able," continued Diefenbach, "to resist the tendencies of ideas, and to preserve against all opposition the order of civilization she approves and finds most consonant to her free spirit and her independent action. The civilization most to her mind was undeniably the Germanic represented by Charlemagne on the continent, and by Alfred in England. That civilization was not founded on a strictly logical theory, and had no craving for a systematic unity. It could tolerate exceptions and anomalies, and suffer institutions resting on a basis independent of the will of the sovereign. It limited the power of the monarchy by personal rights, national rights, municipal rights, corporations, *Volks-Rechten* and local customs, laws, and usages. It therefore saw and could see no inconsistency in leaving

the Church free and independent in her own sphere, with the power of enacting and enforcing canons on all matters coming by her own divine constitution within her jurisdiction, and which should be respected and observed as laws in their order by the state, the monarch,—by all manner of persons, whatever their rank, dignity, position, office, or state of life. There was nothing in this not in perfect accordance with the ideas and the daily practice of that noble old Germanic civilization brought from the original seat of the Germanic race in Upper Asia. But the Church has not been able to preserve it. Hardly was it established and brought to some perfection, before it began to be assailed. It did not satisfy the need of strict systematic unity, of logical consistency throughout, felt by the Roman and Byzantine lawyers, and as soon as these lawyers began to have influence in the courts of sovereigns, the war against it commenced. It lacked the unity, the consistency, and the simplicity of Cæsarism. The Kaisers deserted Charlemagne for Diocletian, waged a fierce war on it, in which, though occasionally defeated, they have been upon the whole successful. The Popes struggled to maintain it, and for three hundred years after the war commenced retained it in more or less vigor; but under Boniface VIII., when the grandson of St. Louis brought to the aid of Cæsarism the power of France, with the mass of her bishops and clergy, they were forced to succumb. Driven, under the successor of Boniface, by the turbulent Ghibeline nobles from Rome, into seventy years of Babylonish captivity at Avignon, on the heels of which followed the great Western schism which destroyed their prestige, and stripped them of their political power, the Popes were no longer in a condition to renew the struggle, and were forced to leave the victory with the Græco-Roman order, which continued to advance daily, till the proper German monarchy was nearly annihilated on the continent, and the Church was placed again under Imperial Rome at the mercy of Cæsar.”

“This result was helped on,” added O'Connor, “by the *Renaissance*, or the new impulse given to the study of Pagan literature by the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the dispersion through the Western world of the Greek scholars who had been trained under Byzantine Cæsarism. The Renaissance and the dispersion of these scholars gave fresh vigor and popularity to the

Pagan views of government and society in western Europe, and revived, especially in Italy, the manners and vices of the worst days of the Pagan empire. Florence under the Medici was almost a Pagan city, and even the city of Rome herself did not escape the contagion. Hearts were corrupted, minds were perverted, and Catholics in all the higher ranks could be found, who, aside from simple dogma, were far more Pagan than Christian. On the heels again of the Renaissance followed the Protestant revolt, and the war of the German princes against the Papacy. The faithful in Italy and France being paganized in their manners and ideas, and beginning to be Romanized in their institutions, and abandoned and opposed by the only princes who could have aided them to preserve some remains of the Germanic civilization and resist the complete resuscitation of the Pagan empire, the Popes must obviously no longer continue a struggle which could not be successful, and might have lost all the continental nations to the faith. They were forced to abandon, and did abandon the useless struggle, and the Roman civilization won the victory over and drove back the German civilization from nearly the whole of the continent that had been subjected to the Roman Cæsars. The Protestant revolt was a treachery, not to the Roman civilization, as some have supposed, but to the German. Its abandonment of the German conquest of Rome, and the surrender of Germany herself whom the Roman arms had never been able to conquer, instead of preserving, as the honest German people were made to believe, the old Germanic order, secured the triumph to Roman Cæsarism, for even revolted Germany had adopted and retained the Roman law, revived and introduced by the treacherous German Kaisers."

"In other words," said Father John, "through the infidelity of the German Kaisers, and the revolt of the German princes, the vanquished Roman civilization recovered its power, and conquered its conqueror. The movement of the German princes in the sixteenth century, what we call the Protestant Reformation, directed as it was against the emperor, who regarded himself as the heir of Imperial Rome, and the Pope who had virtually ceased to struggle against Græco-Romanism, save in dogma and the interior life, might seem to have been a movement for

the defence of the old Germanic civilization, and I have no doubt that it was so in the minds of many honest Germans who supported it, and that in this fact we are to seek its remarkable vigor and persistence. But in its effect it was not so, for the princes who headed it, were themselves imbued with the Roman system, and used the national sentiment which they appealed to, only to facilitate the establishment of Cæsarism in their respective states or principalities. The movement tended to resist the triumph of the Roman order, and to preserve the Germanic system only in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and England, and in those countries only because in them the people had never lost their power, and had never had their autonomy destroyed by the German Kaiser, or the Gallic monarch. If the German princes had remained true to the Germanic civilization, and steadfast in their support of the Pope against the emperor, Pagan Rome could never have triumphed in the civil and political order. The Pope and the Guelph princes and nobles, after the accession of the Hohenstaufen, were the real defenders of the Germanic order of civilization, and the German Kaiser, with his Ghibeline princes and nobles, was then the defender of the Roman, and the party that sought to recover for vanquished Rome once more the power exercised by her Cæsars. Luther and his party, in the sixteenth century, if they had been wise,—for the religious question was only a pretext, as it is now,—would in order to effect their purpose,—which I take it, was the restoration of Germanism—have rallied all that remained of the Germanic world around the Pope, against the Cæsarism that oppressed him and them, and liberated him from the thralldom of resuscitated Pagan Rome. It was not yet too late in Luther's time to have done it; for though warred against and everywhere weakened, Germanic ideas and institutions, till obliterated by the Revolution of 1789, and the Emperor Napoleon, were not wholly extinct in any country in Europe; and even in Italy, France, and Spain, all traces of them have not disappeared. The Diet still survived in Germany, the States-General in France, the Comuneros in Spain, and the Commons in England. But placing the Pope and Emperor in the same category, and warring upon the Papacy, as if it, instead of being the victim, was

the supporter of Cæsar, they consummated a schism in European society, which still remains, and which has operated most disastrously for the Germanic civilization,* as well as for the nations abandoning or adhering to the Catholic religion."

"Although it is idle to expect the restoration of European society from the Latinized nations," said Diefenbach, "we can hardly expect it from the nations that retain a portion of the Germanic civilization, so long as they remain separated from Catholic unity; yet it must be admitted that the old Germanic system, which Europe and the Church demand, exists in more force in the non-Catholic than in the Catholic nations.. Austria, though in part German by blood, is more Roman in her civil and political ideas than Wurtemberg, Hanover, or even Prussia, for she claims to be the heir of the Holy Roman Empire of the Hohenstaufen. Her present emperor is an able sovereign — liberal, enlightened — and a sincere friend to the Church, to which he is willing to concede more liberty in his dominions than the prelates of his empire are willing to exercise; but after all, as a means of consolidating and strengthening the Cæsarism he inherits, not as a means of restoring the monarchy of Charlemagne. He is a Constantine, or a Theodosius, if you will, but still a Roman, not a Frank or German Emperor. I even respect the Emperor of the French as a man, but he is no real successor of Charlemagne, and is Gallo-Roman rather than Frank, and sustains the Roman, not the Frank Empire. He is the rival of the Austrian, and would transfer Imperial Rome to Paris, as Francis Joseph would retain it at Vienna. The re-establishment and consolidation of the Roman not the German monarchy, is the common object of both, and Italy is the prize the one seeks to retain, and the other to win: nothing is really gained for society, let which will prove the victor. Of the two the Austrian is the better Catholic, and more liberal in his concessions to the Church. The French Emperor retains the Church under stringent laws, which he can instruct his police to enforce against her, when he pleases; but as a grace, he permits her a tolerable share of practical liberty; yet her practical freedom has no guaranty, no security, but the personal will or disposition of the sovereign. The other

Catholic States need not be named; they must follow in the wake of either France or Austria, both of whom proceed on the Roman system, recognizing really no rights in the citizen or subject, except as grants from the sovereign, revocable at will, and though personally favorable to religion, holding her legally in the position she was held in under Nero or Diocletian. Civil and religious liberty are both incompatible with the Imperial system, which these two great States maintain, and which now governs nearly all Catholic Europe."

"This is wherefore I complain of the support given to that system by leading European Catholic influences," said Father John. "We know how that system is regarded by our illustrious Chief Pontiff, for the first measures of his pontificate were a solemn protest against it, and a glorious effort to get rid of it. He failed in his generous efforts through the opposition he encountered from Catholics and Liberals, and having protested, he submits to the evils he cannot redress. But because he remains silent, we must not suppose that he has changed his views, condemned the policy he gloriously inaugurated, or reconciled himself to Imperial despotism, whether exercised from Paris or Vienna. We know his mind, and we know that in laboring by lawful and Christian means to restore and consolidate as far as may be in our day, and in the altered circumstances of the world, what we have called the Germanic order of society, we are not likely to incur his displeasure. What I would impress upon Catholics everywhere is, that they volunteer no aid to the old order of Pagan Rome, whether in the form of Democratic or Imperial Absolutism, and that, as far as they can without revolutionism, they labor to strengthen and help on the true Germanic cause, which, though defeated, is not yet beyond hope of recovery, and cannot be so long as Great Britain and her Colonies and the United States retain the vigor of their constitutions, and exert their influence against absolutism. No people in the world are more deeply interested in maintaining the British and American or Germanic system than Catholics, even though for the present the system is mainly sustained by non-Catholics. Nothing prevents the restoration of England and America to Catholic unity, for each feels deeply the need of that

unity, but the Cæsarism of the Catholic continental States, and the regrettable fact that in modern times the Catholic mind is to a fearful extent wedded to the old Roman order of civilization, and hostile to the German. The very nickname, *Romanism*, given to Catholicity, proves what is the nature of the hostility it encounters among English and American Protestants. Everybody knows that, save with a few old fogies, the opposition to the Church is civil and political, not theological, and that the Papacy is opposed only because it is assumed, though falsely assumed, that it is allied or identified with Roman Cæsarism. Say what we will, interpret it as we may, draw from it what inferences we choose, the fact is that the non-united nations retain more of the old Germanic order of civilization than the united nations, and heresy is strengthened by its union with that civilization, while orthodoxy is weakened by its forced and unnatural union with the old Roman order, which after all is not a living but a dead civilization that ought to have been buried with Augustulus. This is an unnatural state of things. The living expansive civilization is linked with heresy, which is a dead body; and Catholicity, which alone has life in the spiritual order, is linked in the natural order, to the dead body of the old Roman world. In each case it is the living tied to the dead. In the non-Catholic nations the Germanic civilization for this reason can expand only in the material order, and be energetic and powerful only in producing, exchanging, or accumulating the goods of this life; in Catholic nations, Catholicity is deprived of her legitimate political and social sphere of action, and is forced to confine herself to the interior man, and to weep over social miseries which she cannot relieve, and which she can do little even to console. The problem of the age is to separate the living from the dead; to gather the living to the living, and the dead to the dead. 'Let the dead bury their dead.' No Catholic doubts or can doubt that it is better to be a Catholic under Cæsarism than a Protestant even under Germanism, or the Catholic subject of the King of Naples than a Protestant citizen of the United States. But if the people of Holland, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States were really Catholic, who doubts that their condition would be far preferable to the

condition of the people in the most favored Catholic nation?"*

* The Reporter has sent us three additional Conversations of Our Club on this same subject, the really most important social question of the day. We shall publish them in our Review for July; at least, we hope to do so. The three Conversations we now publish leave the discussion incomplete, and hardly do full justice to the side espoused by Messrs. Winslow and De Bonneville. Further developments and explanations of the theory broached as to the two civilizations may be required by those to whom that theory is new, and who are not very familiar with the details of European history since the downfall of the Western Roman Empire. The history of Europe from the beginning of the sixth to the end of the tenth century, has been but superficially studied, and the real character of the Frankish Empire founded by Charlemagne is but imperfectly understood, and very imperfectly appreciated by our popular historians. We know something of feudalism, but very little of the political and civil order, save in Gaul under the Merovingians, that intervened between its establishment and the German Conquest of the Empire. Light, however, begins to dawn on those dark ages, and it now appears that most of our historians have confounded the progress of civilization in modern times with the progress made in resuscitating and re-establishing in the Christian world the civilization of Pagan Rome, or the progress of the vanquished in subduing their vanquishers, as conquered Greece subdued with her language and civilization her Roman conquerors. That in the wars between the Empire and the Church in the Middle Ages, the German Kaisers struggled to revive the Roman and the Popes to sustain the German order, is now pretty well known, and gives to those wars a significance little suspected by such writers as Robertson, Hume, Hallam, or even our own Lingard. The superiority in a christian point of view claimed by Diefenbach and Father John, and conceded by O'Connor, of the German civilization to the Græco-Roman, will probably be contested; and the opinion enunciated that the British race in Great Britain, the United States, and the British Colonies represent the system of civilization the most consonant to Catholicity, and the only real, living, progressive civilization of the age, will most likely shock many received ideas, and call forth no little opposition from those who think it Catholic to abuse everything English or American. But the theories broached have their adherents among men whose learning is respectable, and whose Catholicity cannot be impeached. They are worth considering even if they should turn out to be unsound or exaggerated.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

ART. II.—*Politics, Foreign and Domestic, European and American.*

THE present political state of continental Europe is very far from indicating that the era of revolutions is closed, and the era of peace and orderly social progress is opened. At the moment we are writing, though our European news is less warlike than it was a few weeks ago, we have no well-grounded assurance that peace will be maintained. Peace on the continent is decidedly the interest and the wish of Great Britain, and she will do all she can to preserve it. The Emperor of the French would no doubt prefer peace, if he could with it consolidate his domestic policy, and confirm his dynasty. Russia is engaged in vast works of internal improvement, and is just entering upon a social revolution, the end of which it is difficult to foresee, and neither wants nor is prepared for a foreign war. Austria is engaged in securing her frontiers, and in fusing the heterogeneous elements of her empire into a uniform people with a purely Austrian nationality, and has nothing to gain by war. Germany, including Prussia, has enough to do in the interior, in settling the questions still unsettled between the old Germanic order of society and resuscitated Pagan Rome,—questions which war would be more likely to solve in the Roman than in the German sense. The only state in Europe that really wants war is the little constitutional state of Sardinia, and she wants it in order to secularize the government of the Papal States, and thus get a justification, after the fact, of her anti-papal policy and anti-Catholic laws, and to extend her dominion over Upper and perhaps Central Italy. Alone she cannot carry on successfully a war against Austria, who must oppose every part of her policy, and the question of peace or war really hangs on the fact whether the Emperor of the French will actively sustain her or not in her warlike disposition and ambitious projects.

The great question on which just now European politics turn, is the Italian question, raised by Count Walewski at the close of the Congress held at Paris in 1856,

and this question involves two serious difficulties, one in Upper Italy with Austria, and one in Central Italy with the Pope. The Emperor of the French is very desirous of settling this question, both because he has a natural affection for Italy, and because at present Italy is the focus of machinations against his throne and even his life. If he can prevent disaffection from becoming dangerous at home, and without war appease the Italian patriots, whom the attempt on his life by Orsini has made him fear, and feel that he must in some way conciliate, and if possible interest in sustaining his throne, there will be no war. But we see not how he can settle the Italian question peaceably, or how, without settling it, he can conciliate the Italian patriots.

The natural difficulties of the Italian question are much enhanced by the disagreement of the Italian patriots among themselves. They all agree that Austria must be dispossessed of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and driven beyond the Alps, and that Italian nationality and autonomy must be restored, or more properly, created. But here their agreement ends, and discord begins. They dispute as to what shall be done with their basket of eggs when laid and hatched. Some insist that Italy, when emancipated, shall be a single monarchical state with its capital at Turin, and Victor Emmanuel for King; others that it shall be a confederacy of constitutional states, under the presidency of—whom it may be; others insist that it shall be a democratic republic, one and indivisible, with its capital at Rome. Gioberti's plan was a confederated Italy under the presidency or moderatorship of the Pope; Mazzini's plan is an emancipated and united Italy, under a democratic republic, with himself, we presume, as president. The division between the respective partisans of these schemes defeated in 1848 the noble movement favored by Pius the Ninth for the independence of Italy, and complicates the question in 1859. Napoleon III. may amuse, but he cannot support the Mazzinians in Italy any more than he can the Red Republicans in France, and neither they nor Austria will consent to the Giobertian plan of confederation, if he were himself, as he is not, disposed to favor it. The Mazzinians are as hostile to the order instituted in Sardinia, as they are to the Austrian domination, and would oppose Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy as strenuously as

Francis Joseph or the Pope. In their view, a monarchical Italy, under even an Italian prince, whether the Pope, as Gioberti contended, or the King of Sardinia, as Count Cavour probably wishes, with or without a parliament, would settle nothing, and would at best only adjourn a struggle that sooner or later must come throughout all Europe. All European society—all humanity, they say—tends to democracy, and it is only the democratic republic, the inauguration everywhere of the absolute sovereignty of the people, of the people-king or the people-God, that can satisfy the imperious demands of the modern world, settle its present disputes, and secure its orderly and peaceful future progress. They resolutely oppose all compromise, all third parties, and wish to make up a direct issue between monarchical absolutism and democratic absolutism. This issue Austria, as the heir of the Kaisers, who sought to revive in Christian Europe the Cæsarism the German conquerors had overthrown with Augustulus, accepts and is prepared to stand by, both in and out of her own dominions. Louis Napoleon accepts it for France, but does not openly accept it elsewhere; while he is virtually absolute at home, he seeks to present himself as the defender of oppressed nationalities and of constitutional, or even democratic liberty abroad.

But in carrying out his Italian policy, which is to use Sardinia and appear to wish to re-establish an independent Italy under a constitutional *régime* with Sardinia at its head, he has not only Austria and the Mazzinians, but also the Papal government in his way. His troops occupy Rome against the will and even the protest of the Papal government, and to the great discontent of the other powers of Europe. He dares not withdraw them, for that would leave the field to Austria, whose policy they are there to watch and to counteract, and as long as he keeps them there he has to bear the responsibility of sustaining the Papal government, bitterly opposed alike by Sardinians and Mazzinians. So long as he appears to uphold the Papal temporal government, he can neither defeat the policy of Austria nor conciliate either Italian party. The Pope is his difficulty. The Pope's government very properly will make no important reforms in the administration under foreign dictation, and therefore none so long as his troops

occupy Rome. If he tells the government it must reform its administration, or he will withdraw his troops, his threat is taken as a promise, for the withdrawal of his troops is precisely what it wishes, and what it is trying to bring about, since so long as Austrian troops occupy the Legations, it is safe against insurrection. To dispossess the Pope of his temporal states and convert them into a principality, governed by a French prince, or by an Italian prince under a French protectorate, is not only to offend Italian nationality, not only a war with Austria, but is to offend the Catholic sentiment throughout the world, and to endanger his position in France herself. Here is his embarrassment, an embarrassment from which either the Pope or Austria could no doubt relieve him, but from which neither seems disposed to relieve him. We see, then, nothing for him to do, but to suffer Sardinia to provoke a war with Austria, which she is panting to do, and back her up with all the forces of his Empire. War, then, as much averse as he may be to it, seems to us not improbable, although it may not, and probably will not break out so soon as appearances a short time since indicated.

Napoleon III. seems to us to have so involved himself in Italian affairs that he cannot advance without war, or recede with honor or safety. He was a member of the Carbonari whom he has betrayed. They have condemned him to death, and sooner or later, unless he can make peace with them, they will in all probability be able to execute the sentence they have pronounced. He seems to us also to be losing his prestige in France, where his strict alliance with England is not popular save with the business classes. He was successful in terminating the Crimean war just at the moment proper to prevent its advantages from inuring to Great Britain alone. But he has been successful in no great diplomatic measure since. The advantages of the war inured principally to Austria, and Austria renewing her alliance with England has been able to defeat his Oriental policy even when backed by Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. Austria and England have defeated his policy of a union of the Danubian principalities under a prince of one of the reigning houses in Europe, and reduced to nothing his interference in behalf

of Montenegro. Great Britain, if she has not, which we think she has, defeated the project of canalizing the Isthmus of Suez, by seizing and fortifying the island of Perim, has rendered the canal useless in a military or strategic point of view, and it was an English not a French man-of-war, that bombarded Jeddah and avenged the massacre of the Christians, among whom was the French Consul. Everywhere since the peace Great Britain and Austria have singly or unitedly thwarted his foreign policy, or reduced him to play a secondary part, unless we except the attack on Cochin China, made in conjunction with Spain. He has nearly completed the works at Cherbourg, which were begun under Louis XIV., and which had been pressed on to completion by the Monarchy of July and the Republic of 1848; but in almost every measure of domestic policy he has attempted since 1856, he has shown a vacillation, an indecision, a weakness, that has surprised those who observed him in the *coup d'état* and the earlier years of the empire. He proposed a financial measure, which would have emancipated the business of France from the money power of England. The English press remonstrated, and he abandoned it. He proposed to convert all the charitable funds of the empire into government stocks, but was obliged to abandon it; at least, the plan has not been carried into effect. He suffered the illustrious Count Montalembert to be prosecuted by the police for what was really no legal offence, and outraged the whole higher literature of France, and the public opinion of the civilized world. The position at present assigned to Prince Napoleon, the favorite of the Mountain, and, if report may be credited, the most dissolute and debauched prince of his family, and as ready to head a Red Republican intrigue against his cousin as to sustain his throne, is not likely to secure the good-will of the friends of religion, society, and public decency. He is placed in his position, either because he is regarded as too dangerous, if left unemployed, or, which is more probable, to amuse and conciliate the Voltairians and Red Republicans, whose organ is *La Presse*. Even if so, it will turn out a bad policy for the Emperor, for it will damp the ardour of Catholic France, his firmest support hitherto, and will strengthen without conciliating his enemies. Prince Napoleon may prove to him a Duke of Orleans.

In a pamphlet, *Napoleon III. et l'Italie*, recently published, and which may be taken as the official statement of the views of the Emperor, we find revived for the Papal States, the policy set forth in his famous letter to Colonel Edgar Ney, and which he had to disavow or explain away before the Pope would consent to return from Portici to Rome, a policy which we have always maintained he had never really abandoned, and which at the time created in the minds of most Catholics a distrust of his loyal intentions towards the pontifical government, against which it was known he had been a conspirator. Indeed, it called forth the general condemnation of the Catholic world. The pamphlet proposes what would in effect strip the Pope of his temporal government, and leave him a pensioner of France, in accordance with the plan of Napoleon I. With all its verbiage, and verbal respect for Catholicity and its Supreme Pontiff, the pamphlet must wound the sentiments of every intelligent Catholic in France or elsewhere. We do not pretend that there are no abuses in the Papal administration; everybody says it, and we suppose it must be so. Certainly the subjects of the pontifical government are, with or without reason, to a fearful extent dissatisfied, and clamorous for reforms; but the Pope is a sovereign in his own States, and holds by a title to say the least, as high and as sacred as Louis Napoleon holds the throne—not the crown, for he has not yet been crowned—of France. We know no more right the Emperor elect of the French has to interfere with the internal administration of the government of the Pope than he has to interfere with that of Queen Victoria, or that of the United States. What was his pretext for going to war with Russia? Was it not to protect the independence of sovereign states, especially the weak against the strong? Will not the principle on which that war was justified apply to the Pope, the first sovereign in Europe, as well as to the Grand Turk. Are not Catholic sovereigns as much bound by justice and civilization to respect and defend the independence of the head of the Catholic religion, in his temporal dominion, as they are to respect and defend the independence of the chief of Islamism?

The outrages Napoleon has committed on the constitutional party, silent, but not extinct in France; the deep offence he offers to the Catholic sentiment in his evident

attacks on the independence of the Papal government; the impossibility of conciliating by a peace policy the Red Republicans of France and Italy, and the prestige he has lost by his diplomatic defeats, his vacillating home policy, and his evident truckling to England, seem to us to render it very difficult, if not impossible for him, without the diversion of a foreign war, to retain his present position as Cæsar, even if he is able to guard his life from the poniard of an infatuated Mazzinian. To us it seems that he must become a constitutional prince, and surround his throne with real not sham parliamentary institutions, and enlist the intelligence of France in its support, fall by a Mazzinian revolution or a Mazzinian dagger, or seek to avert the danger and to consolidate his policy by a war with Austria ostensibly for the independence of Italy and the redress of her grievances.

But whether such a war would help him may well be doubted. A war for Italian nationality and independence, while refusing to respect the independence of the Papal government, and to establish a constitutional or republican Italy, while he maintains his new-fangled Cæsarism in France, would place him in a false position, and prevent him from carrying with him the sympathies of those who really wish well to Italian independence and liberty. No sovereign can long hope to sustain liberty abroad while he suppresses it at home; nobody, not even the Italians, themselves, could confide in him, for they would see and feel that his efforts to liberate Italy from Austria can be only to bring her under France, as incompatible with Italian nationality and independence as her present condition. Then, admirable as is his army, the success of a war with Austria is far from certain. The Austrian army is hardly inferior, if at all inferior, to his own. It is not what it was in the time of his Uncle, but is undoubtedly the best organized and appointed army in Europe, well disciplined and well officered, while the French army has no longer a real Bonaparte at its head. The Nephew is a first-class man of the Fouché order, but he is not his Uncle. The French are as likely to lose as to win the first battle fought in Lombardy, and the loss of a single battle is the loss of the French throne. Then, Austria will not be left to fight the battle alone, if it is likely to go against her. If she is

attacked by France and Sardinia, all Germany will come to her aid; for Germany understands that the defeat of Austria on the Po, is war against Germany on the Rhine, and France is no match for Austria backed by all Germany. Russia, even if disposed to do so, cannot come to the aid of France, for she has no wish to break down the German barrier between her and France, and because she has or soon will have her hands full at home. Great Britain is quite willing, nay desirous to see established an independent Italy; but she has no wish to see Italy annexed to the French Empire, or Austria so weakened that she can no longer be played off diplomatically against France. Alliance with France against Russia and in relation to Oriental matters may suit British policy, but British statesmen must always seek the alliance of Austria to maintain the balance of power against France. Balancing the weakness to which the national question exposes Austria by the weakness to which the political and social question exposes France, and counting the parts likely to be taken by other nations, we think the chances of the war are not in favor of France, and that the war would prove far more fatal to the Napoleonic dynasty than to the house of Hapsburg.

We are, then, far from feeling, whether peace or war obtain, that Napoleon III. is secure, unless he changes his policy at home—unless, as he may without danger to his dynasty, he relaxes his Cæsarism, returns to the principles of the old Frank Empire of Charlemagne, and disarms the revolution by reviving parliamentary institutions, and giving freedom to French intelligence. It is not too late to do this, and to do it successfully. The Restoration failed, because the Bourbons of the elder branch had learned nothing by the revolution—because they had been forced upon the nation by foreign bayonets, and because they were wedded to an impracticable royalty, and sought to govern through the court rather than the nation. The Monarchy of July failed, because there was a flaw in its title, but chiefly because it rested on too narrow a basis, and committed the fatal error of confiding in a parliamentary majority instead of a majority of the nation. Its basis of suffrage was not broad enough. One hundred thousand or two hundred thousand electors, out of a population of thirty-six millions, was only a mockery, and a government carried on even by

a parliamentary majority, with so limited a suffrage, could not be a government of the nation by itself. It relied on the army and police as much as does the present government. If it had amended its electoral law, and enlisted the majority of the nation in its support by giving them a direct voice in the choice of deputies, it would, notwithstanding the flaw in its title, have established and maintained itself against the revolution. It would gradually have become truly national, and been supported by the interests, the convictions, and the patriotism of the French people. Let the emperor take what was good in that monarchy, avoid its errors, and he may easily, with his personal popularity and the force of his character, give to France really permanent as well as free institutions, and in very deed put an end to the "era of revolutions." Will he do it? Most likely not.

The question of Italy is undoubtedly a difficult question, and we pretend not to be able to suggest a practical solution. Louis Napoleon's proposed solution is, if we understand his pamphlet, the expulsion of the Austrians from Upper Italy, and the union of all Italy in a federative state, under the King of Sardinia. This solution is impracticable; for even if the Austrians were driven beyond the Rhætian Alps, the several Italian States would never consent to yield the presidency to Sardinia, hardly allowed by the rest of Italy to be Italian, any more than Macedonia was allowed to be Greek by the polished Athenians in the time of Demosthenes. The headship of the Italian Confederacy could be obtained and preserved by Sardinia only through the conquest, and forcible subjection of the rest of Italy. The Tuscans, the Venetians, the Lombards, the Duchies, the subjects of the Pope, the Neapolitans and Sicilians, however disaffected they may be with their present rulers, native or foreign, or however much they may talk about *Unita Italiana*, will never peaceably submit to the supremacy of the Subalpine kingdom. The project could be effected only by a French conquest of Italy, and maintained only by French arms. The project, after all, is not a solution of the Italian question, but a pretext for substituting French domination in Italy, for that of Austria, or of governing Italy by French princes, who are to hold as vassals of the French Empire. There is no native Italian prince to which the

presidency can be given, except the Pope, and to that the Italian States themselves would not now consent, and it would not be permitted by France herself, if able to prevent it. To create a new Federal government, as we did at the formation of our Federal government, able at once to sustain itself, and to defend Italy from foreign aggression, is wholly impracticable. You have no materials from which to construct it, and the mutual jealousies and animosities of the several states and cities are so numerous, so inveterate, and so strong, and the sentiment of unity is so weak—has so feeble a hold on the mass of the population, that it could not stand, even if constructed. If you give it power enough to render it efficient, it will be constantly exciting discontent, revolt, and rebellion; and if you leave it so weak that it excites no opposition, and imposes no restraint on the separate action of the States confederated, it will be simply as good as no government at all. The Federation will be merely a rope of sand, falling to pieces by its own weight.

The powers have, by the treaty of Paris, in 1856, rendered the Italian difficulty far greater than it was before. Great Britain and France committed a most serious blunder when they went to war against Russia for the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to place that empire, evidently falling to pieces, under the protection of European international law. They have stayed the southern progress of Russia for a dozen years or so, but they have not reinvigorated or saved Turkey. The fate of "the sick man" is sealed, and all the learned doctors of Europe cannot prevent him from going the way of all the earth. But the recognition and guaranty of the sovereignty and independence of the Padishah, even in regard to the Christian provinces of the empire, has placed a grave obstacle in the way of Italian autonomy and independence. The powers signing the treaty of Paris have laid down, have solemnly recognized a principle as applicable to Austria as to Turkey, and which precludes them from dismembering the Austrian Empire against her consent, and makes it as obligatory on them to maintain to Austria the kingdom of Hungary, or the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, as it does to maintain to Turkey the suzerainty of Roumania or Servia; another proof that the treaty of Paris was primarily

a treaty in the interest of Austria. As both France and Sardinia were parties to that treaty, neither of them can attempt to wrest the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom from Austria without a direct violation of what they have declared to be the public law of Europe. France and Sardinia have also by the same treaty deprived themselves of the means of making a compromise with Austria, by offering her an indemnification for her Italian possessions, in case she should be persuaded to relinquish them. But for the treaty they might have offered her Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, which she might have been induced to regard as a fair equivalent for her Italian provinces. Such an exchange would have liberated Italy from foreign dominion, and permitted the organization of a national government or governments. But this is now out of the question, and Italian nationality and independence is practicable only by violently and illegally dismembering the Austrian Empire, by the manifest violation of public treaties, and of the public law of Europe as proclaimed by the treaty of Paris. We suspect Austrian diplomacy in that treaty overreached the French and Sardinian, if those two powers hold themselves bound by treaties. France and Sardinia are estopped in their Italian policy, not only by the treaties of 1815, but by the treaty of 1856. Here is a grave difficulty, which no diplomacy, and which only war in violation of treaties, can solve. We see, then, again, no way in which Austrian Italy can be liberated, without war with Austria, and the Austrian question, complicated by the treaty of Paris, is, after all, no less a difficulty than the Papal difficulty.

The Imperial pamphlet, written chiefly to enlist the anti-Papal prejudices of England and Prussia against Austria, and on the side of France and Sardinia, represents the great difficulty as lying not in Upper but in Central Italy. This is a fine stroke of policy, no doubt, but either is a difficulty not easy to get over. The Papal government is undoubtedly an insurmountable obstacle to the French and Sardinian policy. The French Emperor proposes to solve this difficulty by leaving the Pope his sovereignty, but secularizing the administration of his government, and assimilating it to that of France. This will amount to nothing, and there is no reason to suppose that it would

soothe the disaffection of the Pope's temporal subjects. What they demand is the secularization of the government itself, and the entire abdication by the Pope of his temporal sovereignty. The pamphlet itself maintains that the difficulty is in reconciling the duties of the Italian prince with those of the sovereign Pontiff, or common father of the faithful. As an Italian prince the Pope might be disposed to encourage the national movement, when as pontiff, he must remain inactive or oppose it. But if the Pope remains sovereign, he remains an Italian prince, and the difficulty or contradiction is the same, whether the administration be in the hands of seculars or of ecclesiastics. If there really be the difficulty alleged, and it is necessary to remove it in order to establish a free and independent Italy, then a free and independent Italy is possible only by secularizing the Papal government itself, and stripping the Pope of all temporal sovereignty,—the conclusion to which the whole argument of the pamphlet, and the whole French and Sardinian policy for Italy necessarily lead.

We do not understand by what right France, even if Austria consents, proposes to interfere in the internal administration of the Papal government. The Pope is either an independent sovereign, or he is not. If he is, Louis Napoleon has no more right to insist on his placing the administration of his government in the hands of seculars than he has to insist on our placing the administration of ours in the hands of ecclesiastics. There is an impertinence, an inconsistency on the Emperor's part, that is admirable, and worthy of a prince who holds himself bound by no law but his own will. While he acknowledges the independence of the Pope as an Italian prince he undertakes to dictate to him how he shall govern his subjects, attempts by external pressure to force him to accept the policy dictated, and goes so far as to complain of Austria, and to make it all but a *casus belli* against her, that she will not add her pressure to his, and render it impossible for the Pope longer to resist. If the Pope is sovereign, whether his states are great or small, he is as a prince the equal of the Emperor of the French or the Emperor of Austria, and neither has any right to interfere in his administration of his government. The Emperor of the French tells us in his pamphlet the measures he wants adopted in the Papal

States, and that they were signified to the Pope as long ago as 1857, and he arraigns Austria before Europe for not joining her influence to his in forcing the pontifical government to adopt them. Is this treating the Pope as an independent sovereign? The measures may be good or bad, but what sovereign that respects himself and wishes to maintain his independence will adopt even good measures when dictated by a foreign power? Who made France or Austria the Pope's superior, or his overseer and guardian? In the name of consistency, either recognize the Pope's sovereignty and independence, respect his rights as a sovereign prince, and leave him to govern his subjects in his own way; or deny his temporal sovereignty altogether, and forcibly secularize his States. You can never succeed in the policy of recognizing him as a sovereign and independent prince, supreme in his own dominions, and then treating him as your dependant, and forcing him to govern in the way you think best. The world will not tolerate such glaring inconsistency. Napoleon I. tried it, and found that it would not work; that he must either abandon his Italian and Continental policy, "the agglomeration of nations," or suppress the Papal government. He chose the latter alternative, dragged the Pope from his throne, and detained him for years imprisoned at Savona and Fontainebleau,—and went himself to die a prisoner on the barren rock of St. Helena, with Sir Hudson Lowe for jailor. Napoleon III., if he chooses, may follow the same policy, and meet perhaps a similar fate. No nation having any considerable number of Catholic subjects, whether itself Catholic or non-Catholic, will consent that the spiritual head of the Catholic world shall be the pensioner of Sardinia, France, Austria, or even of Federated Italia. Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and even the United States, as well as France and Austria, have an interest in the independence of the Pope, and even a stronger interest in his not being the subject of any temporal prince; and they were non-Catholic States, chiefly Great Britain and Russia, that in the Congress of Vienna, effected the restoration of the Papal States, then held by Austria and Naples, to the Pope, in their integrity. If you will not take from the Pope his temporal sovereignty or his independence as a temporal sovereign guaranteed to him by all the European powers who were parties to the

treaties of 1815, then leave him to govern as an independent temporal sovereign; withdraw your pressure and leave him to act *motu proprio*, as you claim to do in your own empire; do so and he will win back the affection of his temporal subjects, and put an end to the disaffection you complain of. But he can never do it, as you well know, whatever the measures he adopts, so long as you stand between him and them, or stand over him, and compel him to do your bidding. It is your unauthorized interference that destroys his influence, that makes him appear a puppet in your hands, and prevents the respect his subjects would otherwise have for him, and the correction of those abuses which he sees as well as you, and is as much disposed to correct as you are. The Austrian policy of leaving the Pope to act in the matter, *motu proprio*, would secure the reform of abuses and a redress of grievances much sooner than the French and British policy of forcing him by external pressure to change his mode of government. Materially weak, the Pontifical government can preserve its independence only by opposing to the pressure brought to bear on it, simply passive resistance, and that it will oppose, and oppose, because to yield would be to surrender its rights as an independent state. Leave it free, as it has not been since 1848, and it is not likely to govern less wisely than Louis Napoleon. Under no point of view, therefore, can we approve Louis Napoleon's Italian policy, which is against the faith of treaties, the independence of sovereigns, and the rights both of the Pope and the Emperor of Austria, and we see no hope at the present, of national independence, or even of a Federal union for Italy. We see nothing that is likely to be done that will not make matters worse, and perhaps, in point of fact, matters all over Europe must become worse before they can become better. Europe is now buffeted backwards and forwards between absolute monarchy and absolute democracy, and we fear it will reach a permanent settlement only by passing through the terrible ordeal of democratic despotism. Liberty will be founded only amid the ruins of the Mazzinian republic. Pagan Rome has been resuscitated, and modern society seems destined to run through Cæsarism in both its phases.

The only ground for hope to the contrary is in Great Britain, who as yet retains something of her old Germanic

and Catholic constitution, and in civil liberty and material civilization, may be said to stand at the head of the modern world. Her progress in all the elements of material strength and the extraordinary energy she has displayed in war and diplomacy, prove that her constitution is still sound and vigorous, and that she is, as to this world, the most living and robust nation now on the earth. The greater, the more numerous and the more complicated the difficulties she has to contend with, the more strength and energy she puts forth, and the more easily does she appear to surmount them. Hardly come out from the Crimean war, she finds herself involved in a new war with Persia, soon with China, and then forced to suppress a rebellion in India, and reconquer an empire of a hundred and eighty millions of souls. Yet during all this time she has in no instance lowered her tone, or abated a point in her diplomacy. On every point she has maintained her pretensions and her influence, falsifying at every moment all sinister predictions, and refuting those who allege that her power has culminated. One of the oldest nations in Europe, her face is unwrinkled, and there is not a gray hair in her head. She appears even more youthful, vigorous, active, and buoyant than our own republic, so much her junior. Say what you will of Great Britain, she has a wondrous activity, and a marvellous vitality. She seems with each generation to renew her youth and her force. She does not know her own vitality and strength, and other nations entirely mistake them. Her own as well as foreign writers are perpetually deceived in their speculations as to the magnitude and stability of her power. She has her faults, her weaknesses, her vices, and her crimes, but no one can say with truth that her power has reached its culminating point, or that she has reached anywhere near the commencement of her decline. Her greatness, it is true, lies in the material, or more properly speaking, in the natural order, but in that order it is greatness, and greatness equalled by no nation since the palmiest days of all-conquering Rome.

We attribute not this to any superiority of race, to her Saxon or her Celtic blood, but to the grand fact that her people have never become thoroughly *Romanized*; have never fallen as to the political and civil order under the

Roman Cæsars, and have never been subdued by resuscitated Pagan Romanism. Separated from the Continent by her insular position, she to a great extent, escaped the reaction of Pagan Rome, represented in the Middle Ages by the German Kaisers and the civil lawyers, and in later times by Philip II., of Spain, and Louis XIV., of France. Her princes of the Plantagenet, Tudor, and Stuart families, may not have escaped the contagion, but they never succeeded in communicating it to the English nation. The nation, unhappily, has broken from Catholic unity, but it did not do so till its Episcopacy became the advocates of exaggerated royalty, nor till it seemed to her that the Pope had deserted the Germanic Monarchy, and accepted Roman Cæsarism. We speak of the nation, not of the king and court. Though she has lost the unity of faith, her people have remained truer to the old Germanic order of civilization developed and matured under the fostering care of the Papacy, and so well represented by the Anglo Saxon Alfred, than the people of any other nation. We are guilty as Catholics of no infidelity to religion in praising her civil and political order, for it is the order that once prevailed throughout Catholic Europe, for which the Popes struggled against the German Emperors, which they defended as long as they could, and which is the order that better accords with Catholicity than that which prevails in the Catholic States themselves, as is shown at length in "The Conversations of Our Club," in the present number of this Review.

Much of the marvellous energy displayed by the British Government during the last twenty-five years is no doubt due to the Catholic Relief Bill, which became a law in 1829, and to the reform of Parliament in 1832. The working of the latter measure has not confirmed the predictions of its opponents, or our own expectations. It has added to the stability as well as to the energy of the government by giving a larger portion of its subjects a direct interest in supporting it, and has not given, as we feared it would, an undue preponderance to the business classes. There is now on foot a new project of Parliamentary Reform, and all parties, Conservatives as well as Whigs and Radicals, agree that some further amendment of the representation is desirable, and may be safely attempted. The ministerial plan has not reached us at the time we are writing, and we

cannot speak of it. The Whig plan is uncertain, but the Radical plan drawn up by Mr. Bright, and presented, not to Parliament, but to the public, we have seen and read with care, as well as several speeches its author has made in its elucidation and defence. The plan upon the whole seems to us remarkably moderate, considering its source. Ignorant as we are of English society, we cannot say whether it does or does not put the qualifications of suffrage too low. Our impression, however, is that it does, and also that in the distribution of the seats in Parliament obtained by suppressing or diminishing the representation of boroughs below a certain standard of population, it gives too large a portion of them to the great centres of Commerce and Manufactures. The principle on which Mr. Bright proceeds appears to be that of approaching as near as possible in the present state of British society, to universal suffrage, and to throw the balance in the House of Commons on the side of the business classes,—a principle that may easily be pushed, and if once adopted almost sure to be pushed, to a dangerous extreme.

Mr. Bright appears to us to be too much under the influence of our American Democracy, and to be quite ignorant of the working of universal suffrage with us. The Reform Bill of 1832 in England, was a step towards changing the Commons from the representation of the people as an estate to their representation as population. Mr. Bright's plan is a step farther in the same direction. It adopts more of the democratic principle, and gives the Lower House of Parliament more of a democratic character. We should not seriously object to this, if we could be sure the House of Lords would be preserved with its present constitution. But with one House constituted on democratic principles, and possessing the powers possessed by the English Commons, understood to represent population, and therefore the nation, not an estate, it will be difficult if not impossible to maintain the House of Lords, which can then be understood to represent only the personal rights and privileges of its members. The House of Lords may remain respectable for the personal worth, ability, or rank of its members, but it ceases to be national, and must lose its hold on the national mind, represented in the House of Commons. When the Abbé Sieyès, in answer to the question, "What is the

Third Estate?" replied "The Nation," he pronounced the doom of the French Nobility as a political body. If the House of Commons represents the nation, it represents the nobility as well as the commonalty, for the nobility as well as the commonalty belong to the nation, and are constituent parts of it. The question may then be pertinently asked, "Why retain the House of Lords?" a question to which it would be very difficult to return a satisfactory answer. The national mind would soon come to find the House of Lords an anomaly in the British constitution, and the invincible force of logic would compel its suppression. The British Constitution and the glory of the British Nation would vanish, if either House were suppressed, or if it should cease to be true that the nation is represented by the two Houses concurrently, not by either alone. The House of Lords enters into the national representation, and is as essential to it as the House of Commons. This is the feature in the British Constitution we most admire, and which gives it whatever advantage it may have over our American system, for there is no analogy between our Senate and the British House of Lords. With us both Houses are elective, and there is no check on the elective principle, and nothing to temper it. With us Democracy may become as absolute as Roman Cæsarism, and majorities may play the tyrant without any effective restraint. In Great Britain the power of the Crown is restrained by the Lords and Commons; the power of the Commons is restrained by the King and Lords, and the power of the Lords by the King and Commons. The hereditary principle in the Crown and Lords prevents the elective principle from becoming absolute, as the elective principle in the Commons prevents the hereditary principle in either the Crown or the Lords from becoming absolute or supreme, and from the necessity of the concurrence of the two principles to the action of the state, stability and movement, order and liberty, or order with liberty, and liberty with order are at once secured.

Mr. Bright seems to us to overlook the fact that the Peers are an integral element in the national representation, and to regard them simply as representing the interests of the great landed proprietors. He does not see that the House of Lords is not a part of the constitution for the sake of

securing the representation of any special interest or interests, but for the sake of sustaining an hereditary principle along with the elective in the parliamentary representation of the nation. Even in his mind the House of Lords is an anomaly, and he would not seriously regret its abolition. He takes as a merit in our constitution, what is really a defect. In our national representation, whether of the States or the Union, we have not tempered the elective with the hereditary principle, because our society lacked the necessary hereditary materials for an hereditary peerage. The defect in the constitution grows out of a defect in American society. The English nobility did not emigrate, only the Commons emigrated, and only the Third Estate of the British Constitution was brought here with the colonists, and when we became independent, we were obliged to constitute our government with that one estate, and to make the House of Commons a national representation. We originally attempted to supply the defect by dividing the House of Commons into two Houses, both elective, but resting on different bases of population, property, or locality. We have now in most of the States left no difference between the two Houses, except that the members of the one are elected from larger, and the members of the other from smaller electoral districts, which amounts to very little in practice. Make the House of Commons the representation of the nation, and adopt, as the Radicals propose, manhood suffrage, and Great Britain becomes at once virtually a Democracy, and the last vestige of the old Germanic institutions of England is effaced.

Mr. Bright thinks universal suffrage works well with us, but if he lived here he would change his mind. Universal suffrage may work well enough in France, where the body to which members are elected is a mere sham, possessing no effective power. But it will not work well where election confers real power; for with it elections not only become venal, which they do in Great Britain and Ireland under a limited suffrage, but they throw, especially in large cities and towns, the power into the hands of the lowest classes, ill able to judge of the qualification of candidates, and who are sure to elect men of low character, those noisy, brawling politicians or unprincipled demagogues, who appeal to their prejudices, or flatter their passions, to the highest and

most responsible offices in the State or Union. The principal objection to universal suffrage is, not that it opens the door to the bribery and corruption of electors, but that it is in the way of electing men of high character, stern integrity, and real statesmanship, who scorn to pander to vulgar tastes and vulgar passions. We had, last autumn, in this city, three or more lists of candidates for various offices under the State and the municipal government, and it would have been difficult to have selected from our whole motley population lists of candidates more unsuitable for the offices to which they were nominated. Hardly a decent man will allow his name to be used as a candidate for any office; for if he should, he knows he would only be run down. We have men of talent, learning, statesmanship, in our country; but such men cannot be elected, for not mingling with and flattering the people, they are not popular. There are men enough here to fill our Congress and our State Senates, who would compare after a little experience, not unfavorably with the members of the House of Commons, or the House of Lords; but you never hear of them, and, except on very rare occasions, they have not so much political influence as the keeper of a low groggery or eating-house. This is due to the extension of suffrage beyond all reasonable limits. We are inclined to think that if Mr. Bright knew the working of our electoral system as well as we do, he would think twice before he willingly lowered the suffrage qualification in the United Kingdom. There is no sensible man here who does not see and deplore the terrible evils of the ultra-democracy we have encouraged. To restrict a franchise now virtually unrestricted, is impossible, and the bare suggestion of a wish to do it, would for ever debar those who should express it from ever receiving the suffrages of their fellow-citizens for the most insignificant office in their gift. It is owing to universal suffrage that our public men make so poor a figure, and are seldom up to the level of their position, that our representatives abroad are seldom such as do credit to the country, and the debates in our Congress fall so far in dignity, ability, and statesmanship below the debates in the British Parliament. What British statesmen should guard specially against is placing their government on the democratic declivity, and strengthening the

elective element of Parliament at the expense of the hereditary element, which they necessarily do just in proportion as they seek to make the House of Commons the national representation.

Mr. Bright lays great stress on the ballot—secret ballot, we suppose, he means. Here the secret ballot amounts to nothing, and is a slur on the independence and manliness of the voter, rather than his protection against the intimidation of employers or of demagogues. What would be its value in Great Britain and Ireland we are unable to say, but if it would have any effect, we think it would be directly the contrary of the one anticipated by its friends. What in general the laboring or tenant classes want protecting against is not the landlord or proprietary class, with whom in the great majority of cases they would vote, if left to themselves, but politicians of their own class, who wish them to vote against their landlords or employers. It is from these politicians or demagogues they would conceal their votes, and if the ballot enabled them to do it effectually, the Radicals, not the Conservatives, would be the losing party. But as it does not enable them to do this, as the politicians of their own class are sure to know how they vote, whether they vote by open or secret ballot, we are unable to attach any importance to the question, further than it seems to us more manly—more in accordance with the character of a freeman, to declare his vote openly than it is to attempt to conceal it. The secret ballot, if adopted, would only help to destroy one of the finest traits in the English character—that of frank, manly independence—a trait of character which disappears under an absolute democracy no less than under an absolute monarchy.

We have said, that we think the disposition Mr. Bright proposes to make of the seats he obtains by the suppression or diminution of the representation of boroughs under a certain standard population, seems to us likely to throw too much power into the hands of the business and industrial classes, as distinguished from the agricultural classes. The theory of the British House of Commons is not the representation of population, but of interests. Hence it was originally composed of knights of the burgesses and knights of the shire. The borough interests had apparently a stronger representation than the county or agricultural

interests; but a large number of the original boroughs having lapsed, and not a few that remained having become by the changes of time more identified with the agricultural or rural than with the business interests of the country, it became necessary in 1832, in order to restore the balance and retain the original idea of the House of Commons, to diminish the small borough representation, become wholly or in part rural, and to enlarge that of the great commercial and manufacturing towns of modern growth. But the business interests held a different proportion to the rural or agricultural interests from what they did under either the Norman or the Plantagenet sovereigns, and to give them as large a relative representation as they then had, would give them a power far greater than they then possessed, and make them the governing interests of the country. At all times, whatever was the numerical representation of the boroughs, the balance of power remained on the side of the land, or the country interests, and to shift it to the side of the business interests is to change the essential character of the House of Commons, and to endanger the very existence of the British Constitution. The strength of the business interests is, in relation to that of the agricultural interests, taking the nation at large, far greater than it was formerly, and if they have their former proportion of the representation, they will become supreme. Give them the decided majority of the representation in the House of Commons, and Great Britain becomes primarily an industrial and commercial nation, in which commerce and manufactures cease to be the handmaids of agriculture, and become its mistresses. No state, where all interests are subordinated to the interests of trade and industry, is or can be long-lived. The land is the primary source of the strength and wealth of a nation, and England's real greatness and wealth have reached their present enormous growth, because she has always drawn vast resources from her land, in the produce of her agriculture, and her mines of tin, copper, iron, and latterly of coal. The germ of her weakness is in the fact that she has, under the present agricultural system, become unable to feed her own population, and supply her own industry, without depending on the growth of foreign countries. But her agriculture, especially in Ireland, admits

of vast developments not yet effected, and which would not be were trade and industry to become supreme. It is essential to her stability, to her steady progress, that the landed interest should preponderate in her House of Commons, as it ought to do in every state. We call the attention of Mr. Bright and the Manchester School to these views, because they do not seem to us to attach the importance to them they deserve.

We cannot deny that we take a lively interest in whatever affects Great Britain for good or for evil. She has fallen from Catholic unity, and is in some points of view the bitterest enemy our religion now has. Her influence is lessened and rendered less beneficial in consequence of her dragging the dead body of Protestantism in her train. But she has retained more of that old civil and political order which grew up under the fostering care of the Church, and is a better representative of the old Germanic civilization that supplanted the Græco-Roman, than any other nation now to be found. With all her faults, and they are many, she is the best supporter Europe has of civil and religious liberty, and without her Cæsarism would triumph throughout the Old World, and perhaps also the New. Then anti-Papal as she is, the Church is at present really freer in her dominions, and suffers less interference and annoyance from the government, than in any Catholic country we can name, and we regard her system as infinitely more favorable to the growth and expansion of Catholicity and Catholic thought than that of France, of Naples, or of Austria. We entreat British statesmen, in their attempted amendments of the Constitution, to guard sedulously against the tendency to continental Cæsarism, on the one hand, and the tendency to American democracy on the other. Let them be slow to adopt our democratic principles, and let them learn to distinguish between the Papacy and continental Cæsarism, from which the Church and the people alike suffer, and direct their continental policy against Pagan, not against Papal Rome, and they will serve their own country and the cause of civil and religious liberty throughout the world. They will keep their country true to the old Germanic order, and make it the grand instrument in the hands of Providence of restoring that order to power, and healing the

schism now so fatal to European society, both temporally and spiritually.

We pass not from Great Britain to our own country with unmixed pleasure, and it is with a subdued pride we contrast British statesmen with our own. We, however, have the consolation of knowing that when things are at worst they sometimes mend, and we are in that state when any change must be for the better. The political morality and integrity of our people have been on the decline ever since the election of General Jackson to the presidency. It was in his election and under his administration that the purely democratic elements of our constitution first became really operative and effective in the government and people. Before him the government had been republican, but not, strictly speaking, democratic. Under him we abandoned the British system, which we had inherited from our fathers, and adopted the system of French or continental democracy, and, with unparalleled external growth, have been going to destruction about as fast as a people well can. We have modified all our State constitutions in a democratic sense, destroyed the independence of the judiciary by rendering the judges elective by the people for short terms of service and re-eligible, tampered with the noble system of the Common Law, assailed the principle of vested rights, struck at the very principle of constitutional government by asserting for the people in caucus the rights and powers which they can have only in convention legally assembled, and removed as far as possible every obstacle to the immediate expression in law of the will or caprice of the majority for the time. We have, in a word, done everything we could to render our government an absolute democracy, as incompatible with liberty as absolute monarchy itself. Conservatism has come to mean, with us, filibusterism, the acquisition of our neighbor's land, the extension of negro slavery, the reopening of the slave trade, and placing under the ban of society every publicist who raises his voice against such conservatism.

We advocated with reluctance indeed, the election of Mr. Buchanan in 1856, but our worst apprehensions have been realized. We can hardly call to mind a single statesman-like measure that he has recommended, nor a wise act of much magnitude his administration has performed. If

he has defended a sound constitutional principle, he has coupled its defence with a principle or measure of a totally different character. In the Kansas affair his course is indefensible, for, though right in maintaining that it is not necessary to the validity of the constitution that it be submitted to the people for ratification, he was wrong in promising the people of Kansas that it should be so submitted, and equally wrong in accepting and presenting the Lecompton constitution to Congress as the constitution of the State of Kansas, knowing as he did that the Lecompton convention and its constitution were a manifest fraud. We do not agree with Mr. Douglas in his doctrine of squatter sovereignty, or the legislative capacity of a Territorial people. A Territory under our system is neither a state organized nor an inchoate state; it has no existence but what it derives from the Federal government, no rights or powers but those conferred on it by Congress. While a Territory it has no autonomy, no substantive political existence. The power of Congress over it is no doubt limited, but by its own constitution, not by the rights and powers of the Territory. If Congress has the right to legislate on the question of slavery, it may delegate the exercise of that right to the Territorial legislature, and that legislature may authorize or exclude slavery as it sees proper; but if Congress has no right to legislate on the subject, the Territory can have none. The pretence that Congress cannot intervene, and yet that the people of a Territory, remaining a Territory, can settle the question of slavery or any other question demanding legislation, is simply absurd. Either Congress has power to legislate on the subject of slavery in the Territories, and then to admit or exclude it, as it judges proper, or there can be no legislation on the subject, till the Territory becomes a sovereign state. In no way, then, can Mr. Douglas's doctrine, if it aims at anything more than transferring the dispute from Congress to the Territory be defended. His doctrine of popular sovereignty, as we understand it, is the most dangerous doctrine that can be asserted, and one which every American statesman should set his face against. On this point we agree with the Southern statesmen, whose interest has led them to deny it, and assert the principle of vested rights. Mr. Buchanan's fault is that while fully acknowledging,

and pledged to maintain the doctrine, he has acted against it, and in a case where by acting against it he sanctioned a manifest fraud.

There are only two ways in which a Territory can legally pass from a Territory to a State, the one is by an enabling act, as it is called, and the other by the adoption by the Territorial people of a constitution, and presenting it to Congress in the form of a petition to be admitted into the Union. The latter is irregular, but not illegal, and is valid the moment Congress grants the petition, which, in this case, it may do or not, as it chooses. In the former case, supposing the constitution formed under the enabling act is republican, and contains no provision repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, Congress is bound to admit the new State, provided it has satisfactory evidence that it is really and in good faith the act of the people; otherwise it is its duty to reject it. Only the people in convention, with whom rests the entire political power under our system, can frame a constitution. The people in convention — not out of it, are the supreme political sovereign; and it rests with the people so assembled, in person or by their delegates, whether the instrument drawn up shall be submitted to the people as simple electors or not. It is usual to submit it, and it is, perhaps, always expected that it will be done, but the submission is not essential to the validity of the instrument. Nay, it is well now and then that it should not be submitted, so that the distinction between the people in convention and the people out of convention, of which we are fast losing sight, may be brought fresh to the public mind. The Lecompton Constitution came before Congress in neither of the ways mentioned, neither under an enabling act, nor as a petition voted by a majority of the electors, and it was notoriously not the act of the people of Kansas. It should therefore have been rejected by Congress, and not entertained for a moment. The President's attempt to force it as a constitution on the people of Kansas, was therefore unauthorized, and an attempt to usurp for the Federal government a power not conferred by the Constitution, and that is in direct derogation from the principle of States Rights, so firmly and so justly sustained by the South.

There is more in this than at first strikes the eye. It

was an attempt to destroy our Republican system, and to introduce the old Cæsarism of Pagan Rome, and to repudiate, as France, Austria, Spain, and Naples have repudiated it, the order of civilization which we have had the happiness of inheriting from our fathers. Almost the only principle we have retained from Germanic Europe, is embodied in our doctrine of States Rights,—a doctrine which assumes the States to stand on a basis of their own, and to be anterior to the Union, instead of holding from it, or existing under it, as the source of their rights and powers, which would assimilate the State to the Territory. If we mean to preserve our system of government, and prevent our republic from falling under monarchical Cæsarism on the one hand, or democratic Cæsarism on the other, we must at every cost, be it even civil war and bloodshed, resist the practical adoption of the doctrine that the States hold from the Union. No man whose eyes are open can fail to see that the ultra-centralized democratic tendency of our people is aiding a tendency to imperial Cæsarism, and that when the purely democratic tendency has destroyed, as it is destroying, constitutionalism, we shall find that we have inaugurated not a constitutional or limited monarchy surrounded by republican institutions, which would be enduring, but such a monarchy as centralized democracy always begets, that of Imperial Rome, what we call Imperial Cæsarism, such as now exists in France and Austria. Everything in the Northern, Middle, and Western States, if not in the Southern, is pushing us through democratic absolutism in the direction of Cæsarism, and hastening the day, when by a *coup d'état* the President will make himself a *parvenu* Emperor. That is the direction things have been taking ever since General Jackson became President, and which nothing as yet has been able to divert.

In his foreign politics the President seems not to have been wise, active, or successful. He might easily when minister to Great Britain, if he had been so disposed, have settled satisfactorily the Central American question, but he preferred to leave it open as an issue to help his nomination and election to the presidency, and as a chance to acquire glory for his administration. Its settlement seems now farther off than ever, and has by mismanagement become so complicated that, if ever settled, it will receive a Franco-British,

not an American solution. For ourselves we shall be glad to see it settled in any way that will secure a free transit across the Isthmus to the commerce of all nations, and close the Central American States to the operations of filibusters.

We have, no doubt, just causes of complaint against Mexico, a republic which can hardly be regarded as a state; but the lust for territorial acquisition has prevented our government from either taking the proper steps to obtain justice for our own citizens, or offering its own friendly offices to assist the distracted republic in re-establishing legal order and preserving peace. We have been quite willing to see her fall to pieces, counting with certainty on getting the fragments at our convenience. We have thought that a little idle declamation about the "Monroe doctrine," wholly inapplicable to the case, would guard our destined prey from any attempt on the part of a European power to snatch it from us; but without an army, and with a navy inferior to that of Spain, our fulminations of the Monroe doctrine are not remarkably terrifying to Europeans, and we find now that France and England are quite likely to disregard them. The proposition of the President to Congress, to authorize him to invade and establish a protectorate over the northern provinces of the Republic, has aroused the vigilance and activity of Great Britain, and we shall hereafter have to reckon with her in Mexico as well as in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

We have no great choice between the rival parties struggling for power in Mexico, for we have no confidence in the loyal intentions of the chiefs of either. Let which will succeed, the Church and society will suffer; order will not be re-established, or the condition of the poor people ameliorated. The elements of a well-organized, orderly, efficient, and progressive government, are wanting in Mexico. The mass of her population are uninstructed, ignorant, and poor, only a degree above the condition of slaves; the higher classes are fearfully depraved, perhaps outwardly Catholic, but to a great extent without faith, or affection for the true interests of the Church. There may be, and no doubt are, many among the clergy who are learned, pious, and sincerely devoted to the duties of their sacred calling, but there are large numbers whose conduct is irregular

and disedifying; while the Regulars, or Religious orders, possessing considerable revenues, will consent, even with the approbation of Rome, to no reforms or changes necessary to restore discipline, and place religion on a proper footing. Under these circumstances religion suffers, and society with it. One party confiscates the property of the Church, and the other takes it under pretence of defending it; and the Church is alike robbed by her pretended friends and her avowed enemies. There is little hope that the robbery will be discontinued, let which party will succeed, till the Church has lost her last dollar, her connection with the State is dissolved, and she is thrown on the voluntary affections of the people, and her own resources as the spiritual kingdom of God. The absorption of Mexico into our Union, so far as it would have this result, would, in our judgment, be no disaster, but a real gain to religion, though the Church for a time would lose many now nominally her children. The same result would follow were she to fall into the hands of Great Britain, but not if she fell into the hands of France, or again into the hands of Spain. To become healthy, strong, and vigorous, Catholicity must, in our days, struggle with heresy and infidelity, and if her limbs be unbound, and the field be open and free, nothing needs to be apprehended. We think our government, when it had conquered Mexico, would have done her and the Catholic religion a real service, if it had annexed her to the Union, and extended over her gradually the protection of our English Common Law, and Germanized her. It is too late now. Both England and France are in our way, and though we could, on our own territory, where all our resources are at hand, and we can bring all our forces to bear, withstand either or both combined, we cannot in a foreign country, or even on the ocean, do more than come off second best with either of them. A war with Great Britain is out of the question. Our mercantile classes, our cotton and rice planters, our pork, beef, and wheat growers would shrink from it with horror. She is the great consumer of our raw products, and the centre of our exchanges with whatever part of the world we trade.

We should have no serious objection to see Cuba one of the States of this Union, and it is a "fixed idea" of the

American people, that, if she passes from the possession of Spain, she must pass into that of no other European power. That she may some day be annexed to the Union is far from improbable, but the Bill introduced into the Senate, at the recommendation of the President, appropriating thirty millions of dollars towards obtaining it by purchase, is one of the coolest things we have ever read of in history, and we know not whether to regard it as the more insulting to our own national honor or to Spain. It is true we purchased of Napoleon I. the territory of Louisiana, and purchased it at a bargain ; but it was in the market, and if there was dishonor, it was on the part of the sovereign who offered it for sale, not on the part of the state that saw fit to purchase it. But Cuba is not in the market, and the President is as well aware of that fact as we are. We might take Cuba by force, though not without a larger army and a larger and better appointed navy than we now have ; but we are not rich enough to buy it. Spaniards are not precisely Anglo-Americans. Not a few of our people, we are sorry to say, are ready to sell anything they have, if at a bargain — there is nothing too sacred to be parted with. The husband would hardly hesitate to strip off and sell his wife's wedding ring, if he could obtain for it a hundred or even fifty per cent. advance on its cost. No homestead is so sacred that they would refuse to sell it at a fair price. Indeed, they would sell the very graves of their ancestors, and even their bones. It does not occur to these that there is anything censurable or regrettable in this, or that in regard to such matters any people can think, feel, or act differently from them. What is sentiment when it stands in the way of hard cash ? But all people are not like this large portion of Americans, and the people of Spain less than most others. Spain may have lost in physical force and in material splendor, but she retains her old Castilian pride, and her high sense of national honor. Cuba may be wrested from her by revolution or by foreign conquest, but she will never sell it, least of all to us, who have for so many years by our disloyalty, our filibusters, and our tampering with her subjects in Cuba, put her to such enormous expenses to retain it. There is something even more insulting in the reasons which it is proposed to offer to Spain to induce her to sell Cuba, than even in

the proposition itself to buy it. Our minister is to say to the Spanish government: "Your possession of Cuba is distant and precarious, and it costs you a large sum annually to defend it, an expense which, in your present straitened circumstances, you can ill afford. We want Cuba; it is indeed very important, almost necessary to us, and we are ready and willing to buy it at a very liberal price, and hand you over the cash for it. You had better close with us at once, for if you will not sell it to us, we shall be obliged in our own interest to take it, and you will lose it, and get nothing." We forget that it is precisely we who render her possession of Cuba precarious, and our disloyal acts that render necessary the enormous expenditures for its preservation to the Spanish crown; that the series of acts that render its possession precarious are ours, and that these acts on our part are done precisely in order to force her to sell it. A neighbor owns a farm adjoining mine, which I want, but which he has no disposition to part with. I enter into a league with his workmen on the farm to break down the fences, destroy the crops, and kill the cattle, horses, and sheep, and then I tell him, "You see, sir, your farm is worthless, and only a bill of expense to you. It costs you more to keep it in repair than it is worth, and more to keep a proper guard on the cultivators than all you can derive from its produce. It is decidedly for your interest to sell it. Furthermore, if you will not sell it, I shall be obliged to take forcible possession of it, in order to remove the scandal of such bad farming from my neighborhood." "But," he replies, "if you would conduct yourself as a good neighbor, and let my husbandmen alone, there would be no difficulty, no bad farming, in the case. What do you think of your own conduct, in rendering my farm useless to me in order to induce me to sell it?" This is the way we treat Spain with regard to Cuba.

But nobody is deceived in the case. Neither the President nor Congress, neither Benjamin the Jew, nor Bennett the Scotsman, expects to obtain Cuba by purchase. The offer to buy and pay is intended after the act is done, to be a plea in justification to public opinion for taking possession of the island by force or revolution. We are informed, on what ought to be very high authority in the case, that a republican insurrection is completely organized

throughout the island of Cuba, so complete and so strong that it is sure of success, if its leaders can only have an assurance from our government that when they have struck their blow, declared their independence of Spain, and instituted the republic, they will be received into the Union as a State. It is on this republican revolution of the Cubans themselves under our encouragement and fostering care we chiefly rely, and the offer to buy, and the Bill appropriating thirty millions towards carrying into effect the negotiation for the purchase, are intended to be offered as a proof that we are disposed to deal honorably with Spain, and also, if the Bill pass, to be an assurance to the Cubans that we are willing to receive her into our family of States. The latter is the principal purpose. The Bill has been introduced into Congress chiefly for the purpose of committing Congress and the people of the United States to the Cuban revolutionists. Hence the effort to manufacture public opinion throughout the Union, especially at the North, in its favor. The American people are not quite so unscrupulous as the administration and its supporters, and they need management and to be made to believe that in receiving Cuba they are not receiving stolen goods. The Bill having failed this session of Congress, we suppose the Cuban revolution will be adjourned for another year.

With regard to the Cubans we have no doubt from all we can learn that they have good reason to complain of the government of the mother country. They are held under a rigid despotic rule, indeed a military despotism, and studiously excluded from every office of trust and employment under government. They have no recognized rights, and may be arrested, executed, imprisoned, or exiled on the slightest suspicion. We have great sympathy with them, and sincerely wish success to any just measures they may adopt, *motu proprio*, to improve their political and civil condition. But we do not think that our people or our government are justified in interfering in the case. They are the subjects of Spain, and if they proved themselves loyal to Spain, their condition would soon become tolerable. Religion, we have no doubt, would gain by their annexation to the Union, for Catholicity is at present more vigorous, more healthy, more progressive under non-

Catholic than under Catholic governments; but in reality we do not want Cuba. In a military point of view, its annexation would extend and weaken our line of defence. It would not give us the command of the Gulf and enable us to make it a *Mare Clausum*. In a commercial point of view, it would perhaps extend our trade, but add little to the revenues of the government. It is wanted only to give us another slave State, and to strengthen the institution of slavery, which after all it would weaken. The South is strong, if she remains as she is, and does not attempt to extend slavery beyond its present limits, or to acquire new slave territory. Slavery and the free labor system are decidedly antagonistical, and the expansion of the one necessarily resists that of the other. It is not possible that the slave system of labor should triumph in this country, and the South may as well give up the hope of it at once. There is yet power enough in the Southern States, and loyalty enough to the Constitution in the Northern to protect slavery where it is; but let the South attempt to extend it beyond its present constitutional limits, and she will lose what she has. Secession from the Union, and the formation of a Southern slave republic, even if attempted, will not save slavery, but precipitate its abolition. The attempt to go beyond the Constitution in support of slavery made by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, has destroyed much of the respect hitherto entertained for its members, and weakened the hold of the judiciary on the public mind; and the attempt on the part of the President and advisers has demoralized the Democratic party throughout the Union. A pro-slavery party can no more succeed than an abolition party, and is no more in accordance with the Constitution, while it is less in accordance with the sentiments of the great mass of the American people. If Mr. Buchanan had taken the advice we gave him in January, 1856, he would have found himself to-day at the head of a strong Union and Constitutional party, able to elect his successor, and to govern the nation. He did not see proper to listen to it, and he finds himself now without a party, with scarcely a supporter but the *New York Herald*, and failing in almost every measure of foreign or domestic policy he has recommended. Never have our politics stood lower, never the reputation of our Republic so low.

We have left ourselves no space to enter into the discussion of the internal politics of the several States, or to dilate on the corruption so rife in both the Federal and State governments, the frauds in the business world, and the low moral tone of the community generally. We are beginning to experience the legitimate fruits of the democracy which we have since the election of General Jackson been encouraging, and which has gained almost a complete victory over our original Germanic Constitutionalism; but we think we see an incipient reaction against the democratic interpretation given to our institutions. We think the breaking up of the Democratic party a great gain, even if it only results in the party that succeeds it doing so under another *name*. To get rid of the *name* is of great importance, for the name has a logic in it, that they who bear it will even unconsciously labor to develop and push to its last consequences. A party christened *democratic*, can never be practically conservative. It can never emancipate itself from the despotism of its name. Whatever party succeeds in 1860, we trust it will not be called *democratic*, and any party in the country not called by that name, will prove a gain. We do not sympathize with the Republican party so called; it is not purely republican in contradistinction from democratic, has too many democratic principles and tendencies, and is tinctured with abolitionism, is even yet a little woolly-headed; but it has a good name, and if it succeeds to power under that name will be forced to eliminate its democratic elements, and develop in a constitutional sense. It is even now assuming a ground less unconstitutional than that which it formerly occupied, and approaching, on the question of slavery, a policy equally removed from abolitionism and pro-slavery. We should not fear its accession to power so much as we did in 1856. The election even of Mr. Seward to the presidency would do less to try the strength of the Union than the election of Mr. Buchanan has done. Even the American party, if it has really dropped the dark lantern, and given up its organization as a secret society, of which we are far from certain, would be preferable to the success of the present Democratic party. No party can succeed here that to any serious extent proscribes naturalized citizens, or pursues a really illiberal policy towards foreigners. It may succeed

in this or that locality, but never in the nation at large. As for Catholics they may experience annoyances, vexations, but no party will ever be able to disfranchise them or to deprive them of their equal rights as citizens. Religious liberty is the law of the land, and will not be seriously disturbed, unless radical democracy becomes a mob, and ends in establishing by universal suffrage an absolute monarchy or Cæsarism, as it has done in France.

In Great Britain the statesman has to study to preserve the hereditary element of his government, against the tendency to absolute democracy. Here he must study to roll back the democratic wave, and to reassert constitutionalism. He has here to rescue the country from that centralized and despotic democracy which we have borrowed from Europe, and guard against the Cæsarism which now weighs down all the Latin, Slavonic, and most of the Teutonic nations of Europe. The real antagonist of that Cæsarism is not democracy, but the British system, which was originally also our own, and intended, as far as applicable to the condition and wants of our people, to be preserved in our State and Federal Constitutions. We do not think it too late to resist the democratic tendency we have followed too long, and to return to a government of law instead of a government of mere will, or of demagogic manœuvring, intrigue, and cajolery.

We need not say that we are attached to our American institutions as they were left us by our fathers. What we oppose is the substitution of Jacobinical democracy for true American republicanism. We do not distrust the people or seek to limit their power. We hold the people in convention are our political sovereign, and the only political power there is in the country. What we oppose is, that because they are sovereign when in convention assembled they are sovereign out of it, in their simple capacity as population, which is, we take it, the essence of democracy. Return to the real theory of our government, and administer it in accordance with that theory, and we shall be satisfied. It is all we ask, or ever have asked.

ART. III.—*The Mortara Case ; or, the Right of Parents to the Custody and Education of their Children.*

IT is scarcely the province of a review to discuss individual cases that arise from day to day, which properly belong to the sphere of the Journals : yet so much importance is attached to the action of the Roman Government in reference to Edgar Mortara, that we may be allowed to examine the facts and principles involved in the case. To put it in its fairest and strongest light : A child of Jewish parents living at Bologna, in the Roman States, who was baptized in infancy, in the presumed danger of death, by a Christian domestic, without the knowledge of the parents, has been recently taken by legal process from their custody, and transferred to Rome, that he may be instructed in the Christian faith, in a public institution devoted to the use of Jewish converts. The age of the child is variously stated, at eight or eleven years. The actual state of his mind is reported by all to be that of happiness in his new position. His father has visited him, and has been graciously received by the Sovereign Pontiff. He is said to acquiesce in the detention of his son. What his wishes are it is not difficult to divine.

With the case itself Catholics living out of the Roman States have no direct concern. Whilst acknowledging the Pope as chief Bishop of the Church, and the centre of unity, they are not subject to his civil authority, and are not in any way responsible for its exercise. The proceedings of the Roman tribunals in regard to the subjects of the Pontiff are regulated by law and usage. Although in this instance they regard an obligation arising from the reception of a Sacrament, they have no force or application beyond the Roman States. Catholics may reasonably decline all investigation of the grounds of action of the Roman Government, since it has exclusive civil control over the parties interested.

The withdrawal of Edgar from parental custody in order to secure his Christian education, was in virtue of an immemorial law of the Roman States grounded on religious

principle, and on the Christian view of individuals' rights and duties. The fact that he had been baptized obliged him to receive instruction in Christian doctrine, which was scarcely possible whilst he remained under the paternal roof. Most probably he would have been placed in an institution in his native city, were it not feared that his parents would clandestinely withdraw him, and send him out of the country. In 1842, a child who had been baptized was left in charge of his parents, on their satisfying the tribunal that they would have him trained in Christian principles. In the Mortara case no regard had been shown by the parents to the baptism of the child, which had come to their knowledge, and consequently no hope could be entertained that they would attend to his Christian instruction. His removal to Rome was consequently decreed by the competent tribunal, and effected by two public officers in a regular way, with as little pain as possible to the parents. It amounts to no more than placing him at a boarding school at the expense of the Pope, that he may be taught his catechism.

The prejudices of the parents naturally rendered them unwilling that their child should be brought up a Christian; but they well knew that such was the law of the Roman States, regarding all baptized infants, and they had exposed themselves to its operation by introducing into their family a Christian domestic, contrary to law. The natural rights of parents to the guardianship of their children are not so absolute that they can retain it, if they be incompetent or unfit to educate them, whether from moral or physical causes. Jews are not qualified to give Christian instruction, and are unlikely to procure it for their children. For this we cannot blame them; nor does the Roman Government claim any right to withdraw their children from their custody on this account, unless these children have been baptized, or when arrived at the use of reason they demand Christian instruction. The case entirely turns on this point, that the child had received baptism, which makes him a Christian and entitles him to the privileges of Christian citizenship, which the State guaranties and guards, by insisting on his Christian education. A Christian State cannot be expected to ignore this or omit to be guided by it in its legislation.

The natural right of parents to watch over and direct the education of their children is necessarily subordinate to the general interests of society, and the welfare of their children. Christian governments judge of these according to Christian principles. They must be guided by them when the rights of parents and children conflict. In England, Lord Eldon, in the case of *Manneville*, which was decided in 1804, remarked that the Crown as *parens patriæ* has authority over all infants which supersedes the rights of parents by nature. On this ground, among others, he took from the father, as being a Jacobin, the control of his son's education. The same principle prevailed in the case of the poet Shelley, who was thought to be an infidel, and therefore deprived of the guardianship of his children.

The Boston Daily Courier gives us the English law on this subject, chiefly from the late Mr. Justice Story, which is so much to our purpose that we will take the liberty of laying an extract before our readers.

“The existing law on the subject is fully explained and sustained in Story's Equity Jurisprudence, as the following extracts show :

“The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery extends to the care of the person of the infant, so far as necessary for his protection and education. * * * It is * * * for the due protection and education of the infant that the Court interferes with the ordinary rights of parents, as guardians by nature, or by nurture, in regard to the custody and care of their children. For although, in general, parents are intrusted with the custody of the persons and the education of their children, yet this is done upon the natural presumption that the children will be properly taken care of, and will be brought up with a due education in literature, and morals, and religion, and that they will be treated with kindness and affection. But, whenever this presumption is removed; whenever, for example, it is found that a father is guilty of gross ill-treatment and cruelty towards his infant children * * * or that he professes atheistical or *irreligious principles*; in every such case the Court of Chancery will interfere, and deprive him of the custody of his children, and appoint a suitable person to act as guardian, and to take care of them, and to superintend their education. * * *

“The jurisdiction, thus asserted, to remove infant children from the custody of their parents, and to superintend their education and maintenance is admitted to be of extreme delicacy, and of no inconsiderable embarrassment and responsibility. But it is, nevertheless, a jurisdiction which seems indispensable to the sound morals, the good order, and the just protection of civilized society. On a recent

occasion, after it had been acted upon in Chancery for one hundred and fifty years, it was attempted to be brought into question, and was resisted as unfounded in the true principles of English Jurisprudence. It was, however, confirmed by the House of Lords with entire unanimity; and, on that occasion, was sustained by a weight of authority and reasoning rarely equalled, (namely, opinion of Lord Redesdale.)—*Story's Equity*, s. 1342.

"Story then proceeds, in sections 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, to exhibit the arguments 'by which,' as he concludes, 'this jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery has been maintained and established in the highest appellate Courts of England.'

"Story next proceeds, in notes, to cite a multitude of cases in which, for one reason or another, this authority has been exerted from time to time, by the Lord Chancellor.

"Indeed, the law of England is more objectionable in the sense of religious liberty, and of humanity, than that of Rome, as a few examples will serve to demonstrate.

"In Shelley's case, the exception was that he seemed to have taken up some sort of religion of nature, or philosophical infidelity. Atheism was imputed, but not proved, and, as is now known, falsely imputed. Poor Shelley was but guilty of the harmless folly of dreamy poetic excursions of the imagination into the regions of the pantheism of some of the old Greeks and Romans.

"But in De Manneville's case, Lord Chancellor Eldon would not allow a father the control of his child, among other reasons, and chiefly, because the father was then (1804) what was called a Jacobin. The Court expressly declares that the Court, as *Parens Patriæ*, has authority over all infants, superseding that of their parents by nature. And in arguing the case, Messrs. Romilly, Fonblanque, and Corlie, speak in the course of it as *indisputable* that the Court will interpose on the ground of religion to prevent a child from being brought up in a religion different from the established one.

"We might adduce many other instances of the exercise of this authority by more modern Chancellors; but we pass over them to specify several which are absolutely identical in spirit with Mr. Mortara's case, and differ only in this, that the child was taken from the parent and natural guardian, because of the child having received Protestant impressions, while the parent remained a Roman Catholic, nay, on account of the parent having but become a dissenter from the Established Church. Thus, Lady Darnley was deprived of her child, because she was an Irvingite. The Vice-Chancellor took the child Alice Race from its mother and only surviving parent, on the sole ground that, while the mother was a Catholic, the child had contracted Protestant impressions.

"The Lords-Justices took Lord Stourton's child away from him on precisely the same ground; and on precisely the same ground,

'abducted' and 'kidnapped' the young children of Mrs. North. These three last cases are quite recent; so recent, that we believe they have not yet found their way into the common knowledge of the profession in this country. However, two of them are referred to at some length in Lord St. Leonard's Handy Book, which is (or ought to be) in everybody's hands."

In former times the profession of the Catholic faith in England sufficed to subject parents to heavy penalties in case they sent their children to any foreign institution, or to any private "Popish family, in order to be instructed, persuaded, or confirmed in the Popish religion."* Notwithstanding the repeal of the penal laws, the English Courts still judge in favor of the Protestant training of the children of Catholics, whenever they can get a plausible pretext. In England, Alice Race has recently been taken from her Catholic mother, contrary to the express wishes of her father at his death. In Ireland, the children of O'Malley, a deceased Catholic, have been given over, by order of the Court, to the care of a Protestant aunt. It is stated, that Nicholas, the late Czar of Russia, ordered three thousand youths, children of Polish Israelites, to be pressed into his naval service, and to be baptized, Montefiore, the English Israelite, travelled to Russia, to remonstrate against this constraint, but did not succeed in changing the determination of the Czar, who answered, that he had conferred on them a signal spiritual benefit pregnant with great temporal advantages. In our country, although the Constitution and laws give no preference to any doctrine or form of worship, public prejudice prevails to such a degree, that the children of Catholics are very frequently withdrawn from their parents, if poor and destitute, and placed under Protestant influence in public institutions. The State laws on this point are framed on the model of the English laws, under the pretext of poverty, or vagrancy, (either being sufficient to place them within the law's grasp); and thus, as Blackstone testifies in regard to England, "the poor and laborious part of the community, when past the age of nurture, are taken out of the hands of their parents, by the statutes for apprenticing poor children."* In most States the magistrates can bind out such children, and in

* Blackstone's Comm. Bk. I. c. XVI.

some places, as in St. Louis, preachers are employed as paid agents, to enter the houses of the poor, and snatch away their children in the name of the law. Their names are sometimes changed, and they are soon sent away and bound out far from the reach of their parents, whose natural rights are most unfeelingly disregarded.

The Roman government on the contrary pays the strictest regard to the rights of poor parents, equally to those of the most wealthy, and avoids all intrusion into the domestic sanctuary as long as the laws are obeyed, but it requires the rights of Christian children to be respected. In the case of the Mortara family, the baptism of the infant took place not by any government act, but through a sense of religious duty on the part of a domestic. The child remained under the care of his parents long after he had attained the use of reason, and was only taken from them by process of law, when it was ascertained that they had not complied with the legal obligation of training him as his baptism rendered necessary, and the laws of a Christian nation required. As Jews, their neglect admits of excuse; but the government being Christian, and the sovereign being chief bishop of the Church, could not be expected to dissemble the fact, and allow the Christian child (such he was by baptism) to be brought up in the hatred of Christ, his Redeemer. The legal process was gone through with all exactness, the facts were proved by satisfactory evidence, the decree was issued and executed with all possible lenity and mildness, and the Christian education of the child was provided for at the expense of the Sovereign. Any one who respects the law must admit that the proceedings was perfectly justifiable. Even those who think the law itself harsh and unjust, cannot fairly censure the manner of its execution. In order to judge justly it is almost essential to examine the fact in the religious aspect, in which the Roman government was bound to view it, and therefore to understand what Catholics hold as the effects and obligations of baptism.

The fact of baptism having been administered by a domestic does not affect its validity, since although the office of baptizing properly belongs to the bishops, priests, and deacons of the Church, every one can validly baptize by using the prescribed form of words, and making simultaneously the

ablution. This is known to us from the ancient tradition and practice of the Church, of which in the third century Tertullian is witness.* A Jew cannot conceive why so simple a rite performed by a menial should be thought to change the condition of the infant who unconsciously receives it; but faith regards the divine institution, and the power and grace of Christ, who invisibly produces the effects which he has attached to it. The act of the domestic is as effectual as that of a priest or bishop, and the mere ablution and invocation are as certainly attended with the sacramental character and grace, as if the Sovereign Pontiff himself solemnly performed the rite with all the imposing ceremonies of the Ritual. The baptized infant born according to the flesh of Israelite parents, becomes a child of God, being born of water and the Holy Spirit. Without his knowledge he receives heavenly gifts purchased for him at the price of the blood of his Redeemer; without his consent he is subjected to the law of Christ and of His Church, since the boon of regeneration is granted on this condition. It is not necessary at this time to prove these positions; it is enough for our present purpose to state that this is the teaching of the Catholic Church, as to all baptized infants, without regard to the religious faith or wishes of the parent. As it is believed that without baptism the infant cannot enter into the kingdom of God,—that is, cannot be a member of the Church on earth, or partake of the glory of heaven,—it might be thought that the Roman government would oblige its Jewish subjects to have their children baptized; yet the Holy See, in accordance with the teaching of St. Thomas of Aquin, strictly forbids the baptism of the infants of Israelites, or infidels, without the free consent of their parents, and consequently their withdrawal with such a view from parental control. Julius III., whose pontificate commenced in 1550, forbade such baptism under penalty of suspension from the sacred ministry, if the offender were in sacred orders, and a fine of a thousand ducats. Benedict XIV., in the year 1747, instructed his Vicegerent to see that the prohibition be faithfully observed. It might be supposed that at least when in manifest danger of death, the government would authorize Christians to force their way

* L. de Bapt. XVII.

into the houses of Jews to baptize infants known to be dying, or would encourage the employment of Christian nurses who might in an emergency perform this most necessary office. Nothing of all this is done. Christians are forbidden to trespass on the domestic independence and peace of the Jews; and these are likewise forbidden to employ Christian nurses. The last prohibition is borrowed from the Canon Law, and enforced by a Papal Constitution, published by Gregory XIII., who reigned in the decline of the sixteenth century. This was not done with a view to prevent the baptism of dying children, though it evidently shows the absence of compulsory measures to secure it. The Vicar of Christ could not entertain a desire to prevent, nor could he forbid, their baptism. The law was directed to save Christian domestics from the danger of apostasy, for it was known by sad experience that familiarity with the Jews served to wean them from the worship of Christ. Think of a girl of fourteen, such as was the maid who baptized Edgar, living in a family where Christ is mentioned only as a wicked and impious wretch, who sought to overturn the divine fabric which Moses had raised, and paid the penalty of his crimes on an ignominious gibbet. That an occasion should present itself for baptizing a dying infant is a possible occurrence; but the danger arising from the conversation and example of the family is obvious and immediate. But whatever was the object of the law, the elder Mortara, by hiring a Christian nurse, was its violator, and exposed himself to fines which the government forbore inflicting. If she used an opportunity to baptize the child, he must blame himself for employing her. What remedy would be offered in a court of justice to a plaintiff alleging a wrong done him by one whom he employed in direct violation of the law? This is something more than *laches*, or neglect on his part to protect himself against wrong; it is legally, if not morally, equivalent to connivance. We are not surprised at the energetic measures recently adopted by the Grand-duke of Tuscany to discover Christian domestics employed by Jews in his States, since the danger to which they are exposed is evident, and there is reason to fear that some case like the Mortara occurrence may serve as a pretext for political excitement. The Cardinal Vicar of Rome has likewise enforced the law, and released fifteen

Christian maids from the danger to which they had been exposed by engaging as domestics with the Jews at Rome.

The Roman government has made ample provision for the religious security of the Jews, by allowing them a synagogue, with freedom of worship and protection, and by forbidding all constraint—all interference with them or their children—all violation of their domicile. It could go no farther. Insisting that all baptized infants be educated in the faith, it showed that respect for the Sacrament, which a Christian Bishop, who is at the same time sovereign, must be expected to entertain. His Jewish subjects well knew the law, and were thus put on their guard against the contingency. If the government were to dissemble, it is not unlikely that the report spreading among the citizens, of a baptized child being trained as a Jew, to dishonor Christ, might give occasion to collision and bloodshed. It is only by adhering to law that peace can be effectually maintained between classes so apt to be carried away by their antipathies.

The dispositions of the child himself are not entirely to be overlooked in this investigation. From all the testimony that can be obtained it appears that he is contented and happy. Some may give little importance to the assent which a child of tender years gives to the Christian doctrine; but the Church recognizes the capacity of all who have attained to the use of reason, to conceive divine faith. The control of parents in matters of religion is necessarily confined to the inculcation of divine truth and the laws of God. Our courts of law seem to acknowledge in them a religious guardianship over their children until these attain to full age; but the ecclesiastical tribunals, with St. Thomas of Aquin, hold, that the child is free from his earliest use of reason, to submit his mind to God, without regard to the views or wishes of his parents, and is bound to embrace the faith, when propounded to him in a manner corresponding to his capacity. He owes obedience to his parents in domestic discipline; he must obey God in things divine. Since, then, the child Edgar, under the instruction which he has received, assents to the Christian faith, it would be wrong for the Pope, who has legal control over him, to place him with his parents, whose prejudices dispose them to train him in contrary principles. His religious

liberty would be manifestly endangered, since he would be unable to resist parental influence. Under similar circumstances in this country even grown children who choose a faith different from that of their parents were allowed by the courts to receive guardians or remain under the care of persons of their new faith. This was done on the broad principle of liberty of conscience admitted even in minors. Those who believe that there is no other name under heaven by which man can be saved but that of Christ, can scarcely approve of consigning a child that has come to his knowledge, to the care of those who regard Him as a criminal executed for sedition and blasphemy. To expect the laws of a Christian nation to make it imperative would be asking entirely too much. We are scandalized at the little account made of the Sacrament and of the salvation of a soul in estimating the action of the Pontiff. A Christian must hold that eternal life depends on the knowledge of Jesus Christ the Saviour, heaven being attainable, even under the ancient dispensation, only in virtue of implied faith in Him :—

“None ever hath ascended to this realm,
Who hath not a believer been in Christ,
Either before or after the blessed limbs
Were stretched upon the wood.”*

In the official note of Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State, addressed to the European courts in relation to this case, the facts are set forth with a view to show, that the child Edgar was validly and lawfully baptized; but no effort is made to prove that such baptism warranted the interposition of the Government to provide for his Christian education. This it assumed as admitting of no question. The Pope as *Pater patriæ* feels authorized and bound to furnish the young Christian with the means of instruction. He does not break off all communication between them, but allows the father to visit his child, who is taught in his catechism to honor his father and mother. But for the excitement raised by designing men, we have no doubt that the return of the latter to his native city, within reach of his parents, if not under their roof, could have been obtained, on the condition of guarantying his Christian

* Parad. xix.

education: this being the sole point for which the Pontiff is solicitous.

The Jews have shown great want of moderation and prudence in this affair. They boasted from the beginning that it would produce commotion and indignation in the whole civilized world, as a most unparalleled outrage; and having to a great extent control of the press in Germany and other countries, and influence with cabinets, like that of Sardinia, needing supplies, they have in part realized their threats. They have insidiously sought to bring odium on the Catholic clergy, unless these join in the outcry against the Pontiff. Unmindful of the benevolence ever displayed towards them in Rome, they have sought to overwhelm him with public censure, and to excite at once the masses of the people, and the crowned heads against him. But they have failed. All men of intelligence easily understand that an act of a government done in pursuance of an ancient law, connected with a religious principle, and calculated to protect a religious right, cannot be justly complained of by its subjects, who, with a full knowledge of the law, brought themselves within its operation. The condescension of Louis Napoleon to instruct his minister to confer with the Cardinal Secretary of State on the matter, has resulted in showing the constancy of the Pope in the course which he had deliberately adopted from motives of conscience. His answer, *Non possumus*, will long be remembered. He is invested with the plenitude of civil power as sovereign of his States, yet he feels himself bound by principle to protect the Christian rights of his subjects, whether adults or infants. He cannot consent to restore to unbelieving parents a child that has been regenerated in Christ, and instructed in the mystery of Redemption. He must continue to discharge the office of a father towards him, and see that he be strengthened in grace, before he be exposed to the danger of apostasy. The waves of popular commotion dash in vain against the rock on which he stands: he hears murmurs and threats from every quarter, yet he remains—

Unmoved,
Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified.

He cannot trifle with the salvation of the immortal soul, which has received the divine impress. We are not

surprised that the parents should feel pained at the temporary separation from their child, or that Israelites generally should regard it as a grievance; but we cannot excuse their attempt to magnify and misrepresent it as an act of kidnapping, an outrage, and a violation of natural right. That Christians should be misled by their clamor is indeed surprising.

The wisdom of the President in refusing to interfere even by way of friendly remonstrance is manifest. The Secretary of State has strongly insisted, in his two official replies, on the settled policy of our government, not to meddle with the domestic concerns of foreign nations; although he has thought proper to give publicity to his individual sentiments in a letter to a friend evidently designed for publication. We cannot blame him for not viewing the act favorably, since its religious aspect is not agreeable to non-Catholics, and its legality can scarcely induce its approval by those who hold that civil legislation should have no connection with religious principles. Nevertheless we think General Cass might have paused before venturing to censure, even in his private capacity, the judicial act of a foreign power. Our own "domestic institutions" are quite as unintelligible to those of other countries, and far more liable to become the matter of censure: but whatever individuals may opine in regard of them, we know of no instance in which men in authority denounce them.

England, as well as Prussia, has declined to interfere. The vaunted unanimity of the reclamations of foreign governments is reduced to the informal communication from the French Emperor, and the remonstrance of the semi-infidel government of Sardinia, the worst mediator that could have been chosen. If a wrong had been committed, the Pope would have been most ready to redress it, since it was the action of the tribunals, which he was free to rescind, if unjust or illegal. If concession implied no danger to the faith and salvation of the child, he would have readily granted to the prayer of the father his custody and charge. No foreign influence was needed, or desirable: no threat was admissible. Notwithstanding the rash course adopted, we are confident that all kindness and tenderness of Christian charity will continue to be exhibited by the humane Pontiff and his agents to the parents, as well as to the child.

We indulge the hope that the young Edgar will grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord, and become the instrument of Providence in drawing to the faith his parents and many of his brethren according to the flesh. The result of the commotion excited, is to show, on the part of the Pope, great moderation with equal firmness, and a faithful adherence to the examples of his predecessors in the humanity and justice which they uniformly observed toward the Israelites. These have no reason to complain, that the law forbidding them to employ Christian domestics is now enforced, and fines inflicted for its violation. If other legal restrictions, to which they are subject in the Roman States, as in various other countries, and which hitherto were practically ignored, through the indulgence of the Popes, be now insisted on, they must blame themselves for having provoked this severity by their most unwarrantable efforts to bring odium on their Sovereign. No power can be indifferent to its own security. The cry of persecution which they now raise is without foundation, as long as they are protected in their worship, and all their religious observances, as also in their persons and property, and in all their natural rights, having it even in their power, if they will, to prevent the baptism of their children. Political privileges have hitherto been withheld from them in most countries. We should rejoice in their full enjoyment of them; but whilst the Roman Government treats them with humanity and justice, the distrust with which she views them is strengthened by the measures which they have so rashly adopted. We rejoice in the social equality with all citizens of every creed which the Israelites enjoy in the United States, and desire that they may everywhere be established; yet we know how difficult it is to remove the apprehensions of governments in regard to the danger of innovation, and to harmonize the heterogeneous elements of society. Z.

The greater part of the clamor that has been raised on this Mortara case, has originated in Sardinia, and has had a political motive. The policy of the present Sardinian government, in which it is seconded, not only by England, which was to be expected, but by the Imperial government of France, is to hold the temporal government of the Pope

up to public execration, as a pretext either for interfering with its internal administration, or for divesting the Pontiff of his temporal sovereignty, and annexing his principality with the Duchies of the Subalpine kingdom, or to the French empire. The real motive of all this clamor is to make the Pope a mere puppet in the hands of France or Sardinia, or to get rid of him as an Italian prince. To effect this it is necessary to decry his temporal government, and to destroy its reputation in the public estimation, and to preserve and increase to the greatest possible extent the disaffection of his temporal subjects. The removal of Edgar Mortara from his Jewish parents in order to secure him a Christian education, it was thought afforded an excellent opportunity of carrying out this not very honorable policy. The Jews, whose rights were not invaded, but whose prejudices were offended, were appealed to as the most fitting instruments, and were only too ready to respond. The conquest of the Papal States involving that of the Duchies, would give Sardinia a chance for rich plunder and the means of paying her bonds, as the conquest of Italy by France would secure to the Jewish bankers the interest on their loans. In any case, they could say with Shylock, "If it feeds nothing else, it will feed my revenge." It would gratify their hatred against Christianity and Christian governments. Understanding the motive, we cannot respect or heed the clamor. It will die away of itself. We can assure the enemies of the Church that her existence is not linked with the fate of French or Sardinian dynasties; she can see, and has seen, dynasties more powerful rise and fall without losing her equanimity; we can also assure them that she does not stand or fall with the temporal government of the Pope. She existed six hundred years before it was established, and may exist six thousand years after its overthrow. The Pope may cease to be an Italian prince, and to be burdened with the thankless task of governing a petty Italian State, and still be Pope, and the representative on earth of Him who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords.

The Papacy itself can never be effectively assailed through the Pope's temporal government. It is as Sovereign Pontiff—as supreme head and governor of the Church on earth, that he inherits the promises made to Peter, not

as an Italian prince, and the wisdom and justice of his temporal government depend on the principles, and are to be judged by the same rules, we apply to other temporal governments. The Church is Divine, but temporal governments, though existing and governing by Divine right, are human and imperfect, whether administered by Pope or Cæsar, Lords spiritual or Lords temporal. If we should find bad laws and worse administration in the Papal States, it would disturb neither our faith nor our piety. We should say simply the Pope, though infallible, *loquens ex cathedra*, in all matters of faith and morals, is but an indifferent temporal prince; or that he finds himself, as other princes, in circumstances which render it impossible for him to make all the improvements in legislation, or reforms in the administration, demanded by wise and good government. We have no doubt that the government of the States of the Church is imperfect, and just as little that the sovereign finds himself surrounded by men and influences that effectually hinder him from placing it in harmony with the wants or the ideas of modern society, or adapting it at once to the changes time and events have wrought in the condition of his subjects. We look to Rome for instruction in what relates to eternal salvation, for spiritual light and direction, not specially for the wisdom of this world, which may be, consistently with our spiritual interests, as little abundant there as at Washington, London, Paris, Vienna, or Naples. It is possible that Popes and Cardinals, while looking out for the true interests of religion, and divinely protected and assisted in their spiritual mission, may be very indifferent statesmen, and also that they may be surrounded by Monsignori and Generals and Provincials of religious orders, all meaning well, but who yet insist that true wisdom is in the admonition, *quieta non movere*, and who would raise a cry that would frighten the faithful throughout the world, if they should happen to detect the slightest symptom of departing from routine, or of adopting a modern idea even in regard to civil matters. There are old fogies, no doubt, at Rome, as there are in and around all temporal courts, and they are often such as every court must consider; yet, though the temporal government of the Pope is not, and cannot be, in accordance with American republican notions, we have no belief that it is so bad, or that its subjects are

generally so disaffected as commonly represented by the anti-Catholic press. Abuses there may be, as there are under every temporal government; obsolete forms may be retained; the machinery for the administration of justice may have become old and cumbrous, and cease to work well; but the condition of the people in the Roman States, if they were disposed to make the best of it, is not intolerable, and is, in fact, superior to that of the people in most European States.

From what has been advanced in the foregoing pages, it will be seen that the law under which young Mortara was taken from the custody of his parents, is not different from the law in England and the United States, and is such as English and American courts every day enforce, and sometimes to the prejudice of Catholics. The law itself is right in principle, and is designed to protect the child against the incompetency, the irreligion, or the vices of the parent. It, of course, is opposed to the doctrine sometimes put forth against state schools, that the education of the child in all cases belongs to the parent, between whom and the child the state must never be permitted to intervene—a doctrine this Review has never defended. It denies that the right of the parent to the custody and education of the child is absolute, admitting of no exception. It supposes there are exceptional cases, where the state may intervene to protect the child. The law may be abused, and is abused every day, and so is everything good. It was abused when in England under it Catholic children could be torn from their parents and placed under Protestant guardians to prevent them from being brought up Catholics, and is abused also when the children of Catholic parents, because they are poor, are taken from them and placed in Protestant institutions, or bound out in Protestant families, without any provision being made for their instruction in the Catholic religion, as every day happens in this country. Yet there are cases in which the courts are bound to intervene in order to protect the child and society itself, as, for instance, when the parent is bringing up his boy to be a thief, or to practice any species of crime or immorality.

Under the ancient Græco-Roman civilization the power of the father over the child was absolute, and the father might put his child to death, or sell him into slavery, without

the law intervening,—a power which in the beginning, no doubt, it was considered the affection of the parent would prevent from being abused. But under the Christian order, this power has been restricted, and the child is regarded as a person, a citizen, with rights that the law may protect even against the parent. A Christian child has in a Christian country, the right to be brought up and instructed as a Christian. It is singular that in the Mortara case, while the right of the parent has been insisted on, there has been a strange forgetfulness of the right of the child to Christian instruction and Christian citizenship. This right on the part of the child was at least as high and as sacred as the right of the father to the custody and education of his children. Edgar Mortara was a Christian from the moment of his baptism. No matter what your opinion on this point may be, the Catholic Church so teaches, and her teaching is the guide the tribunals that took cognizance of the case were bound to follow in deciding what, in the legal sense of the term, constitutes a Christian. Indeed, when the question is between a Christian and a Jew, we suspect any court in the civilized world would hold proof of baptism as conclusive proof of a Christian *status*. Edgar Mortara being a Christian, was entitled to all the rights conceded to a Christian by the laws of the land. The Jewish father had, indeed, the right to bring up his Jewish children in his religion, but not the right to bring up in his religion a Christian child, whether his own child or another's. If the Pope when appealed to, had sent the boy back to his father to be brought up a Jew, he would have violated the right of the child, the right of every Christian child to Christian instruction, and we should have seen it turned by the very persons who now clamor so loudly, against the Papal government, and heard another clamor equally loud, and far less unjustifiable, that the Pope is Anti-christ, for he sends a Christian child to be brought up a Jew, to reject, revile, and blaspheme our Lord. The Jewish father never had the right before God, or by the law of the land, to bring up a Christian child in any other than the Christian religion.

We concede that it is not permitted in the Papal States, nor by the Church anywhere, except in case of abandonment or in extreme danger of death, to baptize the child of non-Catholic parents without their consent; and yet we

should suppose that all who feel any attachment to the Christian religion, would take some interest in the soul of young Edgar, and be pleased at the thought that even one child of Jewish parents is a Christian, and likely to be brought up in the faith of our Lord. We well know that we may not do evil that good may come, and yet all who love the good must welcome it when it comes. We have not been edified by the conduct of those among the clamorers against the Pope who claim to be Christians, or by the way in which they have argued the question. They have argued it as if young Edgar had no soul, as if eternal salvation is a matter not worth troubling one's head about, or as if it were a matter of perfect indifference whether a child be brought up to love and obey our Lord, or to reject and revile him. Do these people ever ask themselves what would become of Christianity, if there were no Catholic Church to assert and vindicate it?

No doubt the Protestants who join with the Jews in the clamor against the Papal government, do it on the ground not that a Jewish child has been baptized and is likely to be brought up a Christian, but that religious liberty and the sacred rights of parents have been violated. But this ground is untenable. If the Papal government had ordered the child Mortara to be baptized against the will of the parents, or had had any hand in bringing about his baptism, or in making him a Christian, we grant it would have been a serious invasion of the acknowledged rights of parents, a real invasion of religious liberty, and we should have blamed the government, not for securing the child after he had become a Christian, a Christian education and a Christian *status*, but for having participated in making the child a Christian without the parents' consent. But Edgar was a Christian, according to the law of the Papal States, when the knowledge of him first came to the government. It had to deal only with the case of a Christian child living in a Jewish family exposed to be brought up a Jew. It intervened not to deprive the father of his right, but to secure to the Christian child the rights he acquired by becoming a Christian. It had incurred no responsibility for the act of baptism, for it never heard of the child till he had been *christened*, made a Christian, and after his baptism, it would have incurred a fearful responsibility if it had left him exposed as he was. If there was any invasion of the right of the parent, it was

done not by the Papal government, but by the elder Mortara's own maid-servant, who baptized the child without the parents' consent; but she did it innocently, believing the child in imminent danger of death, and Mortara could not complain, because he had himself received her into his family in violation of the law.]

There was no doubt a conflict of rights in the case, and, as in all cases of a conflict, one or the other must give way. If the father had the right to the custody and education of the child, the Christian child had the right to Christian instruction, and the privileges of Christian citizenship. If it was wrong to the Jewish parent to take from him the custody of the child, it was also a wrong, and a far graver wrong, to the child to leave him in that custody; and in a Christian land, before a Christian court, when, other things being equal, the right of the Christian overrides that of the Jew. The father in this case, moreover, had forfeited his right, because his son had been baptized in consequence of his own act in employing a Christian domestic contrary to the law. The state was bound to intervene and protect the right of the child, and especially must it do it, after the child is old enough, as appears to be the case, to have a mind of his own, to form and to express a wish to be a Christian. For a Christian government then to send him back to be brought up a Jew, would have been gross injustice, and a violation of religious liberty, deserving the severest execration.

So conclusive does this reasoning appear, that the *London Times* and other anti-Catholic journals, dispute the fact that baptism, especially lay baptism, introduces one into the Christian family, and make themselves quite merry with the absurdity, as they regard it, of supposing that a little water sprinkled or poured upon the head and a few words pronounced over the child by a servant-maid some fourteen years old, can make the child a Christian, and impress upon him an indelible character. Their merriment is sad, for it arises from confounding in the Sacrament the visible sign or symbol with the Holy Ghost that in the sacrament regenerates the recipient. But this raises the theological question, answered in an earlier part of this article, and a question with which the civil courts, whether in the Papal States or in any others, have nothing

to do. The Papal tribunals could not take cognizance of the theological question; they could only take cognizance of the civil question, and decide what constitutes one a Christian in the eyes of the civil law. In the eyes of the civil law of the Papal States Edgar Mortara having received baptism was a Christian, and we are aware of no court in Christendom that would not find itself obliged to decide the same way; for if in some countries individual persons may be recognized as Christians who have not been baptized, there are none where persons who have received baptism, and have not voluntarily renounced Christianity, could be declared to be not Christians in the civil sense. Unless with the exception of a few sectaries, which is doubtful, baptism is held to be a sign of Christian profession and membership by all who call themselves Christians. But to place the opposition on the theological ground is to change its character, and make it an opposition not to the Papal Government, but to the Catholic Church, and to reduce the clamor to our old acquaintance, the clamor always raised by non-Catholics against Catholicity, and to make it turn not on a matter of fact or of law, but on a matter of opinion, in which they who clamor may turn out to be wrong, and they who are clamored against may turn out to be right. All the clamorers can say is, not that the theology of the Catholic Church is false, but they think it is not true. Suppose they do think so, what then? She very likely thinks to the contrary, and, at the lowest, her *think* is as good as their *think*.

We have dwelt the longer on this Mortara case, because it has made much noise, and has been presented in such a false light as to disturb many honest, well-meaning people. We have for ourselves considered it an affair in which we as a Catholic have not any special interest, except the satisfaction we naturally experience in learning that the child is likely to grow up an instructed and worthy Christian. We have seen it in the protection of the rights, in a Christian land, of a Christian child against his Jewish parents, the most natural thing in the world. We give expression to no prejudice against the Jews, to whom we willingly concede all the rights we claim for ourselves. We yield to no one in our devotion to religious liberty, and in the present state of the world, at least, we believe the only true

policy is for the constitution and laws to leave truth and error alike free. We are willing Jews and unbelievers should have equal liberty with ourselves, but we cannot consent that while they are free to be Jews and unbelievers, they should be free to deprive a Christian, old or young, of his right to be a Christian, and to enjoy the rights of a Christian. That were liberty for them, but tyranny and oppression for us; when we yield them the right of conscience, we do it with the understanding that we shall retain our own right of conscience, and we cannot understand the liberty of conscience that would remain to a Catholic, if the Pope could be compelled to remand a Christian child back under Judaism.

ART. IV.—*Remarks on Religious Controversy, with some suggestions as to the manner of conducting it.*

ONE might form very good rules for his guidance in religious controversy if he were able to bear in mind the instances of his own experience in which he acquitted himself creditably, or else failed to do it on account of some defect or mistake. Even a well-trained theologian experiences a certain anxiety from want of confidence in himself, when it is proposed to question him searchingly in reference to his religion, and when he is uncertain as yet upon what point in the range of his information, the question is likely to fall. But when once he has clearly understood the question, the mind regains composure, and brings readily forward the materials out of which his answer is to be shaped. Calm and clear perception of the point at issue is so important to one who would explain truth or refute error in matters connected with religion, that we will notice at once some of the defects arising from the want of it, and some of the remedies which are necessary to avoid or correct them. Thus the nature of our article is explained. We do not propose to teach a system of religious controversy, but to call attention to some defects committed by those who engage in it, and to some amendments which may be of service to them.

One of the most difficult things to do in this miserable world is undertaken by that man who tries to explain to another what he does not understand himself, and yet, oh ! how often is this most difficult task engaged in ! If I wish to furnish the name of some individual, or place which I do not distinctly recollect, although I have it, according to a very inaccurate popular saying, "on the tip of my tongue," I may give you a name like the one wanted ; but it is not the right one. I may get the beginning of it right, or the end, or the middle. I may give you very good names, and names that sound like it, but I do not after all give you the name you want. So with the person who tries to explain clearly in words what he does not possess clearly in thought. He goes at the point, and over it, and under it, and around it, but he does not fairly hit it. He tells you by way of excuse that he cannot explain exactly what he means, or that he fears his language is not clear ; but the good man's language is as right as it can be ; the fog and the pother are in his thoughts. There is a process resorted to sometimes by public and other speakers, which may be called *thinking aloud*. By talking on they give their unready memory time to hunt up the fact, or principle in demand ; or if the intellect be the faculty at fault, then, after floundering about in the waves of doubt and confusion, it sometimes succeeds in climbing painfully at last upon a rock of substantial thought. We hope our Catholic friend knows now what we want him to do if he would explain Catholicity to his Protestant friend. He must know what he is going to say and then say it ; he must have clearly in his head what he undertakes to explain. If he wishes to state what faith is, he must know the definition of faith ; if he wishes to tell what the Catholic Church means by Indulgences, Absolution, Contrition, &c., he must learn it, and understand it himself, not hazily, not vaguely, but with distinctness and precision.

This is all the more necessary, because in nine cases out of ten the trouble with your listener is that he has some erroneous meaning of his own attached to the words you use. You may think that the important part of the discussion is to be that in which he will get the benefit of your ingenious remarks and illustrations. But all the benefit of your eloquence is lost upon your hearer unless

you get him to understand, without ambiguity or confusion, what the Church really teaches in the premises. We say then, never lose an opportunity of getting into a Protestant mind an accurate definition of Catholic expressions, and a clear dogmatical statement of Catholic articles of faith; nor do we know of any greater service that can be rendered even to an audience composed entirely of Catholics. Keeping clearly in view the exact meaning of your subject will enable you to correct a fault in your listener which annoys every one who is in the habit of replying to questions propounded by Protestants. They open the discussion by telling you that they object to or do not understand the use of the "idolatry of the Virgin," and when you, patient man! begin to tell what the Church teaches in reference to the veneration of the Mother of our Redeemer, they will break the thread of your discourse by inquiring whether "priests control the votes of those who go to confess;" and when you have told them how the matter stands in that regard, you find that they paid no attention to you while you were speaking, but that their mind had taken leave of absence and gone on an excursion, and now they want to know if American Catholics have to swear allegiance to the "Pope of Rome." If you have any respect for the truth, and for yourself, you must confine your listener to one point at a time, and allow no digressions, and no introduction of irrelevant matter until that is disposed of. In this connection we must be allowed to introduce a short episode after the manner of the ancient epic poets.

There is in all societies a class of persons whom we will call the *guessers impertinent*, and this is the offence of which they are guilty: One is called upon to explain his meaning in reference to a given point; the impertinent guesser, who perhaps has called for such explanation, listens to the first words of it and guesses at what the speaker means to say in conclusion. If quite vulgar, the guesser interrupts the speaker by supplying words to eke out his supposed meaning. If not, he guesses without uttering anything, at what the speaker will say, and then in place of hearing him out, spends the time in thinking upon an answer. Throughout the discussion the impertinent guesser quotes as having been said by the speaker, not what he

did say, but what he did not say, although the impertinent guesser thought he was going to say it. This habit of guessing ahead of people's words is very prevalent. It is the quickness of a weak mind. An attentive observer of the habits of children notices it frequently in them. You begin to speak to a child about some occurrence, meaning perhaps to praise him as you get on. He quickly interrupts you with an excuse or an explanation. He has guessed ahead of your words, and thinks you are going to scold him, and so replies not to what you are really going to say, but to what it falsely seems to him must be in your mind. The least anybody can give a man to whom he does not wish to be disrespectful and insulting, is an opportunity to be heard, and the privilege of explaining his own meaning.

Similar to this conversational sin, is that of Protestant disputants who are eternally in the habit of giving to Catholic things their own meaning, when engaged in discussion with Catholics. It may be an absurd thing to say that when a man is about to die, even if he has been all his life a desperately wicked character, he will go straight to heaven without any trouble, provided the priest comes and prays over him; but then it may be quite possible that Catholics do not teach or believe any thing of the kind. It is ridiculous, no doubt, to think that by giving the priest ten shillings, an individual can obtain pardon for his sins during five years past, and five years to come; but who says that Catholics are knaves and fools enough to believe it? Your interlocutor has been told that they do believe it, or chooses to think that they do, and without great caution on your part, every time you name Absolution and Indulgences, he will assume that you speak of them in his sense, and not in the Catholic sense of those words. Be then careful and do not play Catholic goose to his Protestant fox. If he is honest, and if he has respect for your intelligence and good faith, he will receive your statements as true in point of fact, and he will avow to you that he never knew the true meaning of the subject before, and most probably add that as he has heard you explain it, it seems to him reasonable and just. The hostile feeling of honest Protestants towards our religion has for its object not really the religion itself, but the phantom which their imagination has mistaken

for it on account of early prejudice, scurrilous books, and the statements of interested fanatics. When people form to themselves an image of some man of notoriety, whom they have heard spoken of perhaps unfavourably, and then come to meet him personally, the effect is commonly one of surprise: "Why," we hear them exclaim, "he is not the kind of man at all I expected to see. I was led to believe him a great blustering fellow, and never thought I should find him the quiet gentlemanly person that he is." So do people form in their minds the hideous caricature Popery, and so are they agreeably disappointed when they come to see the real personage Catholicity.

How strange, and sometimes how unaccountable are the prejudices existing all around us against our holy religion! A Catholic is puzzled to find the Church abused and rejected because she has encouraged some doctrine or practice, when he knows that she has been combating from the beginning for precisely the opposite doctrine, that she has toiled and suffered and made untold sacrifices for precisely the contrary practice. The eyes of her enemies examine her tables of the law, and they are bitter against her because they cannot see some given moral precept written upon them, whereas to the Catholic it stands forth prominent, bright, unmistakable as the rays of the noon-day sun. Yet there are reasons for this difference. When we are trained in any branch of learning from early youth by kind, virtuous, and able teachers, it is difficult not to adopt some false principle, not to overlook some necessary truth. What then is to become of human weakness when every appliance is resolutely brought to bear upon it for the purpose of excluding truth and introducing error, and when to all this is added self-deception of the most wilful kind! The light of truth is there plain enough, but the education of the student has placed before his eyes a pair of spectacles with both glasses all cracked; the rays he sees are refracted and distorted into a thousand fantastic colors and shapes, and he laughs at the sight as amusing, or turns away from it in disappointment and disgust.

Vagueness and looseness in the statement of a truth is a fault in a speaker, and is apt to injure a listener; but it may happen again that such vagueness and looseness exist in the manner in which objections are brought forward,

doubts proposed, or questions asked. Let the Catholic party guard against undertaking to reply to an objection before it is clearly and distinctly understood what the objection is. Those who are not Catholics are frequently heard to object to points of doctrine, without exactly knowing why they object, or what it is they object to. "I like your religion well enough," they will say, "but I cannot agree with you about the Pope.—I go to the Catholic Church for the preaching, but I do not like your ceremonies," and so on. Now what is it that we Catholics say about the Pope? The question might be answered by bringing from a library several large volumes on the institution of the Papacy, on the primacy, on its spiritual authority, on the temporal power of the Popes, on the history of their lives, on the Papal Court and Government, besides a collection of all the decisions, decrees, acts, briefs, bulls, rescripts, &c. &c., that have emanated from the Pontifical See from the time of St. Peter down to Pius IX. So with the ceremonies, fifty questions arise which will readily occur to the reader. It does not appear what is objected to; and for the purposes of a discussion likely at all to prove useful, the objector must narrow down his objection to one point, or if he have several, propose them not in a wholesale manner, but clearly, and one by one. By narrowing down the objections in this manner, it is often found that what is complained of forms in reality no part of the Catholic teaching or belief, but is a wrong impression easily removed by placing the truth in its proper light.

We know of a clergyman who takes the following method with those who apply for instruction previous to being received into the Church, and who are troubled with one or more remaining difficulties. He assists them in giving definite outlines to the objection, and couching it in clear and strong words. He then requests them to write it down, making it even clearer and stronger, if they can, and before their next visit to endeavour to answer it by themselves. When he meets his neophyte again, he finds quite commonly that little is left for him to do; that stating the objection in distinct and precise words has sufficed to show its fallacy, and to suggest, without further trouble, an appropriate and satisfactory refutation. Error is the counterfeit of truth, and is respected only when clothed in the semblance of truth; as

base coin is washed with silver and gold, but is quickly detected when the outward coating is removed and the worthless metal brought clearly in sight.

Certain things are not asserted directly, but taken for granted, alluded to indirectly as if they were established truths, which the speaker or writer himself knows on reflection to be nothing of the sort. We never met but one man who asserted point-blank that Benjamin Franklin was the inventor of the art of printing; but (as our friends of the *Baltimore Catholic Mirror* remarked a short time ago) people who ought to know better are caught giving Galileo credit for having discovered the motion of the earth, and there are those who speak of Luther as the first modern man who ever read the Bible, and of Bacon as if the method of induction had been unknown until he inculcated its application to the natural sciences. We do not suppose that Bacon would approve of the use that is made of what some people falsely imagine to have been his system, especially as it is applied to matters of religion. We have often heard it praised as an emancipation of the reasoning power in religious matters from the trammels of scholasticism, by those whose reasoning power was very evidently emancipated from the trammels of logic and common sense. They hated the syllogistic form of argument because it would not allow them to deduce a falsehood from a truth, to draw a general conclusion from particular instances, to insert conclusions not contained in their premises, or in any way to assume a proposition as proven which the very form of argument itself showed not to be proven at all. More modern philosophers have gone a step beyond even the haters of the syllogism and the followers of pseudo-induction, and inaugurated the comfortable system of taking any thing for truth which is energetically outspoken by the inward power of affirmation. This fashion of argument is the simplest and easiest of all, for it dispenses with the necessity of all proof, and requires to settle matters forever nothing but the politician's rather ungrammatical phrase: "Them's my sentiments." From this source spring manifold objections against the faith and good morals of the Catholic Church, and we invite our readers to coax or force the speaker who will pay attention to their wishes to attempt putting objections of this nature into a syllogism. If so

much cannot be obtained, request him at all events to give some grounds for his injurious assertions. If he makes a positive statement he ought to be able to sustain it, and even if he advances a negative proposition he may give some account of what induces him to believe that it is true.

This is by no means unfair treatment, nor is any advantage taken by it of an adversary in argument; on the contrary, if he thinks his opinion worth anything, it gives him an opportunity to explain and defend it. If a man makes the assertion that Catholic ceremonies are "mummery and superstition," as my Lord John Russell did in his famous Durham letter, it is but fair to call upon him to explain what "mummery and superstition" is, and to show that the ceremonies of the Catholic Church are properly placed under that classification. Unless the Catholic party agrees with him in the definition of superstition, it is very clear that no rational argument can take place. After both parties have found out what the meaning of superstition really is, then let the opponent of ceremonies proceed to show that they come properly within such meaning, if he can. A man may ask a question in a few words that it will require many hours and vast erudition to answer, and even then it may not satisfy his peculiar views. So by all means let him try his hand at proving his statements before you begin to refute them. He will either prove what he has asserted, or he will not. If he proves it, it will be something that does not tell against the Catholic doctrine properly understood; and if he does not prove it, the Catholic party may show how he has failed to substantiate his injurious charges, but will not be obliged to enter upon the discussion of the doctrine involved.

It often occurs that the Catholic who engages in friendly controversy is not made to encounter any remark of a personal nature, but is on the contrary favoured with compliments to his intelligence and freedom from prejudice. He has to hear, for instance, that Catholics are as a general thing ignorant and superstitious in religious matters, that they are slaves to priestcraft, and that they are bound body and soul by the fetters of spiritual despotism, but he is not included in the list. O dear, no! he is clearly a liberal and enlightened man, and is not at all meant to be spoken of as one of the blinded and misguided victims. Any Catholic who acquiesces in compliments such

as these is insulted without being aware of it. How can he be a Catholic if he is different altogether in faith and practice from the great body of those who believe and do what the Catholic Church prescribes to them? Let him repel such compliments if he has a spark of generosity or self-respect about him. It is not pleasant indeed to be considered a poor superstitious fool and slave by one who passes for a respectable man. Certainly not. But whatever he may *think*, we *know* that no person, however humble may be his condition in life, is a fool or a slave, or deserves to be called by such foul names, if he possesses the ordinary rudiments of religious instruction which the Catholic Church commands all her children to possess, and if he practises the moral duties which she commands all her children to practise. Any one who is in reality ignorant, bigoted, or superstitious, is not what the Church wishes him to be, and makes him, in so far as she has influence over him. But Christian humility, obedience, and respect for holy things, are looked upon by proud, self-sufficient worldlings as meanness, slavishness, and superstition. If we deserve the name of Catholics we must suffer reproach in the company of the lowliest of our brethren. We must imitate our Master, the Founder of our religion, and remember that if we are ashamed of him before the world, he will be ashamed of us before his Father who is in heaven. The only useful inquiry is, not what do I, a liberal and enlightened Catholic, think on religious matters, but what does my Church teach, and what is the belief and practice of those people who act in accordance with what my Church tells them to believe and practise.

We do not wish to deny that honest-minded Protestants have oftentimes the greatest respect for firm, sincere faith in those of whom they ask information on Catholic subjects. They ask even a priest, in a tone which shows both their seriousness and their interest in getting a candid reply: Do you really and truly believe in the existence of Purgatory? Tell me exactly what you think of the Eucharist; do you truly believe in the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist? Such questions are not idle ones. Human nature seeks in its doubts to find something to lean upon, and what stronger motive for believing it worth one's while to investigate a given subject than to as-

certain with certainty that a person for whose intellect and moral character one entertains real respect, does actually believe the subject in question as the Catholic Church presents it? This consideration seems to us a strong reason why Catholics should endeavor in all candor to present the doctrines of the Church exactly as the Church teaches them. He who softens down, or explains away any article of the faith, or attempts to apologize for it, or dress it up to suit the prevailing taste and fashion, deceives the friend who applies to him for information. What is wanted is an exact statement of the doctrine as the Church teaches it, and to know whether you have full and entire faith in it or not. Do not then betray the truth on the one hand and your friend on the other by giving views suggested to you by considerations of mean human respect or of worldly and time-serving prudence. Tell what God has revealed to you through the Church, and God and the Church will be responsible for it.

There has always appeared to us to be at bottom something ludicrously inappropriate in quoting admissions made by enemies of the Church as adding any force to what she teaches. Such is not the case where the quotation contains a thought, a sentiment, or an observation worth noticing for its own sake, nor where the person quoted possesses some weight of character to make his opinion respectable. But that Protestant or Catholic mind, we cannot help thinking, must be strangely constituted, that can be influenced by a saying favorable to some Catholic doctrine, from Voltaire, Gibbon, or even Lord Macaulay. What in sober truth was Voltaire's opinion of the Church? Why, when he was in good health he tried to destroy it as an institution which stood in the way of every honest philosopher who wished to gratify his passions, and have a good time in this world. He then commonly designated Our Saviour as "the infamous one," and called upon his followers to crush him and his Church: "*Ecrasez l'infame!*" When he fell sick, he found that he had as much faith as you or I; he was afraid of dying and being damned. He therefore sent for a Capuchin friar to hear his confession. This happened three several times when he was seriously ill, and it would have happened in his last illness, had not his infidel friends adroitly kept the priest out of the way. So poor Voltaire died illustrating the old saying:

*Dæmon languebat, Monachus tunc esse volebat ;
Sed cum convaluit, mansit ut ante fuit.*

Gibbon was a good hater ; if he said anything favorable to Christianity, it was on the principle of holding your adversary up, so as to have a better chance to knock him down. He did not say anything favorable to the claims of Christianity if you take him honestly, and according to his own meaning, and it would matter very little if he did. As to Macaulay and that celebrated traveller from New Zealand (an idea, by the by, stolen from Volney's Ruins ; we forget who Volney stole it from), that traveller quoted and requoted who has journeyed through so many weary pages on his way to London Bridge, Macaulay shows clearly enough what he meant and felt as he wrote, for he concludes his article, a review of Ranke's History of the Popes, by telling us that the Church is simply the most cunning piece of machinery ever contrived and put together by the art of man.—Perhaps we ought to see the force of an admission extorted from an enemy in spite as it were of himself, but we must confess that we make very little of the testimony of Luther, who when mellow with strong beer would exclaim that the Papists were moral Christians, and the Reformers a set of unmanageable vagabonds ; or Rousseau, who for the sake of a brilliant antithesis would allow that our Saviour was a more respectable philosopher than Socrates. Such things serve to amuse and gratify curiosity, but the party who dwells upon them more willingly than the plain official statements of the Church, shows pretty conclusively to our mind that he is not in earnest.

The Church during the last sixty or seventy years has been eloquently and feelingly praised by writers who did not acknowledge her sway, on account of the happy influence which she undeniably exercises on the temporal well-being of mankind. Catholics, in their love and zeal for the glory of their mother, have elucidated her claims, and recorded her triumphs in the same field of beautiful and refining beneficence. Many generous souls have had their attention drawn to the sublime teachings of her holy faith by the works of her patient and self-sacrificing charity, especially in behalf of the poor, the oppressed, and the fallen. Numberless are those again who have begun by admiring the

majesty and the beauty of her external worship, and its pure and elevating influence on all the fair arts through which the beautiful presents itself to the heart of man, and ended by embracing the divine truth which she alone can convey in its fulness to his intelligence. All this is true, and the Church is entitled to the glory that has redounded to her from these sources. In fact, what can be said in her praise that is not true and deserved in some sense or other? Divine in her origin as in her end, she embraces God and all that is in heaven, with man and all that is fit to be elevated upon the earth, fostering and preserving every thing that is good, beautiful, and true, and dooming to destruction nothing but sin. Notwithstanding this her universal kindly influence, we cannot but think that he who calls upon her to devote her whole energy, to commit her character and name to any work for the temporal advantage of man, mistakes the end for which she was instituted, that is, the eternal salvation of souls; and he who would argue from what she has done to further man's temporal advantage, that she must therefore be the one true Divine Church, fails to prove what he undertakes, and is wanting in reverence to her. We are in the habit of asserting every day that she possesses, and is able to body forth a perfect ideal of civilization and improvement in the temporal order, and that men and nations fail to attain the full measure of their hopes for the race only because they will not have recourse to her for this ideal and the means of its practical realization. As a consequence of this fond estimate of her potential usefulness, her friends commit her to this interest and to that, while many, very many men otherwise disposed to have faith, oppose and thwart her mission, not because they hate her, but because they hate the interests with which she appears to be identified. The truth is that the Church never gave, and she never will give to the world perfect civilization, progress, government, natural science, legislation, industry, commerce, improvement, liberty, education, art, institutions of benevolence, national prosperity, or any of the numerous associative happinesses in the temporal order on which men in modern times have centred their intensest affections. These things have always been and always will be imperfect. Not, indeed, because the Church is not perfect in

her own sphere and mission, but because of human imperfection, which will always exist here below. Suppose that all men of all nations were to become Catholics, and good practical Catholics, would they not then possess these various things in a perfect state? The question is equivalent to the other: would all men then cease to be imperfect? They would not; and therefore their various institutions, though they would undoubtedly be better than they are now, would still be imperfect in spite of all the Church might do and would do in their favour.

Our object in these remarks is to induce our readers, when they happen to be engaged in controversy, to avoid discussing the merits of religion as true or false on these grounds. To fail in making out a case in favour of truth may injure its cause in the mind of the listener, and if he is led on such grounds to respect it, his respect may fail upon a close revision of the argument. We do not like to help the truth on false pretences. Say, then, that the Church uses all these things, that she accepts them and can get along with them or without them; say that by giving men supernatural truth, and making them deny themselves, and lead pure lives, she helps them in the natural order, and fits them to succeed in all great and good undertakings; but do not try to prove her divinity from indirect temporal results, which are not the objects nor the effects of her infallible authority, nor part of her deposit of faith, nor fruits of her sacramental and grace-giving institutions.

A young traveller who visited Europe some years ago, found France ringing with the eloquence of Lamennais, who boldly and in the name of her Founder called upon the Catholic Church to put herself at the head of the democratic movements of the day, and identify her cause with that of popular freedom against absolute monarchs. Failing in his purpose he found himself under the unpleasant necessity of excommunicating the bishops of France, the Cardinals, and the Pope, and finally the whole Catholic Church as unworthy the name of Christianity. On a subsequent visit the same traveller found the eloquent Louis Veuillot calling upon all Catholics to save the cause of Law and Order by identifying themselves as Catholics with the interests of absolute monarchy against the interests of popular

freedom, and holding them responsible for the consequences if they would not do so. Who is right, the *Avenir* or the *Univers*? In so far as they have sought to bring the men of either side to be guided in principle and action by the teachings of the Catholic Church, they have both sought to do what was right; but in so far as they have tried to commit the Church to either side, or to prove that she is or ought to be so committed, we cannot think that the followers of either have the right with them, or that they can possibly succeed in effecting the purpose which, apparently at least, they have in view.

We wish we could inform the reader how he is to proceed when he has the misfortune to come in contact with a disputant who is angry, insulting, or indecent in the expressions he makes use of. It is very certain that a discussion, which is allowed to continue in such an unpleasant strain, can result in no good. As every one has the right to decline continuing a conversation which becomes personally offensive to him, one remedy is always within reach; it is to stop the discussion. This summary process may be avoided when the speaker will listen to an appeal addressed to his manhood or his sense of decency and fair play. If not, he has that peculiar obstinacy which constitutes formal or wilful heresy, and to him may be applied the rule: *hæreticum hominem devita*. The Catholic who should allow his own temper to betray him, who should retort, and meet personality with personality, may be sure that he will give rise to bitter feelings on the part of his opponent, and that this bitterness will produce hostility to Catholics at large and the cause of truth itself. It is found that vulgarity is ill at ease in the presence of refinement, and sometimes the quickest and surest way to get rid of a puppy is to treat him with studied politeness.

We notice at times in Catholic papers an account of some scandal which has occurred in a Protestant community, and we suppose that the fact is adduced as an argument against Protestantism, while it really proves nothing against it. We confess that similar exhibitions cause us great pain, and a feeling of profound humiliation. A great human crime is always a great human misfortune, and we know of no more unchristian display than that of exultation and triumph over the unfortunate. Let us take heed how we allow

feelings of hatred to arise in our hearts against our fellow-man, no matter who, or what he may be, and remember that pity if not silence is a duty wherever we see others fall into error and sin from which if we are preserved it is not by strength of our own but only by the grace and mercy of God.

The law that commands us to love our Protestant brethren, is just as clear as the one that commands us to hate Protestant heresy. However prone human nature may be to confound the two, we offend God if we do not keep them clearly distinct. To give a rule for avoiding confusion we will quote the plan adopted by a good-hearted Catholic, and we think no worse of it for the dash of Irish humour just discernible in its expression. "I look upon every Protestant," said he, "as my own child, but sick with the measles or the ship-fever. The more loathsome and revolting the complaint, the more would I pity and feel for the patient; and the more I wished to remove or destroy the disease, the more love would I show for the child, if I were its father or mother." Nothing can be more just or charitable when fairly understood. Nevertheless Protestantism is not all ship-fever and measles. It preserves many principles of the natural law of God, and of Catholic doctrine too, that in themselves are good and true. Is it well by arguments *ad hominem*, and by reproaches of inconsistency, to drive the Protestant to abandon that which remains to him of maxims that are sound and wise? We think not. Charity and prudence on the contrary should teach us to foster and strengthen whatever we find in their mind, conscience, and feelings in harmony with the truth, and seek to lead them on by appeals to their good sense and candor, to believe and practise more and more in the right direction. The system and their education makes them illogical and inconsistent. We cannot reason with them as if they stood upon the same ground that we do. We must learn to appreciate their difficulties—to take into consideration the obstacles with which early prejudice surrounds them, and to be patient if they do not at once see and admit all that we think intellectual honesty requires of them. Whoever gives his neighbor information on even one point of Catholic doctrine—whoever removes even a single prejudice, does a

great and good act, the happy consequences of which no one can foresee. The worst condition of a mind in error is that of apathy and stagnation. Drop but a single pebble upon a sheet of smooth water, and you will see ripple succeeding ripple far away from the spot, and long after the simple agent has sunk and disappeared from the sight.

All that we have said on the subject of religious controversy, may be reduced to three simple directions, which Catholics will do well to remember whenever a discussion arises between them and their Protestant friends. They are as follows:—1st. Explain what it is that we do *not* believe on the point in question. 2nd. Explain clearly what we do believe. 3rd. Bring the authority of God speaking through his Church as the reason why we believe it. By observing the first, you will clear away ignorance and prejudice, and prepare the ground for the doctrine you wish to establish; by the second, you will place the truth briefly and plainly stated before the mind of your friend; by the third, you will awaken inquiry on the fundamental difference between Catholicity and Protestantism, namely, individual affirmation on the one side, and Divine authority on the other, as the motive and rule of faith. The authority of God speaking through the Church, and of the Church proposing articles of faith to our belief, may be appealed to as a general and final reason why we believe in any given doctrine rightly attributed to us. But that it applies to the tenet under consideration, may be shown by referring to the explanations which the Church herself has given on the subject, illustrated by warrants from Holy Scripture, by the long-established usages of the Catholic world, and by the testimony of human reason and experience.

We shall conclude our strictures and suggestions by exhorting our Catholic readers to draw the statements they make on Catholic doctrine from the Catechism, and in order that they may be able to do so correctly, never to grow weary of its perusal. If they are puzzled when appealed to for information on some point of Catholic doctrine, it is because they neglect that study which is indispensable for all. We blush for shame when we are detected in a blunder on the geography of our country, or on some well-known provision of its constitution, or of the laws of the State; but it is a far greater shame to be found ignorant of

the principles of the law of God upon which we profess to base our hopes of eternal salvation. We wish that Catholics would make it a practice when their non-Catholic friends ask them for works containing information upon the belief and traditions of the Church, never to omit placing the Catechism in their hands, whatever other books may accompany it. In all cases of doubt or investigation a plain unimpassioned statement of the facts involved is valuable before all other evidence. Such a statement of Catholic doctrines is set forth in an authorized form in the Catechism approved by the proper ecclesiastical authority. What is there taught may be accepted, or it may be rejected, but the information is given in unequivocal, official language. This language, moreover, is the simple word of God, and his grace is sure to accompany it wherever it goes.

J. W. C.

ART. V.—*Le Progrès par le Christianisme, Conférences de Notre Dame de Paris. 1856 et 1857.* Par R. P. FÉLIX, S.J. Paris, 1858. 2 Tomes. 8vo.

PÈRE FÉLIX, we are told, is one of the most popular and effective preachers now in France. His *Conférences*, or sermons, preached during the season of Lent, in the great church of Notre Dame, at Paris, draw crowds of men to hear them, and produce an impression on the lively Parisians hardly less profound than that formerly produced by the eloquent Père Lacordaire, or afterwards, by the earnest, gifted, and devoted Père Ravignan, whose loss to the French pulpit is still so deeply regretted. They are written with great vivacity and force, with freedom and originality, in pure and beautiful French, and may be read with interest, instruction, and edification even by an Englishman or an American, which is more than can be said of most French sermons, written as they are to be spoken in public, not to be read in the closet.

When we consider how familiar the topics the preacher has to discuss, how little of extrinsic interest he can bring to his aid from time, place, and circumstance, it is remarkable that we have so many good preachers: but when

we consider the number of preachers there are, the variety, greatness, and sublimity of the themes presented by religion, the magnitude and pressing nature of the interests addressed, it is no less remarkable that we have so few. A really great preacher is a rare phenomenon. It is seldom we find even our most eloquent and learned divines making the most of the text or the Gospel for the day, or that we find them reasoning to us of sin, of justice, of judgment in the way that arrests the soul, convinces the mind, alarms the conscience, and makes the hardened sinner tremble, as did Felix before St. Paul, and cry out in tones of deep anguish and firm resolve, "What shall I do to be saved?" Why is this? Not ordinarily for lack of learning, zeal, intellect, imagination, or sensibility. A far larger number of preachers have all the essential gifts of the highest class pulpit orator, than succeed in reaching even a moderate eminence. Why is it, then, that of the immense number of preachers throughout the world, in all ages since the inauguration of the Church, so few attain to the highest summit of excellence in their profession?

Indolence and indifference do something, but cannot be regarded as the principal causes of failure, or as having much influence in preventing success. We think a primary cause of ill success in our day, is owing to the training our young men receive—a training which, on the one hand, cramps and represses the natural genius of the man, and on the other sends him to learn what other men have thought and said, instead of forcing him to think for himself, and speak from his own mind and heart. The student thinks, indeed, but what St. John the Golden-Mouth, St. Augustine, St. Bernard, Bossuet, Fénelon, Bourdaloue, or Massillon, have thought and said, instead of thinking out his subject himself. The great fathers and great preachers he studies and cites—not simply as authorities for doctrine or facts, but for their thoughts and language—became great by letting their own minds operate freely on the subjects they treated, by meditating the subject itself, not by contenting themselves with learning and repeating what those who had gone before them had thought and said, and by speaking out in their full tones, from their own full minds and hearts, the free, warm, fresh, gushing thoughts and sentiments that came to them in

their communion with nature and with God. We mean not by this to underrate learning, or to speak disparagingly of various, and laboriously acquired erudition. No man can know too many things, or have too much learning, and few men will attain to real eminence unless they have a large fund of knowledge acquired from books. But it matters little how many or how good books a man reads, unless he digests them, and assimilates their contents to his own mental life. They will otherwise overload his stomach, produce flatulency, and impair or impede his vital functions. Not seldom the most erudite are the most wanting in judgment, in living and original thought. They rely on their memory or their library, and forget that to think is the essential function of a rational soul. A man who knows his theology well, so that he is always sure of his principles and never in danger of running against faith or morals, has in his own thoughts and observations, in his own life and experience, all the materials he wants; and he needs only to exercise his own mind freely on these materials, to give his own understanding, imagination and sensibility, his own zeal and affection, fair play, in order to place himself on a level with the great fathers and preachers of past ages. He has all they had; and if he will only permit himself to do as they did, and accustom himself, as they accustomed themselves, to read and meditate the Holy Scriptures daily, and to spend hours every day in meditating the mysteries of life, and especially the mysteries of our religion, he may rival them, be what they were, and effect what they effected. No man comes too late into the world, or finds it foreclosed. Always is there new work to be done; always is there a new field to be opened and cultivated; always is there a path to eminence; always a place and a demand for the highest order of thought and action. There is no reason in the world out of themselves, why men to-day should not equal Fénelon or Bossuet, St. Francis of Sales or St. Bernard, St. Leo or St. Ambrose, St. Basil or St. Gregory Nazienzen, St. John Chrysostom or St. Augustine. Nature has not exhausted her powers or grown old; grace is not worn out, nor have the inspirations of the Holy Spirit spent their force. Men to-day, if they will, may live as near to nature and to God, the author of both nature and

grace, as lived the great fathers, doctors, and preachers of the Church in the primitive ages.

Too much thought is wasted in learning without assimilating the thoughts of others, and too little respect is paid to the intellect and reason with which the Creator creates every human soul. God makes man to his own image. We are taught to respect that image in others; we should learn to respect it equally in ourselves. Reason is not a special gift to certain men or certain ages, but a gift common to all men, and to all ages. The creative act of God, which gives us simultaneously existence and reason, is an ever-present and a never-ceasing act. God is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. If the fathers lived, moved, and had their being in Him, so do we live, move, and have our being in Him, and His being illumines our reason as it illuminated theirs. What, then, had they that is denied us, or what means had they of attaining in their respective paths to excellence, that we have not?

The world is rendered sickly, infirm, and feeble, by the Protestant error of substituting a dead book, which speaks only as the reader gives it voice, for a living and ever-present teaching Church. Faith, indeed, was revealed in the beginning, and was finished when the promises made to the patriarchs were fulfilled; but though the revelation of faith was made, in what to us as individuals, is the past, it is made to us equally in the present, and is at all times a present and living revelation. Faith is in the supernatural order what reason is in the natural; as the unchangeable essence and the ever-present and unceasing creative act of God creates reason always the same, and makes it an ever-present reason, so our Lord, through his ever-abiding presence in his Church, which is his body, makes faith unchangeable and always a present faith, or a present revelation. Revelation is as present to-day as it was two thousand years ago, and save the individuals who actually saw our Lord in the flesh, we have all that had the contemporaries of the Apostles. The Church which subsists and bears witness to the faith was their contemporary. Peter, through his Successor, teaches me to-day with as present, as living, and as authoritative a voice as that with which he spoke under the power of the Holy Ghost, who descended upon him in a cloven tongue of fire, to the representatives

of all the nations gathered together at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost. The Church heard the angels sing their *Gloria in Excelsis* at the birth of our Lord; she saw the infant Redeemer lying in the manger, and Mary his mother, and prostrated herself with the kings from the East, and worshipped him. She was the eye-witness and the ear-witness of the great facts and events she narrates, and which embody the great mysteries of our faith. Though born in time, not in time does she live. Her existence is a present existence, Catholic in time as in space, and spans the whole distance from the manger-cradle to the final consummation of the world. She never falls into the past, living only as a thing of memory. Individuals may be born and die, generations may pass on and pass off, but she persists through all changes of individuals and generations, and survives them unchanging and unchangeable. She grows not old with individuals, becomes not heavy with length of days, and what she relates, and what she teaches, is not simply what she once saw and heard, but what she sees and hears now with as clear a sense, with as young and fresh a life, as when she went forth from that upper room in Jerusalem to subdue the world to her Divine Lord. To all individuals and to all ages and nations she is alike present, the one same living, teaching, governing Church, creating by her actual presence a real, living faith, as the creative act of the ever-present God creates an ever-living, an ever-present natural reason. If then in the natural order we of to-day have all the reason, all the advantages men in past ages had, so by means of the Church, the representative on earth of the Incarnate God, we have all the faith and all the advantages in the supernatural order the fathers, doctors, and preachers had, and there is no good reason why we should fail to equal them, if not even surpass them.

We fall, in fact, far below them, but it is because we do not as they did, and because we suffer ourselves to be oppressed by them, crushed under their weight, instead of using them to instruct, to inspire, and to elevate us. We have too little reliance on our own resources. We have too little confidence in the native and inherent logic of the human mind, and still less in the real logic of things, to which we so rarely penetrate. We dare not abandon

ourselves to the natural operations of our own understandings, and lose all self-consciousness, as the Germans say, in the subject we are treating. The preacher dares not throw himself on as well as into his subject, and let it unfold itself according to its own nature and laws. He holds himself back, and hinders the word, instead of giving it free course, and permitting it to run and be glorified. He can neither trust it to itself nor himself to it. He has the fear of the professor of rhetoric before his eyes, and is afraid he shall not preserve his "points," or maintain a just proportion of parts in the several divisions of his sermon. He is thinking more of producing a great sermon than of unfolding his subject, and sending its lessons home to the minds and the hearts of his hearers. He forgets that the end of preaching is neither to produce a sermon nor to prove himself a great sermonizer; but to convince his hearers of some great truth, or to persuade them by the sweet motives of heaven or the startling horrors of sin and judgment to the practice of some duty, to enlighten the ignorant, to arouse the slothful, to quicken the dilatory, to strengthen the weak of purpose, and awaken the spiritually dead to newness of life—in a word, to win souls to his Divine Master. The rhetoricians are of no account; the rules of art can render little assistance, and the grace and excellency of human speech, as of human wisdom, are as often a hinderance as a help. He must know only Christ and him crucified, and preach Christ, to the Jews a stumblingblock, to the Greeks foolishness, but to them that believe, the wisdom of God, and the power of God. He must know, he must think only of the honour of his Master in the salvation of souls.

Preaching is always addressed to the people, and therefore must be popular, in tone, style, and manner. We mean not that it must be superficial, light, and flashy. We have had in this city few abler or more popular preachers than the late Father John Larkin, in whom, let it be permitted us to say, we personally grieve the loss of a long tried and very dear friend, a wise director, and a judicious adviser, whose place can never be supplied to us in this world—and he, as we all know, was remarkable for the learning, the solidity, depth, and originality of his sermons, which were replete with the profoundest theology and the deepest philosophy of life. But he knew how to make

obscure things plain, difficult things easy, and trite things grand and original. But as preaching must be popular, it must address itself to the popular taste and manners, and deal with the actual habits and living interests of the people as they are, not simply as they once may have been. The style of pulpit oratory that comports well with one age, or one country, may comport ill with another. The French style would produce little effect on an English congregation, and the English style just as little on a French congregation. To be effective it must be living, it must be real, it must be actual; and to be so, it must adapt itself to the people as they are, and speak to them in what are to them the tones and terms of the life they are actually living. Much of our pulpit oratory loses its effectiveness by its stiff, strained, and artificial tones. It fails to break through the wall of self-complacency, propriety, or indifference, with which almost every congregation surrounds itself when the preacher ascends the pulpit; it fails to penetrate at once to the citadel, and carry it before the garrison have had time to seize their arms, and rush to its defence. The first words of a preacher should give him the command of his audience, establish a magnetic chain of communication between him and them, so that he may speak with the combined force of their inspiration and his own. He must give them no opportunity to think, while he is speaking, whether he speaks well or ill; but must hold them captive, prevent them from once thinking of him, and fix their minds and their hearts on the mysteries he is unfolding, the sublime truths he is uttering, or the awful lessons he is enforcing. If he himself feels his subject, has his heart and soul saturated with it, forgets himself, and speaks in the strength and majesty of his theme, his tones, manners, and gestures will be natural, as are always those of the child till the masters have destroyed his simplicity, and attempted to make him live an artificial life; and his words and expressions will be the best that could be chosen. The strained and artificial, the stiff and formal manner, too often found in the pulpit, destroys the effect, and leaves any impression but that the preacher is a live man speaking to live men and women. The only really effective preachers we have, whether in the Catholic or non-Catholic pulpit, are those who abandon

that manner, break through the artificial rules with which the professors have embarrassed them, and in which they can no more do battle for the Lord, than young David could fight the giant Goliath in Saul's armor, and have ventured to speak out from their own full minds and hearts in their own simple, earnest, and natural tones, the thoughts that came to them, and in the words in which they spontaneously clothe themselves.

Of the style and manner of Père Félix as a pulpit orator, we cannot speak; but we presume they are French, as they should be in a French preacher addressing a French audience. As a writer he thinks with clearness and force, and expresses himself with vigor, elegance, and grace. Perhaps his style would bear condensation, but it is as easy, natural, and unaffected as is permissible in a modern French author. To us Americans the French always seem a little artificial and theatrical, and Père Félix is unmistakably French. He, however, shows that he has thought and meditated on the subjects themselves that he discusses, and has not merely inquired what others have said respecting them, and his two volumes of *Conférences* before us constitute one of the best and most original works touching the living problems of the age that we have recently seen from the French press. They are not so erudite, so philosophical, so striking, or so original as the *Conférences* of Padre Ventura, reviewed by us a few years since; but they are sounder and more practical. They are adapted more especially to the temper, taste, and thought of the French than of the English or Americans, and yet he who should make them accessible to the English speaking public would render a valuable service to the cause of religion and morality.

The adherents of the doctrine of Progress, combated in these volumes, will recognize a candid, sincere, and conscientious opponent in Père Félix, but they will most likely feel that he was not trained in their school, and has never been one of their number. He has not the secret of the craft,—the password of the fraternity, and is unable to reproduce their doctrines from his own life and experience. He is obliged in regard to them, to rely on speculation, not on experimental knowledge, and we must confess that his discourses are better fitted to guard the faithful against the

seductions of the false doctrine than to convert its adherents to the true doctrine of progress. He has seen that false doctrine only from the point of view of Catholic truth, not from the point of view of the party of its defenders. He reproduces it for the Catholic mind, not for the non-Catholic mind. So far as it is reducible to formal or logical propositions, he is exact enough, but he fails to reproduce it with the sentiments and affections with which it is associated in the minds of its adherents, and in the sharp and well-defined logical propositions in which he presents and refutes it, they will hardly recognize it. He may have seized their doctrine under its purely logical aspects, but they feel that he has not seized—what is far more dear to them—the sentiments and affections which lead them to adopt it, and which, to their own minds and hearts, warrant their holding and defending it.

This, we apprehend, is very generally felt by non-Catholics to be the case with our Catholic controversialists, and is one reason why our arguments produce so little effect on them. They feel that in our reasoning against them, we combat by rigid logic what is not purely logical in its nature or origin. Our logic may strike them as conclusive, as unanswerable indeed, but they, nevertheless, feel that they are not refuted, that there is something they have which justifies them in adhering to their opinions, and insisting on them, which we have not recognized, and which our reasoning does not touch. Hence though we silence their logic, we do not convince them; we convict without convincing them. It will not do, at least in all cases, or even generally, to attribute our ill success to their love of vice, to the corruption of their hearts, to their satanic pride, or to the depravity or obstinacy of their wills. No man embraces error for its own sake. In most men there is something besides logic: there is prejudice, passion, sentiment, affection; and these being different in Catholics and non-Catholics, the logic we use, though, as logic, the same in both, does not meet them. Mankind are far more generally governed by their sentiments and affections than by their logic, and in comparatively few do the sentiments and affections and the logic coincide, or move in concert. Sometimes they are good, and it is bad; sometimes it is good, and they are bad. In our controversies, it is necessary to address

both, and to prove that we know the sentiments and affections, as well as the logic of those we oppose. In refuting them it will rarely be enough, although that must be done, to reduce their doctrines to strict logical propositions. We must reproduce or develop their sentiments and affections, or the non-logical phenomena which accompany their doctrines and are taken as integral in them. While we develop and refute their doctrine from our stand point, we must develop and refute it from theirs. To be able to do this, when we have not lived ourselves their life, we must count ourselves ignorant of their errors till we understand thoroughly the ignorance that leads them to adopt it. That is, we must, in first instance, study their errors not to detect their falsehood, but the truth they contain, or to see them in a light in which, as far as they go, they really are not false, but true. The human mind constituted for truth, and never able to operate without truth as its object, never does and never can embrace the absolutely false, or the absolutely absurd. It can embrace it only under an aspect which is neither false nor absurd. We never fairly and fully comprehend the erroneous doctrines or opinions of others, till we have seen them in the light in which they see them, and detect the truth mingled in them, and which is that which really consecrates them in the minds of their adherents. It is an easy thing for us, who are Catholics, and have the truth in its unity, universality, and integrity, to detect the errors or heresies of others, and to give them a logical refutation from our point of view; but the difficult thing is to understand how or whence men who have minds constructed like our own come to embrace these errors or heresies and to adhere to them apparently in good faith, even after we have demonstrated by strict logic their untenableness. The fact is, we refute them from the point of view of the Catholic, but not from the point of view of the non-Catholic, or fail to show the non-Catholic that the truth he sees in them we also see and retain, and that what he is sure is just and good in his sentiments and affections, we also recognize as just and good in its proper place, and are as anxious to preserve as he is or can be. Father Hecker, in his books, the *Questions of the Soul* and the *Aspirations of Nature*, has attempted to do this, and to some extent at least has done it, for a class of non-Catholics, and herein lies the great merit of his publications.

Father Félix, however, must forgive us, if we say we think he has not done this, except to a very limited extent. He has shown admirably, and conclusively refuted the errors of the modern advocates of Progress, but he has not recognized, disengaged, and presented in its true place and light the truth of that doctrine. The older we grow, the less inclined we are to wholesale condemnation, or to indiscriminate censure, and the more disposed we are to detect the truth which those who fall into error misapprehend, misinterpret, or misapply, and the just sentiments and honorable motives which lead them to adhere to their errors, and which comport far better with Catholic than with non-Catholic doctrine. We grow no less intolerant of error, but more ready to extenuate the fault of its adherents. We feel that we have some right to be heard on the modern doctrine of progress, for we once held it, and were, if not amongst its ablest, at least amongst its most earnest and resolute defenders. Father Félix has refuted it from the point of view of Catholic faith and theology, but he gives no evidence that he has ever seen it in the light that seduces this age, and makes it the great word for the nineteenth century, as Liberty was the great word for the eighteenth, and we may add, as Reform was for the sixteenth century. In the sixteenth century, Reform had its true and false advocates, in the eighteenth, Liberty had its true and false partisans, but nobody can deny that Reform in the former period was rightfully the great word of the day, or that Liberty was rightfully the great word in the latter. The error in the sixteenth century was not in demanding Reform, but in attempting it where it was not needed, or by means that would render the Reform a greater evil than those it sought to redress. So was it with Liberty in the eighteenth century. That century opened with the general triumph of the old Roman Cæsarism in nearly every Continental State of Europe, and it was still doubtful whether it would not succeed with a restoration of the Stuarts in Great Britain. It was not Catholicity that drove the Stuarts from the British throne, or that prevented them from recovering it, but their Cæsarism, their adherence to the doctrines of absolute monarchy, and their inability to govern as constitutional sovereigns, as the first magistrate, not as the sovereign proprietor of the nation. The English warred against the

Stuarts in defence of their national liberties, as they had previously warred against Philip II. in defence of their national independence, and in both cases against Catholicity, only so far as it accidentally presented itself as the ally of the enemy.

It was a great misfortune that the English Catholics were in some sense obliged to link their cause with that of the unhappy Stuarts. Catholics still suffer both in Great Britain and in our own country for the prejudice it exerted against them. In both countries they suffer because their ancestors supported princes who sought to destroy English liberty and the rights of Englishmen, not for their Catholicity, or any attachment they may have to the Pope. The prejudices the American people have against Spain to-day date back to Philip II. and the Grand Armada, and it is precisely the support the Popes are said to have given to Spain in her attempts to get possession of England, and to the Stuarts in their attempts to recover the English throne, that makes it so difficult for us to-day to convince our countrymen that the Papacy is not hostile to the independence of nations, and the liberty of the people. To a Catholic it is easy to explain all the facts in the case without implicating our religion or the Papacy, but it is not easy, and while there was danger, it was not possible, to explain them to non-Catholics. It needed the noble movements of Pius IX., our present glorious Pontiff, to disabuse the public, and to demonstrate that, if some Popes have appeared to oppose the independence of nations or liberal institutions, it has been only because in the complication of civil and ecclesiastical affairs, growing out of a state of things which has ceased to exist, they could not defend the paramount interests of religion without appearing to do so; and that the Papacy itself is never hostile to national independence or to the national liberties, when kept within the bounds of justice, and not made pretexts for denying the liberty of conscience and warring on the Church of God. The Popes could not, in the state of things then existing, have done less than they did, without incurring the guilt of gross neglect of the interests of religion. They did what their duty compelled them to do, but they failed, not because they were wrong, but because they on whom alone they could rely to carry out their

policy had so linked their own cause of Cæsarism with Catholicity, that they could not protect the faith without advancing that of civil despotism, and because the English people were more firmly wedded to their national independence and their national liberties than they were to the Church of God. Still the policy has created a deep prejudice in the English and American mind against the Papacy.

But civil and political despotism at the beginning of the eighteenth century having everywhere triumphed on the Continent, if we except Switzerland and San Marino, and still having a chance of triumphing in the British Isles, Humanity would have been false to herself, and, looking to the future, even false to the Church, if she had not, with all the voice left her, demanded liberty. That demand was not made only by Jansenists, Huguenots, and Infidels, by men of debauched manners and lawless passions, but was made, as had been made in the sixteenth century, the demand for Reform, by many of the purest, the noblest, the loyalest, and the most enlightened and saintly men of the age. The movement for liberty in the assembling of the States-General in France, and the disposition shown by Louis XVI. to extend the freedom of his people, were hailed with approbation at Rome, as they were greeted with joy throughout the world, and the clergy were the first to join the *Tiers Etat*, in the effort to recover the lost liberties of the nation,—liberties lost by the Bourbons, aided by the Frenchman Richelieu, and the supple and astute Italian, Mazarin. The word Liberty was a good word; its cause was a good, a noble, a just cause; but it was abused by an ultra-party, just as Reform had been by the Protestant party. So in the nineteenth century, Progress is a good word, combining in itself the full significance of those two other great words, Liberty and Reform; its cause is a good, a holy, a sacred cause, which Religion and Humanity alike consecrate. But, as in each of the former cases, it has its true and its false friends.

Père Félix does not deny, he even concedes this, and accepting progress, he attempts to distinguish between the true doctrine of progress by Christianity, and the false doctrine of progress by the inherent law of growth or natural development asserted by the age outside of the Church. But

it is precisely here where he seems to us to fail. He makes us believe in his eloquent and masterly Preliminary Discourse, that he accepts the progress itself asserted by the age, and that he is about to dissent only as to the means, influences, and agencies, by which progress has been, and is to be effected; but as he proceeds he restricts progress wholly to the interior of man, and identifies it with the growth of grace in the soul, or with what is usually denominated Christian perfection. That there is the progress he asserts, that it is the highest and most important progress that can be conceived, no Christian can for a moment doubt. No progress that excludes this, or that does not in some sense subserve it, is worth the slightest effort. But to restrict all progress to this interior Christian perfection is to sport with the age, is to play tricks on words, and to give the age a series of homilies on the Four Cardinal Virtues and the Seven Deadly Sins, when and where it looked for a Christian, philosophical, and practical discussion of the popular doctrine of progress. Does the preacher mean to deny all other progress? Does he mean that this progress is what the age is really demanding, and what would meet its real wants, if it understood them? or does he mean to have us conclude that, if we secure this progress, all other progress that can be really desired will be secured as a matter of course? Let him mean which he will, he does not meet the question as it is in the mind of this age, and therefore, though he has produced a very pious and valuable book, he has not produced precisely the book needed, or which his title, *Le Progrès par le Christianisme*, Progress by Christianity, led us, perhaps through our fault, to expect.

There certainly has been in modern society, out of the interior of the individual, or the spiritual life, unmistakable progress. There has been progress in the science of politics, in the physical sciences, in industry and commerce. There has been progress in legislation, political economy; in the construction of prisons, in prison discipline, in the diffusion of education, in the treatment of paupers, criminals, and the vicious. There has been a large development of benevolence, and of the sentiment of humanity, whether always wisely directed or not. There has been a marvellous progress in exploring, reducing, and utilizing the forces of nature. Great changes have been effected among civilized

nations as to the rights of peace and war, and men think to-day of slavery and the rights of man very differently from what they did a few generations or even a single generation back. The world cries out with horror to-day against laws and practices, which almost since our own personal recollection excited no remark, and if thought of at all, were thought to be unavoidable and irremediable. These are facts which nobody can deny. It may be argued, with more or less of truth, that these ameliorations have not been unaccompanied by facts of a contrary character, and that, though good in themselves, they have been brought about by means, which have left man and society upon the whole in a worse condition than formerly; so that, looking to the whole, to all the interests of man and society, there has been a deterioration rather than a progress. We have ourselves sometimes argued in the same way; but we have never been disposed to deny that there has been a real progress in the respects named. Is it not possible in other respects to effect a corresponding progress?

The eloquent preacher seems to us to overlook the fact that the pantheistic and socialistic doctrines on which the false doctrine of progress seems to be based, are with the advocates of progress only an after-thought, invented not for their own sake, but to justify them in asserting progress outside of the individual growth in grace to which he would confine it, and independently of the influences and agencies he admits. Men did not become pantheists and then assert a pantheistic progress, or a progress in man and society by an inherent and natural law of development and growth, like that of the embryo in the animal, or the seed in the vegetable. They adopted belief in progress first, and then adopted the anti-Christian and pantheistic ground of defending it, because they were opposed, or imagined themselves opposed, by Christianity, and forbidden by the Christian religion to labor for it. They are not refuted by refuting their pantheism, naturalism, or Pelagianism. Indeed, the great body of the party care nothing for these absurdities, errors, or heresies, any more than, in the sixteenth century, the mass of the Reform party out of the Church cared for Luther's doctrine of imputed righteousness or justification by faith alone, or the mass of the advocates of Liberty, in the eighteenth, cared for the oratory of

Anacharsis Clootz, the dreams of Condorcet, the materialism of D'Holbach, the atheism of the Hebertists, the communistic reveries of Barbeuf, or the Theophilanthropy of Revelière-Lepaux. The mass of the Reform party wanted Reform, and they adopted Luther's doctrine, not because they believed it or cared for it, but because it was inscribed on the banner under which they fought, and was to them the symbol of the reform they demanded. The eighteenth century demanded Liberty, was terribly in earnest to gain it, but it never demanded Liberty for the sake of holding and propagating the infidelity of its chiefs. The party of Progress to-day want freedom to labor for progress, and to effect it as a practical fact, but the mass of them never heard of Hegel, Leroux, Enfantin, or the pantheistic nonsense Père Félix so triumphantly, and at the same time so pleasantly and wittily, refutes in the volumes before us. Great parties, great movements, do not begin in philosophy, in doctrine, but in instinct, sentiment, feeling, impelled by a practical motive, and seeking a practical end. The only way to arrest them, when they take a wrong direction, is to head them off, is to take what they are driving at that is practicable and not repugnant to faith and morals, separate it from the false philosophy and absurd speculations with which it is connected, and make ourselves its defenders, although it is not precisely what we would ourselves have proposed, as the Church authorized her missionaries to accept in heathen lands even the festivals of the heathen, in so far as not idolatrous, and to give them a Christian significance, or as she consecrates to Mary, to Christian devotion, the month of May, once sacred to a heathen goddess, after whom the month itself is named. The question is not now what would have been the best way of dealing with the party of Progress in the abstract, or before it had acquired strength, but how shall we deal with it to-day, when in one form or another it includes the greater part of the civilized world. It is the practical, not the theoretical question we must meet, and we must meet it not by seeking to recall the age to simple individual progress in Christian perfection, but by showing that, while the Church is a supernatural kingdom, and has for her direct mission only the glory of God in the salvation of souls, she indirectly favors progress in the natural order by the

Christian virtues she cultivates, and allows free efforts for all progress in natural society and institutions that is possible without coming in conflict with revealed truth and the moral law.

Father Félix may be very right in saying man aspires to the infinite, the perfect, but he must remember that we aspire only as we are inspired. We certainly can attain to the infinite, the perfect in the supernatural order, only by means of Christianity, of union with Christ, in whom the human nature he assumed is elevated to be the nature of God. But if, as he maintains, man naturally aspires to the infinite, to the perfect, how maintain that the perfect, the infinite, in the natural order, is attainable only by Christianity? Where do we learn that the supernatural is needed as the complement of the natural? We do not believe that man can attain to the infinite or the perfect, in the natural order, for we do not believe man naturally aspires to either, and what are so often spoken of as his natural aspirations, we believe are the effect of supernatural inspirations. The natural cannot go out of the natural, and can no more aspire to the perfect than it can attain to it. We cannot, therefore, with the preacher, resolve the movement for progress into the natural aspiration of man to the perfect. It grows simply out of man's natural aspiration to the better. We cannot any more accept the doctrine that the desire for progress, as it manifests itself in this age, meets or can meet its full gratification in individual progress in Christian perfection, as the good father contends. The Church neither destroys nor supersedes natural society. She does not even make natural society her special charge, or provide, or pretend to provide, for all its necessities and interests. Even if all individuals should become saints, as eminent as any placed in the Calendar, natural society would remain imperfect, governments would blunder, institutions might be oppressive, and though all would be done that could be done to solace the sufferer, yet the evils would not be removed. The Church has received a supernatural revelation, and is divinely assisted in all things pertaining to salvation. She proclaims infallibly the law of God, whether revealed or natural; she can apply the infallible principle to the solution of any question of conscience that may arise between

sovereign and sovereign, or between sovereign and subject ; but she has not received any supernatural instructions as to the mode of constituting or administering temporal government as such. Place saints at the head of the government, and you have no guaranty for anything but the purity of their motives. Cardinal Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, was a great and good man, but he did as much as any man Spain ever had to destroy Spanish liberties, to centralize power, and to prepare the way for modern Cæsarism ! Men equally wise, equally learned, equally upright, pious, and conscientious, differ, and honestly differ, in their views on all governmental and most social questions. We must be on our guard lest we throw on the Church a responsibility that is not hers, and hold her accountable for all the evils in natural society in professedly Catholic States—evils which she never received the mission or the power to remove. Natural society is responsible for itself, and must redress its evils by the natural virtues, whether the religion be Catholic or non-Catholic.

The Church aids natural society, but she does it by creating and sustaining the virtues which secure heaven. She promotes indirectly its interests in promoting the interests of the supernatural society. Highly important, then, is it that the supernatural virtues of which Père Félix treats should be cultivated in the highest degree and as universally as possible. We need them to sustain our Republic, because without them we cannot for a long time sustain the natural virtues in the mass of the people without which no republic can be permanent. But they cannot alone suffice for all the progress we need, and it is the pretence that progress in these is the only allowable progress that drives so many active and energetic minds in our age into the ranks of the enemies of religion.

The growth of individuals in Christian perfection, or in the distinctively Christian virtues is, and always must be, the progress sought by the Church ; for her mission is the conversion and salvation of the soul—to fit men for attaining their destiny in the world to come ; and we shall not, we trust, be understood to complain of Père Félix for insisting on this progress, fixing its point of departure, and its point of arrival, of showing its lofty and sublime character, and pointing out the aids the soul finds

and the obstacles she encounters in advancing to union in Christ with God. We hope we estimate this progress, whatever may be our practical short-comings, as highly as he does, and we have no fear that he will get people too much in love with it, or too much engrossed with the means of advancing in it. What we complain of is his overlooking the fact and the necessity of progress in natural society—not precisely for the sake of the world to come, but for the sake of that society itself to which we all belong, and in the bosom of which we after all must live, so long as we remain in the flesh. We do not ask the Church to labor for this progress, or to turn aside from her own divine mission, but we do want Catholics to feel that it is lawful for them, keeping a good conscience, and working in none but lawful ways, and using none but lawful means, to labor, not precisely as members of the supernatural society, but in their capacity of members of natural society, for progress in science, art, literature, government, legislation, political and civil liberty, agriculture, industry, and commerce, so as to make society as perfect as, with the imperfection of humanity, it may be. The age attaches, no doubt, too much importance to what is called the progress of society or the progress of civilization, which, to the man whose eye is fixed on God and eternity, can appear of no great value. But we must take our age as we find it, and accept it as far as we lawfully can, respect even its prejudices where they are not sinful, in the hope of winning its regard for that higher progress proposed by the Church, and possible only in her communion. We do not seek to withdraw natural society from the spiritual control of the Church, but we do want those who belong to natural society only to be aware that Catholicity does not make war on the natural virtues, or require us to withhold our sympathy from them in any respect in which they are really advancing the interests of humanity, though only for this life—we want them to understand that we are not indifferent to those interests, and are ready to co-operate even with non-Catholics in promoting them, in so far as we are not required to neglect our duties or to do aught against our faith as Catholics.

BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1859.

ART. I.—*Conversations of Our Club. New Series. Reported for the Review by a Member.*

CONVERSATION VII.

“BOTH Mr. Diefenbach and Father John,” remarked Winslow, “appear to me to take a low, inadequate, and narrow, as well as a very inexact, view of the elements that have warred against each other in modern history. I have an instinctive distrust of all explanations of history by means of any special theory. The antagonism of races, nations, institutions, civilizations, no doubt, counts for much, but it by no means explains all the great events of history. Men and nations act from a great variety of motives, from mixed motives, and not seldom from contradictory motives. They act, too, from passion, sentiment, caprice, illusion, and even delusion, as well as from reason; and it is idle to think of reducing their history to a science, and of finding a logical connection and consistency in all its events. I do not believe that all history, from Julius Cæsar to Francis Joseph and Louis Napoleon, can be resolved into a struggle between Rome and Germany for the empire of the world. In the struggles of nations and civilizations the Church counts for something, and the great struggle, that which has dominated all lesser struggles, has been between her and the powers of this world,—a struggle between the City of God and the City of the World, between the kingdom

of Light and the kingdom of Darkness. The world has been created for the glory of the Word, and all in it is ordered in reference to the glory of God manifest in the flesh, or the Word Incarnate, whose representative on earth is the Church, His bride, whom He loves, and hath purchased with His own blood. It is only when we rise to the high stand-point of Catholic faith and theology, from which St. Augustine wrote his *De Civitate Dei*, the eloquent Bossuet his *Discours sur l'Histoire universelle*, and the profound Schlegel his *Philosophy of History*, that we can seize the master elements that have been at work, and give to history its real scientific explanation."

"That is very true," answered Diefenbach, "when we seek to explain history from the point of view of the Creator, or from the point of view of the origin and destiny of man. God in creating the world has a purpose which he is everywhere and at all times fulfilling, and that purpose we can know only from Catholic faith and theology; but the creation in its own order copies or imitates the Creator. Natural society is not absorbed or annihilated by the introduction of supernatural society: It survives and continues to operate as second cause by its natural laws to its natural end. This end, which is by no means the final end of man, is really the end of natural society as natural society after as before the introduction of supernatural society. It lies wholly in the natural order, and is attained to, even under Christianity, by natural laws, and by the use of natural means; these means, these laws, and this end are the subject-matter of what is beginning to be called social science, and are as susceptible of scientific statement and exposition as the subject-matter of any other science in the natural order."

"Our age," interposed O'Connor, "if steeped, on the one hand, in the Pelagian heresy, is, on the other, profoundly Jansenistic. The essence of Jansenism is in the suppression of nature, to make way for the assertion of grace. In the matter of conversion, it denies all place to free will, and asserts the *gratia victrix*, or irresistible grace; in philosophy, it asserts Traditionalism, builds science on faith, and allows nothing to natural reason; and in history, it sees nothing but Providence, and explains nothing by the free activity of man. Hence that pantheistic fatalism which

marks so many of the historical productions of modern France and Germany."

"The age," added Diefenbach, "very generally denies or misinterprets the great mystery of the Incarnation, into which the whole Christian order is resolvable, and in which is the type of the relation of the human and the Divine in the supernatural order, of the natural and supernatural, reason and faith, nature and grace. Some deny the Incarnation outright, allow no relation between God and man but the relation of cause and effect, and fall into pure naturalism; some absorb the Divine nature in the human and fall into Pelagianism; others absorb the human in the Divine, and fall into Jansenism, substantially Calvinism, in theology, and Pantheism, when not Manichæism, in philosophy. Jansenism is the error of pious minds inadequately instructed, or misinstructed. A little attention to the definitions of the Church touching the Incarnation, against the Nestorians, Eutychians, the Monophysites, and the Monothelites, would guard the student against both Pelagianism and Jansenism. In the Incarnation the Divine assumes the human, not the human the Divine, and while Divine nature and human nature are united in the unity of the Divine person of the Word, and each is literally and truly the nature of God, they remain for ever two distinct natures, without intermixture or confusion, without any conversion of either into the other; so that the human remains as distinctly human nature, and the Divine as distinctly Divine nature, after as before the fact of the Incarnation."

"The Church is, in some sense," added O'Connor, "the continuation or representation on earth of the Incarnation, and each individual Christian, or living member of Christ's body, is in some sort a miniature representation of the Church. He unites in himself both the human and the Divine elements, not, of course, as in our Lord himself, in a hypostatic union, but in a union having its principle in that, and faintly imitating or copying it. The Divine element in the Christian is the indwelling Holy Ghost, or what we call grace; but this Divine element infused into our nature no more transforms nature itself, than the Incarnation of the Word transforms the humanity assumed. The infusion of grace elevates the act of our nature to the supernatural

order, but it no more makes our nature itself supernatural than its assumption by the Word makes it Divine nature. The human nature assumed became the nature of God, but the human, not the Divine, nature of God. The assumption leaves it true and distinctively human nature; so grace leaves nature in its natural integrity, with all its natural powers and faculties, with its natural will and understanding, to operate according to their own natural laws to their own natural ends. While, therefore, as against the unbelieving world, we must assert grace, we must, as against even a portion of the believing world, assert nature and defend the natural order."

"Hence the delicate position in which we are placed," remarked Father John. "If we apply ourselves to the assertion and vindication of nature, we strengthen the hands of those who deny or underrate the supernatural; if we apply ourselves to the assertion and vindication of the supernatural, we strengthen the hands of those who deny or underrate nature. So we can hardly open our mouths on the subject without favoring in effect either Pelagianism or Jansenism. Mr. Winslow, brought up a rationalist, and recently converted, is the more afraid of losing the supernatural, and Mr. Diefenbach, brought up a Catholic, but familiar with the ravages of Jansenism, is the more afraid of losing the natural, because he is well aware that without the natural there can be no supernatural. It seems hard to the devout mind, anxious to abnegate self and exalt the glory of grace, to be told that it must beware of making grace exclusive, and that it must be careful to recognize the existence, the rights, and the activity of nature. It seems like an attempt to check devotion, and to rob God of his glory,—like limiting the Divine by the human. The most subtle and dangerous error we have ever had to deal with is the Jansenistic, which, under a somewhat different form, is as rife now as it was in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and the first half of the eighteenth."

"One extreme," said O'Connor, "begets another. The exaggeration of grace at the expense of nature, begets the exaggeration of nature at the expense of grace. Rationalism is the reaction of common sense against the Scepticism of Pascal and Huet, who demolish reason in order to make way for revelation; Traditionalism is the reaction of

faith against Rationalism; Jansenism is a reaction against Pelagianism, and Naturalism is a reaction against Jansenism. The Church always opposes to the insurgent error the truth that condemns it, but all who undertake to defend that truth, or to oppose that error, do not observe her moderation. She in her definitions stops always with the simple condemnation of the error, without ever striking against the truth its adherents may mingle with it. But the controversialists, intent only on combating the error, fortified, as they think, by the definitions of the Church, rush in their zeal beyond her condemnation, and extend the definition, virtually if not formally, so as to make it condemn not only the error, but even the truth which has led the advocate of the error to embrace and defend it. This gives him a show of right; and as between him and them leaves him not wholly in the wrong. The great work now is to defend the natural order, natural reason and will, and natural society itself, not against the Church, not against the supernatural, which is the error of the Rationalists, but against that false and exaggerated supernaturalism which condemns them as totally depraved, and seeks to suppress them, or to absorb them in the supernatural."

"Very true," replied Father John; "but we must, while asserting and vindicating the natural, be on our guard against favoring a false and exaggerated naturalism. We must fix it clearly in our minds that nature, in and of itself, is totally impotent in the supernatural order, and therefore in relation to our final destiny, since that destiny is purely supernatural. 'Without me,' said our Lord, 'ye can do nothing;' that is, without grace we can do nothing towards meriting or obtaining eternal life. He who should cultivate all his natural faculties, and exercise them all in their normal order, or who should keep the whole law of nature, though he would be less deserving of punishment indeed, would have no more claim to eternal life, to eternal beatitude, than he who breaks every precept in the Decalogue, because that life, that beatitude is the reward, not of works done from nature alone, but of works done in and from grace as their principle. Grace is always gratuitous, and can never be merited by any purely natural work whatever. We must fix it also in our minds that the

Church is a supernatural kingdom, supernaturally founded, supernaturally supported, for a supernatural end, the true and only final end of man in the present decree of Providence, and that by no possibility can she be resolved into natural society, or natural society be elevated to her level, substituted for her, or be made to perform her work, or the smallest conceivable part of her work. Having done this, and keeping it always in view, we are in no danger of exaggerating nature, of unduly exalting man's natural faculties, or the rights, powers, and duties of natural society."

"All that I accept," said Winslow; "I wish neither to convert nature into grace nor grace into nature. What I protest against is keeping grace and nature so distinct, that grace cannot elevate nature. Justifying grace is an infused habit, and, if infused, it is infused into nature, coalesces with it, supernaturalizes it, and gives it a supernatural power or facility of acting, so that nature with it can do what without it infinitely exceeds its power. I am not willing to say that nature supernaturalized acts as simple nature, or that the Church, the medium of grace, has no hand in civilizing natural society, and giving it a higher and nobler character than it could derive from nature alone. All civilization, we have agreed, is of sacerdotal origin. Priests have always been the civilizers of the race."

"Grace, that is, justifying grace, is an infused habit indeed," said Father John, "and it gives us the ability to do what without it would infinitely exceed our power; yet the ability it gives is not an ability in the natural order, or in relation to natural society, but in the supernatural, and in relation to the supernatural end of man. It is, if you will, the complement, or the perfection of nature, but in relation to the supernatural, not in relation to the natural. It enables a man to make a hat or a shoe from a supernatural motive, and to acquire thereby a supernatural merit, but it does not teach him how to make or give him the ability and skill to make either, or either better than he otherwise might. Certainly grace illuminates the understanding and inspires the will, but only in relation to things that pertain to the supernatural order, the supernatural destiny of man, or the order of supernatural merit. God may, by a miracle, no doubt, endow individuals with knowledge, wisdom, skill, strength, or ability, for natural

ends which they have not naturally; but grace, as an infused habit, gives ability only in relation to supernatural ends. Civilization is of sacerdotal, but not necessarily, therefore, of sacramental origin. Priests are the civilizers of the race, for civilization lies in the substitution of the dominion of reason for the domination of passion, and priests are always the representatives of reason as against passion, of intelligence and moral power as against brute force. Yet elevate civilization as you will, you can never elevate it to the supernatural order; perfect it as you may, it will still lie in the order of nature, and depend on the natural knowledge, wisdom, and virtues of the race. Civilization can never be converted into Christianity, nor substituted for it; natural society can never be transformed into supernatural society; and the most we can ever expect of civilization is that it shall accord with the Church as reason accords with faith. The Church does not administer the sacraments to the State, or baptize civilization. Civilization always remains, and must remain, in the natural order, and depend on the natural virtues, however much grace may contribute, as a matter of fact, to sustain those virtues."

"Yet," said Winslow, "grace elevates the natural virtues to supernatural virtues, and a man in a state of grace, making a hat or a shoe for the love of God, acquires a supernatural merit."

"Undoubtedly," replied Father John. "Every act we perform has a supernatural value, and gives us, through the merits of our Lord, a title to heaven, if done in grace and from supernatural motives; but this affects the merit of the action in the supernatural order, not the ability or skill of the workman in the natural order. All the natural virtues, private as well as social, may in this way be made supernatural virtues, and meritorious of everlasting life. The Church, instituted for the supernatural end of man, and having for her mission the glory of God in the salvation of souls, labors constantly to induce us—not to neglect the natural virtues, for without them there are, and can be, no supernatural virtues, but—to perform them from supernatural motives, so as to enable us, in performing them, to merit eternal life. This is her great care and solicitude, 'for what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world

and lose his own soul,' or miss the supernatural reward? Yet what we must not forget is, that the grace does not add to the natural ability to perform the natural virtues as natural virtues; it only adds the ability to perform them from supernatural motives, to render them at the same time supernatural virtues, meriting, through the merits of Christ who gives us the grace, eternal beatitude. Our ability in the natural order, in reference to natural motives and ends, is precisely the same with or without infused grace. A man cannot without infused grace acquire supernatural merit in making a hat or a shoe, but he may without that grace make as good a hat or shoe as with it, and merit his natural reward for making it."

"Yet," interposed O'Connor, "the Church, by enabling us to perform the social and private virtues from supernatural motives, and promising us a supernatural reward, makes us more diligent, more earnest and persevering in performing them, and thus renders an important service even to natural society, and exerts an incalculable influence in advancing true civilization. She thus adds to the natural motive the supernatural, and to the hope of a natural the hope of a supernatural reward, an eternal reward to one that can be enjoyed only in this life. The natural motives are in most men too weak to secure the natural virtues, as all experience proves, and we need the hope of a higher than a natural reward to keep us from neglecting or violating them. The Church by adding the supernatural motive, through grace, strengthens the resolution, confirms the purpose, and gives energy and perseverance to the will in well-doing. The man will do more for the love of God than he will for the love of man, the love of natural society, or the love of civilization; more, when a firm believer, for an eternal supernatural reward, than for a temporary natural reward. In this sense grace may be said to aid nature in obtaining natural ends, by enabling us to obtain them for an ulterior supernatural end, and the words of our Lord are verified—'Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.' We are struck with astonishment at the vast services rendered by the clergy, secular and regular, to civilization in the barbarous ages, that is, from the Conquest of the Western Empire to the establishment of feudalism in the eleventh

century. There is no period in history when the progress of civilization has been greater, or has overcome greater obstacles; yet the progress of civilization was rarely the direct end the clergy proposed to themselves. The direct object of their love was not natural society, but the Church, or God manifest in the flesh. The direct end of their labors was not an earthly reward, but the crown of eternal life. They were animated by the love of God, by divine charity, and they looked only to the heavenly reward, the salvation of their own souls and the souls committed to their charge. Yet they abounded in all the natural virtues, and devoted themselves, for God's sake, to solacing the evils of their times, to the founding of schools, hospitals, institutions for the relief of the poor, the suffering, and the captive; to the amelioration of manners, the organization of the State, the improvement of legislation, the promotion of learning, art, and science, and thus lifted the human race up from the depth to which it had fallen, and placed it on the high road to a civilization in harmony with the Gospel.

"And because they did so, and because without them that progress could not have been made," said Winslow, "we say, and say truly, modern civilization is the work of the Catholic Church, and as her work, it is rightly called *Catholic civilization*."

"It is the work of the Church," replied Father John, "in the sense that it has in great measure resulted from her labors for the glory of the Lord in the salvation of souls, but not her work in the sense that it was the end she had in view, and for which she labored. She advanced natural society in laboring for the supernatural. She had the same mission then as now, and worked to the same end and in the same way that she now works. Yet we must distinguish in modern civilization that which was developed and matured under her fostering care during the period from the beginning of the sixth century to the end of the tenth, from that which has been retained from Græco-Roman civilization, or which has been since resuscitated, and is now generally meant by the term *civilization*."

"The Church also aids civilization in a less indirect way," added Diefenbach, "by laboring always to secure her own freedom and independence. The Church is indeed a spiritual kingdom, and established solely with reference

to the glory of God in the salvation of souls; but she is a spiritual kingdom set up on the earth, and though operating for eternity alone, nevertheless operates in space and time. It is necessary to the successful prosecution of her divine mission on the earth that she be free to act in all her integrity according to her own divine constitution and laws. Although she has received no authority to impose her faith and discipline by force on unbelievers, she has as inherent in her essential constitution, like any other kingdom that legitimately exists, the right of self-defence, and therefore, when necessary, to employ force if she has it at her command, to repel violence, and to protect her own freedom and independence. In asserting and defending her own freedom and independence as the Church of God, she necessarily asserts and defends religious liberty, the freedom of conscience, without which there is and can be no civil or political liberty, no government of law, and therefore no civilization. The Church under the Germanic system, had to deal with rude manners, violent passions, and lawless and headstrong individuals; but she was recognized by the civil and political order as an institution independent of the State, resting on a basis of her own, and deriving her rights and powers from God through her own spiritual constitution, not through the concessions, charters, or edicts of temporal government. The State did not originate her freedom and independence, or even establish her as the religion of the land; it recognized her freedom, her independence, her authority, as the Church of God, and its own obligation to obey her as such, and to protect and defend her in all her divine rights and powers from all external violence. She was a free independent corporation in the Germanic society, and held as other corporations by a title anterior and superior to the State. To attack her liberty was to attack the whole constitution of the Germanic society, and the liberties of all corporations, all institutions, all distinct and independent bodies, cities, towns, principalities, dukedoms, or counties, and with them the liberties of the people. Hence in defending herself as she did against the German Kaisers, who sought to revive imperial Rome, she necessarily became the defender of political and civil liberty, and the grand supporter of the necessary conditions of all genuine civilization."

"Just as in defending her own freedom and independence,

in this country," added Father John, "she must necessarily defend the freedom and independence, or the rights of the citizen, what we call the Rights of Man. Under the Germanic system the Church was free as an institution, or as a body not created, but recognized and protected by the State, or supreme temporal power. That was then the condition of all freedom. The people then were free as bodies, corporations, guilds, or estates, not as isolated individuals. This feature of the Germanic system is not retained in our American system; we have reversed it, and now defend the rights of corporations and institutions as the rights of the citizen, the individual, the man. The Church is not known as a corporation or institution to our constitution and laws, and is free and entitled to freedom and protection under them only as a citizen, that is to say, only in the right of the citizen or the man to freedom and protection. That this is a change for the better or the worse may or may not be true. On that point men may honestly differ, but it certainly has introduced a better condition than that in which the Church existed in imperial Rome, even after the Emperors became Christian, and far better than that she is now in under France or Austria. Whether for the better or for the worse, the change has been effected, is a *fait accompli*, and we must accept it. We can now defend the freedom of the Church before the civil tribunals only in defending it as the right of the citizen, and therefore only in defending the freedom of conscience of the individual, and all the rights our system acknowledges the citizen holds, not from civil society, but anterior to it, from his own manhood, or from God as the common Father of all. Catholics here must defend the peculiar American liberty as the very condition of defending before the law the freedom and independence of the Church as a spiritual kingdom or the kingdom of God, for here we can defend the rights of God only as the rights of man."

"And that," answered O'Connor, "is a full answer to those non-Catholic Americans who are, or affect to be, afraid that the Church, if she prevailed here, would require her children to destroy the American republic, and introduce a despotic civil rule. It is not to be supposed that the Church is bent on suicide, or that she can require or permit her children to destroy the only basis and safeguard of

her own freedom that she has or can have in the Union, and to establish despotism, her worst enemy, of which Catholics would be the first victims. Individual Catholics, trained under a system where their religion is used to adorn the Court, to swell the pomp of royalty, and is allowed the chief place in processions and the post of honor on gala days, may not much relish our republican simplicity, and may even regret the lack of court patronage; from old habits they may think there is a natural association between the throne and the altar; but this belongs to them as Europeans, not as Catholics, and the Church herself knows that she has had comparatively little to suffer from the people, and that her worst enemies have always been despotic princes, especially when they claim to be her friends and protectors. The interests of the Church are here united with the interests of the citizen, and the rights of each are, in relation to the civil order, so intimately connected, that you cannot assert and defend the rights of the one without asserting and defending the rights of the other. There can be no clashing here between the Catholic as such, and the non-Catholic American, on the subject of liberty, or between the believer and the unbeliever. The unbeliever defends our civil order from natural motives, from love of natural society and natural justice, if you will; the believer does it from the same motives, and also for the sake of defending the freedom and independence of his Church."

CONVERSATION VIII.

"I do not blame Mr. Diefenbach for his high estimate of the Germanic system," said De Bonneville; "but he should not forget that the Germans, when they first came in contact with the Romans, were an uncivilized people, barbarians, very much like your North American Indians, to whom the learned and judicious Guizot compares them. What little civilization they had at the epoch of the Conquest they had derived from imperial Rome, in whose armies they had served from the time of Julius Cæsar, and from the efforts the Romans had made for two hundred and fifty years to civilize those who remained in their native forests. In conquering the Empire they did not, with all deference to Father John, introduce a new

order of civilization, but broke up the existing order, and planted barbarism on its ruins. The struggle from the Christian era down has, if you will, been a struggle between Rome and Germany, but it has been at the same time a struggle between civilization and barbarism. Before the Conquest Rome sought to impose civilization on the Germans. Since the Conquest the struggle has been to preserve the wrecks of the old civilized world, or such portions of it as had been retained by the Church, and the Roman populations of Gaul and Italy; or on the one hand to restore and advance civilization broken down by the German Conquest, and on the other to preserve and spread Germanic barbarism. In this work of reconstituting a civilized Europe the Church has undoubtedly taken the lead, through her Popes, her clergy, and her religious and military orders. To no one man is more to be attributed than to St. Benedict, a Roman nobleman, and the legislator of the Monastic Orders of the West. The great centres of revived civilization have been not only recently admitted into the civilized family in Germany, but in the so-called Latin nations, where the conquest had been the least complete, and the most of the ancient order had been retained. They have been in Italy, Southern Gaul, and Spain. These nations retained a large Roman population, much of the language, the manners, the customs, the literature, and the institutions of the Roman world, and have been, as all the world knows, the leading nations in recivilizing Europe."

"Mr. de Bonneville should not forget, when speaking of the recivilization of Europe, my native country," said O'Connor. "Ireland had escaped both the Roman and the Germanic conquests, and in the sixth and seventh centuries stood at the head of the civilized world. It was her scholars and her pious and heroic missionaries that restored religion and learning in Gaul, and even in Italy, and no one, when he names St. Benedict, should forget to name St. Columbanus, St. Gall, and the colonies of monks they led with them, or which followed them from Ireland, where young men from England and all parts of the Continent flocked to receive their education in the celebrated Irish schools, and to share the generous hospitality of the Irish people."

"I neither forget nor wish to underrate the services of

the Irish monks in the sixth and seventh centuries to the Gallo-Roman population of the Continent," answered De Bonneville. "An Irish monk founded, I believe, the monastery of Luxen in France, St. Gall in Switzerland, and Bobbio in Italy, but the influence of the Irish missionaries was very slight on the Germanic population, and they entirely failed in their efforts to introduce Christianity into Germany itself. The Apostle of Germany was, I believe, the Anglo-Saxon Winifred, whose name the Pope changed to that of Boniface. But be this as it may, the learning that was cultivated in Ireland during the centuries named, and which the Irish monks and scholars carried with them to the Continent, was Roman learning, learning which had been received from Rome through Gaul with St. Patrick and the Christian religion. I know nothing, and I can say nothing, of the learning, the arts, the sciences, the laws, the polity, the civilization of the Irish prior to their conversion to Christianity in the fourth or fifth century of our era; I only say that what they gave to Italy and Gaul in the sixth and seventh centuries was what they had previously received from them, and which undeniably pertained to the Roman order. This forms, then, no exception to my position that modern Europe has been recivilized, not by Germany, but by Old Rome and the Church, and those nations which have the most firmly adhered to the Church and retained the most of Roman civilization, or that have been the least Germanized, have been, and are foremost in civilizing as in Christianizing the world."

"There is undoubtedly truth in what Mr. de Bonneville says," remarked O'Connor, "and his view is certainly that which has been generally entertained. What we call civilization to-day is certainly the Græco-Roman civilization retained or resuscitated. Taking the Græco-Roman civilization as the standard, and calling all that differs from it barbarism, we must of course measure the progress of civilization in the modern world by the progress that has been made in the revival of Græco-Romanism, or classical antiquity and the Roman imperial polity and jurisprudence. Scholars, whether Churchmen or laymen, educated at first in the Imperial schools, which were never entirely broken up till supplanted by the modern universities, and imbued with Greek and Roman letters, have very naturally iden-

tified all civilization with the Roman order, and counted as barbarous whatever does not harmonize with it. You see this in Dante, in Petrarca, in Tiraboschi, in Muratori, as well as in Arnolfo da Brescia, Rienzi, Machiavelli, and Erasmus. Learning, letters, scholarship, have always in all Europe, since, as before the Conquest, been Græco-Roman. If by civilization we mean specially literature, art, liberal culture, refined taste, and polished manners, we must concede that all modern civilization is Græco-Roman, and that the Germans, save so far as civilized by the Romans, were a barbarous people, barbarians as the Romans termed them, as all history terms them, and as they indeed termed themselves, accepting in their laws and language the distinction of Roman and barbarian."

"There is no pretence," replied Diefenbach, "that the Germans, when they first came in contact with the Roman Empire, were a highly civilized people in the sense in which we use or in which the Romans themselves used the term. They were not a lettered people, and when compared to the Romans, refined and corrupted by their Greek slaves, become their masters and teachers, they were an unpolished people, and rude in their speech and in their manners. But they were less cruel, less inhuman, and less absurdly superstitious than pagan Rome had always been, and continued to be to the last moment of her existence. The whole history of pagan Rome gives countenance to the old fable that her founder was suckled by a she-wolf, for her wolfish were always her most prominent qualities. As for literature, for art, science, philosophy, liberal culture, the Romans themselves, till after their conquest of Greece, were as deficient as their own German conquerors. What Rome had of these she borrowed from the Greeks, themselves a Germanic people, a branch of the great Germanic or Aryan family, corrupted by Egypt, Phœnicia, and the East, and by mixture with the old Pelasgic stock. I call the Germans who conquered Rome a civilized people, because they had a civil polity, laws, religion, manners and customs, a fixed and regular political and religious order, which their language, traditions, mythology, legends, and popular poetry prove they had brought with them from their original seat in upper Asia."

"We must distinguish among the Germans," remarked

Father John, "three classes:—1. Those who entered the Roman armies and served under the Imperial eagles; 2. Among those who remained at home, the nomadic and predatory bands, reappearing in our frontiersmen and filibusters; and 3. The sedentary population living in towns, villages, and hamlets, pursuing agriculture, trade, and the mechanic arts. The first class to a great extent adopted Roman ideas and manners, learned the Roman arts and sciences, cultivated Roman literature, and not unfrequently rose to senatorial, and even consular dignity, under the Empire. The second class uniting with their nation in war, and forming not seldom the most effective part of its troops, were, no doubt, an irregular lawless set, as are our own filibusters, and went where, and did very much as, they pleased. But the third class, the great body of the German people, with a high spirit of freedom and an indomitable love of independence, lived under a regular civil polity, and the empire of religion and law. Undoubtedly their civil order, as their literature and science, was less developed than that of the Romans, but it *was* a civil order, and contained the elements or germs of a civilization far superior to the Roman under the Cæsars, whatever it was under the Republic, and far more in harmony with the rights of man and the freedom and independence of the Church."

"The Romans themselves, as the Greeks, sprang from a Germanic stock," remarked Diefenbach, "and found their way to Italy from Media southwardly, through Asia Minor, as the Germans found their way to Europe from upper Persia to the north of the Black Sea, and spread themselves from the Palus Meotis and Thracia, through Dacia and up the valley of the Danube, to the ocean. But by their relations with Africa and the East the Romans lost much of their original Germanic character before the end of the Republic, and became corrupt, weak, effeminate, cunning, crafty, subtle, lying, and unchaste under the Imperial despotism. They had long recruited their armies from the Germanic tribes, and even the legions with which Julius Cæsar conquered Rome and defeated Pompey at Pharsalia were Germans, recruited from Germanic Gaul. At the epoch of the Conquest there is no doubt the Germans were superior to the Romans in nearly all the

virtues that pertain to the natural order. They were for the most part, no doubt, pagans or Arians, but they were braver, more manly, more chaste, more truthful, and possessed a higher sense of honour and integrity than the contemporary Romans, or inhabitants of the Empire. Hence the term *Barbarian*, applied to them, was a term of honour, while that of *Roman* was intended, and felt to be, a term of reproach, expressive of all that is low, cunning, lying, mean, base, and cowardly. The Franks, from whom the French derive their name, had, according to Salvian, the reputation of being liars, and would seem to have been the fiercest, the cruellest, and the least tractable of all the German invaders of the Empire, but the more advanced and far-seeing of the ecclesiastical writers of the times predicted that the Germans would prove to be a people superior to the Romans, and regarded their conquest of the Empire, though a terrible evil for the moment, as likely to be a great benefit to religion and society. You meet every now and then, in spite of their patriotism and their Roman sympathies, the conviction flashing out that the Conquest was a providential work, and designed in mercy to the human race. Impartial history confirms their predictions and their hopes."

"That the Germans were not a wholly uncivilized people, even in our modern or the Roman sense of the term," said O'Connor, "may I think be inferred from the success with which they maintained the struggle with the Roman empire for nearly five hundred years. For two hundred and fifty years Imperial Rome exerted all her power to impose her civilization on the Germans without success. She penetrated their country with her armies indeed, though not without occasional disasters, and established her posts on the Rhine, the Danube, and the Elbe. Trajan carried away Dacia, drove the inhabitants beyond the Carpathian mountains, and planted the depopulated territory with a military colony, composed, it is said, principally of Gauls and Italians, the ancestors of the present Romans, or inhabitants of the Danubian Principalities. But the emperors were never able to subdue the German spirit, or to Romanize Germania, as they had Romanized Celtic Gaul, and Iberian and Celtiberian Spain. Rome has left no trace of her language, of her laws, her manners, and her customs with

the Germans, except of such as have been introduced since the Conquest. This shows that the Roman civilization never conquered or subdued the German. After centuries of vain efforts to impose the pagan civilization of Rome on the Germans, Germanic patience was exhausted, the Germanic spirit was thoroughly aroused, and provoked to make reprisals on the Empire. The Germans retort the attack, and commence offensive operations, and after a struggle continued with alternate successes and defeats for two hundred years or more, they obtain a complete victory, and put an end to the Western Empire, in the year of our era 476 or 479, when Odoacer the Goth compels its last emperor, Augustulus, the imbecile son of Orestes the Pannonian, to resign the purple and sue for mercy. This result might and would have been effected more than a hundred years earlier, if the Germans themselves had not, while they invaded, also sustained the Empire. The soldiers with whom Ætius defeated Attila were for the most part Germans, and Alaric would have defended instead of taking and sacking the city of Rome, if Roman pride and Roman perfidy, as well as Roman cowardice and meanness, had not disgusted him, and justified his vengeance. Now a people who could resist the efforts of the Roman emperors when Rome was as yet in the pride of her strength, to subdue them and to bring them under their yoke, who could not only successfully resist, but retain sufficient strength to make reprisals, and in turn invade, conquer, and subdue the most renowned civilized empire in the world, whose very ruins fill us with awe, could not have been an uncivilized people like the Indian tribes of North America. Barbarism can never successfully resist and subdue civilization; it may be violent, but its violence is that of weakness, not of strength. Barbarism is weakness, civilization is strength, and the conquering people, other things being equal, has always a higher, a more living civilization, even if less refined, than that of the conquered. When a civilized people meet a barbarous people, as when well-disciplined and well-appointed regular troops meet an irregular and undisciplined horde, it is sure, finally, whatever checks it may momentarily undergo, to come off victorious."

"That is," said Father John, "supposing the civilized people to be a living people, and their civilization a living

civilization. A civilization may have become old and decrepit, and succumb before a people less civilized, but possessing more rude vigor and more manly courage. Yet in reality a civilization that has grown old and decrepit has lapsed into barbarism, and ceased to be civilization, for barbarism always results from the loss of civilization. The Romans excelled the Germans in letters, in art, in science, in culture, in discipline, in classical refinement; but they were inferior to them in that civilization which gives and secures freedom, personal bravery and activity, high daring, noble resolve, and real energy of character, and these are the qualities which ensure, as they deserve, victory. I do not, however, go so far as some of my Teutonic friends in asserting the early civilization of the Germans. They were civilized before the Conquest, in the sense that they had as yet unexhausted the elements of a rich and vigorous civil polity superior even to that of the Romans under the Cæsars, especially after Diocletian had reorganized the Empire and made it a pure despotism. The Germans—I include under the term all the Teutonic tribes or nations who took part in the invasion and conquest of the Empire, by whatever name they were called—were all virtually the same people, the white Scythians of Herodotus, as Cardinal Wiseman very properly maintains, and known in history as the Asi, the Sagetes, Assagetes, Massagetes, the Getæ, Guttones, Gottones, Thracians, Teutones, and Goths, and were a branch of the great Aryan family that migrated to Europe after the Iberian and Celtic migrations, and probably before the Slavonic. There were differences among them, no doubt, but their language, their civil polity, their laws, religion, mythology, manners, and customs, their traditions and popular poetry, as well as the testimony of the early writers themselves, prove very satisfactorily that they were all of the same family, and entitled to the same generic name. Using the term in this generic sense, the Germans, though less cultivated and less lettered than the Romans, were at the epoch of the Conquest superior to them in their moral and physical qualities, in simplicity and purity of manners, in manliness, frankness, courage, and strength and energy of character, and deserved to be held up, as Tacitus holds them up, in contrast with them. If success was due to the most deserving, they rightfully suc-

ceeded in their warfare against the corrupt and degenerate Romans under the Empire. But what I contrast with the Roman civilization is not the Germanic civilization, as the Germanic family had retained it in their migrations from Asia, or possessed it when their relations with the Romans commenced, but as I find it developed after the Conquest in connection with the Christian religion, under the fostering care of the Church, whose missionaries had assimilated all that was worth retaining in the Jewish and Græco-Roman civilizations, and which received its most complete and vigorous organization under Charlemagne, elevated by Pope St. Leo III., in the year 800, to the Imperial dignity, and constituted the protector and defender of the Holy Roman Church and the Ecclesiastical States."

"That act of the Pope, reviving the Western Empire and crowning Charlemagne its Emperor, with the intention of making him the vassal of the Holy See," said De Bonneville, "was the source of incalculable evils to Europe, and led to the long struggle for supremacy between the Pope and the Emperors in the Middle Age. The Pope, charmed with the piety of the French king, and grateful for the services he had just rendered him in delivering him from his turbulent temporal subjects, who had risen against him, put out his eyes, and cut out his tongue, which a miracle restored, in a fit of enthusiasm created him Emperor of Rome, and laid the train for the terrible disasters which followed, when the Empire passed from the French to the Germans."

"Mr. de Bonneville is out in his history," said Diefenbach. "Though Charlemagne reigned over what is now France, he was no *French* king, but a pure German, as were all the Franks. The kingdom of France begins only with what the French call their third race of kings, the Capetians, really their first race. Prior to the accession of Hugh Capet, Duke of France, there was no French kingdom, no French people in the modern sense of the term. The Francia of an earlier date was German, and a reminiscence of it remains in the modern name of Franconia. The principal part of the glory the French claim for services rendered to the Holy See, is not theirs, and is made to appear theirs only by confounding the Franks with the French. They usurp for the French the glory that belongs

of right to the Germans. The Franks were a German nation, and, it is said, were distinguished from the other German nations by being great liars, the only distinction which French historians seem to have inherited from them. Of all modern nations, the French have done the most to pervert history, and the least for its truth. They are a hybrid of the Franks who invaded the Empire, and the old Gallo-Roman population. They retain no little of their old Gallo-Roman character, and better than any other Western people, the vices of the Lower Empire. What of glory the French are entitled to, they owe to their Germanic elements. The French nobility, the French chivalry, are Germanic, derived either through the Franks or the Normans. French meanness, littleness, astuteness, cruelty, ferocity, and licentiousness, exhibited on so gigantic a scale in their foreign and civil wars, are due to Gallo-Roman traditions and nurture, and have been inherited or resuscitated from the Romans of the Lower Empire."

"Mr. Diefenbach suffers his national prejudices to push him to injustice to the French," interposed Father John. "The French are a great and noble nation, and with all their faults deserve to be spoken of with love and respect. The old Gallic population, especially in those provinces where they had not, as in Brittany for instance, become thoroughly Romanized, are as high-toned, as chivalric, and as virtuous as the population of any other country in the world. I dislike the present Imperial *régime*, and the despotic tendencies of French politics, but the French people are as enlightened, brave, virtuous, and freedom-loving as any other. I own, however, the French historians are wrong in calling the Carlovingians French sovereigns, and this has been well proved by Augustine Thierry, himself a Frenchman, in his *Lettres sur l'Histoire de France*. We might with even more truth call the Angles and Saxons English."

"Thierry was a Frenchman, no doubt," replied Diefenbach, "but he claimed to have been descended from Thierry, a Frankish king, and believing himself of Frankish origin, he was not unwilling to do justice to his German ancestors. But this remains true, that the Franks in the time of Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne, were not French. They were Germans, spoke the German

language, and remained Germans as long as the Carlovingians reigned. It was only as the Carlovingians became exhausted, and the Gallo-Roman population revived, that the Franks sank to Frenchmen. Yet it is not against the Roman or Celtic, Aquitanian or Iberian, blood, I speak. It is not the race that is in fault, for all are of the same original stock ; but the influence of Imperial Rome. Wherever I find traces of the corrupt and effete Græco-Roman civilization under the later Empire, I find matter to condemn. The French civilization differs from the German in the single respect that it mingles with its Germanic elements a much larger infusion of Imperial Rome. To a certain extent Rome always survived in Gaul, and still survives in France, and therefore it is the French are to a great extent prone either to Imperialism or Jacobinism, always wedded to absolutism, either in the monarchical or the democratic form."

"Celt as I am," said O'Connor, " I naturally sympathize with the French and Romans, whom I have considered of Celtic origin, and from whom I have received my faith and my learning, rather than with the Germans ; but it cannot be denied that the Frankish sovereigns, who in the eighth and ninth centuries did so much to defend the Holy See, to protect the temporal sovereignty of the Popes, to check the advance of the Saracens, and in the conquest of the Pagan Saxons to save Christendom itself, were Germans, and not French as we now understand the term ; and the glory, which is great and imperishable, belongs to Germany, and not to France. *Suum cuique.*"

"Mr. de Bonneville is wrong again," said Diefenbach, "in alleging that Pope St. Leo III. revived the Roman Empire in the West, and crowned Charlemagne, who was King of the Franks and Lombards, and Patrician of Rome, its Emperor. The Holy Pontiff did nothing of the sort, and the Western Roman Empire, which ended with Augustulus, was never revived by St. Leo or by any of his legitimate successors in the Papacy. Charlemagne was never emperor of the Franks, of the Germans, of France, of Germany, or of any other country, or any other people. His estates were never during his life erected into an empire, either by the Pope or by himself, and rarely, if ever, were they called an empire during the Carlovingian dynasty.

When Napoleon I. dreamed of reconstituting what he held to be the Frankish Empire, composed of France as the ruling nation, Spain, Italy, Germany, &c., as vassal kingdoms, or when he called himself the successor of Charlemagne, he only proved his ambition and his ignorance of history. He committed as gross a blunder as did Barbarossa when he called himself the ninety-sixth successor of Augustus, and alleged that the Empire had been transferred from the Romans to the Germans. The Ghibellines have always been sad historians, though men of rare invention, and I can hardly explain how it is that the English, who are naturally Guelfs, generally confide in their statements. The Popes, attacked by the Lombards and the Iconoclastic Greeks, and conspired against by the disaffected among their own temporal subjects, called to their protection and assistance the Frankish kings, and in order to save their own temporal sovereignty, and yet give the Frankish monarch a legal right to exercise authority in the Papal States, created the office of Patrician, and conferred it on Pepin, and subsequently on Charlemagne. It was an office in the Papal States and under the Papal sovereignty, as much so as is at present the office of Governor of Rome or of Bologna. St Leo III. having been attacked by a portion of his own subjects, made his escape to Charlemagne, and called upon him to come and aid him to restore tranquillity in his States, and to punish the criminals. Charlemagne, as was his duty as Patrician of Rome, complied, and marched an army into Italy, restored the Pope to his temporal sovereignty, punished the criminals, and re-established peace. The Pope, in gratitude for his services, surprised him by crowning him Emperor, that is, simply raising him from the Patrician to the imperial dignity, and associating him under the imperial title with himself in the exercise of temporal authority in the Papal States. He did not confer on him any new power, he did not declare him Emperor of the Roman Empire of the West, nor erect his estates into an empire, far less did he raise him to the sovereignty of Rome and the Papal States, for he must, as the condition of receiving the crown, swear to protect and defend the Pope in his temporal sovereignty."

"In the fact that the imperial dignity was conferred on the Patrician who held his authority from the Pope, and

carried with it powers under the Pope in the Papal States, as well as duties to the Roman Church and the special people of St. Peter, we see the reason," said O'Connor, "why the right to elect and crown the Emperor belonged to the Pope. The right did not belong, nor was it pretended that it belonged, to the Pope, precisely as spiritual head of the Church, but it was a prerogative of his temporal sovereignty in his own principality, and was in principle nothing more than the ordinary right of the sovereign to appoint the officers of his government."

"The struggle commenced," said Father John, "only when the emperors wished to assume the position and exercise the authority of the Roman Cæsars, when they forgot that by virtue of the imperial dignity they were not created sovereigns of Rome, but protectors, defenders, and coadjutors of the Pope in his own temporal sovereignty, and wished to make the Pope the temporal subject of the German Kaiser, as he had been of the Roman Emperors, as Napoleon I. pretended to have made him, and as Napoleon III. is trying to make him, a subject of the emperor of the French. This, since the German Emperors claimed not only the civil, but even the pontifical power of the old Roman Cæsars, would not only have destroyed the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, but would have subjected the Church to the State, the spiritual to the temporal, and annihilated all religious freedom and independence. The Popes could not abandon their right to elect and crown the emperor without neglecting their manifest duty not only as temporal sovereigns, but as the spiritual head of the Church and guardian of the rights and interests of religion. But let us return to the point we were discussing. The Germanic system I admire and contrast with the Roman, is not precisely the Germanic system, as it prevailed among the Germans before their intercourse with Rome, but as it was developed after the Conquest, primarily among the Franks, and as it prevailed in Western Europe till the establishment of feudalism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. I do not pretend, that this system, even as thus developed, was perfect, or that it secured all the advantages of both order and liberty. I see in it many defects; but in its general principles, and in its leading features, it belonged to the highest and most desirable order of civilization. What I

most admire in it is its federal character, and the absence of centralism. It eschewed that logical unity and simplicity which characterizes alike Roman Imperialism and modern Democracy. All simple governments, flowing from a single principle, are absolute governments, and therefore despotic, hostile to all freedom. The Germans, though they had unity of origin, spirit, traditions, &c., were never a single political people organized under a single chief, or one and the same civil polity. The estates of Charlemagne were never constituted into a single state, kingdom, or empire, like modern Spain or France, or like what the present excellent Emperor of Austria is attempting to make of his estates, induced, no doubt, by the *Bureaucratic*, which interferes hardly less with the freedom of the sovereign than with the freedom of the subject, and by the belief, I presume, that it is necessary to his position in face of the great military monarchies of France and Russia. After the final defeat of the Pagan Saxons, who made their last stand for barbaric Paganism, under their duke, Witi-kind, backed by all the Pagan nations of the North and the East to the Western limits of China,—all the nations of Europe, from the Lower Danube, south of the Carpathian Mountains and the Vistula, with the exception of the Papal States, Southern Italy, the British Isles, and a part of Spain, were united under Charlemagne, and formed the estates he left to his sons; but they formed a vast confederacy of nations, principalities, dukedoms, counties, free cities, under an elective chief, not a single consolidated state. The Germanic kingdom was not dissimilar to the American confederation or federal union of free, sovereign, independent States, and had some resemblance to what had several times been attempted among the free cities of Greece and Italy. Under the American system the States do not derive their rights and powers from the Union, but the Union derives its rights and powers from them. They are anterior to it, and remain independent and sovereign within their own limits under it. They elect the Federal Congress and the Federal Executive. It was the same, in principle, under the Caroline Constitution, only under it the Federal Chief, if I may so term him, was not a simple citizen of one of the States as under the American Constitution, but the king, hereditary or elective, of one, and that usually the most

powerful and preponderating State of the confederation. This was a defect in the system, and, though unavoidable, finally proved fatal to it."

"It is easy to see," continued Father John, "the difference between this system and that of the Roman Cæsars. Under the imperial system the provinces were governed as conquered or subjugated provinces, and the original local rights of the towns or municipalities were converted into the duty of paying or collecting taxes, and supplying the Roman fisc. What under the republic were local or municipal privileges, became under the empire an intolerable burden, which the decurions would frequently have willingly exchanged for slavery, if an imperial edict had not come to prohibit any freeman from making himself a slave, and compelling him to remain free for the benefit of the treasury, or to support the luxury of the court and its parasites. The land through the entire empire was held to belong to the emperor, and to be only leased to its occupiers,—the seminal principle, I take it, of feudalism, modified by the action of the Germanic system. All power was concentrated in the State, and was held to emanate from Cæsar, the fountain of justice, right, authority,—on earth what God is in heaven. The Caroline or Germanic system, left to each member of the federation its autonomy, its local sovereignty, its laws, its rights, its powers, its language, its usages, its manners and customs. It left the members their original freedom and independence, and recognized in them rights which must be respected by each and by all. The same principle was extended to the Church as a spiritual kingdom, and hence her freedom and independence entered into the public law, and were recognized and guarantied as public right."

"This was true," said Diefenbach, "only under the Caroline constitution, or under the Austrasian Franks. It was never true, however consonant to the Germanic spirit, ideas, and sentiments, of the Neustrian Franks. The Neustrian kings were more than half Romanized, and sought to revive or continue Imperial Rome in Gaul, as Theodoric did in Italy. The Germanic nations who had invaded the empire, and alternately fought for and against the emperors, imbibed many Roman ideas and affections, and whenever they attempted to found in the limits of the empire

kingdoms of their own, they copied the imperial system. Gothic Spain was, perhaps, an exception. We see this especially in the Ostrogoths, and after them in the Neustrian Franks, who were seated in Northern, Western, and Central Gaul, and who received the Christian religion with their king, Clovis, or rather Hlodowig, Ludwig, Louis. They not unnaturally inclined to the civilization they found associated with their new religion, and with Roman prelates in the Church, and Gallo-Romans for ministers of state, or counsellors of the sovereign, they could hardly avoid tending to Roman imperialism; and we find, in fact, the Merovingian kings putting forth all the exorbitant claims of the Cæsars, and copying the Byzantine emperors in their relations with the Church. Happily these first German organizations within the empire, which rivalled the Roman in corruption and despotism, proved short-lived, and were obliged to give way to the Austrasian Franks, whose relations with the empire were of more recent date, who had been but slightly Romanized, and who were never severed from all connection with their original seats in Germany. The Austrasian Franks remained German, and are substantially German even to-day. The Neustrians, from whom on the German side the French are more immediately descended, became partially Romanized, and it is to this Romanization I attribute the contrast we find to-day between the French and the German minds. The French mind is the best representative the modern world has of the Roman mind under the later emperors."

"France is to-day," added Father John, "substantially the Bas Empire, with its refinement, its polish, its culture, its corruption, its vices, its despotism. Whether imperial or democratic, it must have a centralized government, and is always despotic. It can accept no alternative between Cæsarism and Jacobinism, the Empire and the Republic one and indivisible. The old Germanic elements are eliminated from its soul, at least if we may believe the government and its supporters, as well as from its constitution. The fact is, France, of all the nations that have sprung up from the ruins of the Empire, has remained the most Roman, and been the least thoroughly Germanized, with perhaps the exception of Southern Italy."

CONVERSATION IX.

"The Caroline Constitution," said Winslow, "had one grand defect, at least, which hastened its ruin. Its central bond was too weak, and there was a constant tendency to dissolution. The centrifugal force was too strong for the centripetal, and it was only a strong and energetic chief that could prevent the union of so many heterogeneous elements from being dissolved. Charlemagne is hardly laid in his tomb, before the dissolution begins, and is completed under his grandsons, when we see begin to be formed distinct nations, and emerging the feudal system, which left no trace of European unity, except that of the Papacy."

"The German emperors, so much abused by our friends, saw this," said De Bonneville, "saw all Europe parcelled out among petty feudal lords, each claiming and exercising high criminal justice in his own feudal territory, and between free cities, each claiming to be sovereign and independent in its own limits, all making war on one another as independent sovereigns, and inflicting untold sufferings on the poor people, and rendering impossible the restoration of civil order and social progress—they saw this, and attempted, by concentrating the royal and imperial power, to apply a much needed remedy. They took the side of the people against their feudal oppressors; hence the support the people gave them in return, and that, too, in spite of the Papal bulls excommunicating and deposing them. The Hohenstaufen still live in the popular heart of Germany, and hold a far higher place in the memory of the Germans than is held by those emperors who always proved themselves obsequious to the slightest Papal behests, and for their subserviency were canonized."

"The Caroline Constitution was defective," replied Father John, "or else it would not have failed. The German Kaisers, as the Gallican Kings, were right in seeking to redress the evils, and they were many, of feudalism; but they were wrong in attempting to do it by the revival of Imperial Rome, and reëstablishing that Imperialism which their ancestors had overthrown, and which was and is repugnant to the proper German spirit. The Popes did not oppose them for the good they attempted, or for seeking

to repress the anarchy and barbarism fostered by the feudal system, but for interfering with the rights of the Church and of the Holy See, with the freedom and independence of the spiritual authority on the one hand, and the independence of the Pope as temporal sovereign in his own States on the other. There is a right and a wrong way of doing things; the princes, whether German, French, English, or Spanish, took the wrong way, as do our modern Jacobins, and the remedy they would have introduced that way would have proved a greater evil on one side than it could have cured on the other. Bad as feudalism was, it was not so bad as Roman Imperialism in the fourth and fifth centuries; great as were the evils it inflicted on society, the evils of the destruction of the freedom and independence of the Church would have been greater."

"The people," said O'Connor, "seldom discriminate in their judgment, and the fact that they sympathized with the Kaisers in their war against feudalism is no evidence, that the Popes were wrong in opposing their efforts to revive Roman Imperialism. The history of Europe will show many weak Popes,—weak according to our human modes of judging,—and some few whose personal morals were not much superior to the average morals of secular sovereigns; but the Popes have always been the first to see and comprehend every new movement and tendency, and we may feel, even in matters not of faith, we are on the right side when we are on the side espoused or approved by the reigning Pontiff. The Pope almost alone saw the tendency of the movements commenced by the German sovereigns. He saw that it could end only in the resuscitation of Roman Caesarism, and the whole Imperial system which for three centuries had proscribed Christianity, and persecuted the Christians, and had done religion afterwards a far greater disservice by pretending to protect it. Gioberti says the Romans were an ieratic, or sacerdotal people from the beginning, commissioned to spread civilization by conquest,—an ieratic people armed with the sword. Certain it is that the emperors succeeded to all the powers claimed by the Roman people, and concentrated in themselves the Patriarchal, the Tribunitial, and the Sacerdotal powers, which under the Republic had been distributed in different hands, and made to operate as checks one upon another. Under

the imperial *régime* they were united in the person of the emperor, who was in reality Consul, Senate, Tribune, and Pontifex Maximus. He was assumed in Pagan times to be a divinity on earth, and divine honors were paid to his statues. Traces of this are detected in the court language used even after the emperors became Christian, as late as the time of Theodosius the Great, who was addressed as 'your divinity,' 'your eternity,' &c. According to the Imperial theory, all power, all right, all justice, as has been explained, emanated from the Emperor. This theory runs through the whole Theodosian and Justinian codes, and was tersely expressed by Ulpian, *Quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem*. As the Emperor was Pontifex Maximus as well as Imperator, supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, the Church as well as the State fell within his jurisdiction, and could legally exist and exercise her functions in the Empire only by his permission, and only so far and so long as it pleased him. The Emperor was in every respect the superior of the Pope, and the Church, though tolerated, nay, though declared by an Imperial edict to be the religion of the Empire, had and could have no freedom, no independence, save at the expense of martyrdom. It was the recollection of the pontifical character of the Emperor that led, after he became a Christian, to his perpetual interference with religious and ecclesiastical affairs, and to the greater part of that civil legislation respecting religion which is usually alleged as proof that the Church opposes religious liberty, and demands for religion a civil establishment."

"In this claim of the emperors to be the chiefs of religion, as well as of the State, we see why under Pagan Rome Christianity was proscribed and Christians were persecuted," added Diefenbach. "The Christian religion was opposed to the state religion, and therefore held to be the enemy of Cæsar, and its profession was punished as a crime against the Emperor. Constantine the Great, Pontifex Maximus of the Pagan religion, when he professed Christianity repealed the edicts of his predecessors against the Christians, and granted them liberty to profess Christianity, but he left Paganism the legal religion of the Empire. He promulgated an act of toleration, as was afterwards done by James II. of England, who, though a Catholic, was the

legal head of the state religion, and held to be supreme in spirituals as in temporals in his realm. The successors of Constantine went farther, made Christianity the state religion, and ordered the Pagan sacrifices to cease and the temples to be closed, depriving them at the same time of their revenues. Whether Pagan or Christian, Catholic or Arian, the emperors always claimed the right, if not to determine what is or is not Christianity, at least to determine what must or must not be the religion of the empire. They never rose to the conception, certainly never adopted the conception, of religious liberty, or the full freedom and independence of the Church before the State. They prohibited and persecuted the Church, connived at her existence, tolerated her, or they enacted her as a civil law, and made the profession of her faith obligatory on their subjects. In no case was the Church free. Her rights in the Empire were held to be derived from the Emperor, and whatever her privileges or possessions, they were held to be the gifts of the Imperial liberality, and might be revoked at will. In this fact, that the Church was held to have even spiritual authority in the Empire only by virtue of the Imperial edicts, not by virtue of her own divine constitution, is to be found the principal reason why the introduction of Christianity proved impotent to regenerate the Empire, to save it from the vices and corruptions which destroyed its strength, and rendered it unable to resist the attacks of the German invaders. Her social action was circumscribed by the civil authority, and the private virtues of individuals, prevented by an iron despotism from infusing new life into the State, proved, as they must always prove, inadequate to the task of arresting the fall of an Empire founded on despotic principles, and already on its declivity. This theory of Imperial Rome was common to the Empire in the East and the West, and continued in force in the Greek Empire till it fell before the victorious arms of Mahomet II. It passed from Byzantium into Russia, where it was fully and firmly established by Ivan the Terrible. It was attempted to be revived by the Merovingians in Gaul, and in Germany and Italy by the German Kaisers; it prevails now in most of the German courts, is sustained by rare ability, astuteness, and dissimulation by the present Emperor of the French; it dominates in Turkey and China, and is imposed on the

Elizabethan Church in England and Ireland. This system had been suppressed by the Austrasian Franks and the old Germanic Constitution, which remained in vigor from the seventh century to the eleventh, but the later German Emperors, as well as the Kings of England, France, and Aragon, attempted to revive it, and it was this system, so utterly repugnant to every Christian conception, that the Popes, in so far as it affected their own temporal sovereignty and the rights of the Church, opposed in their long and terrible struggles with the Franconian, and more especially the Hohenstaufen, Kaisers, and the temporal power in general during the later Middle Ages. For warring against this system they have been so loudly and bitterly denounced by Kings and Kaisers, courtiers, jurisconsults, heretics, schismatics, and disrobed monks, that even good Catholics have almost feared to defend them, and felt that their conduct was to be excused, apologized for, rather than applauded, although in fact these noble Popes devoted themselves, with all the spiritual and temporal forces at their command, to the defence of the highest and dearest interests of religion and society. If in opposing this doubly despotic system, which enslaves men's consciences as well as their bodies, the Popes deranged royal and imperial plans for redressing the evils of feudalism, the blame belongs not to them, but to those by whose pride and ambition affairs became so complicated that it was impossible to defend the rights of the Papacy and the independence of religion without disturbing, for the time at least, plans of civil organization in themselves not bad."

"But in no country," said Winslow, "is this system, which I as thoroughly detest as does any member of Our Club, carried to greater perfection, or the doctrine of royal supremacy more complete, than in England, where the chief of the State is *ex officio* the recognized chief of religion. And yet we are told that England, or Great Britain, is the representative in the modern world of the old Germanic Constitution of Europe!"

"But the system," answered Father John, "is, and always has been decidedly anti-English, and repugnant to the genuine spirit of the British Constitution. Only a minority of the British people adhere, or ever have adhered, to the State Church. The system was favored by the Planta-

genets, and imposed by the Welsh Tudors, but it was never accepted by the Catholics, who so late as the beginning of the last century constituted full one-third of the population of England and Wales; it was resisted in the seventeenth century by the much misunderstood and misrepresented Puritan movement in England and Scotland, and has been nobly, almost heroically protested against recently by the organization of the Scottish Free Kirk, which I regretted to find a writer in *The Dublin Review* condemning; it is opposed by the Tractarian movement in the bosom of the Elizabethan Church itself. The Non-Conformist party daily gathers courage and strength, and the admission of Protestant Dissenters, Catholics, even Jews to seats in Parliament, proves that the system must ere long be abandoned, and that the recognition by the State of the equality of all professedly religious bodies before the civil law, and the suppression of the Anglican Church as a State religion, are only questions of time. The whole tendency of English Legislation and of the English mind itself is towards true religious liberty, and the assertion of the incompetency of the State in Spirituals. England nobly sustains religious liberty in her numerous Colonies, even in India, and is rapidly approximating it at home."

"I have as an Irishman no reason to like England," said O'Connor, "and it is asking too much of my countrymen to ask them to forget the wrongs done to them and their religion by Saxon and Protestant England. Irishmen cannot be expected to join in the praise of the desolator and oppressor of their country, and they would be more than human, if they did not desire her humiliation, or at least the extinction of the English faction in Ireland. Yet I think myself, though mainly through Irish influence, the day is not far distant, when the English Government will be permitted, nay, required by the British people to recognize full religious liberty, the full freedom and independence of every religious body recognizing the obligations of natural morality, to legislate for and govern in spirituals its own members according to its own constitution, creed, discipline, and canons. Under such a recognition the Church would be as free in the British Empire as she ever was under the old Germanic Constitution."

"She will be free and independent," resumed Father John, "in relation to her own members only, but that is all the freedom and independence she needs or has ever needed. She needs the protection of the laws against the external violence of her enemies, but she does not need laws to suppress sects and religions hostile to her. She asks what she has here, what our Constitution and laws guaranty her, but I cannot discover that she asks or has ever asked any thing more. Here she is as free as she can be, and has to suffer only the annoyances and vexations that must always be expected from popular bigotry and prejudice, where the majority of the people are opposed to the Catholic religion. I do not pretend that England is not full of Anti-Catholic prejudices; I do not pretend that she represents the old Germanic system in all its best features; I do not deny that she has suffered and still suffers terribly from the old Imperial system of Pagan Rome; but I do maintain that she represents the old Germanic system far better than I find it represented by any other European nation."

"I fear," said Diefenbach, "that that is true. The Germans are not what they were in the time of Charlemagne, or even under the Ottos. Roman Imperialism reigns in the courts, and French Jacobinism has made terrible ravages among the people, yet I am far from despairing of the Germans in Germany. In nearly all the German States the old German spirit still lives, and reminiscences of German freedom are retained. There is in all Germany a strong constitutional party, free from either extreme, which needs only proper encouragement to become predominant. The difficulty is, that at present, order in Germany is defended on despotic, and liberty on anarchical principles. The German publicists, not connected with the administration, are book-men, theorizers, drawing on their logic and their imagination instead of practical knowledge and experience, and therefore almost necessarily favor either Cæsarism or Jacobinism, that is, absolutism either under the imperial form or the democratic."

"There is another difficulty," said O'Connor; "Germany is about equally divided between Catholics and Protestants. The North, where Protestantism predominates, is precisely

the part of Germany where we find the most of the original Germanic character, and where liberty is best understood, the most fearlessly asserted, in theory, if not in practice, and this turns the Catholic sympathies towards Austria, which, though for the most part Catholic, claims to be a continuation of the so-called Holy Roman Empire, and really inherits its traditions and its policy. Hence springs up the conviction, which superficial appearances justify, that Protestantism favors liberty and Catholicity favors despotism. Hence the Catholic shrinks from liberty, and the Protestant from Catholicity. Certainly the freest States in Christendom are precisely the States in which Catholics have the least influence in public affairs, and the most despotic are those in which Protestants are in a hopeless minority. The fact cannot be denied, and it is not strange that the world should infer that there is something more than a mere accidental relation between Protestantism and civil freedom, and between Catholicity and despotism. There are Catholics, as well as Protestants, who infer this, and therefore who earnestly oppose all efforts to introduce free institutions, and with equal earnestness support the claims of absolute government."

"The inference, however," interposed Father John, "is false, and rests on a pure sophism. The truth is, Catholicity, though not given to introduce liberty, yet needs and demands it, in order to be able to labor freely and efficiently in her spiritual and divine mission; and Protestantism demands, not liberty but power, for, as a religion, it sustains and spreads itself only by the aid of the civil government or by colonization. Protestantism must always suffer, as Catholicity must always gain, by an extension of liberty combined with order. Francis Joseph deserves credit for the new Concordat; but even that Concordat, comparatively liberal as it is, is but a poor amends for that really liberal constitution for his States which he proclaimed shortly after his accession to the throne. If he had put that constitution in force substantially as he proclaimed it, sustained it, and governed his States in accordance with it, as I think he might have done, he would have proved that the connection between Protestantism and liberty, and Catholicity and despotism is, if it exists at all, purely accidental, and would have given us a Catholic State

as the modern representative of the old Germanic system, or of modern representative and parliamentary government. Austria would have thus placed herself in harmony with modern ideas, annihilated French Jacobinism, conciliated even the Italian liberals, and taken her position at the head of the European world, and the lead in the progress of civilization. But her great statesman, Prince Schwartzenberg, unhappily wedded to the system of centralization, threw away that liberal constitution, returned, as soon as the battle with the rebels was fairly won, to the old Bureaucratic system, and we have now to confide in Protestant England rather than in any Catholic state."

"Father John forgets France," interposed De Bonneville, "the eldest daughter of the Church, and really at the head of the modern civilized world. Her present Emperor sustains constitutionalism in Sardinia, he favors the establishment of free institutions in the Papal States and the rest of Italy, and, if I understand his policy, he is evidently laboring to revive a Christian and Catholic East."

"I do not forget France and her terrible sacrifices for liberty," answered Father John, "or that she contains many enlightened and patriotic sons who detest the present Imperial régime. I do not even forget or overlook the arts and pretences by which Napoleon III. seeks to bamboozle both Catholics and Liberals. But he has used universal suffrage to establish Cæsarism, and he carries and must carry with him, as did his greater uncle, that Imperial despotism which lost to the Church the whole East, the Greek Empire to civilization, drew Russia into schism, and plunged the half of Germany, all Scandinavia, Holland, England, and Scotland into the Protestant heresy. I want no such aid for the Church as he seems likely to give, for he will concede her nothing save at the expense of her freedom and independence. I speak not lightly of Catholic France. In France there is much true faith and earnest piety, and the French do more than the Catholics of all other nations put together to fill and sustain Catholic Missions. I speak of Imperial France, of France as organized under and devoted to the will of Napoleon III., and I say, if the Imperial régime does nothing to confirm the prejudices already existing against Catholicity, and to eviscerate the manhood

of Catholics, it is all that can be expected, and far more than I dare hope."

"So Father John hopes more from heretical England, the persecutor of the Church, and the oppressor of Ireland and India, than from Catholic France," said Winslow.

"More than from *Imperial* France, most assuredly," answered Father John. "I hope I do not lose sight of the interests of my religion. In matters of faith and morals I can make no compromises, and I maintain all the rigid intolerance of truth itself in the theological order. No man is or can be less disposed to favor the indifference of religions than myself. But the great question we have now to settle is not a theological question. It lies in the natural order, and is first of all a question as to the reorganization of European society, broken up by the conflicts between the Cæsarists and the Jacobins. As a Catholic, looking solely to the interests of my religion, I wish this reorganization to be compatible with its freedom. What I want, as a Catholic, is the freedom and independence of the Church; and I know of no way, I can discover no way, of gaining for her a tolerable security but through free civil and political institutions; and for such institutions, since they lie in the natural order and are a want of natural society, Protestants can labor as earnestly and in as good faith as Catholics, although they can do it only for the sake of natural society, while Catholics may do it both for the sake of natural and of supernatural society. Though I can have no communion *in sacris* with heretics or schismatics, I know no reason why I should in matters relating to natural society refuse to co-operate with any man I find struggling for what I hold to be just and desirable. I regret the heresy and schism of Great Britain, but in spite of her heresy and schism she is the best friend and most energetic supporter I can find in the Old World of that political and civil order, which as a citizen I want for myself, and as a Catholic for my Church. Russia is schismatic and autocratic; Austria and France are to-day both wedded to Cæsarism; Germany is debated between Prussia and Austria, between Imperialism and Red Republicanism, or losing itself in vague theories and pantheistic dreams; Spain is enfeebled and distracted by her internal struggles; Portugal, Belgium, and Sardinia can hardly stand alone, and

are little better than mockeries of free States; and Italy must follow in the wake either of France or of Austria, or be divided between them. Where, then, can I look but to parliamentary England, who stands almost alone in Europe as the earnest defender of civil and religious liberty? I do not make facts; I must take them as I find them, and do the best I can with them. If Europe, if the Catholic cause even, hath need of England, is it my fault? or is it a fault in me to say so?"

"England has always played an important part in the European world," remarked Diefenbach. "The Germans who conquered the Empire, and seated themselves among its ruins, were partially converted by the Roman prelates and missionaries, although in the sixth and seventh centuries a very large portion of the Gallo-Roman population lapsed into heathenism, from which the missions of the Irish monks did much to recover them. But these learned and excellent monks, zealous and devoted as they were, made little progress in converting the Germans, and hardly any progress was made in converting the Germans in Germany proper till the mission of St. Boniface, the Anglo-Saxon Winifred, or till after the conversion of Anglo-Saxon England by the missionaries sent by the Pope, Gregory the Great. The Anglo-Saxon missionaries were able to address the Germans in their own language, in real German accents, and with full sympathy with German life, manners, and customs. They could present them Christianity unembarrassed by any association with Roman Imperialism, and convert them to Christianity without transforming them into Romans of the Lower Empire, and satisfy them that they could be Roman Catholics without being subjected to the civil order of Pagan Rome. The conversion of Clovis, king of the Neustrian Franks, was a great event, and filled Rome with great joy, for it gave the Church a Christian kingdom in the West to balance the degenerate Greek Empire in the East; but the conversion of Ethelbert, king of Kent, some years later, when the Neustrian Franks had become nearly as base as the Greeks themselves, was a still greater event, and filled Rome with a greater joy, for it secured the conversion of the whole Germanic race. It was, in a human point of view, the greatest event that had occurred in the Christian world since the conversion of

Constantine, and the lapse of England into heresy in the sixteenth century was the greatest loss the Church suffered even in that era of disasters."

"Considering that the causes which alienated so many nations from the Holy See are political rather than religious," added Father John, "the reconciliation of England to the Church would be the greatest gain in its probable results to the Catholic cause that could now be made. With her old Germanic Constitution, modified to meet the ideas and wants of modern society, still in vigor, and the sympathies alike of Catholics and the friends of Liberty enlisted on her side, Catholic England would carry with her a moral force that would check the progress of Cæsarism, heal the schism in the European republic, give confidence and strength to the party that is struggling to restore, with the necessary modifications, the old Germanic order of political organization, enable the Germans to reconstruct German Unity, recall Russia, who would otherwise be isolated from the European family, to submission to the Holy See, and enable her Church to labor successfully for the conversion of the Asiatic nations remaining in heathenism, and to restore the old languishing East to Christian faith and unity. The great obstacle to the reorganization of Europe and the progress of true liberty, is the unnatural and false position of England in regard to the Papacy, which enables the Sovereigns who profess themselves Catholic to use the Catholic populations in establishing despotism. Her position of hostility to the Papacy, and her persistence in carrying with her free and living civilization her puerile and lifeless Protestantism, which she never loved, and more than half despises, weaken her influence on the Continent, and arm against her the Catholic populations that would willingly, joyously accept her civilization, if they could see it disengaged from Protestantism, with which it, in fact, has no necessary connection. She insists on her Protestantism, not for any theological reason or conscientious religious conviction, but because she has imbibed the false notion, in which Catholics have done their best to confirm the English people, that there is some necessary connection between it and the civil and political order which makes her glory. She falsely imagines that the Pope is the defender, not the victim, of Cæsarism, and that she cannot

carry out her protest against Pagan, without at the same time protesting, with equal earnestness, against Papal Rome. But even all Protestant as she is, the Catholic States of Europe have need of her, and though she can serve them less than she would if Catholic, she can serve them more than any professedly Catholic power at the present moment to be found. France might serve them more and better, and would, if she would heartily and in good faith accept the Constitutional and Parliamentary *régime*, and so might Austria, but that is out of the question."

"And therefore," said Diefenbach, "I can conceive no greater blunder than that which is very generally committed by English-speaking Catholics, of directing all their artillery as well as small arms against Great Britain, and imagining that the Catholic cause would gain by effecting her humiliation and the preponderance of Imperial France. We should never suffer personal or national wrongs, however great, to weigh in the balance against the real interests of religion. We can safely leave vengeance to the Almighty. We should look deeper and farther. It is not, as is too often pretended, a matter of indifference to the interests of religion what political order obtains, or what order of civilization is sustained. France, to-day, represents the Lower Empire, and Great Britain its German invaders and conquerors, and her defeat and the triumph of France would be as great a calamity for religion and society as would have been theirs and the success of the Roman arms."

"Then the victory once won," added Father John, "Constitutionalism once secure from the attacks of Cæsarism, the English would moderate their hostility to the Papacy, which is and always has been political rather than theological, and suffer themselves to be converted, as were the Arian and Pagan conquerors of the Roman Empire. When Catholics prove false to their trust, God sends them the heathen and heretics to scourge them back to their duty, to their manliness, and courage. Non-Catholics have gained their victories over us because we have suffered them to surpass us in the stronger and more energetic natural virtues, which deserve and ensure success. It may be humiliating to us to need non-Catholics, who have known how to preserve free institutions, to help us regain the liberties we have suffered to be wrested from us; but it is so to

us as men, not to our Church, which has always struggled to maintain her own freedom and independence. All the dispensations of Providence are designed in justice and mercy. Victory for the British civilization will not result in making the world more heretical, but will help make it more Catholic, by removing the principal obstacle which now prevents the return of the nations to unity. Even the British system suffers by being associated with Protestantism. It hath need of Catholicity in the English people to save it from its own decay, to prevent it from becoming too material, to sustain the purity of morals and manners, without which liberty becomes license, and provokes a reaction which ends only in establishing despotism."

"The struggle of the day," added Diefenbach, "though in its results it will have important bearings on the interests of religion, is in the natural order, for the world now insists on judging religion, not by its fitness or unfitness to secure our supernatural beatitude, but by its direct effect in favoring or retarding the progress of one or another order of civilization. The war which rages is not a war between Papal Rome and schism, or between Catholicity and heresy, but, consciously or unconsciously on the part of the belligerents, between two orders of civilization, between Constitutionalism and Cæsarism — in a word, between liberty and despotism. There is no use in multiplying words about it. Catholicity is not now, except with a very few old fogies, opposed on religious grounds, and men who reject it do so for the most part because they believe it wedded to despotism. Let it be once clearly shown, by facts as well as theory, that the Popes in their long struggle with the German Kaisers did not war against the Germanic constitution of society for the re-establishment of Roman Imperialism, but in its defence, as securing their own rights as temporal sovereigns, and the freedom and independence of religion, and submitted to Cæsarism only under protest, when they were no longer able to carry on the war against it; and let Catholics, wherever they have a free voice, and are free to act, prove themselves in word and deed the true, firm, and enlightened friends of liberty as well as of order, of the rights of the subject as well as of the rights of the sovereign, and the war, however long it may continue, will cease to be directed against the Papacy, and the party of liberty at

least will respect the Church, and count her freedom and independence among the rights they are fighting to secure. Through the tendency of Catholics, inherited or revived from the Empire, to associate the Græco-Roman civilization with their religion as it was associated with it under the Roman Empire, the despots have taken advantage of us, and placed us and our Church in a false and unnatural position, so that the Catholic often finds himself obliged either to submit to the despotism his soul hateth, or to make common cause with the enemies of his religion and his country. We must break the unnatural alliance, and avoid the snare the despots set for us. It is because I am a Catholic, and wish the freedom and independence of religion, that I am attached to your American political Constitution, and that in the struggles going on in the Old World my sympathies are with Great Britain rather than with France, Austria, or Naples, for liberty is the only atmosphere in which my religion herself can breathe freely, and liberty for the Church we can secure only by renewing the martyr ages, or else by establishing civil and political freedom."

"Mr. Diefenbach," said Father John, "need not fear that the Church will censure the principle that governs him. Pius VII., of glorious memory, proved under the First Napoleon, in the most heroic manner, that even the Sovereign Pontiff can have the sympathy he expresses, and prefer British victory to the success of Imperial France, though nominally Catholic. He even owed to British influence and British victory his release from a French prison, and his restoration to his temporal throne. You will find at Rome far less dread of British than of Russian preponderance, for Great Britain, with all her pride and arrogance, carries with her a comparatively free constitution, respect for law, and the faith of treaties, from which the Church must always gain more than she can lose, while Russia continues the Greek Empire, carries Cæsarism with her wherever she goes, makes all rights and powers emanate from the Czar, and subjects the spiritual to the temporal authority.

"I know very well," continued Father John, "that the attempt to revive constitutionalism in Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, or countries where the Church has been imposed

by the civil law, has been attended with results for the moment not favorable to Catholicity; but this is not owing to any incompatibility between the Church and a free commonwealth, but to the fact that the Church had long been associated in the popular mind with the despotism of the State, sought to be displaced by the new constitutional *régime*. Wherever the Church has been enacted and enforced as the religion of the State, imposed by the civil authority rather than freely chosen by the people, the first effects of political emancipation will be attempts at emancipation from the spiritual authority of the Church. The people know not at first, and cannot be expected to know, how to use their newly-recovered freedom. But let not the friends of the Church be frightened. After an infidel freak or two, very pleasing to Satan, no doubt, the people will return to their faith and their religious duties. We must allow nothing of this sort to frighten us back to despotism, and induce us, like the children of Israel, when they began to experience the privation of the wilderness, to long again for the flesh-pots of Egypt. We must stand by liberty, even when we are obliged to deplore its excesses, and use our influence not to restrict it, but to protect it from abuse.

“The interests of the Church require that the association in men’s minds of Catholicity and despotism, and of Protestantism or infidelity and liberty, should be broken up, and broken up it can and will be only when Catholics learn that liberty, not despotism, is the element in which their religion thrives,” remarked Father John, in conclusion. “The system which obtains in the principal Catholic States is suffered by the Church, but she neither desires nor approves it. Catholics who are alive in those States to the interests of their religion, groan under it, and would gladly throw it off, if they could. The clergy do not like it; feel that it oppresses them, and crushes the life out of them; and to an extent little suspected they sympathize in their souls with the Revolution, and half believe that even a Red Republican revolution would be a relief, and less undesirable than the systematic repression now resorted to by despotism. Even in France, decried and enthralled by the specious pretences of new-fangled Cæsarism professing to hold from popular suffrage, there is a noble and heroic band of Catholics who have remained firm

amid all defections, who have not bowed the knee to Baal, or offered sacrifices in his temple, and who may yet retrieve the honor and liberty of their glorious country. We English-speaking Catholics, who are free to speak out our full thought, must send to our brethren in these countries, languishing in secret and silence for the liberty we enjoy, words of sympathy, encouragement, and hope. Something we say may reach them, and if not, they may still serve to undeceive our non-Catholic countrymen, and prove to them that we can be devout Catholics, and at the same time the enlightened and unflinching friends of both civil and religious liberty, even in the American sense of the terms."

ART. II.—*Pastoral Letter on the Decrees of the Second Provincial Council of Cincinnati.* By the MOST REVEREND J. B. PURCELL, D.D., Archbishop of Cincinnati. Cincinnati: Walsh. 1859. 8vo. pp. 16.

PASTORAL Letters are privileged documents, and not open to the animadversion of the government or the criticisms of the press. In them the pastor speaks with the plenitude of his authority to his own flock, and what he says must be received with due reverence and submission. We have not, therefore, introduced this important Pastoral by the venerable and illustrious Archbishop of Cincinnati, for the purpose of reviewing it, far less for the purpose of controverting any proposition we may find in it. We call the attention of our readers to it, because it uses very energetic and decided language on the subject of Public Schools,—a subject on which we have some remarks and explanations which we deem it proper to offer, in order to prevent, if possible, our views from being misapprehended or misrepresented, and with which we hope to close the further discussion on our part of the subject in these pages.

On the subject of Catholic Education and the Public Schools, the venerable and illustrious Archbishop says :

"The cause of education must ever enlist the sympathies and excite the lively solicitude of every order of the clergy, as well as of

the parents and friends of youth. It was the proud boast of the citizen of this State, who labored more than any other to obtain legislation to establish and endow the common schools, that when they were once in successful operation, the criminal statutes would be a dead letter! There would be no more offences against morality, law, or order. Never was any man more implicitly believed, Never were heavier pecuniary sacrifices imposed by the Legislature or submitted to by the people, than in the vain attempt to realize this Utopia. The system has had a fair trial for considerably more than a quarter of a century, in this, and in other States of the Union. But what is the result? Are crimes diminished? Are they committed, especially in their most aggravated form, only, or mainly, by the uneducated? The answer to this question is returned to us from the Senate Chamber, the hotel dining-room, the streets of Washington, the offices of state and county treasuries, the counters and desks of banks, the jail and the jury room of Hawesville, Ky. Education without religion is not at all, or only a questionable boon. The hand and the heart must be educated, as well as the mind. Domestic education and the good example of parents must be added to the instruction of the school-room. The injustice of taxing Catholics to support schools from which they derive no benefit must cease, and the use of their own money be allowed them to educate their own children. Or, if this cannot be, the Common Schools should be placed on such a basis as that Catholics may profit by them without the sacrifice of faith. Their religion, the work of God, the religion that conquered Paganism, and Islam, and barbarism, must not be reviled as an apostasy, while sects that sanction divorce, and deny the future punishment of the wicked, and lessen Gospel truths the most essential, and books that teach open and shameless immorality, receive the suffrages of the majority, and are commended to the confidence and admiration of the pupils.

"We are not so unwise as to think, so unjust as to say, that Catholics have not to answer for their full share of the depravity we deplore. Let the Church and the State, let Catholics and Protestants do what they may to arrest the torrent of evil, it will never wholly cease to flow; for, while there are men, there will be vices. But we seek to control this torrent, to confine it to narrower limits, to lessen the volume of its waters, and preserve those portions of society which it has not yet invaded, from the inundation. If the State, if our fellow-citizens, will let us have our own money to make our own experiments in our own way, we hope to succeed. If justice be denied us, Catholics must only do what they can to redress their part of the evils of society.

"Now, what is the duty of Catholics with regard to the right education of youth?

"In the first place, they must teach them the catechism, or send them where they will learn it—to the Catholic school and to the

Church; to their own school and their own Church, and not another. Secondly, they must provide for them teachers who will know how to teach—who will give them good example; who will not suffer their pupils, boys and girls, to be exposed to the dangers of promiscuous, unrestricted intercourse in the same school-room and play-grounds and evening parties, where the passions are prematurely developed, and religion and reason hold no control. They must interdict the demoralizing reading of romances and novels, not to speak of other works of a still more fatal description. And instead of those, they must furnish them with only such books and instructions as will explain to them the end for which they were created, and the duties which they must fulfil, as good men and good women, good citizens, and, above all, or to say all in one word, good Christians.

“ The boarding and day schools, taught by religious communities of women, leave us little to desire in the education of young girls, of the various orders of society. In vain will you look for the ladies whom they have educated, among the women’s rights’ party, the free lovers, the spirit rappers, or the Mormons. But you will find them in their proper sphere, in the discharge of their domestic duties, and the practice of the religious and moral virtues.

“ For boys whose parents can pay the required stipend, we have our colleges. But for those who are not so well favored with the goods of fortune, we are not so well provided. We want Normal, or Training schools, where the instructors of youth may be prepared for their holy and high vocation. We want a body of men who will devote themselves to this task for life, from the most perfect, the most sustaining of all motives—the pure love of God and of humanity. Or if those cannot be found in sufficient number, we want the endowments of Catholic Free Schools, made on such a scale as to admit of our giving sufficiently ample salaries to teachers, to induce them to persevere in their profession, and not merely regard it as a stepping-stone to something better. To secure the first class of teachers, the Fathers of the late Provincial Council addressed a Letter to the Sovereign Pontiff, beseeching him to use his high influence with the Superior of the Brothers of the Christian Schools in France, to induce him to found a training school for teachers in this Province. The Holy Father has already deigned to comply with our request, and the answer of the Superior of the Christian School Brothers which has just been received, bids us hope that this grand object of this Council’s legislation will soon be realized.

“ The idleness of boys, when they leave school, an idleness which is often not wilful, but compulsory—idle, because unable to find any thing to do—we regard as one of the most fruitful sources of vice, and one of the greatest evils of society. It is such an evil that we look on the military despotisms of Europe, which take young men from their families, or the streets, for a term of years, and compel

them to serve in the army, as a comparative blessing. In the service they acquire habits of obedience to superiors, cleanliness, regularity and order. In our large cities hundreds of boys and young men are wasting energies which they are anxious to devote to the conquest of a respectable position in society, and therefore to the public good, but they know not what to do—they are idle ‘because no man hath hired them.’ This is no false excuse. We have repeatedly tried to have virtuous and industrious boys placed where they could learn trades or be otherwise usefully employed, and could not. If we leave them unoccupied, they will cease to be virtuous. Is there then no resource but to make prisoners of them? To incarcerate them with others like themselves in a house of refuge? We think there is; and that it can be found in parents setting their boys to work, when they can, and in Catholic communities establishing workshops and agricultural schools, such as are now used with such satisfactory results in Catholic France and England. Had we the means, personal and material, we should commence one without delay. We commend the project to the zeal of our beloved clergy.”—pp. 7—12.

It would not be dignity, but silly affectation, for us to pretend not to be aware that our Review is accused of assuming a position on this subject of education in opposition to that taken by the venerable and illustrious American Hierarchy. It is accused of having taken “a non-Catholic ground,” and is represented as having once been, but as being no longer, “a Catholic Review.” Indeed, some Catholics even have gone so far as to warn its editor of the fate of Lamennais and Gioberti, and to hint that he is probably on the point of renouncing his Catholic faith, and of returning to some form of Protestantism, or of no religion. There appears in certain quarters a determination, if we insist on exercising the freedom of thought and expression which the Church allows us, either to reduce us to silence or to force us out of the Church. We look upon all this as pitiable, and can see in it only a proof that men may profess to be Catholics, and yet be as bigoted, as narrow-minded, and as intolerant as the ordinary run of Protestants.

We assure our readers that, personally, things of this sort do not disturb us, but we regret them for the sake of the Catholic cause in our English-speaking world. There is with some Catholics, especially in this country, a narrow-minded bigotry, an illiberality of speech, if not of feeling,

an intolerance in matters of opinion where differences are permissible, that is not creditable to their Catholic character, and which must be got rid of if we are ever to have a broad and generous Catholic literature, or are ever to attain to that position and moral weight in the community to which we are entitled by our numbers, our wealth, our intelligence, and our scholarship. Where authority ends liberty begins, and in matters outside of faith and morals we must learn to respect the full freedom of thought and expression, even where unanimity is desirable. We must arraign no man's character, we must labor to damage no man's standing or influence as a Catholic because he differs with us in opinion, or even runs athwart our prejudices. In matters outside of faith and morals the public opinion of Catholics in this or any other country is simply public opinion, and can never be adduced as authority either for reason or conscience, for it has no guaranty of infallibility, and may be only a mass of prejudices or superannuated traditions, which no honest and intelligent man devoted to truth and virtue can consent to follow. Public opinion in Athens condemned Socrates to drink hemlock; public opinion in Judea condemned our Lord to be crucified between two thieves. Public opinion, even, in Catholic countries, is to a fearful extent intensely hostile and bitter towards the clergy, and is far from being as reverential and as affectionate towards them, even among Catholics in this country, as is desirable. Whoever writes with a laudable aim, writes to correct the errors of public opinion, and to aid in forming a just and enlightened public opinion, not simply to echo the public opinion he finds already formed. If he so writes, he must necessarily run more or less counter to the opinions of the public he addresses, and of course find himself more or less opposed by it. You must not take it for granted that he is therefore wrong. It may turn out that it is public opinion itself that is wrong, and he that is right. Controvert him by fair and solid argument, if you believe him wrong; reason with all your intelligence against him, refute him if you can, and refuse to believe him if he fails to convince you that he is right, or that what he defends is just and good; but so long as he advances nothing incompatible with the doctrine, the rights, and authority of the Church, you must judge what he puts forth on its

merits, and never to attempt to bring public opinion against him, and to crush him.

No Catholic periodical in the world has more uniformly, more loyally, or more earnestly defended the rights of authority than this Review. Indeed, it has been accused of going too far, and at times even gravely censured by a portion of the so-called Catholic press, for claiming too much authority for the Church. We assert for ourselves no rights against the Church. She is the supreme judge for us of her own powers, and of the extent and the limits of our obedience. But with the same earnestness that we assert her authority, we deny the authority of public opinion, whether the public opinion of Catholics or of non-Catholics, and vindicate for ourselves and for our brethren the freedom of thought and action she leaves us. When the authority of the Church is questioned, we defend it; when the freedom of the individual Catholic is invaded, we defend that, and resist the best way we can the invasion. We will no more surrender the freedom and independence. Catholicity allows us, than we will call in question the authority with which our Lord invests his Spouse. Where the Church speaks, we are silent and obedient; but where she is silent, we recognize in no man the right to command or to censure us.

We recognize in the Church all the authority over the subject of education she claims, that is, plenary authority in respect to all that pertains to the moral and religious training of the young. Faith and morals saved, I have the right, in purely secular education, to educate my children as I judge best; but I am not free, even in secular education, to send my children to schools which she interdicts, or to which the Prelates the Holy Ghost has placed over me declare I cannot send them without gravely imperilling their faith or morals. On this point we see not how there can be any question among Catholics. The Church has the full and supreme control of the moral instruction and religious education of the young, as included in her divine mission, and she has full and supreme authority to say what secular schools are or are not imminently dangerous to faith and morals, and to those she declares to be thus dangerous no Catholic parent can lawfully send his child. Now, how stands the case with the public schools, or as we usually say, the District Schools? Have our Prelates in-

terdicted them? If so, we are ignorant of the fact. The Pastoral before us does not go that length, and it goes as far as anything we have seen. Have our Prelates officially declared that the District Schools are so dangerous to faith and morals that it is unlawful to use them, even when and where we have not, and cannot at present have, good schools of our own? Not to our knowledge. In this city, and elsewhere, Catholic children certainly go to the District Schools, and good, devout, earnest Catholic teachers are employed in them. Is this unlawful, anti-Catholic? Authority never speaks with an uncertain voice. It is, and must be explicit. From all that we have been able to learn, our Prelates have not declared this to be unlawful. We know clergymen who have discontinued their parochial schools, which at great labor and expense they had sustained for years, and permitted the children of their charge to go to the District Schools, and we have not heard that these clergymen have been placed under interdict, suspended, or even admonished. Wherein, then, have we by anything we have ever said or done placed ourselves in opposition to the American Hierarchy?

We know our Pastors are not satisfied with the District Schools as they are, and we know that many of them are doing all they can to establish separate Catholic Schools for our Catholic children. Have we ever taken ground against them, pretended the District Schools, as they are, satisfy even ourselves? Or have we in any way whatever opposed their movement to establish separate Catholic schools? We assuredly have done no such thing. We have never felt that we were free to oppose, and, moreover, have never wished to oppose or take ground against them. Whence, then, the tremendous outcry against us? Whence comes it that we are charged with taking a non-Catholic ground, and that our Review is referred to as being no longer a Catholic periodical, in consequence of its views on the subject of the District Schools? It comes not from any opposition we have offered to our Prelates, to Catholic education, or to Catholic Schools, but it comes, if the truth must be told, from the source whence has come the greater part of the opposition to us for the last five years,—that is, from our steady and determined opposition to any and every movement the direct tendency of which is to denationalize the American Catholic,

and to keep Catholics a foreign colony in the United States, or Catholicity here in this New World linked with that old effete Europeanism, which has always, wherever it has existed, been a drag on it, and which all that is true, good, generous, and noble in our American political and social order repudiates. We adopt as our line of policy conformity to American life, manners, and institutions, in all respects in which they are not incompatible with Catholic faith and morals. We adopt this line of policy not, as some pretend and labor to make the public believe, from narrow-minded national prejudice, or from hostility to any class of foreigners settled here, but because we believe it the only sensible policy, because it is the policy the Church always recommends to her missionaries when sent to a non-Catholic country, and because we are thoroughly persuaded that it is the only policy compatible with the spread and permanent prosperity of our religion in the Union. Will any man have the hardihood to pretend that in adopting and supporting this line of policy we are opposing the venerable and illustrious American Hierarchy? Rightly or wrongly, we believe that the best safeguard, aside from purely Catholic instruction and the Sacraments, of the faith and morals of our children, is not in building up a wall of separation, not required by Catholic doctrine, between them and the non-Catholic community, but in training them to feel, from the earliest possible moment, that the American nationality is their nationality, that Catholics are really and truly an integral portion of the great American people, and that we can be, whatever the Know-Nothings may say to the contrary, without the slightest difficulty, at once good Catholics and loyal Americans, and the enlightened and earnest defenders of political, civil, and religious liberty.

We are, and always have been, decidedly in favor of really *Catholic* schools, that is, schools in which our children are sure to be taught, and well taught, their religion, and we cannot understand how any Catholic at all worthy of the name can be otherwise than earnestly in favor of such schools; but we have not favored, and, till further advised, we cannot favor, under pretext of providing for Catholic education, a system of schools which will train up our children to be foreigners in the land of their birth, for such schools cannot fail, in the long run, to do more injury than good to the

interests of religion. We quarrel with no man for being a foreigner, but we recognize the moral right in no class of American citizens to train up their children to be foreigners, and then to claim for them all the rights, franchises, and immunities of American citizens. We have no unfriendly or unbrotherly feeling towards any class of foreigners, but we do not want that miserable Europeanism, by which we mean despotism, in some or all of its ramifications, which oppresses the people, trammels the freedom of the Church, and cripples the energy of the clergy in Continental Europe, brought here to eviscerate Catholics of their manhood, and to keep up a perpetual war, in which faith has no interest, between them and the great body of the American people. In this we only express the general sentiment of our Catholic population, whether born and brought up here or in the "Old Country." Leave out the Europeanism, and let the movement be really for Catholic schools and Catholic education, as no doubt it is in the intention of our Prelates, and we are with it heart and soul, and it shall never fail for the lack of our feeble support. The men who began the clamor against us were precisely such as either never distinguish between their foreign traditions and their faith, or as prefer those traditions to their religion. They felt from the first instinctively that in us they could find no sympathy, and that to effect their purposes they must cry us down, and turn the Catholic public against us. This they attempted by crying out that we were anti-Irish, and finding that would not do, they now attempt it by crying out that we are anti-Catholic. Time will most likely teach them that neither is a good cry against us, and prove that though we have no blarney for the Irish, we love and respect the Irish settled here as men, as citizens, and as Catholics who have adhered to their faith through centuries of martyrdom; and furthermore, that however short we may fall of Christian perfection, we love both Catholics and the Church too well, and are too anxious to secure our own salvation, to turn anti-Catholic in a hurry, and make our damnation sure. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou only hast the words of eternal life."

This, we apprehend, is the first and chief cause of the outcry against us. Another cause is in the fact that we have steadily refused to oppose the District School system established in the majority of the States on the ground

assumed, or for the reasons alleged by some of our Catholic journals, or to concede that, even as faulty as they undoubtedly are, they are as corrupt or corrupting as some of our over-zealous friends represent them. We do not, as our readers well know, recognize in the State any right to interfere in spiritual matters, but we do recognize its right, if it judges proper, to establish a system of District Schools for all the children of the land, whether rich or poor, and to appropriate funds or to impose a public tax for their support, providing it excludes from them every thing that can reasonably offend the conscience of any class of its citizens, and does not make education in them a prerequisite to the enjoyment of any right or franchise, to public office or employment, or to a diploma in any of the learned professions, and leaves parents and guardians free either to use them, or to establish private schools for their children at their own expense and option. Such schools do not fall under the condemnation of the State schools in Europe, and are improperly called State schools. They are simply public schools, and the State only authorizes and supports them, keeping education up to a certain standard, and protecting the respective rights of parents, children, and teachers. We certainly approve the principle and the policy of the system, and we think its establishment and support highly honorable to the intelligence, the wisdom, and the philanthropy of our countrymen. It pertains to what we regard as wise and liberal statesmanship, and though it secures not all the positive virtues needed by the State, it seems to us a necessary concomitant of that political equality on which our Republic is founded, and to tend directly to prevent the growth, and even existence, of that ignorant, brutal, and uncivilized mass of human beings, hardly a degree above wild beasts, which till lately was to be found in the heart of the most enlightened and polished nations of Europe. Nothing outside of religion itself could be more serviceable to us as Catholics than this very system of District Schools if the whole American people were Catholics. It would be the very thing we should want. We cannot, therefore, condemn the system itself. We do not deny that it has its evils, but they are simply abuses which may be corrected, or the results of its workings in a mixed community, where the people are partly Catholic, partly Protestant, and partly of no religion.

Although we do not pretend, and never have pretended, that the District Schools are all that Catholics need for their children, we yet cannot approve the wholesale condemnation of them in which some of our friends indulge. Much of that condemnation is, we think, dictated by European notions and habits, and proceeds from not considering that many things which in the Old World have a good and desirable tendency would have a contrary tendency here, and that many things which could not there be tolerated for a moment without the gravest consequences resulting, are wholly innocuous here, because in harmony with the general spirit and constitution of our society. Immorality and irreligion are, no doubt, on the increase in the Union, but it is wrong to attribute the fact to the influence of our Common School system. These schools do not, indeed, wholly prevent it; but we think there would be much more immorality and irreligion among us if we were without these schools. Even Catholic schools have not always proved effectual in preventing immorality and irreligion in Catholic States. Education is not omnipotent, and can never be a substitute for the Sacraments. No system of schools ever devised, or that ever will be devised, can be completely successful in making or keeping a people moral and religious. Experience has disappointed the too sanguine expectations of the philanthropists. Too much is, perhaps, still expected from education. Our friends, also, make too much of individual cases of immorality in our public schools, and which are only rare exceptions to the rule. We ourselves were educated in a District School, and as teacher or as committeeman, we have since been connected with the Common Schools in New York, Michigan, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, for over twenty years of our life; we have had eight children partly educated in them, and we claim to have some personal knowledge of them, and although we do not consider them by any means faultless, we are very far from recognizing as just the description of them which we usually meet in our Catholic journals. No schools, not even our Catholic schools, are perfect.

We do not advocate secular education without adequate religious education, and it has never entered our head that any Catholic could be so insane as to do it. We are in favor of giving a good secular education to all the children of

the land, but if we can have but one, we, of course, should say, let us have religious education. The spiritual is above the temporal, and there is no proportion between the religious and the secular. We have not dwelt at length on the importance of religious education, for we have supposed Catholics sufficiently instructed on that point, and in no need of lessons from us; but we have never for one moment contemplated secular education without an adequate provision being made in some form for religious education; only we have not believed, and we cannot say we now believe, that it is absolutely necessary that it should be given along with secular education in the same school-room, at the same hours, and by the same teachers. The first duty of parents and pastors in regard to children, as soon as intellect begins to dawn, is to look after their spiritual welfare, and to see that their moral and religious instruction and education is properly attended to; but whether the moral and religious instruction, and education, if given, and thoroughly given, be given at home or in the Sunday School, in the District School, or the Parochial School, we have supposed could be a matter of no real importance. But be this as it may, we are prepared to accept with all our heart the assertion in the Pastoral before us: "Education without religion is not at all, or only a questionable boon," for after all, "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" We know no way in which a man can save his soul without religion.

We do not pretend to know or judge the motives or policy of our Prelates, but we would respectfully suggest to our friends of the press, that any movement, whatever may be the rights of the Church, or be really desirable in itself, designed to secure to the clergy the whole management and control of education outside of faith and morals, must fail. Neither non-Catholic nor Catholic secular society will consent or can be forced to place the whole business of secular education in their hands, and give up public for parochial schools. The clergy may retain, as within their special mission, the moral and religious instruction and education of the young, but to struggle for more will ultimately be to get less. We say not that this is not an evil and much to be deplored; but we look upon it as a "fixed fact." The old union between Church and State is dissolved in this

country most likely never to be restored, and sooner or later, struggle as we may, we shall be forced to accept all the logical and legitimate consequences of that dissolution. The sooner we foresee and make up our minds to accept those consequences and conform to them, the better we believe it will be for us and for our religion. It is always worse than idle to contend for the impracticable, or to war against the inevitable. Throughout the whole modern world there is a settled conviction, false assuredly, that the clergy, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, are greedy of power, and constantly laboring to concentrate all power in themselves, and hence a determination on the part of secular society to yield them as little as possible. Whoever looks at the modern world as it is, and studies its temper, and the tendency of its thought and sentiment, must, it seems to us, be convinced that in all human probability, the most the Church can hope to recover and retain is freedom to watch over and provide for the moral and religious instruction and education of the young. This is the most, we are convinced, that she will be able to obtain, although it may be not all that is her right. She, in her modes of acting in relation to secular society, is forced to consult the exigencies of space and time, and to follow the mutations of human affairs, though she herself remains unchanged and unchangeable. She has no power to restore a political and social order that has passed away, or to establish in natural society an order of things resisted by the dominant ideas, sentiments, and passions of the age, when not absolutely required by Catholic faith and morals. She is immutable in her doctrine, her universal discipline, and her divine constitution; but she is free, and Catholics must regard her as free, to act according to the ever-changing circumstances of time and space. The very worst service we can render her is to attempt to chain her up to a dead past, or to bind her free limbs with the cords of obsolete precedents. We have not, therefore, joined with those of our friends who are striving to place the whole business of education, outside of faith and morals, in the hands of the clergy, simply because we have not believed it practicable, and because we have believed that by so doing, we should injure, instead of serving, the sacred cause of religion, and betray the confidence that invited us to conduct a Catholic

Review. If in this we have erred, if we have exceeded or abused the liberty the Church concedes us, let the proper authorities distinctly and in some authentic way—not simply by anonymous leaders in irresponsible journals—tell us so, and they will find us neither deaf nor disobedient. We are and will be a submissive son of the Church.

In what we have written on the public schools we have had no intention of opposing the Hierarchy, or of discouraging or interfering with their efforts to provide for Catholic education, which seems to us to have been greatly and even culpably neglected. We have written with a far different purpose. The District School system is an American pet; it is the pride of the American people, their boast, and really their glory. It is dear to their hearts, and we cannot strike them in a tenderer point than in striking this system, or do any thing more effectual in stirring up their wrath against us, or in confirming their prejudices against our religion,—a system devised and adopted for themselves without any view favorable or unfavorable to Catholics, for it was devised and adopted when there were scarcely any Catholics in the country. Common prudence, if nothing else, should prevent us from exaggerating its defects, and shutting our eyes to its good points. We do not pretend, we never have pretended, that the public schools can satisfy all our wants as Catholics, and we have never pretended that we could use them, save where we have not and are not able to have good schools of our own, in which the positive doctrines of our religion can be taught. But we have believed that some of our Catholic friends have assailed them unjustly, with a zeal, a vehemence, and a bitterness alike impolitic and unwarranted, and we have wished to say something to neutralize their undue severity, and by frankly acknowledging the merits of the system to allay the wrath unnecessarily excited against us and our Church. We have also felt on this subject as an American as well as a Catholic, and have wished to vindicate the honor of our country against the unjust aspersions cast on it, by men who are indebted to her free institutions and the protection of her just laws for the very liberty they use in insulting and abusing her. In order to do this we have felt it necessary to bring up the side usually overlooked by our journalists, and to remind our Catholic friends that something may be said for as

well as against our countrymen in relation to the public schools.

We have not dwelt on the defects of the public schools, because we know the American people are aware of them, and are constantly laboring to remedy them, and also because we have found our friends even exaggerating them. We have not said much of the gross injustice of taxing any class of citizens for the support of schools which they cannot in conscience use, because it is patent to every American, because the law organizing our District Schools requires every thing sectarian to be excluded from them, and because this injustice has been pointed out by our so-called Catholic journals with a vehemence, a warmth, and an energy to which we cannot aspire. We have not, we confess, joined in the agitation for separate schools for Catholics, because agitation is the business of the journals rather than of a review, and because it has not seemed to us that agitation was needed, or likely to do any good. We have not supposed it needed for Catholics, for they, it is to be presumed, will listen to the voice of their pastors, and it is far more likely to do harm than good to non-Catholics. We cannot, if we would, break up the District School system, and we can just as little induce the State to divide the schools and the school money, and establish separate schools for the children of Catholics. All that we can do is to have the law organizing these schools practically enforced, and get excluded from them all textbooks and all teaching insulting to Catholics and offensive to the Catholic conscience. This much we might do, for we have the law on our side, if it was understood that in case it was done we would use them. But when it is contended that even then we could not, or would not, use them, how are we to persuade those who have no great fondness for us, and who neither believe nor respect our religion, to exert themselves to do so much since assured in advance that it will not conciliate us in the least? If it were clearly announced by the Pastors of the Church that they would use, as others, these Common Schools in case whatever is repugnant to the Catholic conscience be excluded from them, we could, in time, far sooner than we can build up schools of our own, get it excluded, for no new law is needed for that purpose. But we have been denounced as non-Catholic, because we have defended in such case

the use of them when and where we have not and cannot have separate schools of our own. Do our Pastors approve that denunciation? Would they authorize the free use of these schools in case all sectarianism were excluded from them? If not, what is to be gained by agitation from non-Catholics? They will not, we repeat, give up the system, nor will they furnish us at the public expense with the means of establishing schools for the children of Catholics under the exclusive management and control of our bishops and clergy. It is idle to expect it. We may say, we only ask to be permitted to use our own money in our own way; but the money once collected in the form of taxes is not our money, but public money, and besides our contribution to the tax would go but a small way towards establishing and supporting schools for all our children. Under no point of view, then, can we see any good to come from public agitation of the question by the Catholic press. We have believed the true way is to leave the question in the hands of the bishops and clergy, to take such measures for the moral and religious training of the young of their flocks as they think practicable or expedient, without any outside pressure or interference, and without making any war on the public school system of the country, or unnecessarily provoking the hostility of our non-Catholic countrymen. We have gained nothing, but we have lost much, by the course that has been adopted. We have only made the great body of the American people still more firmly attached to their Common Schools, still more determined to maintain them, and still less disposed to modify them so as to meet our conscientious objections, while we have rendered our own position in the country, as Catholics, more unpleasant and embarrassing. We ought to learn some practical lessons from the late Know-Nothing movement, and correct the errors on our part which provoked it.

We cannot hope what we have said will be acceptable to those of our friends who judge that the true policy for Catholics here is to make war on every thing highly esteemed by non-Catholic Americans, or to those who would abolish the American system of public schools, and leave the whole matter of education to parents and the religious bodies to which the parents belong. We favor in principle a system of public schools, and are not prepared to main-

tain that the State should withdraw entirely from the whole matter of schools and education. We assert its right and its duty to see, as far as in its power, that all its children receive at least a good Common School education, though we deny most energetically its right to interfere with the conscience of any class of its citizens, and we maintain with equal energy the plenary authority of the Church in all that pertains to the moral and religious instruction and education of the children of Catholic parents.

We cannot hope any more to satisfy those who look upon intelligence and independence as guilty tendencies, and make war, in religion, in morals, in science, in philosophy, in politics, on the whole natural order, and think we can be good Catholics only by denouncing all the works of unbelievers as sins. We are not among those who fancy that Catholicity can flourish here only by rooting out every thing American, and completely revolutionizing American society and institutions. We believe American society, as natural society, is better organized, and organized more in accordance with the needs of Catholic society, than is any other society on the face of the globe, and we are anxious to preserve and perfect it according to its original type. We are disposed also to remember that the people who, under the providence of God, organized American society, in which Catholics enjoy a freedom they have nowhere else in the world, were themselves almost to a man non-Catholics, and at the time they organized it, there was probably no Catholic nation in existence that could have sent out a colony capable of organizing a society so much in accordance with the natural rights of man and the freedom and independence of religion. Certainly no Catholic colonies did do it, or by the mother country were permitted to do it. It does not become Catholics, who have subsequently, by virtue of its own free constitution, been received into this society on a footing of perfect equality, to forget this fact, or to show themselves ungrateful to the memory of its founders by constantly holding them up to ridicule, and seeking to undo their work, as the so-called Catholic press frequently does our Puritan ancestors. The late Know-Nothing movement, unjustifiable as we regard it, should be turned to profit, and instead of exciting our hostility to Americans

and every thing American, and making us sigh for a *régime* like that introduced into France by the Nephew of his Uncle, should induce us to re-examine our conduct, and inquire if we have not been pursuing a line of policy admirably fitted to provoke such a movement. It would do us no harm to inquire if there have not been faults on our side, and if there have been to seek to avoid them in future.

That there are differences between us and some of our Catholic friends on the subject of education, as well as on several other subjects—and differences of considerable magnitude, where unanimity is desirable—we pretend not to deny or to disguise; but these differences, we believe, are all on questions that lie outside of faith, and such, even if regrettable, as are allowable among Catholics. At any rate, we have honestly and frankly expressed the views we have entertained on this subject of education, and the general line of policy we have pursued in our efforts to serve Catholic interests in our own country. We have spoken honestly, from our earnest convictions. If we are wrong let us be refuted, and let those who differ from us meet the question, if it is a question of opinion, on its merits, and cease to cry out that we are anti-Irish, or that we are anti-Catholic. All we have said is respectfully submitted to the proper authorities. If they tell us that our views are incompatible with our faith or duty as a Catholic, we shall renounce them as false and erroneous; or, if they assure us that our views are such, though it is not forbidden to hold them, as we cannot urge here and now without detriment, to the interests of religion, of which they, not we, are the judges, we shall forbear to urge them. More cannot well be asked of us as a loyal Catholic, since if we have exceeded or abused our liberty, we have done it ignorantly, not wantonly. With these remarks we dismiss the subject from our pages, and leave its further discussion to others. We cannot close, however, without thanking *The Catholic*, published at Pittsburgh, for its candor in expressing its conviction that, after the explanations of Father John in our last Review, we have not placed ourselves on the school question in opposition to our Prelates. If all our Catholic journals had shown themselves equally candid and just, this article would not have been needed. Catholic editors should be liberal and candid, considerate and just, and if

all, as well as some of them, would be so, there would be much more harmony between us, and Catholic journalism would soon rise to the level of its mission, and prove of great service to the Catholic cause in the Union.

ART. III.—*The Complete Works of Gerald Griffin.* New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 12mo., 10 vols.

GERALD GRIFFIN is a writer who just fell short of being the Irish Walter Scott. If we ask what prevented him from equalling Scott as a national novelist, we shall perhaps find that it was, in the first place, the early age at which he embarked in a literary career; next, the poverty which, even without his enthusiasm, rendered this premature labor inevitable; and lastly, an original defect of that simple and comprehensive intuition which, when improved by experience and practice, becomes the gift of *judgment*, and crowns all the other gifts of artistic genius. Gerald Griffin possessed every other native faculty of the artist in an eminent degree; he did not absolutely want the crowning faculty of judgment, but it was not equally developed with the others, and probably was originally weak in comparison with the rest. Or rather, his intuition was not simple, comprehensive, and penetrating; he saw things in detail, observed carefully, and described with grace, with humor, and with graphic fidelity; but he did not see the whole at once with the eye of a master, and consequently he was rarely able to present either scene or landscape, or incident, or entire story, with that admirable character of unity which distinguishes the master's work.

This want of unity, of wholeness, of simplicity, and consequently of grandeur, is so conspicuous in Gerald Griffin, that it forms the most characteristic feature of his longer and more serious works. In the shorter tales we do not perceive the same fault. The same vigor of intuition, the same comprehensive grasp of mind, and the same degree of practised skill, are not required in order to impart the requisite unity to a short and simple story as to a long and elaborate fiction. Hence it is in short and simple tales

that Gerald's genius unfolds itself. He has a fine eye for the dramatic morality of common life: he seizes the vicious principle, the sinful act on which turns the catastrophe of a peasant career, and develops it in all its modifications of passion and guilt, in all its providential consequences, with a power that is perfectly his own. He could not have unfolded the drama of a rebellion like that in *Waverley*, nor painted the passions and crimes of great nobles, nor the mighty heart of kings. We may say what we like, but Art will never be democratic. Kings and queens may be banished from the world of reality, but they will always continue to walk the stage of fiction, and to parade their griefs and their passions before the foot-lights. Even in democratic Athens what would the drama have been without the royal House of Atreus?

There is another kind of grandeur in fiction which arises from the adequate representation of deeply tragic passions and incidents. Here again our Gerald shows that his power is not of the highest and most commanding order. He shrinks from handling this style of incident and pitch of passion. Ireland surely is full enough of violence, and Gerald Griffin has introduced many a scene of blood, but where is there one that can be compared to the slaughter of Morris by the wife of Rob Roy, or to the execution of Fergus McIvor? In the *Duke of Monmouth* the main incident was a real event of the history, and one of the most profoundly tragic, as it really occurred, that fiction ever seized upon: but Griffin was afraid of it—he has softened it so that it loses at once its probability and its pathos, without losing its disgusting horror. We allude, of course, to the fate of the heroine, whom the infamous Col. Kirk robbed of her innocence as the price of her brother's life, and then gave her brother's lifeless corpse in fulfilment of his equivocal promise. Gerald Griffin introduces a marriage celebrated by a mad clergyman and denied by Kirk, which alike confuses the plot and emasculates the horror. Hardress Cregan, in the *Collegians*, is a very feeble villain: he is, and he is *not*, a murderer. Scott would have made him a murderer pure and simple, and would have conducted him all simply and purely to the gallows. This want of artistic nerve was an effect of Gerald's pure, pious, and gentle character, in part; but also, in part, it indicates the

absence of a certain clear and vigorous intuition. A great artist sees a plot as a great general contemplates a battle-field. The manœuvre on which success depends is always simple, though the combination by which it is brought to bear may be intricate. The artist, like the general, forms his plan and sacrifices every thing to its success; consequently, he succeeds. Gerald Griffin was *afraid* to adopt the real incident of the history: now fear is as fatal in the shock of a fictitious catastrophe, as under the fire of an enemy's battalions. The motto for a writer who undertakes such a theme as that of the *Duke of Monmouth*, should be:—

“Right in the jaws of hell
Rode the Six Hundred.”

The question of Catholic Fiction is now agitated: it is one of the “living questions.” M. Eugene de Margerie contends in France for the *Roman Catholique*—he writes them; so does Madame Yemeniz, and very clever ones too. In Italy, to say nothing of the immortal *Promessi Sposi*, we have the *Jew of Verona*, which probably will not prove immortal, written by a Jesuit and published at Rome under the eye of the Holy Father, in the *Civiltà Cattolica*. In England, Cardinal Wiseman and Dr. Newman have written exceedingly clever Catholic novels: for *Fabiola* and *Callista* are nothing else. In America—but here we are getting on ticklish ground. It seems then, at first sight, that Catholic Fictions—Catholic Novels, even—are written: therefore, they are possible. Gerald Griffin (poor fellow!) ended by having scruples about writing novels. He came into the world too early: had he flourished in our day, he would have discovered a field for his genius of which he little dreamed.

But need a novel be Catholic in order to be permissible? And what is a Catholic novel? To answer these questions we must recur to first principles.

Being the imitation of human life, Fiction belongs to the poetic arts. Being such, it has necessarily two aspects; one looking towards the visible and natural world, the other towards the invisible and supernatural. Life passes in these two spheres; so must its mimic representation. And the more nearly fiction touches on the supernatural sphere of

humanity, the nobler and loftier, the more moral and the more universally popular it becomes. Note, that in fiction the supernatural means the preternatural — mythology, witchcraft, *diablerie* of all sorts, the ghost, the fairy, the demon, the magician,—the more than natural powers, and agents over which our imagination possesses rightful control; for as to the truly higher and divine Powers, the rule still obtains, *Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus*.

Let us now take one step further. There is no such thing as natural society stripped of every supernatural element, unless it be among the Hottentots; but the society in which human life is most deeply interpenetrated with the supernatural, is Catholic Society, whether in present or past ages. A Catholic novel, strictly, is a fiction in which this highest and most beautiful society is depicted. Some of the best of these have been written by non-Catholics. The novels of Walter Scott, in spite of his ignorance, prejudice, and unfair *animus* towards the Catholic Church, are of this description. Accordingly, as vivid pictures of Catholic ages, they contributed powerfully to the revival of Catholic sympathies and ideas in the heart of educated England. Now, in this point of view, Gerald Griffin is evidently a Catholic novelist; not because he was individually a Catholic; not that he introduced any controversy, open or tacit and implied, into his stories; but simply because he described with unaffected truth a Catholic society, a society eminently interpenetrated with the sentiment of the supernatural, a society instinct with the spirit of faith, that of Catholic Ireland. The humblest peasant, who believes the Catholic faith, is a more poetical personage than a Protestant king. The only thing that renders Griffin's Irish stories less poetical, more vulgar and commonplace, is the introduction of so many Protestant characters, especially, of Protestant heroes and heroines*—a capital mistake, for such people can have little interest in fiction, except as criminals, and as such it is neither fair nor expedient to represent them. A Catholic rogue or villain is incomparably more interesting;

* Protestants have done this successfully, it is true, as Fielding and Goldsmith; but then it was mainly in tales which treated Protestantism simply as natural religion, that is, as a part of Catholicity, in which natural religion is included. Can anybody imagine "Parson Adams" as believing the XXXIX Articles? The hypothesis is evidently absurd.

his villany is sure to be deeper dyed, he sins against greater grace, and acquires by his fall all the poetical lineaments of a real devil incarnate. I wonder that no Catholic fictionist has ventured to paint a bad priest !

Gerald Griffin has the remarkable merit, in this point of view, of having described Irish society with the utmost fidelity. Irish vice and Irish crime are represented in his pages with all their native colors ; if, indeed, he can be justly complained of in this respect, it is that he has not done sufficient justice to Irish virtue, which is owing, perhaps, to the fact that he was so good and pure himself. Let alone a good man for describing villains ; the horror he has for them gives the vividest touches to his pencil. On the contrary, if you want a fascinating picture of the noble and chivalrous gentleman, of the model husband, lover, father, set a couple of rogues like Bulwer and Dickens, to paint these beautiful characters. To the good man, goodness is not sufficiently remarkable to strike his fancy ; and he passes over traits of heroic virtue as common things, because they are his own familiar actions. We have known a fiction condemned for want of a "moral," when it merely wanted the cant which was all the morality that the critic understood. Be this as it may, nothing can be less exaggerated, less partial, than Gerald Griffin's representation of the Irish peasant, or indeed of any class of Irishmen that he undertakes to set before us, from the wildest *gossoon* to the country gentleman : there are some classes that he avoids introducing ; he has neither peer nor priest in his stories, and the latter omission is not a little remarkable. Probably he felt the subject to be too sacred for a purely literary treatment, and he was too sincere a man of letters to attempt any other. Certainly the hand that drew the inimitable schoolmaster in the *Rivals*, could have given us the portrait of an Irish P. P., ruling his flock in some White-boy district.

The *Complete Works* of Gerald Griffin, with his *Life*, written by his brother, form some ten volumes duodecimo, of between four and five hundred pages each. They are, *Holland-Tide*—a series of Tales that purport to have been related by a cottage fireside on *Halloween*, and which was Gerald's first attempt at prose fiction ; *Tales of the Munster Festivals*, a sort of continuation of *Holland-Tide*, among which *Card Drawing*, a capital story, *The Half Sir*,

Suil Dhuv the Coiner, perhaps the best he ever wrote; next came *The Collegians*, the most popular of his tales, and which thousands in America have read, as they have heard his songs, without knowing the name of the author; then some more *Munster Festivals*; then *The Invasion*, an elaborate historical novel, founded on the early history of Ireland; *The Rivals*, admirable for its portraiture of Irish character; the *Duke of Monmouth*, another historical novel, the title of which sufficiently indicates the period of history; *Tales of My Neighborhood*, including the *Barber of Bantry*, a rambling and digressional story, which takes in four generations of a family before we arrive at the *Barber*, who had nothing to do with it except that he shaved and robbed one of the Moynehans,—a tale essentially of mystery, which reminds us not a little of the *House of the Seven Gables*; and, finally, *Tales of the Five Senses*, written when Gerald Griffin was already throwing off the *cocoon* which had hidden the Religious. But we believe that in point of time, *The Christian Physiologist* (as this last-mentioned series was also called) was not precisely the last written or published. Besides all which, reckon the drama of *Gysippus*, written before he was twenty, a great quantity of songs and sonnets, *The Fate of Cathleen* (a charming ballad), and the beautiful poem of *Matt Hyland*, the most perfect, perhaps, of his productions, a gem of its kind, the MS. of which he destroyed when he became a Christian Brother, so that what we have of it is, unfortunately, defective in some stanzas.

Now, here is a very tolerable literary fecundity for a man who quitted letters at thirty-five; to say nothing of his incessant labors for the first few years, on magazines and literary newspapers to gain his bread; and thus much certainly must be said, that few literary men retiring at that age have left to the world a more brilliant, and none a more unblemished fame. Of few men of genius could it be said with equal truth, that they never wrote “one line which dying they would wish to blot;” and yet such was the nicety of his conscience, that long before he thought of dying (except to the world), he wished to blot the whole, and was only restrained from doing so by the pure impossibility. The struggles, the success, the morbid or the well-chosen retirement from this world (as it may be) of this

Irish boy, who adventured himself in the great world of London at the age of nineteen with a MS. tragedy for his capital, genius for his reliance, and the hope of "rivaling Shakspeare and Scott" for his incentive and consolation, are related with pious minuteness in the Memoir which accompanies the American edition. A little more vigor and condensation would not have been amiss in this literary biography, the trials of our Gerald not being greater than those of nearly all literary adventurers, nor at all peculiar to him: as, indeed, there is little that is peculiar in his life but its purity, and nothing that is salient except that renunciation of the world with which it concludes.

In estimating the literary genius of Griffin, there is a difficulty arising from his age, and another from his very limited experience of life. It is almost always a pity when a genius rushes early into print. Griffin was only four-and-twenty when *Holland-Tide* was published; *Gysippus*, his play, was written in his teens; and the interval between them was filled with incessant labor, as a contributor to reviews, reviser of MSS. for publication—in short, as a literary hack. Think of all the virgin freshness of a young genius being used up in this barren toil. No doubt Gerald gained in point of facility, but he lost in point of concentration. He drew too early and too heavily on his genius, which can no more be done with impunity than on the bodily health. The treasures of artistic observation were spent as fast as they were acquired. He worked his talent as a Western farmer maltreats the rich soil of a virgin prairie, raising crop after crop, without giving anything back, neither manuring nor deep-ploughing, until the surface (and he never gets below the surface) has lost all its plastic material, and nothing short of a course of guano and clamshells can restore its perished fertility. Now and then there is a genius so consummate, or so precocious in its maturity, that from the very first start it dashes into renown, and keeps its place to the last. But ordinarily, the power that is destined for a magnificent development has to be kept back by pruning and clipping. The novelist especially needs a profound and extensive experience, a steady hand, a ripened calm in his heart, such as time alone can add to the native glow of the imagination and the genial thrill of the creative passions. Scott was near forty

when he published *Waverley*; he was already older than Gerald Griffin at the period of his retirement. Shakspeare, too, wrote his plays in the maturity of manhood. Milton, Dante, Homer, sang their divine poems when age had tamed the fire of their passion. There is a species of literary orgasm which depends on the same cause that colors the dreams of youth with poetry, and which disappears with the reveries of tender sentiment. The poetical inspiration of women rarely survives the critical period of life; and that which in men comes with the beard, and cools down as the latter turns gray, is equally suspicious. We cannot say, nor do we in fact suppose, that this was at all the case with Gerald Griffin, who died too young for us to know it; his was rather a true genius, too early tasked; a vein too soon exhausted. Not that he could ever have rivalled Shakspeare as a dramatist, or surpassed Scott as a fictionist—a task of infinitely inferior difficulty; for such men are the creation of centuries, the expression of the gifts of nations:

“A thousand streams one river make—
Thus Genius, Heaven-directed,
Conjoins all separate veins of power
In one great soul-creation;
And blends a million men to make
The Poet of the nation.”

And, moreover, it is only *nations* that produce these marvels; and they produce them in virtue of their unity. Whatever cause weakens the sentiment of national unity, destroys that interior principle of artistic unity, to which the works of genius only supply the expression. Without doubt, Ireland feels the operation of this law, which impedes the creation of an Irish national literature more than all other causes combined. What gives unity to *Waverley*? Had Scott ever meditated on the unities? He has violated them all, technically speaking; but the sentiment of nationality guided him to the true unity of dramatic action in his story. How is it that he has attached an immortal interest to every scene that he has described? Because he has attached those scenes to the historic idea of Scotland; it is in causing that idea to seize the imagination of the world, as it already possessed his own, that he has flooded the hills and lakes and castles and cottages of his native

land with a poetical glory. Some people suppose that because a country has beautiful scenery, wild and rugged mountains, picturesque traditions, clans and wars and bards, and all that, a man of genius could make out of it, in a literary point of view, what Scott made out of Scotland. Fatal mistake! These are but the ingredients of the incantation; the magical wand of the enchanter is wanting. Ireland has all these, and more than these, and a people more picturesque than the Scotch; but she lacks the interior unity of faith, laws, and manners, and the exterior unity of national independence. As a Catholic nation (which she is), she has not and never had any autonomy. It is not in the nature of nations to bring forth poets, until they have brought forth liberators. Bruce and Wallace preceded Scott and Burns, who are inconceivable without them. The poet whom we have already quoted, an Irishman and a noble one, has well expressed it; he speaks of Scotland, but it is evident that his own country is in his mind, and in singing the eulogy of Caledonia, he insinuates the apology of Erin:

“ From age to age that land had paid
 No alien throne submission :
 For feudal faith had been her Law,
 And freedom her Tradition.
 Where frowned the rocks, had Freedom smiled,
 Sung, ‘mid the shrill wind’s whistle—
 So England prized her garden Rose,
 But Scotland loved her Thistle.

* * * * *

“ Can song be false where hearts are sound ?
 Weak doubts—away we fling them !
 The land that breeds great men, great deeds,
 Shall ne’er lack bards to sing them.
 That vigor, sense, and mutual truth
 Which baffled each invader,
 Shall fill her marts, and feed her arts,
 While peaceful olives shade her.”*

We incline to think that we have here lighted upon the true reason why Gerald Griffin was not an Irish Walter Scott. It is easy to talk of accidents. A revolution broke out and spoiled the novel market, says Gerald’s biographer, and his publisher thought the same. Strange indeed, that

* Aubrey de Vere. “To Burns’s ‘Highland Mary.’”

the first three volumes of the *Munster Festivals* (comprising, *Card Drawing*, *The Half Sir*, and *Suil Dhuv*), though they were "said by those to whose judgment the publishers had submitted them, 'to be equalled only by the author of *Waverley* in their national portraitures and sketches of manners,'" netted Gerald only about £250. "The novel trade had declined so much," says the author of the *Life*! But an Irish "*Waverley*" would have raised it from its decline, as by the touch of an enchanter's wand. And how much did the *Munster Festivals* lack of being an Irish *Waverley*? By being three stories instead of one, in the first place. By a most remarkable defect of interior unity in each separate tale, in the second place. Of these three, *Suil Dhuv* is far the finest, and yet it contains some very striking anomalies in composition. There is one heroine for the first part of the story, and another for the conclusion. The latter heroine is not even introduced until the closing scene—the *denouement*—is ripe, and all the other actors are in motion to accomplish it: Gerald Griffin takes that opportunity to suspend the action in order to bring Miss Lilly Byrne upon the scene; he indulges us with a fascinating description of her person and dress, traces her love-affair with Mr. Robert Kumba, reduces her nearly to the grave with disappointed affection, kills her father quite, and, what shall we say more? brings her finally to the point where *Suil Dhuv* (who is waiting for her all this time) is to carry her off. The early part of the story exhibits the same fault of construction. The old Palatine and his companion are very picturesquely introduced, when a simple remark of the former draws on the narration of all that has happened from the childhood of *Suil Dhuv* to the present moment, not related by the Palatine, to whom a great part of the history is yet unknown, but by the author. After continuing this narrative through the chapter, and half of another, the author coolly adds: "We now find it necessary to return to our travellers. * * * After riding about two miles further, &c." This is certainly not the art of story telling.

Gerald Griffin's tales abound in digressions; some one is always ready to tell a story, and capitally told it is. These episodes are often the most charming part of the work to the unity of which they do not contribute. Some

personage, too, is sure to be poetical, which affords Gerald an opportunity of interweaving one of his own agreeable songs; but they are always his own, and he takes no trouble whatever to render them characteristic of their supposed authors. This want of dramatic consistency in his characters occurs in more serious instances, as for example in *Tracy's Ambition*, the admirable plot of which is ruined by it. Dalton, the villain of the story, describes Irish scenery with the graphic and poetic vein of Griffin himself, and lets fall sentiments in regard to the country, which belong to a philosophic philanthropist. There is nothing in which the *coup d'œil* of the master in fiction is more unequivocally displayed than in the avoidance of this fatal impropriety. Gerald Griffin wrote rapidly, and seldom or never corrected his work. As it came from his pen, so it went to the press. His biographer boasts of this facility, than which nothing is more facile: but the question is not did he revise and correct his work or not, but did it need correction and revision. The best writers probably fall into the same faults in the heat of composition; but a sound judgment points them out afterwards, and a patient industry removes them. That Gerald Griffin wrote this series in four months, and completed that tale in two, is a poor lesson for young writers, unless they are told that in consequence the series is full of serious faults, and that the plot of the tale is disjointed, its *denouement* unskilful, and that in fine all the genius lavished on it has failed to produce a masterpiece. This was the error of a young writer, and perhaps we may add of a necessitous one. Griffin wrote for daily bread, hence he had no time to perfect his works; which is another illustration of the maxim of Scott, that "Literature is a very good staff, but a very poor crutch."

But if these are the defects of Gerald Griffin as a writer, and we think we have handled them with sufficient plainness, what are his merits? The first and most conspicuous is his delineation of Irish character; next, ranks his insight into human nature; then, his vivid apprehension of the supernatural; and among minor excellences, his vivacious dialogue, his high descriptive power; and lastly, the beauty and purity of his English style.

The prose style of Gerald Griffin is very unequal; in many parts of his stories, it is exceedingly careless; and

yet, though it cannot be compared with the uniform elegance of Irving, it often possesses a clear and simple beauty which can only be matched by the author of the *Sketch-Book*. Some passages in the *Collegians* and the *Invasion* can hardly be surpassed in this respect; and where the style does not attain to absolute beauty, or even falls short of absolute correctness, it is never disfigured by fustian, is always simple and of a crystalline clearness. The directness and simplicity of his narrative is one of the traits in which he most resembles Scott. There is a quiet consciousness of power in this unpretending manner of telling a story, which at once lifts Gerald Griffin above the crowd of novel-writers to the dignity of a classic.

His powers of description are, upon the whole, very great; although the school in which he learned to describe, his own haste, and perhaps some of the defects to which we have before alluded, cause him to overload his descriptions with minute detail. In description, he belongs to the real school, not to the epic. Frequently, the first few lines of a descriptive passage in his novels set before you the scene with great vividness and beauty; but as he proceeds, he adds circumstance after circumstance, the whole becomes confused, and you end by getting no distinct image whatever. The most charming *pictures* in his tales are of the Shannon scenery. The finest single scene is, perhaps, the description of an Irish waterfall in the *Rivals*. The pencil of Church could hardly have done it better. Here we have first a "glen of pine and birch wood," then "a broken stream, half smitten into foam by the long descent," and rushing betwixt a mountain, clad to the top with the trees before mentioned, and a "crag, steep, stern, and precipitous." Down this glen roars the cataract, "now flinging itself in one impetuous mass over the brow of the precipice, now split into a multitude of milky streams," now dashing its concentrated and frothing force against the "deep-founded masses of black rock, that seemed to *shoulder its strength aside* with imperturbable facility," now outspreading in a foamy sheet upon a broad tablet of everlasting granite, "half screened by hanging trees," and again falling heavily, "with an exhausted plash, over a low ledge of rock, into a deep and troubled basin." The mountains and the turf beneath the beholder's feet, "tremble with

the far-driven concussion of the mass of waters, and the foliage shivers in the breathless air."

The modern novel is essentially a substitute for the stage, as this Review has heretofore contended, and as Gerald Griffin himself used to consider. Description, then, supplies the place of the shifting scenery; it also clothes the characters and "makes them up" for their parts. All this portion of a story should be so managed as to blend with the general sentiment; it should also be rapid, never suspending the action longer than is absolutely necessary; and should be so introduced as at once to be motived by the story, and to irradiate it, in fine, with the kind of *instantaneous* effect which is produced in a theatre by the change of the scenes. Hence, descriptive power is an essential quality of the novel-writer; without it, the tale degenerates into mere dialogue. Scott describes admirably landscapes, interiors, and persons, even to their costume. How vividly Meg Merrilies and Dominie Sampson are set before us! There are glimpses in the works of our author of a faculty which might easily have been matured into a similar power; take, for instance, the old Irish witch in *Card Drawing*, and Danny Mann in the *Collegians*. The portrait of Lilly Byrne in *Suil Dhuw* proves Gerald's taste in female beauty to have been exquisitely refined; altogether, we have so far the native elements which go to the making of a great novelist. Add the vivacity of his dialogue, which he considered the test of a story, and which is a great proof of a distinct and vigorous conception of individual character. But the last is a point of which we shall speak presently.

Those minor stories of Gerald's in which his genius reveals itself so unequivocally, are mostly imbued with the supernatural. How should an Irish tale be at all national without this element? To be original, by the way, is always (for a poet or novelist) to be national. The English taste of the period when Griffin wrote was all for reality, as he himself observes. Yet, although he was strictly a London man of letters, writing for the great British public (who are catered for by Irish genius to an extent of which they have no conception), the ideal, the supernatural, and the miraculously Providential, pervade his happiest and most popular stories. He differs in this respect most re-

markably from Carleton, Lever, and most of his gifted rivals and compatriots; and that is why we are inclined to take him, agreeably (we think) to the general verdict, as the most truly Irish of them all. The *Rock of the Candle* (a beautiful Irish superstition, woven into a perfectly national and patriotic tale), *Owney and Owney Napeak*, *The Story Teller at Fault*, *The Swans of Lir*, *The Brown Man*, *Phadrig's Dilemma*, and other stories, expressly founded on supernatural legends, show this characteristic and national tendency of his mind. But besides those entire stories which as a whole belong to this category, he has interspersed in others short legendary narratives of the same description, in all cases most exquisitely told, like that in the *Rivals*, illustrating—

“Happy is the bride that the sun shines on,
Happy is the corpse that the rain rains upon.”

There is also yet another sign of a genius for weird narrative, which we find in Gerald Griffin, viz.: that without going beyond strict probability, he infuses an air of mystery that has all the effect of a supernatural incident. Such is the dream of Aquila in the *Duke of Monmouth*, when her brother “stooped down (in the dream) and pressing her arm, whispered some words into her ear, the purport of which she could not distinctly gather, but which heard even partially as they were, filled all her soul, she knew not why, with a piercing and almost intolerable melancholy.” “She wished to hear them all, and urged him to repeat what he had said; but he refused to do so, nor could all her entreaties induce him to say again what he had said. She woke while pressing him to speak, *but now could call to mind no portion either of the words or meaning of the whisper she had heard him utter.*”

The tale in which this remarkable passage occurs is noticeable. It is the *Duke of Monmouth*, an English historical novel, of a period so comparatively recent that the introduction of any distinct supernatural element would have been impossible: yet Gerald Griffin contrives to produce all the effect of a ghost rising to warn the heroine of the treachery of Kirke, and vanishing with a movement of silent lips that refuse to tell their tale of horror! We see at once that her brother, though yet living, is marked for

the grave, and that the sacrifice she is about to make for him will be fruitless. In the romances of Hawthorne, who has been driven by the necessities of a New England *locale*, and by the tendencies of his own weird inspiration, to employ similar expedients, we find nothing more admirable.

The peculiar power which is here indicated is intimately allied to that profound and instinctive knowledge of the secret springs of human character, so necessary to the dramatist and the novel writer. Wherever the peculiar faculty thus implied is absent, there may be a keen power of observation, and a talent for caricature, but never the immortal and creative inspiration which makes the Scotts and the Shakespeares. There is Carleton, for example, one of the closest observers and best describers, who ever delineated Irish life, but who never penetrates below the surface of motive and character. Hence we find in his tales, sometimes a broad caricature, very forcible no doubt and laughable, and at others a sort of blubbery pathos, both which are in their way untruthful. *Phelim O'Toole* is a good example of the one, and *The Poor Scholar* of the other variety. The humor and the pathos of Dickens belong to the same school. There is nothing like this in Gerald Griffin, who is often deficient in art, but never untrue to nature; or, if this appear rather too antithetical, we may certainly say that his analysis of character is penetrating and true, but that the construction of his narrative is careless and unskilful. It is a sort of Irish genius after all, you see, is Gerald Griffin,—brilliant in perception, deficient in organizing power. For, the want of national organization reacts (as we have already observed) upon the genius of individuals; immense is the debt, then, that a nation owes to the exalted and elect individuality who first organizes it into unity by his wisdom, or achieves its independence by his valor; and wo worth the day for her, when his memory ceases to be in benediction.

Open the *Rivals* at the first page, and read the scene in the Dispensary:

“ ‘ Docthor, darling.’ ”

“ ‘ Docthor, I’m here since mornin’ !’ ”

“ ‘ Docthor, let me go, an’ the heavens bless you. I’m as wake as a piece of wet paper.’ ”

“ ‘ Glory to your soul, docthor, ashore, an’ gi’ me some thing

for this thremblin' I have. I do be thrembling always, like a straw upon the water.'

" ' Docthor, I *hear* a great pain in my foot, sir. I declare I cried that bottle full to-day morning, with it.'

" ' That was a fine physick you ga' me last night, long life to your honor. It walked me all over. It sarched me finely, long life to your honor.'

" ' There isn't a bit I ate, docthor, this time back, but what I get a *conceit* again' it the minute afther.'

" ' Docthor, I can make no hand o' my head at all, these days.'

" ' Oh, docthor, what'll I do at all with these ears of mine? I'm partly deaf always, an' whenever I do be, I hear great sounds an' nizes, waves dashin' again' the bank, and birds whistlin' an'—boo! an' *candlesticks*; an' when I'm deaf entirely, it's then I hear all the bells in Ireland ringin' in my ears.'

" ' Docthor, I have a great *express* upon my heart.'

" ' That girl, sir, that you saw yesterday evening was bad entirely afther you goin'! Oh, she began screechin' in a manner, that if the priest was at the doore, you'd think he wouldn't overtake her; an' every bit of her so hot, that you'd imagine the clothes would light about her, an' her face the whole time as red *as if you threw a bowl o' blood in it!*'

" ' Docthor, a' ra gal! Docthor, darlin', Docthor, asthore! Oh, ma gra hu! Ma grien chree hu, Docthor! an' let me go!'"

What a poetical glow in every phrase of these patients! You may wait long enough before you get such a burst of poetry from Englishmen or Americans similarly situated. That is the charm which pictures of Irish life in the lower orders have over those describing the manners of any other peasantry in the world. In the English peasantry, described under the happiest effect of light and shade, you never get beyond the crude and commonplace elements of ignorance, simplicity, selfishness and a certain boorish honesty; in Scotland, you obtain the additional features of intense pride among the Gaelic, and of puritanical cant among the lowland population; the Irish peasant is quick-witted, a skilful flatterer, a fierce revenger; but he is a born poet; his common conversation is dramatic, and his life alternates between a comedy that you are never tired of laughing at, and a tragedy to move stones to tears.

Has any one described the Irish peasant upon the whole so well as Gerald Griffin? We think not. And the proof is that no other writer has rendered Irish character in the lower orders so poetical. We often shrink with disgust from

the delineations of Carleton, but Gerald Griffin's Irishmen are never vulgar. It certainly must arise in part from the religious faith of Griffin that he is so successful in this respect, even when he is setting before us some unmitigated rascal. Nothing is so necessary for a writer, in order that he may worthily describe a people, as to be in harmony with them himself. We all have a vulgar, commonplace and earthly side; and all, too, have a poetic, a heavenly, and a beautiful aspect; but if that which is holiest, if that which redeems, exalts, and glorifies a people, is not understood, how can justice be done them? No Protestant, no Catholic not deeply religious, can possibly paint fairly such a people as the Irish, whose moral, historical, and national unity, down to the current *Annum Domini*, is constituted by their faith.

It is not at all implied in this eulogium of Gerald Griffin, that he has sacrificed truth to poetry in describing his countrymen. On the contrary, he has been fearfully candid. In *Tracy's Ambition* we have an Irishman of the middle class, more consistently mean than Thackeray ever painted, under the inspiration of his malice. Certainly the Irish witnesses in the *Collegians* are not flattered, yet it is impossible to be otherwise than fascinated, as well as amused, by their ingenious insincerity, and its perfect triumph over all the resources of the examining magistrate. Such wicked wretches as Suil Dhuv and his white-haired partner in crime—the palsied villain Rody, the cowardly murderer, Fitz Maurice, Danny Mann, and his meaner master, and Black Yamon of the *Hand and Word*, are pretty specimens of Irish human nature as an enemy would wish to portray. Heaven save us from falling into the hands of such villains, outside of a book! Betwixt the two covers of a novel of character, and of *national* character, they have quite a different interest. In the *Knight of the Sheep* we have a pair of Irish *sons*, who are too natural not to be after the life, and who deserve, as does the story itself, more special notice. The Knight of the Sheep is an Irish King Lear in middle life, with two unnatural and ungrateful sons instead of the same number of ungrateful daughters. But Shamus and Guillaum Taafe—why, each of them fairly “out-gomerils Gomeril!” The beauty of this story is the rendering of so classic a theme in an Irish dress.

But the expedient by means of which the old man thricks his boys into taking him back, is richly Hibernian. He borrows some gold of a farmer, and goes to count it "under the kitchen-garden wall." The daughters-in-law and the two ungrateful sons discover him:—"You done very wrong, Shamus," said Guillaum, 'ever to turn out the ould father as you done. *See, now, what we all lost by it.* That's a part of the money he laid by from year to year, an' we never 'll see a penny of it.'"

"At this," adds the author, satirically, "they all felt the greatest remorse for the manner in which they had acted to the old man." So the old man is brought home again, with a heavy box, which is deposited in his chamber. He receives abundant attention from the young people, but in grief for the loss of his virtuous youngest son (the *Cordelia* of the story), he soon draws near his end. The dying scene is too edifying to be omitted:

"Whatever cause I had to complain of ye, Shamus and Guillaum, that's all past and gone now, and it is right that I should leave you some little remembrance for all the trouble I gave you since my coming home. Do you see that chest over there?"

"Ah, father! what chest?" cried the sons. 'Don't be talkin' of it for a chest.'

"Well, my good boys," said the knight, 'my will is in that chest, so I need tell you no more.'

"Don't speak of it, father," said Shamus, 'for as the Latin poet says:—

"Non possidentem multa
Recte beatum." [the hypocrite!]

Only as you're talkin' of it at all for a chest, where's the key, father?"

"Ah, Shamus!" said the knight, 'you were always great at the Latin. The key is in my waistcoat pocket.'

"Soon after he expired. The two sons, impatient to inspect their treasure, could hardly wait until the old man ceased to breathe. While Shamus unlocked the chest, Guillaum remained to keep the door fast.

"Well, Shamus," said his brother, 'what do you find there?'

"A parcel of stones, Guillaum!"

"Nonsense, man, try what's undher 'em."

"Shamus complied, and found at the bottom of the box a rope with a running noose at the end, and a scroll of paper, from which Shamus read the following sentence aloud for the information of his brother:—

“‘THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BRYAN TAAFE, COMMONLY CALLED THE KNIGHT OF THE SHEEP.

“‘*Imprimis.* To my two sons, Shamus and Guillaum, I bequeath the whole of the limestones contained in this box, in return for their disinterested love and care of me ever since the day when they saw me counting the gold near the kitchen-garden.

“‘*Item.* I bequeath the rope herein contained for any father to hang himself who is so foolish as to give away his property to his heirs before his death.’

“‘Well, Shamus,’ said Guillaum, ‘the poor father laid out a dale on our education; but I declare all the taichin’ he ever gave us was nothing to that.’”

If this is not a delineation of Irish character, what is?

There is indeed less of sham sentimentality in the works of Gerald Griffin than in those of almost any other Irish novelist. Hence his pathos is genuine pathos, and when he gives the people credit for virtue you can heartily believe him. There is in this bold style of treatment a generous confidence in the strength of the Irish cause, which its advocates too often seem to lack. Gerald Griffin’s nationality implied genuine sympathy for his countrymen, a deep-seated respect and veneration for his native land—its faith, its history, its essential character, and its holy and patriotic traditions. He had the noble courage, therefore, to paint Ireland as she is; and the fidelity of the portrait, while it makes his fame as an artist, possesses, in the eyes of the world, that beauty and dignity which must always attach to the true and unaffected picture of a Catholic people. Indeed, first of all in his hands, the Irish dialect of the English language and the peculiarities of Irish provincialism in accent, character, and mental traits become, like those of Scotland in the hands of Scott and Burns, invested with a halo of poetry. This is one of the attributes of poetry and romantic fiction, which show us how much every historic nation—every nation which aspires to respect itself and to love and cherish its own peculiarities—owes to its men of literary genius.

The novel of *The Invasion*, so far as we know, is the only Irish historical novel of the highest class ever attempted; it is admirably conceived, and though upon the whole the execution must be regarded as a failure, it gives us a higher idea of the author’s latent powers than any other of his works, not excepting *Suil Dhuv* and *The*

Collegians. We attach no faith to the theory insinuated by the writer in his preface—that the work was not designed for an historical novel: this was an after-thought, and a mere instinctive apology for the defects of which Gerald Griffin could not have been unconscious. The plot of the *Invasion* is as follows:—

O'Headha is the chief of the Ithians, in the reign of Nial Frassach, king of Ireland, about the beginning of the ninth century, that is, in the time of Charlemagne. The story opens with the ceremonies attending the marriage of the O'Headha with Matha, daughter of O'Driscol, the Canfinny or head of the sept of that name. It is not a felicitous opening, inasmuch as it plunges the reader at once into a labyrinth of antiquarian learning, which takes from the tale the character of a narrative in its very inception. Among the chiefs present is one who takes no part in the religious ceremony, and we learn that this is the chieftain of the "hooded race," a Druid people, who still retain the old pagan superstition. Hence an altercation which but for the interposition of a bishop and of the Canfinny would have terminated in mortal combat. Before the end of the year occurs a skirmish between the Ithians and the Druids; the latter are defeated; O'Headha and Baseg, his brother, and the *thanist*, or successor to his rank and power, follow on beyond their men, and, most mysteriously, the victorious O'Headha is slain. The *thanist* should now succeed, but he is unpopular with the clan, and being suspected of attempts on his brother's life, his claim is rejected in favor of Matha's new-born son, the posthumous child of O'Headha. Baseg attempts to enforce his claims, is defeated, and obliged to fly. He takes refuge with the Druids, by whom he is received with open arms. Baseg makes several attempts to carry off the young O'Headha in his infancy.

The tale then traces the education of the young chieftain, first at home, then at a famous abbey on the shores of the Senan or Shannon. Griffin takes this opportunity to interweave a graphic and highly interesting sketch of the early history of Erin, which brings us down to the convent college of Muingharidh. We are then introduced to the second hero of the story, in the shape of a new scholar from Inismore, or Great Britain. Gerald's national feelings

are well displayed in bringing a young Englishman of this early period to Ireland for education, as well as in describing the ridicule which his appearance and costume excite, and the taunts which he undergoes in regard to the slave trade then existing between Ireland and England, by which the English peasantry were still frequently sold into servitude in "Inisfail." He also gives us the history of Kenric, the new hero, *ab initio*, whereby for a chapter or two the scene is transferred to England. From the convent, at sixteen, the young O'Headha, whose Christian name is Elim, is transferred to the military school of Tamrach, where for two years he learns the art of war. In fine, at twenty he returns home an accomplished prince. He is greeted by his clansmen with the devoted and enthusiastic attachment of an Irish sept for their chief. On closing his five-and-twentieth year, he is invested with the government, and devotes himself to its duties in an enlightened spirit, which, though attributed by the author to the ninth century, reads more like that of the nineteenth.

Next, we have an adventure. The young O'Headha, in a military affray with the Hooded People, is drawn on to pursue them alone into their own fastnesses, into the wildly beautiful Coom-na-Druid, where he arrives in the midst of the pagan festival of Samhuin, and is made prisoner. We witness the ceremonies of the Druids, and are introduced to the heroine, niece of the Ard-Draithe or Druid chief, but herself a Christian; which, after the manner of Griffin, entails a fresh digression, viz.: the history and education of the lovely Aithne, told as a perfectly fresh story. While the Druid ceremonies are proceeding, we get at the mode of educating a young Christian princess of those times, as we have already had that of a young Christian prince; and also we accompany Aithne on a visit to the "Sepulchre of the Kings" of Inisfail. In conversation with Aithne, on whom the task of entertaining the stranger devolves, Elim of course falls in love, as the reader does, with the charming and highly cultivated Irish princess. The Druid ceremonies are strange, picturesque, and beautiful; in the midst of them returns Tuathal, son of the Ard-Draithe, who recognizes Elim as the slayer of one of his followers in that morning's raid. The Ithian is seized and condemned to die. Leaving him in this predicament, the

author returns to resume the history of Kenric the Englishman.

This is one of Gerald Griffin's best drawn characters, in which he satirizes with great power the infirmities of the literary aspirant. The story of Kenric is told with an artful naturalness that shows the writer to be at home in it. After pursuing it for some chapters, we return to the captive Elim, who is suddenly liberated by the intercession of Aithne. The heathen death of the old Ard-Draithe, the ceremonies of his burial, the election of Tuathal as his successor, the wise administration of O'Headha, and the love-passages between him and Aithne come next in order. The story advances rather slowly, as modern sentiment is rather a drag on the action of a time so stirring, and we hear nothing yet of the "Invasion."

Kenric, the Northumbrian, was left travelling in England with a wandering book-vender. This turns out to be the *third* hero of the story—a Swede, named Inguar. We now return to this pair, and on pretence that Inguar has related his story to Kenric, the author, in his usual manner, commences the life of the Swede, and carries it on independently of every thing else, during eleven chapters, in which (the rest of the story standing still) we have a full description of the Vikings, the Scandinavian temples, gods, priests, rites, and manners. Returning to Kenric, we have merely an adventure in which the old thanist, Baseg, is introduced, still yearning for vengeance, and the recovery of his inheritance and power.

In England, whither he has come on his way to Iona to obtain the consent of the abdicated Ard-Righ, the friend of Aithne's father, to his marriage with that young lady, Elim again encounters Kenric, and carries him back with him to Inisfail. On their return they happen upon the Feis Tamrach or grand national assembly of the princes of Ireland, extraordinarily convened on account of a threatened *invasion* by the Northmen. Nothing can be more abrupt or inartificial than the manner in which this important assembly is introduced. It is described with a picturesque splendor that really rivals any similar scene in the Waverley novels. Aithne is present, and adds her feminine charm to the description. The occasion is also seized, with admirable judgment, to introduce a discussion between

Elim and Kenric on the ancient Irish laws, to which, with true philosophic acumen, the former traces the "unhappy spirit of disunion" which has ever distinguished Ireland. To the twin customs of gavel-kind and thanistry, specious and popular—but at war, the one, with the idea of individual property; the other, with the regular and uniform transmission of authority, whether by election or descent—he justly ascribes the imperfect civilization of his country. The former ruins the family; the latter precludes the unity and organization of the State.

It is now, in fact, that the true action of "The Invasion" commences. Inguar re-appears on the scene, and attempts to corrupt Kenric. Kenric falls in love with Aithne, and is tempted to betray his friend. The Northmen appear in the Coom-na-Druid, and Baseg, acting as their high-priest (for the ancient thanist has apostatized from the Christian faith), causes Aithne to be condemned as a virgin-sacrifice to the bloody gods of the invaders. In this crisis, Elim invades the Coom, to rescue his love. A battle ensues between the Ithians and the Northmen; the latter are defeated; and Aithne is rescued by the repentant Kenric, just as Baseg (recently discovered to be the murderer of his brother the O'Headha) is about to kill her at the foot of the iron altar of the "Incendiary." This plot is well-contrived; it is only the execution that fails; there is a fatal indistinctness in the narrative; the order of events is confused by their number and rapidity; the battle is too complicated to be understood; and the agencies at work are too numerous to be followed without difficulty. For all that, the interest is kept up to the final scene. The minute antiquarian learning with which the tale is overloaded injures its effect as a story but slightly, in comparison to the absence of proportion between the different parts of the action, and to the excessive looseness of the construction, which carries Gerald Griffin's characteristic faults to their utmost extreme. They are the same which we observed in *Suil Dhuv*, rendered even more flagrant by the elaborate plot which they mar. The character of Kenric is, however, a psychological masterpiece, and gives, as we have already intimated, the highest idea of the author's latent capabilities.

We have scarcely alluded to the character of Gerald

Griffin as a poet. Several of his songs possess that universal popularity which is the best test of excellence. Such is—

“A place in thy memory, dearest,”

which every young lady who has a voice and piano, has played and sung at some time or other. As a song-writer he belongs to the school of Moore, or perhaps we might say to the Irish school of which Moore is the best representative. Few have known so well how to interweave Irish words in English songs, with a pathetic effect, as in—

“The mie-na-mallah now is past,
O wirra-sthru! O wirra-sthru!
And I must leave my home at last,
O wirra-sthru! O wirra-sthru!
I look into my father’s eyes,
I hear my mother’s parting sighs,—
Ah! fool to pine for other ties—
O wirra-sthru! O wirra-sthru!”

Or in “My Mary of the curling hair,” to the air “Shule a-gra,” which words, and some more which we don’t understand a syllable of, are mingled in very musically, in one of the sweetest love-songs poet ever penned. These things are suited to music, like the well-known “Aileen aroon,” and “I love my love in the morning.” Why, even the famous General Morris has not written any songs more popular than these among the daughters of America, who little think as they sing them, that the author was an Irish Catholic, who at thirty-eight quitted the muses, and ended his life in the quaint garb and lowly religious retirement of a “Christian Brother.” But this poet, whose love-songs are so sweetly amorous, and who, in the *Fate of Cathleen*, has depicted the passion with a glow not unworthy of Robby Burns or Anacreon Moore, is the same who wrote:

“That Virtue, humble, simple, fair,
Is all the knowledge worth our care;
That heavenly wisdom is a thing,
Above the flight of reason’s wing;
That human genius cannot sound
The depths in which her truth is found,
While a poor peasant’s simple prayer
Will find her always watching there.
That learning oft is but a rod—
That he knows all who loves his God;

And every other eye is dim,
Save theirs who hope and trust in Him.
Willing to serve is truly free ;
Obedience is best liberty ;
And man's first power—a bended knee."

Matt Hyland, which he attempted to destroy, is a ballad of very sweet and flowing versification, something diluted perhaps, the fruit hidden in that leafy luxuriance of words which characterizes Irish poetry. As a specimen of what Wordsworth calls "that dear production of our days, the metrical novel," it does great credit to Gerald Griffin; and yet one can understand how a poet whose taste was formed on the masterpieces of Campbell, should have destroyed it. Whether a poet has the right to deprive us not only of some of his happiest verses, but of the means of estimating his genius as it merits, is a subtle question for casuists. It only remains for us to speak of the Play of *Gysippus*, in order to complete the general view which we have endeavored to take of Griffin's works. The brilliant success which it had at Drury Lane, shows that *Gysippus* is a good acting play: it does not possess any remarkable poetic beauties, but its construction must be good, or it would not stand the test of performance. The main action is improbable, in attributing to Pagans a power of self-abnegation which flourishes only on soil fertilized with the blood of the Cross. Interior consistency is further violated by representing *Gysippus*, after a sacrifice which a Christian only could have made, as feeling all the desolation of a heathen. One must remember, in reading the play, that the author was only nineteen when he composed it. As a proof of his native capacity it is striking; as a work to be judged on its intrinsic merits, it cannot claim a very high rank. The fame of Griffin must rest ultimately on the *Collegians*, on *The Invasion*, which reveals even higher qualities, on the beautiful tales of Irish legendary and preternatural lore, in which he surpasses all his countrymen, and on a few of his songs—gems, as they doubtless are, of lyric grace and feeling.

It will be in vain to expect any unanimity of opinion here below on the question of Gerald Griffin's retirement from the world. Some will regard it as an act of heroic virtue, or at least of obedience to a heavenly vocation that

supersedes in itself all earthly ambitions, all merely social and domestic claims. Others will persist in thinking that Gerald Griffin was disappointed; that his success, though in one sense brilliant, still fell short of his aspirations; that he was sensible of a comparative failure in that respect; that his powers had become exhausted, and his mind morbid. It is, however, quite certain that Gerald felt keenly the precariousness of a literary support: which would go to show that he took a common sense view of things. His later scruples in regard to a literary career, the destruction of his MSS., and his endeavoring to stop the circulation of his published works, are circumstances which favor the supposition of a morbid influence.

But let us allow that this was really the case—the question still remains:—is not religious retirement the appropriate cure and remedy of that morbidness which springs from excessive and premature intellectual toil, and disappointed literary ambition? Is it not better than drinking or suicide—the terminations of so many literary careers? We recollect seeing in the papers not long since an account of the end of a great number of literary men in France, of the present generation; and even without either drunkenness or self-murder, there was enough that is appalling. “Coffee and licentiousness” were the causes of death to the majority, including such names as Balzac and Sue, men whose ambition was not disappointed, who were pampered with every kind of success. Gerald Griffin was an eminently cheerful Religious; his mind regained as a Christian Brother all its elastic force; and when he was struck down by typhus, he was already meditating a new literary activity appropriate to the sphere which he had chosen, and wherein he had found peace and hope and supernatural joy. If Heaven called him away before he was able to accomplish any thing in this new direction, may we not say that what he had done already, was accepted as sufficient? Certainly his writings are among the healthiest productions of Catholic literature: though he wrote (fortunately, we think) for a Protestant public, the tendency of his works is almost entirely in harmony with Catholic faith and morals; and it is even a fortunate thing for our prospective literature, that we possess such admirable models, the defects of which are almost entirely defects of mere art, defects which do not

hinder them from overflowing with genius, with geniality, with wit, with nature, with poetry, with philosophy; nor prevent their being free from every thing noxious, from every thing impure, from every thing mean. Here is a Catholic man of letters, who has never concealed his religion, who has known how to weave it into his stories as a legitimate source of interest to all his readers, and who has succeeded quite as fully as he was, by the artistic merit of his works, entitled to succeed. Surely, that is a great fact for us all. From the view that we have taken of the "Complete Works," and of the "Life" of Gerald Griffin, certain reflections have occurred to us in regard to American Catholic literature, reflections which we think will not appear forced.

Religious books are only a part, and by no means the most considerable part, of the literature of a Catholic people. Poetry and fiction, let the puritans say what they will, are legitimately included in it. Puritanism is not confined to Protestant sects; we find it inside the visible Church, where it is closely allied with Jansenism, so closely that wherever you detect the one, you may justly suspect at least the near neighborhood of the other. There is undoubtedly a difficulty (confining ourselves now to fiction) in the delineation of character and society as found among Protestants, because you must either do it from "the Catholic point of view," and that leads to a satirical mode of treatment, which is also tacitly controversial, and which, however recommended by wit and witty reason, Protestants will not bear, and few Catholics appreciate; or else you must take a purely natural stand-point, which is the next door to misprision of heresy. We won't exclude the satirical novel of society, for some superior genius may yet arise to disprove such a position by succeeding in that species; but evidently the more promising field is the delineation of Catholic life and Catholic ages. This points us to such countries as Italy, Southern Germany, Spain, France, Belgium, Ireland, and the Catholic portions of America; to the period of the crusades, of the Catholic colonization of America, to the primitive ages of Christianity. Catholic life in America at the present time, both in the higher and in the humbler classes of society, affords a fruitful theme, to which no one has even attempted to do justice.

The aim of the Catholic fictionist (for that is as wide a conclusion as can be drawn from the works of Griffin, we suppose) should not be *to please Catholics alone*, or even Catholics first; for if it is, he will not succeed in it: he should look to the general public. You may just as reasonably hope for a general sale of Catholic literature, under that name, as of Catholic sugar candy. People will buy the best, no matter how it is labelled. It is important that we should fix our principles on this point. Catholics will buy religious books recommended as Catholic, and subscribe for religious papers, but not literary or secular ones. They prefer a literature which the *world* is reading; and if you wish to give them a literature such as you think they ought to have, you must give it to the world too, and persuade the world to read it, or the Catholics won't. And the thing is not impossible. Gerald Griffin's books were popular, and where they missed popularity, it was from want of mere art. There is of course a great danger that in seeking general popularity, we shall be tempted to sacrifice principle, in order to secure it. This is a temptation which must be met like any other which attends living in the world; it besets the merchant, the mechanic, and the day-laborer, as well as the man of letters, and the latter has, therefore, no peculiar reason to complain of it.

We have observed that Gerald Griffin felt deeply the uncertainty of support which attends on the literary profession. He expresses somewhere, in the midst of his success, a great anxiety for some more assured means of subsistence. "Literature," as we have already quoted from Scott, "is a good staff," that is, a *help* to the natural limbs; "but a very poor crutch," that is, a bad *substitute* for them. Very few really great writers have depended on literature for their bread. Scott had an office; Irving was a foreign minister; Byron had an estate; Bulwer is rich patrimonially; Prescott was a man of fortune. Now in every organized society, there are numerous collateral resources for the man of letters. Offices, pensions, editorial chairs, college-professorships, furnish many with a living, without precluding the necessary leisure for the more genial pursuit. None of these resources are available for the Catholic man of letters, either in England or America. Carleton had a pension of £200 a year: Gerald Griffin would never have dreamed of such a

thing. Education with us is a monopoly of the religious orders; in fact, we have no position among ourselves for literary laymen, because except as a Church and in a spiritual sense, we are not an organized body—a fact which bears severely upon converts from the educated classes, of whom there is scarcely one whose subsequent career, however alleviated by consolations of which the world knows nothing, has not made him a spiritual scarecrow of the most effectual kind to deter others from following his example. It is to be hoped that the patience and constancy with which these sufferings are borne have a secret virtue that intercedes for our country; for the external and visible effect is deplorable enough. The cross—thank God!—is more mighty than learning, genius, eloquence, fame, prosperity, or aught else the world reveres.

But we repeat, the Catholic body, except in a religious sense, is a fiction. We have—let us praise God for that same!—an Irish community; and—not less indispensable—a German community: we have Irish and German associations, journals, etc.—but that is a totally different affair. These have the same relation to an organized Catholic society that a scaffolding has to a church—they are temporary organizations for temporary purposes; but, like every thing else that is not the Church itself or directly sustained by it, they will dissolve in the potent alembic of American life—and then where shall we be? American society is organized; but to the conquest of American society by Catholic ideas, there exists, we suspect, a profound and not very creditable indifference. Fatal indifference! for our countrymen cannot be saved unless they are converted—that is certain; and neither can we or our children (speaking in general terms); for unless we convert *them*, they will end by perverting *us*. And who will convert them? Pray, how have some been converted already? By a movement from within, not by any action of the Catholic Church! The conversions have been a spontaneous development, like a new miracle of Divine grace; and the converts by that grace have acted on others—it is the history of the whole affair, which no mortal can dispute. Now, what we infer is, that the educated converts were never meant to quit the bosom of the society in which they were born—but to remain in it, to labor in it, to impregnate it

with the new life they have received from the Catholic Church of Christ. This is that natural society which, as this Review has contended, the Church recognizes, blesses, instructs, and will yet transform. This offers us duties, a sphere, a career—humble, laborious, and ill-rewarded perhaps, but eminently useful, and in the end victorious. In any other point of view it is evident that we have no career, and no position at all. What career, we should like to know, has a man of letters, especially if a convert, in what is called the Catholic community as such, unless it be that of lecturing gratis for the benefit of our charities? What other rightful “position,” but that of an “illustrious” mendicant? If he is too independent for that, we may get him a situation as book-keeper, or set him to teaching a parochial school on a salary of 200 dollars per annum. Gerald Griffin manifested more shrewdness, haply, than we gave him credit for, when he became a Christian Brother: it was the only position consistent with a literary vocation that a layman could hold in the Catholic “body,” while celibacy and a cassock rendered its humble poverty honorable. Our convert is probably married; our young literary aspirant wishes to be so; that resource is not open to them. Let them make up their minds, then, that it is in the great world outside they have to succeed or fail. This point settled, their efforts will take a legitimate, a feasible, and a really useful direction.

This train of thought has been suggested to us by the career of Gerald Griffin. We see in him a Catholic man of letters, abounding in talent, adorned with singular and precocious gifts of genius, of irreproachable morals, of great industry, and who had the rare felicity of a new and unexplored field for his imagination in the history and the social features of his country. But that country possessed no distinct national organization apart from religion; her independence, her autonomy, she had either never enjoyed or had lost: it was a Catholic people with a Protestant government. Yet this young Irishman succeeded in a literary career, not by virtue of any support he derived from his own country, but in the great British world of letters, where he challenged comparison with such a name as Walter Scott. He succeeded without betraying either his faith or his race. He would have succeeded one can hardly guess how

much better, had Ireland been a free and organized nation in the same sense as Scotland is. The success that he had was due to the faithful, true, and loving picture which he drew of a living but oppressed, disunited, and unorganized Catholic people; it would have been greater had he possessed a better subject for his canvas, in a nation liberated, disenthralled and united, and could he have commanded a more solid position than that of a London literary hack. It was the difficulties and necessities of this position which, in our point of view, ultimately drove him from literature; when, being a Catholic, he became not a suicide or a misanthrope, but a Religious, and (if you please) almost a saint. From the contemplation of such a career, we could not but turn thoughtfully to our own beloved country, and to the position and duties of its Catholic men of letters, or those who aspire to be such; and we think, that the comparison is not at all discouraging.

J. V. H.

ART. IV.—*Censure de Cinquante-Six Propositions Extraites de divers Ecrits de M. de la Mennais, et de ses Disciples, par PLUSIEURS EVÊQUES de France, et Lettre de mêmes Evêques au Souverain Pontife GREGOIRE XVI.; le tout précédé d'une Préface où l'on donne une Notice Historique de cette Censure, et suivi des Pièces justificatives.* Toulouse, 1835, 8vo. pp. 215.

A LEARNED theologian and a highly esteemed correspondent has sent us a copy of this work, published many years ago, and called our attention specially to the Encyclical Letter, *Mirari*, of Gregory XVI., dated August 15, 1832, inserted among the *pièces justificatives*, and setting forth the Catholic doctrine on the main points in which it had been departed from by Lamennais and his disciples in their manner of defending religious and political liberty in France. Our correspondent tells us that he has his misgivings, although he does not feel quite certain, that we have failed to keep our Review in strict harmony with the doctrine of the Encyclical, and he wishes us to examine

the question and see if such be really the fact. He writes us in no captious or censorious spirit, but as a real friend, and as a priest earnestly devoted to Catholic truth. We thank him for his kindness, and we have endeavored to follow out his suggestion.

We have been engaged with pretty much the same questions which were raised and discussed by Lammenais and his associates in France some thirty years ago, and have no doubt had the same general end in view, and we can well understand that we may have seemed to many at first sight to be defending the same general doctrine on liberty and the relations of the Church to the State. We have had, at times, we confess, our own misgivings on some points, and our fears that we might not be steering clear of all the errors branded by the Encyclical of the Pope. To err is human, and truth and error on some points run so close together, and look so nearly the same, that the wisest and best of men are not, without supernatural assistance, always sure of not mistaking the one for the other. We may have fallen into error on some points, we may have used language which is too strong or inexact, but this much we are certain, we have aimed to be orthodox, and we shall never persist in an error when once it is pointed out to us. Truth is the only reality, the only good, and we cannot understand why anyone should wish something else than truth, or that truth should be something else than it is. As St. Augustine says, err we may, a heretic we will never be. But we studied carefully this Encyclical when it was first published, before we ever dreamed of becoming a Catholic, and we have since constantly had it before our eyes in all we have written on the subject on which it sets forth the Catholic doctrine. We have examined and re-examined again and again our views, in the light of its teaching, and we are unable to discover any instance in which we have really departed from it, or fallen into an error it condemns.

The fall of the unhappy Lammenais may well be held up as a warning to all over-zealous and headstrong individuals who have theories, or crotchets of their own for advancing Catholic interests; but, though wholly inexcusable on this part, it may, perhaps, be urged with no less propriety as a warning to those who are more ready to

pounce upon a writer for his errors, than to help him to discover the truth that would correct them. We cannot help thinking, that if they who with so much zeal denounced the unhappy Abbé, had taken, in a spirit of charity and candour, half as much pains to help him understand the truth he had in view, but which he saw only dimly or fitfully, as they did to prove him in the wrong and the advocate of monstrous errors, he might have been saved. Certainly, his philosophical system was unsound, but his opponents in France combated it with a system about equally unsound. His doctrine that Christianity is the only religion there is, or ever has been, and that it is the universal belief of the race, has its side of truth, which it will not do to overlook, and can no more be unreservedly condemned than it can be unreservedly accepted. In opposing it his adversaries did not take the requisite pains to recognize its side of truth, and distinguish it from its side of error. God revealed to man the truth in the beginning, and in that primitive revelation, the tradition of which has never been wholly lost with any nation or tribe, however obscured, mutilated, corrupted, or travestied it may have become, is the type of all the religions which have ever obtained,—the type realized, aimed at, or departed from. All error has, in a certain sense, its origin in the truth, which it misconceives, misinterprets, or misapplies. The grossest and most abominable superstitions of the heathen started from a true principle, and rightly considered, bear testimony to the primitive revelation. The greater the truth perverted, the greater and more destructive the error that results; the holier the principle, the grosser and more abominable is its corruption, or the superstition generated by its corruption. That the gods of the heathen were devils or fallen angels, no Christian can doubt, and yet we have just as little doubt that the tradition of the true God was never absolutely lost among any people, or that the worship of devils grew out of the perversion of the true doctrine of good and bad angels, and of the true worship of saints, though not without Satanic aid. Did Lamennais mean anything more than this? Could he have meant that men continued to worship the true God while they worshipped idols? or that the worship they gave to their false gods was really the worship of saints and angels,

the Catholic *Cultus Sanctorum*? We believe no such thing.

The gravest error of Lamennais was in identifying Christianity with the general or universal reason, and making the common consent of the race the authority for doctrine and faith. But even this has a side of truth. The tradition of the primitive revelation is, in some form, universal, and enters into the common reason of the race. With Christians this is still more true, and this internal tradition, if we may so call it, common to all men, and especially to all Christians, is in some sense, authority for doctrine and faith, and, perhaps, an authority not always duly respected. The error is not in recognizing it, but in substituting it for the positive teaching authority of the Church. All the Church teaches is not, save in germ, in that common reason, and it is only her positive teaching that brings out what is in it and supplies its deficiencies. In dealing with Lamennais, his adversaries should have begun by first of all recognizing the side of truth he had and distinguishing it from the error, so as to enable him to see how he could reject the error without at the same time rejecting the truth. Perhaps one of the most fatal errors we can commit, is to assume that a man we see advocating an error has set out deliberately to defend a false doctrine, and that he defends it for the sake of the error. It is never for the sake of the error, but always for the sake of the truth mingled with it and in his mind not distinguished from it, that he defends. How else can St. Thomas be right when he says, truth is the object of the intellect, and that the intellect can never be false? A man may persist in an error, after it has been pointed out to him, because he may have that false pride which forbids him to own that he has been in the wrong; but ordinarily he persists only, because he does not see how he can reject the error without rejecting the truth he has associated with it. This, we think, was the case with Lamennais. There were certain things true and good, which he saw and insisted upon, and which it seemed to him his French adversaries required him to reject, and finding, as he imagined, that they were sustained by the Pope, he came, after a severe struggle, to the conclusion that there is no infallible guide for mortals, and no Church but the people. This was a

conclusion of despair, not of reason. We have no disposition to excuse or to palliate it; but it is, perhaps, permitted us to believe, that, if his French adversaries had themselves had more light and more charity, and had opposed him, with more judgment and less passion, he might have escaped the complete shipwreck of his faith. It is hard to believe that when such a man as Lamennais is driven to despair and through despair to arrange himself on the side of the enemies of religion, all the error is on his side, or that his case is less instructive to his violent opponents than to his headstrong followers. There may be a lack of charity and humility on the side of the defenders of Orthodoxy, as well as pride and arrogance on the side of those who depart from it.

These remarks, of course, apply in no sense whatever to the Encyclical of Gregory XVI., which sets forth the Catholic doctrine on the several matters touched upon. The Pope does not name Lamennais and his disciples, and nowhere formally confirms the censure pronounced by the French Bishops; in fact, makes no allusion to it whatever. That censure deserves respectful consideration, but it can by no means be regarded as the judgment of the Church, and it is not improbable that, if Lamennais had been more moderate in his language towards the Episcopacy, and had agreed with the French bishops in his politics, they would have been less keenly alive to his philosophical and theological errors. French bishops, or a certain number of them affecting to speak for the body, have too frequently been affected by panics, and too often proved themselves ready to sink the bishop in the courtier, to be able to give their censure that weight it might otherwise possess. We should have no special misgivings, though falling under their condemnation, if properly assured that we were in harmony with Catholic doctrine, as declared by the Sovereign Pontiff. We hold the Encyclical to be an infallible exposition of Catholic doctrine in relation to the errors it censures, and we accept it purely and simply, whether the matter censured is theological or political; for though we maintain the freedom and independence of the secular in its own order, we do not recognize in it any rights against the spiritual.

Lamennais and his disciples avowed that they aimed at a thorough restoration or regeneration of Catholicity, and

more usually called by those outside Neo-Catholics. If they meant what they said, they were simply absurd. "Since, in the words of the Fathers of Trent, it is certain," says the Encyclical, "that the Church has been instructed by Jesus Christ and his Apostles, and is taught by the Holy Ghost, who never ceases to suggest to her the truth, it is wholly absurd and supremely injurious to her to propose her restoration or regeneration as necessary to her preservation and growth, as that would be to judge her liable to failure, obscurity, and other inconveniences of this sort. The object of the innovators in this respect is to lay the foundations of a human institution, and to make the Church, instead of a divine, a human Church, the thing which St. Cyprian held in horror." But though the Church can never fail, grow old, or be obscured, and therefore stand in need of restoration, or regeneration, we cannot say the same of nominally Catholic populations. Nothing is more unwise or unjust than to pretend that the conduct of all Catholics is Catholic; for nothing is more certain than that a Catholic population in a particular time or place may forget its high calling, become cold and dead, with their minds darkened by false or defective philosophical or political systems, and their hearts hardened by love of the world and devotion to sensible goods. They may, and often do, fall below their religion, and have only a name to live; and consequently a regeneration, a restoration, or resuscitation of Catholic life, manners, affections, conduct, may often be a desideratum, and legitimately labored for, as we find in the Lives of all great saints who have founded orders or congregations for the salvation of our neighbour. Did Lamennais and his friends really mean any more than this?

It is too much the custom to say the Church has done what has been done only by Catholics, to say the Church has done this or has done that, when it has been done only by Churchmen, and even by these only when acting not as Churchmen, but as politicians, as ministers of State, or as simple seculars. Confounding these with the Church, we make her responsible for their conduct, and then contend that she has fallen, become corrupt, or obscured, and needs renewal, reform, restoration, or regeneration. This mode of speaking was very common in the Mennesian school, and it is universal with non-Catholics, who have

no Church conception, and hold that the Universal Church, as we not long since heard even a Catholic Archbishop assert in a sermon, is simply "the aggregation of individual believers." The mystic character of the Church and her real relation to the Incarnation, is too often overlooked even by Catholics, and the word *church* is often used with an inexcusable looseness, in a manner that excludes both unity and catholicity. We were present at the gathering of a few Catholic friends, and heard two priests, both of unquestionable orthodoxy, maintain that the Church would have here a new field for the display of her powers, and would in this new world realize a new Catholicity, when all they really meant was that here, under her fostering care, would be developed a new civilization more strictly in accord with Catholic principles than any that has hitherto existed. This may or may not be so, but there is nothing uncatholic in hoping or believing that it will be so. We can easily conceive that the Church has encountered obstacles in the political and social organization of other countries, the despotism of princes, the pride and oppressiveness of privileged classes, the ignorance, degradation, and slavery of the people, that she will not find here; and that if we can succeed in preventing what is objectionable in Europeanism from gaining a footing along with the Church, there will be developed here a civilization far truer to the original principles of natural society, and more in accordance with the principles and wants of supernatural society, than she has yet met or been able to develop in her passage down the stream of ages. We ourselves believe it, hope it, and labor for it. Hence the reason why we so often find ourselves in collision with many of our Catholic friends, who identify the civilization of Catholic countries with the Catholic religion itself, and imagine that to have Catholicity here in its full vigor, we must combine it with the secular order, the ideas, habits, and manners of old Europe. We want nothing from Europe, but the Catholic faith and what pertains to it. We do not go to Europeans for lessons in the political and social organization of natural society, for we think in that matter we are some centuries in advance of them. Very little of the actual civilization of Catholic nations is either of Catholic origin, or favorable to the Catholic religion. We want the Church here as she

exists and has existed in Europe unmodified, unaltered; but we do not think it is uncatholic to wish for a reform, a regeneration even of very large masses of the Catholic populations of Europe, and even of other quarters of the globe, not excepting North and South America. There is room for great improvement in their morals, in their life, their manners, their habits, and their secular notions and tendencies; and we think a good Catholic may labor for that improvement without necessarily falling into any error condemned by Gregory XVI., or by any other successor of St. Peter.

Lamennais and his disciples, simple presbyters or laymen, labored to effect important changes in the relations hitherto subsisting in nearly all Catholic countries between the Church and the State. They called upon the Church to cut herself loose from all connection with the State, to fall back on her own resources as the kingdom of God on earth; and to rely on the affections and voluntary contributions of the faithful, as she did universally before Constantine, and as she does now in Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States. We do not find that the Holy Father disapproved this in principle, and we have been assured that when he sent the late Bishop England to Hayti to settle the ecclesiastical affairs of that republic, he gave him instructions to place them there, if possible, on the same footing they are on in this country. But a measure, though not wrong or undesirable in itself, may yet be objectionable, because impracticable, inopportune, or urged by those who have no right to urge it. The Bishops did not believe the measure could be adopted in France without grave injury to the interests alike of religion and of society, and they, not simple presbyters and laymen, were the proper judges in the case. The Pope seems to have censured the movement, chiefly because it was set on foot by persons who had no right to do it, and in opposition to the French Episcopacy. "Let the presbyters," he says, "be submissive to the bishops, who, as St. Jerome admonishes them, are the fathers of the soul; let them not forget that the ancient canons of the Church forbid them to perform any ministerial act, and to teach or to preach without the permission of the bishops, of whom the account of souls will be exacted. Let them be aware, that

they who plot against this order are, as far as in them lies, disturbing the state of the Church. It is manifestly culpable and contrary to the laws of the Church, which should be respected, to find fault, from our insane license of opinion, with the discipline she has established; and which embraces the administration of sacred things, the rule of manners, and the rights of the Church, and of her ministers, to charge it with being opposed to certain principles of natural law, or to represent it as defective, incomplete, and subjected to the civil authority."

If this is to be said of presbyters, then, *a fortiori* of laymen. But, we have never to our knowledge arraigned the discipline, or any portion of the discipline, of the Church as contrary to the principles of natural law, or as subjected to the civil authority; nor have we had the impudence to ask the Church to change in any respect the relations which have subsisted in most Catholic nations between her and the State. We have undoubtedly maintained that portions of her discipline or of her canons were originally adapted to the state of things which she found existing at the time, and to govern the relations of the faithful with the temporal authorities as they were constituted; and that the changes in human affairs have rendered much of this part of her discipline inapplicable, and made changes in it necessary to meet new circumstances and new wants. We have maintained that the relations between the Church and the State which subsist in Europe, do not subsist here, and we have expressed ourselves opposed to every effort to introduce them here: first, because such efforts must prove unsuccessful, and second, because we think the interests of religion do not require, and as long as our society remains constituted as it is, cannot require them to be introduced or reëstablished. What may be called the universal discipline of the Church can never be changed, or need changing; but there is a part of her discipline, though just in principle, and while in force equally obligatory on the conscience, that does, and may change with the circumstances of time and place. The Church, in our judgment, is freer, and more independent here, than she is in any Catholic State in the world. She is entitled here, as a citizen, to the protection of the laws from external violence, and is free to exert herself in all respects

according to her own constitution and laws for the salvation of souls. She is not recognized by our laws as a proprietor; but these laws are nevertheless such, if our bishops choose to avail themselves of them, as to secure her the use according to her own discipline of all donations, contributions or bequests of the faithful for her services or her charities, for the principle of our laws is, that all eleemosynary gifts must be appropriated according to the will of the donor. The entire liberty which the Church here enjoys more than compensates for certain privileges or favors she may have secured to her in Europe by Concordats. She no doubt has in Austria an advantage which she lacks here, that of having the majority of the population in her communion; but in all other respects her position here is far better than it is in Austria, even under the new Concordat. We have never pretended that the union of Church and State as it has existed in Europe is wrong; but we hold it to be impracticable and undesirable here, for we believe that where the people are prepared for it the order prevailing here is much the best for religion and for society.

We have never urged the dissolution of the old union of Church and State. We have treated it as *un fait accompli* in our own country, and as a result which is indicated by every movement and tendency of the age. We think it is sure sooner or later to come everywhere, and we believe that in the long run, the Church has more to gain than to lose by it. We do not seek to hasten or to retard what seems to us the inevitable tendency of events. Certain it is, that the change could not be effected in Europe at the present moment without a violent shock, both to religion and society; and the Holy Father says only what simple reason tells every one of us, when he says, "it is not permitted to produce present evil with a view to future good." The terrible evils that would follow the adoption in old Catholic States of the Mennesian policy, are not doubtful; the good contemplated might fail to be obtained. Take the Catholic states and populations as they really are on the Continent, with their constitutions, pretensions, habits, manners, ideas, and customs, and it is easy to see that the policy could not be suddenly introduced without a long series of most disastrous conflicts. We believe the order

that obtains here is the best where it exists or can be peaceably introduced. So we believe the republican order we have established is, upon the whole, the best possible form of political and social organization: but we certainly would not urge the French people to undertake to throw overboard the Emperor, and to establish a republic modelled after ours.

The Encyclical certainly condemns those who seek to disturb the concord between the Church and the State, and as certainly represents the concord as alike for the interests of religion and of society. This Review has not incurred the censure here implied. That concord is desirable for both, and still more for society than for religion. The State hath everywhere need of the Church, and cannot discharge properly and beneficially its higher functions without her assistance. But this assistance may be given in different ways according to the different forms of political and social organization adopted. In a government where the people count for nothing, and all power is concentrated in the king or emperor, it can be rendered effectual only by real or virtual concordats with the sovereign. It is only through the prince that the Church can reach the State, and hence for her there to cut herself loose from all connection with the State would be to abandon the State to political atheism. But in a republic like ours no formal connection of the Church with the government is needed for either party, for she can assist the political order by her direct action on the people themselves. The relations of Church and State under the Roman Empire are neither necessary nor practicable under a republic like ours, and would not be even if the whole population were sincerely and earnestly Catholic. Under the empire, the Church treats with the government; under a republic, where the people are the motive power, she does not need to treat with the government, for she can operate through the faithful, and assist the government by the just principles she inculcates, the lofty sentiments she inspires in them, and the supernatural virtues she requires and aids them to practise. Establish the same general political order throughout the world that we have established, and the most desirable relations between the Church and State will be those which subsist with us, and which are what we call religious liberty, or the full and

entire freedom of religion. As this order does not subsist in Europe, different relations and forms of concord between the two powers, for the common interests of religion and society, are there no doubt required.

The real difficulty, however, in our times is, that the concord the Holy Father demands no longer exists. The secular order has cut itself loose from the spiritual. The *Politicians*, as they were called in the time of Henri Quatre and the *Ligue*, have carried the day; and the peace of Paris, 1856, has incorporated their political atheism into the public law of Europe. The sovereigns consult no longer the interests of religion, but are governed solely by what are called reasons of state—by mere secular policy, before which all moral and religious considerations must give way. Political atheism is now the religion of the State, and the Church cannot, whatever her wishes, maintain the concord between true religion and the empire. She may restore it, but not through the sovereigns, for even if one sovereign were well disposed and determined to reëstablish it, he would find himself thwarted by the bureaucracy, or by his ambitious neighbors, who will appeal to the infidel and revolutionary sentiment of the age against him, as we see in the present war of Louis Napoleon and Victor Emanuel against Francis Joseph. The evil will be surmounted and concord restored only by winning back the affections of the people to the faith, and through them recalling the sovereigns to their duty. Lamennais and his party saw this as distinctly as we see it now, and they sought to detach the Church from the sovereigns and to enlist her on the side of the people. There is, they alleged, an alliance between the Church and the despotic governments of Europe. The clergy, instead of standing by the people and using their moral power on the side of popular freedom, arrange themselves on the side of the oppressors of the people, and exert all their spiritual influence to uphold despotism. This divides Europe into two hostile camps—the people and their friends, in the one; and the clergy, the despots, and their slaves and tools, in the other. They called upon the Church to abandon the sovereigns, and to command her faithful children to take sides with the people against them, and go forth and fight manfully the cause of freedom against despotism. Nothing is apparently more simple or more just, since resistance to

tyrants is said to be obedience to God; yet practically the matter was not so plain and simple as it appeared. In the first place, the Church teaches her children, instead of being taught by them, and she is herself the judge for them what is for the true interests of both natural and supernatural society. In the next place, for her to have complied with the demand would have been for her to espouse the infidel and impious liberalism then and now rife in Europe—to turn revolutionist, preach sedition, and sanction rebellion. This the Church could not do, and the Encyclical of course condemns the demand, and sets forth the Catholic duty of obedience to the civil magistrate. We cannot perceive that we have on this point fallen under the Papal censure. We have opposed the alliance which some of our friends would effect between the clergy and Cæsarism, and the attempt of Louis Veuillot and others to bind up the Catholic cause throughout the world with that of the absolute sovereigns of Europe; but we have opposed with equal earnestness and perseverance the alliance of the clergy with the demagogues, and the attempt to unite the cause of Catholicity with that of European liberalism. We gave in 1848, some of our readers may perhaps remember, as much offence by our strictures on Padre Ventura's *Funeral Oration* on O'Connell as we have since given by our strictures on the *Univers*. The pages of this Review, from 1847 down to 1850, bear ample testimony to our decided opposition to the alliance sought to be effected by Lamennais and his party. We have not changed since: the question indeed has changed its aspects, but we have not changed in the slightest respect our principles or views. In 1848, the tendency was to treat democracy as a Catholic dogma. The danger then was all on the side of liberalism—ultra-democratic revolutionism, and we met and opposed the danger where it was; since 1851, the danger—the immediate danger we mean, has been on the side of despotism, Cæsarism, and on that side we have confronted it. There seem to be publicists who never can understand that one extreme is sure to beget another, and who always suffer themselves to be carried away by the popular passion of the moment. When that passion is for democracy, they are democrats; when it is for Cæsarism, they are Cæsarists. They are always echoes or conduits of the popular passion

or caprice of the moment. The Red Republican revolutions of 1848 were very likely to provoke a reaction in favor of despotism, which, in its turn, was just as likely to provoke another reaction in favor of Red Republicanism. We have differed from many of our friends in this, that while they have alternately favored each extreme, we have uniformly opposed both, and done what we could to prevent the Catholic cause from being linked in the public mind with either. It is now generally conceded that we were right in 1848, in opposing the alliance sought to be effected between the clergy and democracy, and it is beginning to be suspected that we have not been wholly wrong in refusing to hail the revival of pagan Rome under the imperial form in France as the restoration of Catholic society in Europe. Events, against which we warned our Catholic friends seven or eight years ago, threaten now to justify our refusal.

The man who is never carried away by the popular passion of the moment, and who steadily resists either extreme, and the extreme that for the moment is the popular one, always finds it hard to prevent his true position from being misunderstood and misrepresented. The fact is we have never favored liberty in the sense of the Liberals, or authority in the sense of the Cæsarists. We regard the Church as a spiritual kingdom set up on the earth by God himself, and we look upon her as complete in herself and sufficient for herself. We have therefore never been able to understand her alliance, or league with any thing outside of herself. In our view she can form an alliance neither with Liberalism nor with Despotism. We ourselves are attached to constitutional or republican government; we believe it the best possible constitution of natural society both for its own sake and the sake of religion, but we would, if we had the power, no more commit the Church to it than we would commit her to Cæsarism or to Jacobinism. The Church is instituted for the glory of God in the salvation of souls, and may often find that she can better accomplish her mission as things are by submitting to a less favorable political order than by encouraging her children to attempt by a revolution to obtain what under other circumstances would be better. She is the judge of what is, in any given time or place, the most for the interests of religion, and her

enlightened and true friends will never attempt to embarrass her by forestalling her judgment, and linking her cause with one political organization or another, with this political party or with that. We can never lawfully advocate one or another system of political and social organization in the name of the Church, or pretend that it is Catholic in the sense that the Church must by her own principles always and everywhere command it, or as the one so bound up with her dogmas and her immutable discipline that she can acquiesce in no other, or command her children to be loyal to no other.

We are firmly persuaded that the order we have elsewhere called the Germanic, and which with our feeble ability we defend, is more in accordance with the principles of natural society, and more favorable where it is the established order or where it can peaceably and without violence be established, to Catholic interests, to the freedom and independence of the Church, than that which has been resuscitated from pagan Rome, and which before the commencement of the present war in Italy was widely defended as a revival of Catholic society; but we have never pretended that the Church adopts it, and anathematizes the Romanic system, or that she ought to do so. There are countries where it is impracticable. The Church could not, had she attempted it, have introduced it into the Roman Empire before the Barbarian Conquest, and she cannot establish it now, if she would, in China, Turkey, Russia, Austria, or France. To attempt it in any of these countries would arm the whole secular power against her, and sacrifice the existing interests of religion without gaining any thing for the people or for true freedom. She may dislike the Romanic system as much as we do, but she must for the sake of souls deal with the authorities of those nations as *de facto* governments, and make the best terms with them for religion she can. We must leave the Church free to follow the dictates of common prudence.

The Church has to deal with the world as she finds it, and, therefore, must often acquiesce in a political *régime* which she is far from approving, and remind her children that it is better to be submissive to an order of things, under which, though by no means a desirable one, it is after all possible to live and to save one's soul, than it is to

attempt by violence, by revolution, to overthrow it for another. On this principle the Church often requires her children to be loyal to a government despotic in its constitution and oppressive in its conduct, and hence often has the appearance of sustaining despotism and tyranny when she in reality sympathizes only with justice and freedom. Her mission is one of peace and love, and to fulfil it she wants peace in society, and that she cannot have without government, and there can be no permanent government where the subject is not taught to be submissive and loyal to authority. She cannot encourage sedition, insurrection, rebellion, or revolution, since she is too conscientious to do evil that good may come, and too wise to dream of ameliorating the condition of society and promoting the interests of religion by asserting and acting on principles subversive of all society and of all religion.

The Holy Father certainly censures the revolutionary spirit, and asserts that it is the duty of Catholics to be submissive to the existing governments as loyal subjects. But we nowhere find that he approves the constitution or the conduct of those governments. We cannot discover that on this head our Review has ever been in fault. We have indicated the danger of a new revolution which the policy so warmly defended by Louis Veuillot and the party he represents, if persisted in, is sure to provoke, and we have called upon them to desist from that policy, and to cease from their insane efforts to link the cause of the Church with the Cæsarism resuscitated from pagan Rome, and which should have been suffered to lie dead and buried in the grave prepared for it by the German conquerors of the Empire; but our readers, if readers we have, know perfectly well that we have never advocated revolution, or defended the right of disobedience in civil matters to the powers that be. The duty of obedience, of loyalty to the prince, has been as strongly stated in the pages of this Review as in those of the Encyclical of Gregory XVI., and our uniform opposition to the revolutionary movements in Europe, and the fact that we have never failed to brand sedition, insurrection, and rebellion as high crimes against society and deadly sins against God, have, we need not seek to disguise, gained us the hostility of many nominal Catholics, especially those who take an active part in poli-

tics, whose Catholicity is strangely commingled with down-right revolutionism, and who not seldom are at once ultra-democrats and violent Cæsarists.

But while we deprecate revolution and hold ourselves bound in conscience to be submissive to the powers that be in all respects in which they require us to do nothing prohibited by the law of God, we are very far from feeling it incumbent on us to maintain that these powers are immaculate, and can do no wrong, or that it is forbidden us as good Catholics to point out the evils of an existing *régime*, or to do what we can to enlist public opinion on the side of true liberty. The strength of despotism is in the weakness, effeminacy, corruption, ignorance, indifference, or moral cowardice of the people. The impracticability of modifying Cæsarism where it exists, is in the want of a sound public opinion against it, or in the fact that public opinion, as in France, is favorable either to it or to Jacobinism. Correct public opinion,—there are ways, if no revolutionary doctrines are broached, in which it can be done in the most despotic country where Christianity is professed,—correct public opinion, give the people, and especially the immediate leaders of the people, just views alike of authority and of liberty, and all needed changes or modifications will be gradually and peaceably effected. This is what every publicist should aim at. The revolutions of 1848 interrupted the steady progress of the European governments towards constitutionalism, and by compelling the friends of religion and society to assert the rights of authority and to strengthen the hands of government, prepared the way for the revival of despotism, and have thrown back the cause of liberty fifty or a hundred years. We have lost all the advantages we had gained by the long peace, and have now all our work to do over again. But the extravagances, the errors, the blunders, and the crimes of the revolutionists should never be suffered to drive us into Cæsarism, to make us despair of society, or turn us against reasonable and orderly liberty. We may both by prudence and religion be required at times to submit to Cæsarism as a temporary necessity or as the less of two evils, yet we should never give Cæsarism our approbation, or cease by every peaceable and legal means in our power to prove that we appreciate the rights of man and of society, and that

we are prepared in every legal and practicable way to assert and maintain them. The primitive Christians in civil matters obeyed the Pagan Emperors, even the most tyrannical and persecuting, but we do not find it recorded that they approved the persecution, or justified the tyranny from which they and the whole Empire suffered, or that they hesitated to raise their voice, if in calm, still in strong and energetic tones, against both. We have never complained of our friends in France, or elsewhere, for acquiescing in the revival of the Empire, and yielding a loyal obedience to Louis Napoleon as the elected Emperor of the French; we have complained of them only for having shamefully abandoned their own principles, for abusing every one of their former friends who has remained true to principle and to honor, for advocating despotism on principle, and defending it, as in 1848 they had defended democracy, as the *Catholic* order, and its revival as the revival of *Catholic* society in Europe,—and for using the little liberty they were suffered to retain to sound the praises of Cæsar and to rivet still firmer the chains of Cæsarism, instead of using it to form and maintain a sound and healthy public opinion which would gradually and peaceably force the government to concede to the nation an effective voice in the management of its own affairs. It is they not we who really incur the censure the Pope pronounces against the revolutionists; for Napoleon III., their master and their idol, not only avows, but boasts his adherence to revolutionary principles. Since he professes to recognize and continue the revolution of 1789, in which were contained the germs of all subsequent European revolutions.

The Holy Father censures in severe terms *Indifferentism*, or the pretence that one religion is as good as another, and that it makes no difference of what religion a man is, whether of any or none, providing he maintains a certain moral decorum. We need not dwell on this, for we have made many enemies by the earnestness with which we have insisted on the dogma that there is no salvation out of the Church. There are here and elsewhere many Catholics who are latitudinarian in their feelings, and are quite shocked to hear the doctrine of exclusive salvation asserted. They regard that doctrine as uncharitable, bigoted, intolerant, and altogether unsuitable to the liberal and en-

lightened age in which we live. We are, we think, in no danger of being included in their number, and we leave them to settle the matter with the doctrine of the Church, so as to escape the Papal censure, the best way they can.

The Encyclical also censures the false notions with regard to liberty of conscience, so much in the fashion, both then and now. "From this impure source of indifferentism," says the Holy Father, "flows that absurd, and erroneous maxim, or rather, that delirium—that liberty of conscience for every one is to be asserted and maintained. This most pestiferous error has the way prepared for it by the unrestrained freedom of opinions diffused far and wide, to the grave injury of both religious and civil society; and from which some have the extreme impudence to pretend that certain advantages may result for religion; but what worse death to the soul, as said St. Augustine, than the freedom of error?" The liberty or freedom of conscience here censured is that which grows out of indifferentism, and which presupposes that there is no difference between truth and error, right and wrong. It is the assertion of the absolute freedom of every man to do what seems to him right in his own eyes, or to live as he lists, and is only another name for universal license, and wholly incompatible with all religion and morality, and all society religious or secular. This error cannot be charged against this Review, for it has always maintained that no man has the moral right to err or to follow a false conscience. There may be, and doubtless are, cases in which error is excusable or inculpable, but every man is bound to do his best to have a good conscience,—to know and conform to the truth as God has revealed it.

But it does not follow from this that the State must take upon itself to suppress by force every error in belief or practice against religion, or that it may not recognize and protect before the civil law the equal freedom of all religions or of all consciences that enjoin nothing contrary to the law of natural society. The State, since it holds its power from God—*non enim est potestas nisi a Deo*—is under the law of God, and bound to place the interests of religion above all others; but it may often happen that the interests of religion are best promoted by placing the Church and the sects on a footing of perfect equality be-

fore the law, and the State's recognizing its own incompetency in spirituals, as is the case with us in this country. The nations, in their present mood at least, cannot be held in the faith by civil enactments or the infliction of civil pains and penalties for heresy. In those states where Catholicity is the civil law, or enacted and upheld by the civil law, we find almost universally a bitter feeling of hostility towards the Pope and the clergy; and that the people, however fond they may be of shows and processions, or however careful they may be in the observance of the external forms of the Church, to a fearful extent lack the soul of religion. We demand for Catholics in all non-Catholic States the full liberty of conscience before the law; and we do it on principles that would authorize non-Catholics to demand it for themselves in Catholic States. We cannot understand how what is right in our case can be wrong in theirs. Catholicity is always just and always consistent with itself. The tendency to the civil freedom of conscience is universal in our modern world, and that freedom is now at least partially recognized in France, Belgium, Sardinia, and Austria, and is beginning to be in some of the Protestant continental States, as well as in Great Britain. We do not say that the Church has not the right, when she judges proper, to call in the secular arm to protect her against the external violence of her enemies; we say she has and must have that right as the representative of the spiritual order, but we deny to the State the right in its own name, or *motu proprio*, to enact what shall or shall not be the religion of its subjects. It is bound to protect the Church of God in the free and full enjoyment of all her rights, but it has and can have no spiritual competency, no more competency to establish Catholicity as a part of the civil constitution than it has to prohibit its belief and practice. We do not urge any change in the legislation of any Catholic State on this subject, for that is not our business, but we believe that the order established in this republic will ere long be adopted in all civilized States, and are fully convinced in our own mind that the Church will ultimately gain far more than she will lose by it.

The Encyclical brands with severe censure, as growing out of the same false system, the so-called freedom of the

Press, or the unrestrained freedom of publication of all sorts of books and writings, however false or pestiferous they may be. This censure does not touch this Review, for we have never defended the freedom censured. We claim the right to exercise, holding ourselves responsible for its abuse, the freedom of opinion and publication conceded us by the Church, and not incompatible with her authority, doctrine, and discipline. This freedom we will suffer no merely human authority to deny us or to abridge. But this freedom, we have said over and over again, is not a freedom or right against the Church, but from and against all not clothed for our conscience with her authority. We have no rights against her, nor against Churchmen in so far as commissioned by her. We recognize her full right of censorship, and we seldom publish an article in this Review, without submitting it before publication to the revision of a theologian, and shall always submit to such revision when it can be obtained. We recognize no man's right to publish an erroneous or immoral book or writing, and we are aware of no government that does not place some sort of restriction on the press, either by way of prevention or punishment. So far as it concerns the spiritual order there is no difficulty in the question for Catholics, for the Church has for all Catholics the right of censorship; but the civil question has grave difficulties, and which it is not easy to solve. We know the most rigid censorship established by the State has proved ineffectual to prevent the publication and circulation of bad books, and it generally is more effectual in suppressing good books than bad. There certainly are books which the police ought to prevent the circulation of, but no police can prevent every thing corrupt or corrupting from reaching the people. How far the police should intervene, or in what form, it is hard to say. Our present Supreme Pontiff, as temporal prince, relaxed materially the censorship which had been maintained under his predecessor, and the free discussion of political questions was allowed all through the Papal States. The question, in our judgment, is a practical question which must be answered differently in different countries, and under different circumstances. The English and American system, that of freedom, but with responsibility for its abuse, is unquestionably the best, as it is the only practicable system

for Englishmen and Americans. Whether the continental system, which prevents the publication, or at least the writing of many a good book, and hardly prevents the writing or publication of a single bad book, is the best for the continental nations, it is their province, not ours, to decide. We will only add, that there are times when we have more to hope from meeting false liberalism with liberty than from meeting it with repression, which in the present absence of respect for authority can seldom be resorted to with advantage.

The Encyclical certainly condemns, under all its aspects, and in all its applications, liberty in the sense defended by the so-called European Liberals, but we respectfully submit, that it pronounces no censure on true liberty, or on liberty in the sense we have defended it. It is always an "audacious liberty," "a liberty without bounds," an "unbridled liberty," a liberty that respects no authority, no law, no order, and is in reality only unbridled license or pure Jacobinism, that is condemned. There is no censure of that orderly constitutional liberty which denies Cæsarism, and asserts the right of the nation to a legal and effective voice in the management of public affairs, as in Great Britain and the United States,—the only liberty we have advocated. This Review has never advocated, and we trust never will advocate, liberty in the sense the Encyclical censures it. The liberty we advocate is not liberty without, but with and by law. This is wherefore, while we condemn Cæsarism, which is power without law, we equally condemn Red Republicanism, which is liberty without law, and in principle simple anarchy. We defend republicanism, but authority is needed in a well-ordered republic, and should be held sacred and inviolable in a republic as well as in an absolute monarchy. There is no true liberty without authority, and it cannot subsist where the supremacy of law is not maintained, and wise and just laws are not enacted, and faithfully executed. Disloyalty is a vice, and treason is a crime in a republic no less than in a monarchy.

The great difficulty in our times grows out of the fact, that false notions alike of liberty and authority everywhere obtain. In old Europe, the party that defends authority tends to Cæsarism, while the party that demands liberty

tends to Red Republicanism or Jacobinism. The English and American mind formerly steered comparatively clear of both of these errors, and adhered to the principles insisted on by all the great Doctors of the Church, prior to Bossuet, who mistook the political system of pagan Rome under the Cæsars for that presented in the Holy Scriptures. But there are plain indications that it is now following the continental mind, and in danger of identifying authority with despotism, and liberty with Jacobinism, as in France, Italy, and Austria. When, in 1848, we condemned revolutionism, we were denounced as an absolutist, and now when we condemn Cæsarism, we are denounced as a revolutionist, and some over-zealous Catholics have read us, or threatened to read us, out of the Church. This shows that public sentiment even here, identifies liberty with liberalism, and authority with Cæsarism, while the rapid strides we are making towards each, may well alarm the patriot and the Christian.

Now this Review holds that Cæsarism and Jacobinism, absolutism and liberalism, are alike opposed to liberty. We want order with liberty, and liberty with order, and resist alike the despotism of Cæsar and the despotism of the mob. We wish to be the slaves neither of courtiers nor of demagogues, and therefore accept none of the simple forms of government, but support, whenever practicable for the constitution of natural society, what are called mixed governments, or governments into which enter the several simple elements of government, so combined as to balance each other, and temper or restrain within given limits each other's action. We do this, because we think it best for natural society, and the most favourable, as a general rule, to religious interests. We do not call this order *Catholic*, for the term Catholic we appropriate to what is in, or pertains to the Church or supernatural society; and this is in natural society, and may be accepted by non-Catholics, and labored for with as much earnestness and good faith, as by Catholics. It is not Catholic, any more than the institutions of this country are Catholic; but it accords with Catholicity as natural reason accords with supernatural faith, and it is only the view of a superficial logic that concludes because the Church, a Divine institution, is under the Supreme Pontiff, that Imperialism in the State is the govern-

ment that best accords with Catholicity, for the Church and the State belong to different orders, and the conclusion rests on analogy which does not, and cannot exist, till you can assert the same supernatural assistance for the prince in the government of temporal affairs, that we on the strength of our Lord's promises assert for the successor of Peter in the government of spiritual affairs.

We hope these remarks will remove our friend's misgivings, and also be found to have an interest aside from that of vindicating the orthodoxy of this Review. Every periodical must, if it intends to have a living interest, treat the questions of the day as they rise, and as these questions are perpetually changing their aspects, the periodical must continually change the aspects under which it treats them. The Editor has before his mind at each successive moment all he has previously said; and writes with the presumption that it is also before the mind of his readers. Thus he trusts that what he says to-day will be understood in the light of what he said yesterday. But, unhappily, what he said yesterday was not read, or is forgotten, and attention is only paid to what he says to-day, which is incomplete without what was said before. Many readers, too, forget what was said in one article in the same number, before they finish reading another, and hardly one seems to think it incumbent on him to read through a single article before pronouncing judgment on it. We have found some of our Catholic journals condemning one article for its doctrine, and highly lauding another in the same number, containing precisely the same doctrine. We pray our readers not to forget when reading what we say of liberty, what we have said of authority, and when reading what we have said of authority, not to forget what we say of liberty, for the one is qualified by the other.

ART. V.—*Napoleonic Ideas. Des Idées Napoléoniennes*, par le PRINCE NAPOLEON-LOUIS BONAPARTE, *Bruxelles*, 1839. Translated by JAMES A. DORR. New York: 1859.

THIS work, which attracted less attention when first published than it deserves, is important both as an apology for Napoleon I., and as indicative of the policy of Napoleon III. It was written when its author was an exiled prince, and comparatively few ever dreamed that he was ever destined to occupy the French throne, or to play a prominent part in the political drama of the world; but now that he is seated on that throne, though as yet uncrowned, and threatens to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious Uncle, it will probably be read, and the principles and policy it sets forth be carefully studied. We in this Review have always done justice to the abilities of Louis Napoleon, and we believed him to be as much as he has since proved himself, when nearly all the world counted him mad or little better than a fool. That he is the ablest sovereign in Europe no man can doubt, or that he is the least scrupulous. That his reign will redound to the glory of France and to the general good of Europe is not so certain. For ourselves, we believe still in truth and honesty, and expect no solid good for individuals or nations from their violation.

What most strikes us in this remarkable work, is the total absence of every moral and religious conception on the part of its author. Reasons of state are for him the supreme law, and material good the final end of man. Religion and morality, when they do not interfere with state policy or impose any restraint on the prince in his public or private conduct, are no doubt to be tolerated;—the clergy, as long as they do not aspire to power or influence, or to be a governing body, and keep in their place and tell the people to be submissive to Cæsar, may be encouraged and even salaried by the state, whether Catholics, or Protestants, or Jews. But it is essential that they have no power even as a spiritual body not subjected to the direction and control of the prince. The work shows us

clearly enough that the Emperor will not suppress or make war on religion as long as he can use it, or as long as he does not find its practical influence interfering with his state policy. It commends Napoleon I. for keeping the clergy in subjection, suppressing monastic orders, and maintaining everywhere the supremacy of the state, and finds no fault with him for his treatment of either Pius VI. or Pius VII. Every question it treats is treated from the point of view of a low human policy, and the author gives no indication that he has ever heard that a policy to be wise must be controlled by justice, and that there is a King of kings and a Lord of lords, whose will even Cæsar is bound to obey. His conceptions are in general farther removed from Christianity than those of a respectable heathen, and make the Emperor a God on earth.

The ideas of the first Napoleon, it seems, were very different from what appearances indicated, or the world in general supposed, and perhaps still supposes. He was free from selfishness, disinterested, and ambitious only to do good. He was "the testamentary executor of the Revolution of 1789," and labored only to secure its practical results for France and the world. He organized its principles, and made it his mission to establish them for all nations. His wars were never wars of aggression, nor were they wars undertaken to redress wrongs done either to himself or to his subjects. They were not wars for the aggrandizement or, till the last, for the defence of France or of himself, but wars waged in the sacred cause of humanity, to liberate oppressed nationalities, to establish the freedom of the people, and the autonomy and independence of nations. He had conceived a grand system of European organization, entirely in the interest of liberty and the social and national prosperity of mankind, and went forth as its armed propagator. There were nations not prepared to adopt it, and these he had to convince or to subdue. He was the prophet of the *Code*, and took that in one hand and his sword in the other, and as a second Mahomet, bid the nations accept the one and be happy, or prepare to fall by the other. He did not want war; he wanted peace, and when he could succeed without war he preserved peace. When he went to war it was only to force the enemy to accept his system, his religion of materialism, as that which was sure to work out

their felicity. He was a true representative of the fraternity preached by the French revolution of 1789, which, as somebody has described it, was, "Harkee, stranger, come and embrace me as your brother, or I will cut your throat." The nations he conquered and held in subjection, he intended to liberate as soon as he had trained them for independence and freedom. His design was to restore all nationalities to their independence, with a wise and beneficent internal organization and government. He failed in his wise and beneficent intentions, because he was almost constantly engaged in war, and he was almost constantly engaged in war because there was one nation, the *perfidie Albion*, he could neither convince nor conquer.

The Nephew, now Emperor of the French, intends, it is fair to suppose, to resume and carry out, or put in the train of being carried out, the policy of his Uncle. This policy, the author tells us, was the organization, on the principles of 1789, of a "federative Europe;" a policy, if practicable, and attempted by wise and just means, we are far from regarding as censurable, or as ill-adapted to the wants of European society. But Napoleon should have recollected that a federative Europe is inconceivable without a federative government, which must derive its existence and powers from the free action of the states federated, and that these states had not constituted him their sovereign and supreme legislator. If his nephew is to be believed, all his wars, except those after his Russian expedition, were really wars of propagandism, or wars to impose his political and social system on Europe; such wars are seldom, if ever, lawful, and are nearly always inexpedient. Napoleon started, we are told, with the principles of the Revolution of 1789, but no permanent order can be founded on a revolutionary basis, and we can never arrive at liberty through the practice of tyranny. We cannot impose liberty on a nation by force of arms, because the employment of force against a nation for such a purpose, is a direct denial of its liberty. No people can receive its liberty from another; and any people to become free, must itself achieve its freedom by its own energy, courage, and heroism. To destroy a nation's independence, as the condition of enabling it to maintain its independence, is about as wise as to destroy the life of a plant in order to

facilitate its growth, or to improve the beauty of its flower, or the quality of its fruit.

Napoleon, if he really contemplated a federative Europe, misconceived its character and conditions. In a federation, the central power holds from the federated states, and is their creature; but the Napoleonic idea made these states themselves derive both their existence and their powers from the central authority. The federated states elect the federal chief, and determine his rights and powers, as under the Carolingian Constitutions. Napoleon reversed this, and his pretended free and independent nations could only have been provinces, prefectures, or vassals of France. The kingdoms he created and placed under members of his family, had no national autonomy, and existed only for the interest or glory of France, as his brother, the King of Holland, bitterly experienced. These kingdoms were created by Napoleon, and for his French empire; and their nominal sovereigns were allowed to have no will of their own. They must look to him, and obey him as their master. To tell us that they were organized with a view to nourishing and consolidating their nationality, and preparing them to become subsequently independent nations, is to pay no great compliment to our political understanding.

The Nephew shares, we presume, the ideas of his Uncle, and we have no doubt he intends, one after another, to carry them out; but he will proceed with less rashness and more moderation, and will be very cautious, as long as he is master of the situation, not to push matters to extremes. Yet we think he has less chance of succeeding than had his more brilliant and richly endowed Uncle. He will find that there is more than one nation he can neither convince nor conquer. He succeeded in his policy in the Crimean war, made England contribute to the consolidation of his power in France, and won, by his moderation after victory, Russia to be his friend, and perhaps ally—for a time. He has taken his second step with consummate prudence, and with an adroitness equalled only by his unscrupulousness.

He has contrived, while suppressing liberty in France, to appear as its champion in Italy, and against Austria, the most decried and unpopular government in Europe.

To fight for Italian liberty against Austria, is, in the minds of a large part of the world, to fight for the revolution against the Pope, and against both Catholicity and despotism. This enlists on his side the sympathies of all the Liberals of all nations, if not their active co-operation, and, if he could make other nations believe that he will stop with putting an end to Austrian domination in Italy, without substituting for it that of France, he would be sure of encountering only the Austrians for enemies. But a man who has proved that he can be bound neither by treaties nor by oaths, cannot inspire confidence. Nobody believes his professions, and nobody believes he will abide by any pledge he may give, unless he finds it for his interest to do so. Germany does not and will not trust him; and England, while she would not grieve to see Austria expelled from Italy, can never consent to see France installed in her place. France in possession of Italy, with the present expansion of her navy, excludes England from the Mediterranean, breaks up her trade with the East, and interrupts her communication with India by the way of Alexandria and the Red Sea. Great Britain, as a first class power, cannot suffer France to add Italy to her empire, either directly or indirectly, and whatever her anti-Papal prejudices, she will never suffer it, so long as she can prevent it. Unless the war terminates speedily, and leaves the balance of power unaffected, it must become general, and turn into a war between the Germanic and so-called Latin nations, in which the Germanic nations are not likely to come off second best.

For ourselves we have no special sympathy with Austria, and we should be glad to see Italy restored to her autonomy, and taking her proper rank as a free, independent, and united nation. If the French expedition to Italy results in reëstablishing Italian independence, and opening a career for the Italian nobility, which they now lack, we shall not regret it; yet we have no belief that such will be its result. French expeditions to Italy have usually proved disastrous, both to her and to France. The French have hitherto proved themselves more successful depredators than liberators. Their domination in Italy, under the first Napoleon, was such as to make the return of the Austrians hailed as a blessing; and we have

no reason to think that the French are any better now than they were then. As between the French and Austrians in this war, our sympathy is with the latter. Austria has given no cause of offence either to France or to Sardinia; she has violated no treaty, broken no faith with either. She has simply stood on her legal rights, while scrupulously respecting the rights of all others. She has done nothing to provoke hostility, and the war is one of pure aggression on the part of France and Sardinia. We know the talk about bad government, but everybody knows that the most prosperous and best-governed part of Italy, is that part which is under Austrian rule. Piedmont is by no means so well governed, is by no means so prosperous as the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and her subjects have less freedom. The "cry of anguish which comes to us from Italy," comes almost exclusively from Piedmont, or from Piedmontese, and there were far better excuses for the French to intervene against Sardinia than in her favor.

We are strongly attached to constitutional and Parliamentary government, but we have never regarded the Constitution of Sardinia as anything more than a mockery, fitted only to throw power into the hands of a faction. No country in Europe has been worse governed for the last eight years than Sardinia. There is none more deeply in debt, in proportion to its resources, and none in which, the people are so heavily taxed. A large portion of the people are actually or virtually serfs, and have by no means the personal freedom, or the material well-being, of the rural population of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The liberty the Piedmontese constitution secures, is liberty for the nobles and wealthy burghers to task the rest of the nation. Yet even such liberty as the constitution was intended to secure, is now suppressed. The parliament is prorogued, probably never to assemble again; and the king governs as absolute dictator under the Emperor of the French. The French hold the strong places of the kingdom, the Piedmontese army is absorbed in the French, and Victor Emmanuel is simply a general of division in the Imperial army, under the orders of Napoleon III. We cannot say what the future will bring forth, but at present Sardinia is absorbed in France, and has no more

autonomy than Lombarday or Venice, and if the French are victorious and the Emperor regards it as safe to annex her, she will find herself at the conclusion of the war, once more a part of the French Empire, governed by an imperial prefect. We think she would do well to secure her own freedom and independence, and set an example of good government, before assuming to be the champion of Italian liberty and independence. Napoleon III., who has by a *coup d'état* destroyed the Republican constitution he swore to observe and defend, suppressed liberty, and established a worse despotism than it can be pretended obtains in Austria, does not strike us as the most suitable person to establish Italian independence, and to consolidate the freedom of the Italian people.

The Napoleonic system is no better than the Austrian, and in fact not so good, for it is less honest and frank, and deals largely in fraud and deception. It professes to recognize popular suffrage, but the bodies it suffers to be elected have no substantive power, and are mere instruments for aiding the Emperor to carry out his will. His breath has made them, and his breath can unmake them. The Emperor boasts that under his system the equality of all citizens is recognized and secured; but that is little, for despotism is a universal leveller, and all slaves are equal. The question is not, Are all equal before the law? but, Does the law recognize and protect the equal rights of all? It is nothing that all Frenchmen may vote for members of a Legislative body, when by the constitution that body is a sham, and can only register the Imperial will. A legislative body is of no importance, unless it has power to bind or to resist, if necessary, the executive. This is not the case with the Senate and Assembly of France. They have no power. The departmental or communal bodies elected by the people, as popular institutions, are only shams, for they have power only as instruments of the Imperial will. Look through the whole Imperial constitution, and you will find that there is no substantive power in the empire, but that of the Emperor. To attempt to palm off such a system of downright Cæsarism as a system of liberty, or to pretend that to fight for its extension to Italy is to fight for Italian freedom and independence, is an outrage upon common sense. But to pretend that the upholder

of this system has the right to make war, without any provocation, in the name of liberty, upon Austria, is something a little too gross to be swallowed.

How then can France justify the present war, which is really one of her own making? By what right, by virtue of what commission, does she assume to be the liberator of Italy,—she, who is herself even more than Italy in need of a liberator. The world has not forgotten that the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom is legitimately in the possession of the Austrian crown. Lombardy has been a fief of the German Empire at least since the twelfth century. The Lombards, the Longobardi, from whom the province takes its name, were a Germanic people. Charlemagne was king of the Lombards, and Lombardy went on the division of the empire with his Germanic states. Even the victory obtained by the famous Lombard League over Frederick Barbarossa, while it secured the local independence of the Lombard cities, left the right of investiture with the German Kaiser. Lombardy was a dependency of the house of Hapsburg at the breaking out of the French Revolution, and had been with brief intervals for three hundred years. It was taken from the Austrians by the French, and on the dissolution of the empire was restored to the Austrians, in 1815. Venice was destroyed as an independent state by the French under General Bonaparte, and given over to Austria by the treaty of Campo Formio. It was finally confirmed to her by the congress of Vienna in exchange for the Austrian Netherlands transferred to the new King of Holland. There is no title by which France can claim to hold Brittany, or the ancient kingdom of Armorica, Gascony, Provence, Arles, Burgundy, Franche Compté, Lorraine, Alsace, or any portion of her dominions, except the ancient Duchy of France, which Austria cannot plead in behalf of her right to Lombardy. To deny the validity of the treaties of 1815 as the basis of European public law, were suicidal for Piedmont, for it is only by virtue of those treaties that she holds Genoa; and there is no argument Napoleon can use to justify his making war on Austria to wrest from her her Italian possessions, that would not equally justify his making war on Piedmont to wrest from her Genoa and her former possessions, or even on himself, to wrest from his grasp and to restore to Genoa

or to the Holy See, the Island of Corsica, the birthplace of his family.

The Emperor has made an appeal to what are called "oppressed nationalities." Did he do this in 1854, when he waged an unprovoked war with Russia to preserve for the chief of Islam the power to oppress the Greek, Slavonian, Syrian, and so many other nationalities within the Ottoman Empire? Does he propose to restore all oppressed nationalities to independence? Let him begin, then, with his own Empire, and restore Navarre, Brittany, Aquitaine, Provence, Lorraine, &c., to their independence; let him proceed as his next step to wrest from the House of Savoy, "his ally," which is not Italian, its Italian provinces, and reestablish them in their autonomy. He may then cross the channel and wrest Ireland from the grasp of Victoria, and reestablish the Irish pentarchy. Having done that, let him pass over to Scotland, and reinstate the Picts and Scots in their former independence. From Scotland let him pass to England, drive out the Normans, restore Wales to her autonomy, and reestablish the Saxon Heptarchy. Then let him visit Russia, another of his allies, and restore Finland, Courland, Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, Pomerania, the Ukraine, and all Poland proper, and Circassia, Girghistan, &c., to their independence. But we stop. All the present states of Europe are "agglomerations" of former independent nations, or tribes, and to restore all so-called oppressed nationalities, that is, nationalities which by conquest or treaties have been in the course of time annexed to other nationalities, would be an endless and impossible task, which could not be attempted without unsettling the whole civilized world, and plunging Europe into a worse barbarism than that which prevailed at the epoch of the German conquest of the empire. It is contrary also to the "Napoleonic idea," which accepts the revolution of 1789, and that effaced for France the provinces, established uniform departments, and sought, in the name of liberty, of fraternity, to efface as much as possible all national distinctions, as in the supernatural society they are effaced by Christianity. It is also incompatible with the modern doctrine of the "solidarity of peoples," preached by Kossuth, the new friend of the Emperor.

In human affairs prescription must count for something,

and unless we mean to lapse into barbarism, and give up the nations to perpetual war, we must observe the faith of treaties, and respect the settlements they have made. No doubt the north of Italy was confirmed to Austria by the Congress of Vienna for the purpose of preventing it from falling again into the hands of France, and nobody can doubt that if the Austrians were driven out, France would possess or control all Italy, and add the vast resources of the peninsula to her own. She would thus, with her warlike, enterprising, and aggressive character, be too powerful for the peace of Europe, or the safety of any other European state. We see many evils resulting from the Austrian supremacy in Italy, but we cannot persuade ourselves that more and greater evils would not result from the domination of France, and one or the other must dominate, for the whole peninsula cannot be united in a single state, and if divided at all, no one state can be found powerful enough to resist French influence without a close union with Austria, for France is essentially aggressive, or if you prefer, propagandist, and can never live in peace with her neighbors, unless she controls them, especially if governed by a Bonaparte.

France, that is, Napoleon III., since for the present he is France, is alone responsible for the present war, and the best interests of Europe, as far as we can judge, require his defeat. The peace of Europe will never be established on a solid basis till it is clearly settled that Austria is amply able to defend herself against French ambition, however disguised under the name of liberty and humanity. France is the only really aggressive power among the great powers of Europe. Great Britain and Russia may seek to extend their dominion in the East, but the former seeks no conquest on the Continent, and the latter seeks, and is in fact able, to make no further advance to the West. Austria has never been an aggressive power, and has seldom, if ever, fought except in self-defence. The rest of Germany seeks no external conquest. It is only France that disturbs the peace of Europe, and renders necessary the immense standing armies now kept up, and which are so ruinous to the great powers; and even she would prove herself a peaceable neighbor when once made to feel that Austria is her match without foreign alliances. Perhaps the present war will

prove that, and teach her that Austria can stand alone against her. We hope it will, for then, but not till then, will the settlement of the Italian question be practicable or possible.

The bearings of the present war on the interests of religion cannot be good, let the victory be on which side it may. The settlement of the Italian question, as Napoleon wishes to settle it, requires the Pope to be absolutely stripped of his temporal sovereignty, or to be rendered absolutely dependent on France for protection against his Italian neighbors. If Austria is driven out of Italy, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom must either pass under the dominion of France, or, as most likely, at least in the first instance, be given to the House of Savoy. Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, will probably be erected into a Kingdom or Grand Duchy of Etruria, for Prince Napoleon Jerome, and the two Sicilies be given to a Murat. No one of these will respect the independence of the Pope as temporal sovereign; and, least of all, the House of Savoy, which has ever been a bitter and persevering enemy of the Holy See. Possessing the whole north of Italy, it will be constantly seeking to extend its power southwards, at the expense of the Papal territory, in which it may count on an ally in the Prince Napoleon; and what protection against either can the Holy Father find but in France? Austria, driven out of Italy, and without a navy, can no longer come to his aid, and the other great powers are heretical or schismatic, and will not. Whether stripped of his temporal power or not, the Pope will be at the mercy of his Italian neighbors, and have no power on which he can lean, but France, and France unrestrained by any other power. He will be far more overborne and oppressed by France, than he is by Austria now; and his difficulty in reconciling his duties as Sovereign Pontiff, with his interests as an Italian prince, will increase a hundredfold. If the French are defeated, the conservative influence of Austria will prevent any of those reforms in his estates which, no doubt, time and its changes have rendered necessary, and the clamors raised against the Papal Government, to the great detriment of religion, will continue louder than ever.

It is true the temporal sovereignty of the Pope is not es-

sential to his existence as Sovereign Pontiff. But if he is not a temporal sovereign, he must be a subject. There is no middle ground. Of what power shall he be the subject? Of Sardinia, Etruria, Naples, Austria, or France? As the subject of one or another of these, he would, indeed, retain his infallibility in deciding questions of faith and morals, but he would cease to be free in the government of the Church, in regard to discipline and administration. The Franks were real protectors of the Holy See—the French have seldom been. The Bonapartes may profess much, but they have inherited a large portion of Greek dissimulation, and of Italian astuteness, and they can never be trusted. Napoleon I. proves what they are when dealing with the Papacy. The Napoleonic idea is, that Cæsar is supreme, and that Peter must be subservient to him. Napoleonism uses the clergy, but it has no respect for the rights of religion, and never concedes the supremacy of the moral order. It places Cæsar above law, and requires him to be worshipped as a divinity. It protects the Pope so long as he wields his temporal and spiritual power in the interests of Cæsar, and when he refuses to do it, it drags him from his throne, carries him a prisoner into France, and confiscates his estates. That is the “Napoleonic idea,” which we are old enough to have seen acted on once, and are perhaps young enough to see acted on again.

We are told France is too Catholic to suffer such an idea to be carried out. Perhaps it is so—we should be glad to believe it; but we fear that the more hostile the Emperor proves himself to the Papacy, the more certainly can he count on the support of the most energetic class of Frenchmen. The dominant thought, the reigning intellect of France, is, if not absolutely Voltairian, at least decidedly anti-Papal. The peasantry may love processions and the external forms and pomp of religion, and may speak very affectionately of *le bon curé*, but they have little of the soul of religion, and will follow the lead of the Emperor, and place the glory of France above the glory of heaven. But, after all, let the result of the war be what it may, the Papacy will survive, and Catholicity will prosper. England and Russia, anti-Papal as they are, will be used by Providence in his service, as they were before, and if Napoleon attempts to follow out the policy of his Uncle, he can hardly fail to meet his Uncle's fate.

One word more, and we conclude these desultory remarks. We are accused of disliking the French, and hardly less effort has been expended in making us pass for anti-French, than has been expended to make us pass for anti-Irish. We do not dislike the French; we do not dislike the French nation, but we do not like the French government, French ideas, French tastes, or French influence. France has many of the finest conceivable traits of character, and a large population that for intelligence, for faith, for piety, and for solid worth, is unsurpassed, if not unequalled elsewhere. But it so happens that the good in France as in other countries are not in power, and are not the part of the nation that shapes or controls its policy. Louis Napoleon feels it far more important for him to conciliate the anti-Papal, sneering, scorning, irreligious portion of the French people than he does the truly Catholic portion; and his whole conduct since he became Emperor proves it. Were he to push matters to extremity with the Holy Father, the Bishops and clergy of France would certainly regret it, and a few would make reclamations, but even the Catholic part of France would not rise against him, or cease to give him their loyal support,—till they found him ceasing to be successful. For ourselves, we do not believe there is faith enough, or sufficient attachment in the mass of the French, or of any so-called Catholic nation in Europe, to move them to do bloody battle for religion; and therefore we do not believe the obstacles Napoleon has to fear are on the side of Catholic France, or the Catholic feeling in any part of Europe. Public sentiment in Europe is anti-papal, and anti-clerical, if not absolutely infidel. Nothing but physical force or political reasons will restrain the Emperor in any expedition he chooses to set on foot. Providence will protect his Church, but more by means of the rivalries and jealousies of the great European powers, than by the courage or devotion of the faithful. It is sad to think it is so, but so we believe it is, and hence we regard with sad forebodings the future of Europe. In the present war neither party represents the Catholic cause. Austria would simply preserve the *statu quo*, and Napoleon would simply efface the Papacy as a political power. The sympathies of Europe are with him rather than with Austria, but the political and other interests of Great Britain and

Germany are against him, and these may enlist them against him, and in so doing sustain the Pope as temporal sovereign. But things cannot last in Europe as they are, for the present constitution of European society is rotten to the core, and a grand break up, sooner or later, is inevitable.

Europe seems to us not unlikely to follow the old Asiatic world, and, after a few more struggles between the despots and the mob, to fall under Oriental despotism. Especially does this seem to us to be true of the so-called Latin nations. We have no hope from these nations, whether French, Italian, or Spanish. They have been false to the faith, they have deserted their God, and he perhaps will desert them. Our hope is in the yet unexhausted energies of the Germanic nations, and especially in this New World. The Church has to create a New Christendom, and out from the new must go forth the forces to redeem the Old. The field of Catholicity in a few years will most likely be transferred from the south to the north of Europe, and to the United States of America. In both the north of Europe and in the United States Catholicity will spread and become predominant, as soon as it is seen to be fairly detached from the effete or despotic civilization of the southern nations. Let Austria perish, let France perish, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States remain, and the Church will soon repair her losses. It is for these nations themselves, not for the Church, we fear.

In the complications of our times we think Catholics have really more to hope from Protestant Great Britain than from any so-called Catholic state; and hence we think it time for us to change the tone of our remarks towards that nation, the only bulwark of liberty in Europe. We deny, we palliate none of her faults or her crimes, but we would see the bonds of friendship between her and Catholics everywhere drawn closer and strengthened. This is a new position for us, we grant; but the true Catholic will never suffer his prejudices to prevent him from pursuing the just policy most likely to promote the interests of his religion. A close union of Great Britain and the United States is needed to sustain the cause of true liberty, and to create a balance of power alike against European despotism and European Jacobinism, the two principal enemies of Catholicity. For us Catholics,

in this country, our duty is to stand by the cause of freedom, and to labor incessantly, under the inspirations of the successor of Peter, to gather this great and growing nation into the one fold of Christ, that we may in the faith and piety of the West balance the defections in the East; and if we duly consider it, Great Britain is more an American than a European power, and she and we have very much the same interests and tendencies.

LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

ART. VI.—1. *Tigh Lyfford. A Novel.* New York : James Miller, 1859. 12mo, pp. 270.

THE Catholic who writes works of fiction labors under a very great disadvantage, if he looks to the Catholic public for readers. The devout have either no taste for works of fiction or have scruples about reading them; and those who are neither devout nor scrupulous, want works more highly spiced than any Catholic can in conscience write. There is also among Catholics generally a feeling that in pure literature Catholic authors are inferior to non-Catholic authors. Save in matters of faith and piety, our Catholic public is very much the slave of the non-Catholic public, and have very little confidence in their own judgment. Hence the Catholic who devotes himself to pure literature, unless he has happened to be commended by non-Catholics, has really no public among the adherents of his own religion. He can succeed only by pressing in a national sentiment of some sort to his aid, and that in this country must be a foreign nationality, because comparatively few of our Catholic population have any American sentiments or traditions. He or she who can write a good Irish story may succeed; but he or she who has the misfortune to have no nationality but the English or the American, will find few readers for a purely literary work among Catholics. Even *Fabiola*, by his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman, has probably not reached now a sale of above seven or eight thousand copies; and the ordinary sales of literary works, we are told, reach somewhat between fifteen hundred and three thousand copies.

We make not these statements by way of complaint. We could not really expect the facts to be other than they are. But we state these facts in order to show the discouragements and difficulties of a Catholic literary man, depending on the Catholic community for readers and the sale of his works. The author of the work before us, if he had written without any reference to the Catholic or non-Catholic public, and kept himself wholly within the range of the natural order, would long since have occupied a high position in the ranks of American literature. As it is, non-Catholics will not read him because he brings forward his Catholicity; and Catholics will not read him to any great extent, because, being a Catholic, they have no confidence in his literary merit. Yet we assure the public, both Catholic and non-Catholic, that

Tigh Lyfford is a novel of no ordinary merit, marked by just perception and nice discrimination of character, filled with noble sentiments, and written in an easy, graceful, and dignified style. It is an interesting novel, and it is even more than that—it is a good book, embodying deep and valuable experience of life, and indirectly teaching lessons of the gravest importance both to Catholic parents and their children. The scene is laid in this city, and satirizes most successfully two follies which, though not peculiar to our Catholic population, are quite out of harmony with the true Catholic spirit—snobbishness and eagerness for place under government, especially in the Custom-house. We commend it especially to those of our Catholic young men and women who aspire to be fashionable and to associate with the Fifth Avenue in virtue of the wealth acquired by their parents in retailing or wholesaling bad spirits—really in vending poison, and causing sorrow and death all around them. It is well not to forget the rock from which we are hewn. In this point of view *Tigh Lyfford* is not only an interesting, but a deeply instructive tale, and may be read with equal pleasure and profit.

2. *Songs for Catholic Schools.* By Rev. Dr. Cummings. Published by St. Stephen's Sunday School. New York: P. O'Shea. 1859. 18mo, pp. 53.

THIS is not a large book, if we look to its bulk, but if we look to its contents it is by no means small. It is designed for Sunday schools, and is admirably adapted to the wants of our Sunday school children; while its songs, set to music, are adapted to any age. The author is so closely connected with this Review, and has been for years so warm a friend of its editor, that we hardly dare praise these songs as much as they deserve; but we are sure that all good Catholics will thank the author for these contributions to our Sunday school library; and we trust they will be welcomed and sung with grateful hearts and pious lips in more than the excellent Sunday school of St. Stephen's parish in this city. Little books of this sort are far more difficult to write, and are worth far more, than grave philosophical or theological treatises; for they associate poetry and music with faith and devotion. We regret we have no room for even the shortest extract.

3. *Redemption. A Poem.* By John D. Bryant, M.D. Philadelphia: Pennington and Son. 1859. 8vo, pp. 366.

THIS poem is superior to Milton's *Paradise Regained*, which Milton himself is said to have preferred to his "*Paradise Lost*." It certainly is the most ambitious and elaborate poetic work that has been produced by any American Catholic, and certainly contains passages of the very highest order of poetic merit. We hope to be able to return to it, and to review it at length, and in a manner that will not be unacceptable to its author.

4. *The Life St. Francis Xavier, Apostle of the Indies and Japan.* From the Italian of D. Bartoli and J. P. Maffei. With a Preface by the Very Rev. Dr. Faber. First American from the last London edition. Baltimore. Murphy and Co. 1859. 16mo, pp. 653.

THIS is an admirable Life of the great St. Francis Xavier, and we heartily welcome its translation and publication for our English-speaking Catholics.

5. *Spiritual Conferences.* By F. W. Faber, D.D. Baltimore : Murphy and Co. 1859. 16mo, pp. 476.

THIS is a work that needs no recommendation from reviewers. Dr. Faber has the ears and the hearts of the Catholic public.

6. *The Jubilee at Mount St. Mary's.* October 6, 1858. Published by the President of Mount St. Mary's College, Emmittsburg, Maryland. New York : Dunigan and Brother. 1859. 12mo, pp. 288.

THIS is not merely a volume of temporary interest, but has a permanent value. Mt. St. Mary's is one of the oldest and best Catholic Colleges in the Union, and around which there seem to cluster more Catholic associations than around any other we have ; perhaps because most of the others are sunk in the congregation or religious order that has charge of them. Perhaps we like it all the better for being more American and less foreign than most of the others. It has done and is doing the Catholic cause a great service in naturalizing Catholicity in the country, and proving that an American may be a Catholic without becoming a foreigner. We want to see Catholic education nationalized, and our educated young Catholics trained to feel that this country is their country, and their home. Whoso reads the volume before us will feel that he is standing alike on Catholic and on American ground ; and yet Mt. St. Mary's owes its existence and its character to foreigners, to the energetic Dubois and the saintly Bruté, both Frenchmen, but Frenchmen who founded and educated for America, not for France. It matters not where our bishops, our clergy, or our educators were themselves born or educated ; it is only necessary that they should understand the genius and wants of our American community.

7. *The Life of St. Francis de Sales, Bishop and Prince of Geneva.* By Robert Ormsby, M.A. New York : D. and J. Sadlier and Co. 1859. 8vo, pp. 269.

MR. ORMSBY has not in this Life told us much that is new of the great St. Francis de Sales, but he has given us an admirable biography of the Saint, in a reasonable compass, and in a popular form. It is well written, and the author does not conceive that there is any lack of piety in writing the life of a saint with taste and elegance. The work itself is sure to be a favourite.

8. *My Thirty Years out of the Senate.* By Major Jack Downing. Illustrated with sixty-four original engravings on wood. New York : Oaksmith and Co. 1859. 8vo, pp. 458.

WE have room now only to add that this is the original and veritable Major Jack Downing, whom we have all known so intimately for thirty years, out of the Senate of the United States, where he has rendered not less important services to the Union than those rendered by the late Mr. Benton by his "Thirty Years in the Senate." This is the veritable Downeaster, and is not to be confounded with a certain impostor, a Knickerbocker by birth, who signs himself "J. Downing, Esq., Major, &c." The New-York counterfeit is cleverly done, but it

wants the ring of the true metal, and is easily detected by every genuine downeaster. Seriously, these letters of the original Jack Downing are the production of true genius, and Jack himself is a real creation, and moves and acts amongst us as a living man. He is a more living character than Cooper's Leather Stocking, or the Edie Ochiltree of *The Antiquary*. The author, Seba Smith, Esq., is the only writer we have ever found who could write the genuine Yankee dialect with the true Yankee accent and turn of thought. Jack Downing, Uncle Joshua, Ephraim, Zeke, and Aunt Nabby, are veritable Yankees, think, speak, and act like Yankees on every occasion, and we recognize them as old familiar acquaintances. They are unmistakable, and as little to be confounded with persons of any other race or nation as any given number of Parisians, Cockneys, Sawneys, or Patlanders. The character is disappearing now, more's the pity, and will ultimately be known only as preserved in these "Letters and Dokyments," which, for originality, genuine wit and humor, as well as for rare creative power, are unequalled by any volume that has ever issued from the American press. It is almost the only genuine American book ever produced, and it could have been written in no country but the United States, and by no one not born and brought up in New England. The "Letters and Dokyments" afforded, when first published, infinite amusement, and have afforded us more than amusement as we have re-read them in their collected form. The author is an American, a New Englander, and a downeaster, and one whose genius and honor are dear to all of us who, like him, are downeasters, and remember our own childhood and youth, and our early vernacular.

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9. *The Eternal Truths. Preparation for Death ; or, Considerations on the Eternal Maxims, useful for all as Meditations, and serviceable to Priests for Sermons.* By St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori. Newly translated from the Italian, and edited by Robert A. Coffin, C.S.S.R. New York : Dunigan and Brother, 1859. 16mo, pp. 282.

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10. *Month of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. From the French of Rev. F. GAUTRELET, S.J.; to which are added Morning and Evening Prayers, &c.; dedicated to the Pupils of the Sacred Heart.* New York : Dunigan and Brother. 1859. 32mo, pp. 263.

THE devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus is, perhaps, of all our devotions, that which is most offensive to non-Catholics, because it is founded on the great fact of the Incarnation, and implies the fact that we are redeemed and blessed by our Lord in his human nature—the fact that makes it so dear to all true and living believers. The Christian is united to God not as pure spirit alone, but through the human nature of the Word. The peculiarity of Christianity, its distinctive feature, which gives to all Catholic devotions their form, their significance and appropriateness, is that its God, the Christian's Father, beginning and end, is the man-God, or the Word made flesh. It is only by recognizing this great mystery that Catholic devotions to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and Mary can be seen to be just and proper. To those who make little of this mystery, or fail to perceive that all in Christianity proceeds from it, these devotions, as well as many others we

practise, seem either unmeaning or idolatrous. But we honor the Father in the Son, and the Son in his sacred Humanity, as also in his Divinity. The objections to these devotions prove that, though the objectors may believe in God, they do not believe in Christ; and that, though they may be Deists, they are not Christian believers.

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11. *The New American Encyclopædia, or Dictionary of Universal Knowledge.* Edited by George Ripley and Charles Dana. Volume VI. New York: Appleton & Co. 1859.

Now that the attempt of some of our Catholic Journals to make this Cyclopædia pass for a work satisfactory to Catholics has been defeated, and it is suffered to stand on its merits as a liberal Protestant work, we have no special fault to find with it, and can recommend it as the best Cyclopædia of its size and its price in the English language, and the least offensive to Catholic taste and feeling. We have no doubt that the editors do their best to make it worthy of the extensive patronage it is receiving; and it is a work that must find a place in every American private library. The Appletons are also republishing *Chambers' Encyclopædia*, which, from the specimens sent us, we judge will prove very acceptable to those who cannot afford the expense of the larger work.

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12. We see the publishers are engaged in bringing out an enlarged and much-improved edition of Worcester's *Dictionary*, which, we trust, in orthography, orthoëpy, and etymology, will supersede throughout the country Webster's, which is valuable only as a defining Dictionary, and which ought never to be regarded as a standard work.

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13. *The Life of Sœur Rosalie, of the Daughters of St. Vincent de Paul, born September 8, 1787; died February 7, 1856.* Baltimore: Murphy and Co. 1859.

THIS is a very well written life of a remarkably energetic and influential Sister of Charity, whose works of piety and benevolence have left on the minds and hearts of the poorer and even irreligious classes of Parisian society a deep and indelible mark. She was a true daughter of St. Vincent de Paul, and proved how much even one woman, in a quiet, unostentatious way, may, with the blessing of God, do for the relief of the poor, and the conversion of the unbelieving and the vicious. She presents an example which it does one good to contemplate; and we hope this little volume will be read and meditated by all, both old and young.

* * * The articles II. and IV. in this present number have somewhat of a personal bearing, and are designed as an explanation and defence of the course latterly taken by this Review, and which seems to have displeased some of our Catholic friends. We have deemed the remarks we have made, and the explanations we have offered, as due alike to those who agree with us and to those who

differ from us. We have not wished to defend or to apologize for any thing we have said, nor have we written to deprecate censures, if we deserve it, or to stop the denunciation of our views which we expect to receive regularly once every three months from a portion of the so-called Catholic press. We are, as O'Connell said of himself, "the best abused man" in the country, and have little reason to fear the woe pronounced against those of whom all men speak well. We leave to those journals that make it a point to give, on the appearance of each successive number, half a column or a column of conceit, nonsense, and abuse concerning it, to settle the matter with their readers and their own consciences the best way they can; all we ask is, that whether approved or condemned, it shall be with a correct understanding of what are our real views. Of course we are not partial to vituperation and abuse, and we have no great respect for the method of our journalists of refuting a man from whose views they dissent, by the weight of popular prejudice, rather than by the weight of their arguments. The method does not strike us as very reasonable, nor as precisely in harmony with the true Catholic spirit; but if the journalists choose to adopt it, this is a free country, and they can do so. To fair and manly discussion, however, we have no objection; no man is obliged to agree with us any farther than we agree with the truth, and they who do not believe we agree with the truth have, so far as we are concerned, a perfect right to differ from us, and refute us if they can, by fair and solid arguments. Of anything in the shape of reason urged against us we do not complain; but we think, after all, that Catholic journals should, for their own sake, be sure they understand the intrinsic merits of the case better than we do, before presuming to denounce us on their own authority, and that they should be sure of our meaning before arraigning it.

There is one practice very common with a certain class of editors, who have more imagination than reason, and more words than arguments, which we cannot approve, that of assuming that they express the sentiments of our venerable bishops and clergy, and therefore that what they say against us is said by authority. This assumption is one they have no right to make, and neither they nor we have any right to drag the bishops and clergy into our controversies.

Journalists, in their capacity of journalists, do not and cannot speak by authority; and no one, no matter who he is, has any right to speak for anybody but himself. If we have that respect for the clergy we all ought to have, we shall shrink from attempting to make them responsible for our opinions or the policy we advocate. We venerate the Church too much to try to make her responsible for anything we do or say, and we have too little respect for what is called public opinion, which is usually only popular prejudice, to urge it against others, or to hold it a solid argument when urged against ourselves. We see a great and glorious work to be done for religion in this country even by laymen of talent, learning, and piety, and we regret that the moment we attempt to do what we can in its direction, some half-a-dozen editors who have not the slightest conception of the work, of the real character and wants of the country, should have the disposition, without rhyme or reason, to place themselves in opposition to us, and the bad taste to pretend to do it in the name of the clergy. We neither pretend to speak in their name, nor do we wish by any outside pressure to force them to acquiesce in our views. We wish to use without abusing our own liberty, and to leave the clergy theirs, unembarrassed by anything we do or say.

We regret the divergence between us and a portion of the so-called Catholic press, for united the press is none too strong. We cannot expect the divergence to be less, but we have said in this number all we choose to say respecting it, and can foresee no event that will cause us to allude to it again. If there is to be fighting hereafter, it must be all on one side; we shall take no part in it, but pursue the even tenor of our way, simply holding ourselves responsible, as we are bound, to the proper authorities. We have no time to waste in encounters with windmills or wind bags. The times demand earnestness, and the best efforts of every friend of religion, for scenes of trial and of peril are before us. The war is raging, and there is no saying what will be its extent, or what shape it will assume before its end. But be it longer or shorter, extended or confined, or let it take what shape it will, the cause of religion and of humanity can only suffer during its continuance, and our study should be to gain for both here what they are losing in the Old World.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1859.

ART. I.—1. *De Immaculato Deiparae conceptu Caroli Passaglia commentarius.* Romae, 1854, 1855. 3 Tomi, 4to.—2. *The Immaculate Conception of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary a dogma of the Catholic Church.* By J. D. BRYANT, M. D. Boston, 1855.—3. *L'Immaculée Conception de la Bienheureuse Vierge Marie considérée comme dogme de Foi.* Par MGR. J. B. MALOU, Evêque de Bruges. Bruxelles, 1856. 2 Tomes, 8vo.

NEARLY five years have elapsed since the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin has been proclaimed by the Chief Bishop in the assembly of his brethren, from the chair of St. Peter, to be a revealed doctrine, necessary to be believed under penalty of forfeiture of Catholic communion. It was anticipated by some that this measure would prove a serious trial for Catholics, especially for converts, and an occasion of triumph for Protestants, who would regard it as a manifest instance of addition to the ancient faith. The religious Order so long distinguished for opposition to this doctrine, was expected to protest against its solemn recognition, or if it durst not raise the voice to murmur in low tones, and reject it. Among the bishops themselves, who, in reply to the Pontiff's letter of inquiry, had declared their attachment to the sentiment, a few were adverse to its definition, and a greater number expressed doubts of the expediency of declaring it under pain of anathema. Yet no definition has ever been received

with such unanimity throughout the whole Church, or has occasioned fewer murmurs. Converts as well as those trained in the faith, have bowed in submission, and embraced it with unreserved assent. Two cases only have come to our knowledge in which it proved an occasion of scandal and apostasy, and in one of these the grace of re-conversion was obtained, doubtless through the intercession of the Virgin, on the feast of her Dolors. The opposition from without has been feeble and faint, whilst the faithful have rejoiced in the assurance given them by the unerring authority of the Church, that the devotion which they had all along cherished, was not grounded on conjecture, or sentimentality, but on the positive revelation of heaven. The triumph of the Virgin in the acknowledgment of her exemption from the stain of original sin, has been most complete, and without any loss to the Church, as his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman observed, on the very evening of the definition, addressing a literary society at the Roman Capitol. In almost every other instance the sword of authority cut off from the communion, numbers of proud spirits that resisted the truth defined; but, in this case, the patience and indulgence of the Church were crowned with general submission and harmony.

The want of serious opposition from without may perhaps be ascribed to an incorrect view of the object of the definition, which some confound with the supernatural conception of our Lord by His Virgin mother. We ourselves, have heard a Protestant say, that he always had believed the Immaculate Conception. Some Catholics have mistaken the dogma for a supernatural conception, as if Mary was not a descendant of Adam, in the ordinary way. But either error was limited to few individuals. The world at large, Catholic and non-Catholic, have understood that the definition regards merely the exemption of the Virgin from the stain of sin, which each member of the human family contracts in the first moment of his existence. Protestants have thoughtlessly said, that she is put on a level with Christ our Lord, but the difference is vast, as Cardinal Gotti a century and a half ago observed, for Christ is by right free from such stain, by reason of his supernatural conception and Divine Sonship; Mary is only exempted by special favor, and for His sake, in virtue of His merits.

Not caring to make this distinction, why have they not more loudly clamored against the dogma? Perhaps because indifference and latitudinarian views have made rapid strides among them, and controversy has lost its attractions. More probably, however, it has been because the previous measures adopted preparatory to the decision, the solemnity with which it was pronounced by the Pope, surrounded by his brethren; the readiness with which it was everywhere accepted, gave it weight and authority, even in their eyes. May it not be that the prejudice against the Blessed Virgin, Mother of our Lord, has lost much of its bitterness, and that a sentiment and feeling of veneration for her are almost unconsciously spreading even beyond the limits of the Church; Even Mrs. Beecher Stowe has observed, that Protestants, in opposing the worship of the Virgin, had perhaps not sufficiently considered the position she held in the great work of man's Redemption.

It cannot be dissembled that the definition of the dogma presented a practical difficulty of great magnitude. It was a known fact that the sentiment, although widely spread and devoutly cherished, was avowedly not formally of faith, that it had been for centuries a matter of dispute, with liberty of dissent, and that it was prohibited to brand as heresy the opposite view. How could it in a moment be changed into a dogma, to be believed as divinely revealed, under penalty of incurring the guilt of heresy? The solution of this difficulty is found in the Catholic principle that the Church is the pillar and ground of truth, and that her judgment in regard to the fact of revelation is final and supreme. As long as she had not pronounced judgment, there was no infallible certainty that this doctrine had been revealed. It was held indeed by many with all the tenacity with which we cling to divine doctrines. The University of Paris, and many other seats of learning, for centuries had bestowed their academic honours only on such as bound themselves by oath to defend it. Many individuals made a vow to maintain it, even with the sacrifice of their lives. It was the popular sentiment of all Catholics expressed, in some countries, in their familiar salutations; it was the basis of devotions everywhere received, yet it was not an article of faith, for the want of a solemn definition. When this has been pronounced, every Catholic

intellect has bowed in homage, and the doctrine is now embraced with the same unhesitating assent of the mind, with which we adore all revealed truths. It is not indeed of the same intrinsic importance as many other doctrines; but the certainty of faith is the same, because God has spoken by the Church. The revelation however which the Pope declares, may be explicit. The great mysteries are explicitly revealed; and in them is implied much, which, when defined and propounded by competent authority, must be accepted and believed. As all revelation that appertains to Catholic faith closed with the Apostles, it would be difficult to show that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was distinctly and explicitly revealed, since it could scarcely have been so long left undefined, especially after it was controverted, if clear and decisive proofs existed of such distinct revelation. It may, therefore, be safer and more consistent, to hold that it was implicitly revealed in the mystery of the Incarnation, and in the doctrine of the eminent Sanctity of the Virgin Mother.

The consonance of the privilege with the mystery of the Incarnation is manifest. Every circumstance that elevates and ennobles the chief instrument of this ineffable mystery, must facilitate its belief. Since Christ was God incarnate, His mother, must have been stainless and pure to bear Him within her bosom. In the fulness of time God sent His Son born of a woman. It relieves us of much of the difficulty of believing this depth of Divine condescension, to consider her as sanctified for this purpose in the very act of her creation, and made a worthy temple, as far as a mere creature can be, of the Deity. Yet, we do not rest the privilege on our sense of what is right and becoming in her regard. Whilst it was open to dispute, Scotus, or his followers, might argue in support of it from its manifest propriety and suitableness: DECUIT; POTUIT, ERGO FECIT. Now that it is defined, we regard it as a revealed fact, intimately connected with the mystery, and certified by the same authority, which assures us that the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us. The place in which God manifested Himself in vision was declared holy: the temple consecrated to His worship, by sacrifices and prayers, was hallowed by His presence. As the Virgin was chosen

to be the living dwelling of Incarnate Deity, whose body was formed of her substance, she must have been prepared for this most intimate union with Him by the choicest graces and privileges. Any stain of sin, even for a moment, would have rendered her unfit for the high honour : any subjection to Satan, although merely as a member of the human family, would have detracted from the glory of Him, who was without sin, set apart from sinners. All is in perfect harmony, and is every way worthy of God. The character of Saviour still belongs to the Son, even in her regard, since her preservation is in anticipation of His merits and atonement. The divine bounty shines forth in this most favoured creature, that reflects the brightness of Incarnate light, and in grateful accents celebrates the praises of her Creator. "My soul doth magnify the Lord : and my spirit doth rejoice in God my Saviour : . . . for He that is mighty hath done great things to me : and Holy is His name."

It is easily understood that doctrines, which from the beginning were openly and constantly held and professed, were defined with precision and proclaimed with solemnity in the progress of ages, when it became necessary to guard them against the subtleties of innovators. Thus, the mysteries of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption were at various periods, and under various aspects, defined and enforced. True it is, that Socinians and others take occasion to represent such doctrinal definitions as gradual advances on the teaching of the early ages, and recall Christians to the simple language of the original Creed and of the Scriptures. Still, we are by no means disposed to claim for the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception the same degree of evidence : but we may justly place the divine maternity of the Virgin in the same category, since it was necessarily believed from the very origin of the Church, in connection with the Incarnation. It was solemnly defined in the Council of Ephesus, when the one Person in the two natures, divine and human, was declared against Nestorius, and Mary was proclaimed Θεοτόκος, Mother of the Man-God. This dogma contains all that regards her. It does not, indeed, expressly state that she was preserved from the stain of original sin ; but it prepares us for believing whatever the Church may declare of so high a dignity.

We venture not to assert that the privilege now defined was present to the minds of the fathers of Ephesus, whose attention was concentrated, and probably absorbed in the mystery then under consideration, fiercely combated by Nestorius; but we insist that the definition must be regarded as a stand-point from which the gifts and prerogatives of the Virgin must be examined.

The doctrine of original sin became prominent about the same time. It was delivered by St. Paul, as well as by other sacred writers, and handed down by the early fathers; but no one can dispute that the definitions of Councils and Popes in the fifth century gave a more distinct form to the teaching of the Church on this subject. It is indeed so connected with the mystery of Redemption that this cannot be sincerely believed, if the fall of the human race in Adam be denied. In the disputes on this subject, in which St. Augustine acted so distinguished a part, we may naturally expect that the exemption of the Virgin Mother must have been expressly laid down, if any revelation concerning it existed. Yet, we do not find him making such exception, but, on the contrary, in the strongest language he declares that Jesus Christ alone is free from the malediction which the whole human race incurred in our first parent. This might be thought fatal to our cause, had not the heretic Pelagius pressed the Catholic champion with the consequences of his position, and reproached him with classing the Mother of God with sinners, whereas Christian piety acknowledged her to be sinless, and with consigning her to the power of Satan. Augustine felt obliged to explain himself, by replying that when sin is in question, he did not at all mean to include her, since for the honour of our Lord, who was wholly without sin, she received grace to overcome sin in every respect.* Again, he denied that he placed her under the power of Satan, although it is the common lot of all men to be subject to the devil at their birth, and remarked that the grace of a new birth prevented such necessity in her regard. These passages shed light on the primitive tradition concerning this privilege. The entire holiness and stainlessness of the Mother of God was admitted and maintained by heretics as well as by

* Lib. de Natura et Gratia, c. 23.

Catholics. There was no dispute on this subject. All the passages of Augustine which affirm the universality of the original taint are qualified by this solemn declaration, that he does not mean to include her when sin is in question; and so the like passages of St. Leo and other fathers are to be understood of the general lot of all the children of Adam, to which even Mary would have been subject had she not been preserved from it for the honor of our Lord, her Son. It is impossible to limit the exception to the commission of actual sin, since in the mind of Augustine, actual sin and original are correlative, so that he ventures to assert that Christ our Lord would have been liable to actual sin, had he been at all infected with the taint of the original corruption.

This privilege does not appear to have formally engaged the attention of the Church in the early ages, although it was implied in the divine maternity of Mary, and in her eminent sanctity, which was loudly attested. It was not to be expected that attention should be directed to her special gifts and prerogatives, when the great mystery of the Incarnation was exposed to the rude assaults of unbelievers. It is maintained, however, that it became the object of special devotion among the Greeks as early as the fifth century, if not earlier, or at least as early as the seventh. "The conception of St. Anne," which they celebrated from either period, was directed to honor what we understand by the conception of the Blessed Virgin. In the West this festival was introduced, some say, in the ninth century, or at latest in the eleventh. How is the late institution of this festival consistent with the alleged revelation of the doctrine in the age of the Apostles? Many festivals have been instituted in much later times to honor facts recorded in the Scriptures, or doctrines necessarily involved in the high mysteries of faith. Before restrictions were placed on the power of each Bishop in this regard, it easily happened that a festival was introduced in a local Church, which was soon adopted in other Churches, and finally got the sanction of the Roman Church, styled the mother and mistress of all others. The institution of minor festivals furnished pleasing evidence that the great dogmas of Christianity were triumphant, so that leisure was afforded the pious to contemplate facts or doctrines in connection with them. In our case the

opposition made by St. Bernard to the introduction of the festival in Lyons, awakens suspicion that its object was not wholly beyond doubt or controversy. The Saint, indeed, complains that its introduction was irregular, the sanction of the Holy See not having been previously obtained; but as this restriction was not generally observed at that period, we must suppose that it was insisted on principally because the object was uncertain, or thought to savor of superstition, as in fact St. Bernard alleges. In the state of physiological knowledge then prevailing the conception was likely to be understood of the formation of the embryo, which was thought to be animated after a long lapse of time, sixty or eighty days. As it involved considerations of great delicacy regarding parental agency, we are not surprised that St. Bernard, and others, should have shrunk from its celebration. This also may account for the opposition which the doctrine itself encountered during so long a period, as it was not easy to present it in its simplest form, as implying only the freedom of the soul of the Virgin from all stain of sin in the first moment of her existence.

The divine maternity is for us the grand argument for every prerogative of the Virgin. "*Propter honorem Domini*," as St. Augustine says, we are unwilling to entertain any question of the Mother of our Lord, as regards sin. We feel bound to believe her all holy and perfect. Yet we by no means undervalue the reasoning of divines on various passages of Scripture that concern her. Doubtless she is the woman spoken of in the *Proto-evangelion*, or first promise of Redemption to fallen man—between her and the serpent, that is Satan, there is an essential opposition and hatred, for by her Son she has crushed the head of the enemy. She is *κεχαριτωμένη*, full of grace* and heavenly gifts—the most favored of all the daughters of Eve—she is blessed amongst women. Those who can afford time to read over the argumentation of Passaglia, with the copious illustrations which he furnishes from the

* Bergier, on the alleged authority of Origen, states that this term means "created in grace;" but we find nothing in the passage quoted to support this view. Origen merely says, that "this salutation was reserved for Mary alone." Valckenaer, a learned Protestant, shows that it implies fulness of heavenly gifts.

fathers and other ecclesiastical writers on the various passages, that regard her, or are accommodated to her, will find much to strengthen their convictions of her high prerogatives. St. Justin, St. Irenæus, St. Epiphanius, strikingly present the contrast between her and Eve, and show her instrumentality in the work of Redemption. Mgr. Malou thinks that Passaglia does not give sufficient weight to the argument derived from the accommodation, or application, of certain Scriptural passages to the Virgin, for although, generally speaking, no proof can rest on such ground, yet the accommodation of texts to the Virgin by the public authority of the Church shows that in her they have a definite meaning. It is remarkable that the Canticle of Solomon should contain passages that can scarcely be applied to any other creature, such as that which the clients of Mary love to repeat: "Thou art fair, my beloved, and there is no stain in thee." Mgr. Malou cannot persuade himself that such texts are merely accommodated to her,* or that the mystical meaning when recognized and supported by Catholic tradition is not entirely conclusive.

The work of Passaglia, published with special encouragement from the Pope, with a view to prepare for the definition of the dogma, and to support it, fills three large quarto volumes, the last of which is equivalent to two. It fully proves the ancient universal tradition in favor of the exalted dignity and eminent holiness of the mother of God. Among the documents and vouchers which it contains, there are numerous passages from accredited sources, the effect of which appears to be marred, if not defeated, by the multitude of supposititious writers that are presented as *pseudo Augustinus, vulgatus Hieronymus*, or with other marks of false pretensions exposed. The crowd of minor witnesses, especially of Greeks, appears almost equally objectionable, since, being for the most part unknown to fame, their testimony, however forcible, can scarcely make a strong impression. It would appear that the Hymn-books in popular use, and the discourses and works of mediæval writers, have been literally eviscerated to supply the materials which the learned compiler has wrought into every variety of form. We should prefer less bulky volumes,

* Vol. i. p. 297.

having intrinsically more weight, by the judicious selection of proofs, and their just application. A galaxy of witnesses is presented, whose effulgence is dimmed by the vastness of their numbers. The proofs of the general belief of the stainless sanctity of the Mother of God are indeed abundant and overwhelming. Even those writers who are thought to have questioned this special prerogative, have spoken so highly of the gifts bestowed on her, that it is difficult to reconcile the various passages one with the other. St. Bernard addresses her: "O! thou alone blessed among women, and not accursed: free from the general curse." * "Human nature in Mary was not only pure from all defilement, but also pure by the singularity of her nature." † St. Thomas of Aquin repeats with Anselm, that her holiness must transcend that of men and angels, and be the highest imaginable under Deity itself. The Liturgical books in Greek, Coptic, Armenian, and Syriac bear witness to the same tradition. Very few of these passages have any direct reference to the Immaculate Conception, but they establish that stainless and exalted perfection which is inconsistent with sin of any kind.

In the controversy to which the festival of the Conception gave rise, St. Thomas and the scholastic divines generally freely avowed, that the Virgin Mother was sanctified the very next moment after her creation. It may be that they took too material a view of original sin, which is now held to be a mere privation of justice and grace incurred by the whole human family in Adam. The stain is to be conceived morally, inasmuch as each one is a child of wrath, an object of God's displeasure, at the first moment of existence. The Blessed Virgin being created to be the Mother of Christ, was necessarily an object of divine complacency from the first moment of her existence. This is all that is implied in the dogma. We see little force in the scholastic objections, because exemption from the actual stain of original sin is as fairly presumable, as immediate purification from the stain, since the dignity of the Mother of God is the chief ground on which either rests: and the benefit of redemption is no less real because anticipated.

* Serm. iv. in Virg. Nat. n. 3.

† Serm. de Nativ. 13 V. n. 7.

The concession of the sanctification of the Virgin in the second moment, which was common to all the opponents of the festival, shows the strength of the ecclesiastical tradition in favour of the privilege, and breaks the force of the objections urged against it.

The festival prevailed despite of the objections and influence of its opponents, and although not speedily approved of or adopted by the Roman See, which is usually slow to countenance whatever has the appearance of novelty, it was tolerated. St. Thomas of Aquin affirms this as a reason for not condemning it absolutely, suggesting, however, that the sanctification of the Virgin, consequent on her conception, might be the object of the devotion. This explanation is no longer admissible since Alexander VII., in 1661, declared that her immunity from original sin was from ancient times the object of the solemnity. It was celebrated at Anagni and Avignon in the presence of the Pope in the fourteenth century. It will surprise some that he should follow others in a matter of this solemn character, but in those ages festivals being frequently instituted by Bishops, were subsequently approved and confirmed. It detracts nothing from the dignity of the Holy See, or from the office of chief teacher and Hierarch, that a festival of this kind directed to honor a special privilege of the Virgin Mother should originate with inferior prelates, whilst the successor of Peter was content with honoring her in direct connection with the incarnation and birth of Christ. It is characteristic of that See to be slow in its proceedings, and to weigh maturely the grounds of its action, so that when it sanctions the acts of local Churches, its judgment and authority give them great weight and importance. It was only in the latter half of the fifteenth century, in 1476, that a special Mass and office were appointed by Sixtus IV., with a proffer of indulgences for those who should devoutly celebrate "the wonderful conception of the Mother of our Lord." Many regarded the act as decisive in its character, and did not hesitate to brand as heretics those who presumed to doubt of a prerogative so solemnly acknowledged. These on the other hand boldly pointed to acknowledged doctrines of faith, namely, the universal taint of original sin, and the need which all have of Redemption through Christ, which dogmas they alleged

were denied and subverted by the sticklers for the privilege. All the wisdom and forbearance of the Chief Bishop were necessary to steer the vessel of the Church amidst the rocks on each side, but Christ always lives and teaches in the successors of Peter. The storm was abated by a measure of prudence, each party being forbidden to censure the other, whilst the clients of the Virgin Mother were allowed and encouraged to celebrate the festival. The dogma "not having been yet decided by the Roman Church and Apostolic See," the Pontiff excused its opponents from heresy and mortal sin, although he did not fear to declare false and erroneous their charges of heresy on the advocates of the privilege. From that time forward the festival was celebrated without opposition, although some strove to explain away its object, and weaken the proof which it furnished of the prerogative of the Virgin Mother. The special office and Mass then sanctioned were set aside by Pius V., and replaced by the office and Mass of the nativity, with the substitution of the term "Conception" in its place. Some ventured to drop this for the word "Sanctification," but this was forbidden, and the exemption of the Virgin from original sin continued to be the acknowledged object of the festival.

The Church might tolerate a festival instituted in a particular place, and gradually extended by the zeal of the clients of the Virgin, with probable grounds for its celebration. She would certainly not adopt and encourage it, unless she deemed its object certain, still less would she enjoin its observance. Never would she sanction it by a doctrinal definition, unless she was fully persuaded that the object was divinely revealed. Plausible reasonings might induce her to tolerate the usage, convincing arguments and extraordinary facts might lead her to encourage it, but authoritative teaching requires divine light, and is never attempted by the Church unless with entire certainty of revelation.

Men who view divine things as they do natural facts, may think that the slow process by which this sentiment was spread and strengthened, was the result of policy devised and carried out by devotees and enthusiasts; but plans are not easily formed which require centuries for their execution. It is more natural to refer to divine Providence

the progress of the devotion. The increase of the veneration of the Virgin Mother was a natural result of the great triumph of the divinity of Christ over all the wiles and assaults of Arianism; and the distinct honor paid to each special prerogative was a token that the piety of the faithful found delight in contemplating the gifts with which she was adorned. This particular privilege was not brought into view by any effort of the Holy See, which is ever vigilant to restrain the excesses of enthusiasts, no less than to repress the proud daring of unbelievers. The festival was slowly admitted, and then approved, and encouraged, and finally, when the manifestations of the Holy Ghost, teaching and moving the faithful to this devotion, were multiplied, the Pontiff felt not only warranted, but impelled, to proclaim from the chair of Peter, that Mary the Mother of God, is fair and stainless.

Whoever has leisure to read over the great work of Passaglia will find all these facts and arguments stated at length, and placed in their full light. Ordinary readers will find in the essay of Dr. Bryant, an American convert, much to instruct and edify them. He has recently made this privilege the key to an excellent poem on "The Redemption," in which the Virgin Mother acts a part such as is assigned her in the Divine Scriptures.

"Intact the second Eve shall be, and free
From every stain of body, soul, and mind.
Beneath her sacred feet the serpent dies,
And sinful Eve a perfect counterpart,
Replete with grace, immaculate shall find."

Mgr. Malou, the author of the third work on our list, bore a distinguished part in the discussions of the Bishops, which preceded the definition, and was privately urged by some of them to publish a work in its explanation and defence, the Pope himself vouchsafing his encouragement to the undertaking. He has successfully executed the labour of love assigned him,* which he presents in two octavo volumes, on a plan and method entirely his own, but using freely materials derived from Passaglia, and other sources.

* A singular lapsus memoriæ occurs on p. 346, vol. i. The words of Zachary are attributed to Simeon. Aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus.

He has well digested and arranged them, and placed them within the reach of the readers in a way that their force cannot be ignored or mistaken. The clergy for whom his work was specially designed, will find it highly serviceable to enable them to understand correctly the grounds of the action of the Church, and to dissipate the objections made to this exercise of her authority. We congratulate the illustrious author on having given to the public so valuable a defence of the privilege in a popular style, which cannot fail to be acceptable even to the Laity. In his quotations he is generally critical and accurate, although some may dispute whether the passage ascribed to St. Gregory,* is of this great Pontiff. The commentary on the first book of Kings, from whence it is taken, is thought to be of another writer, who, nevertheless, culled his materials from the genuine works of Gregory. The passage in question is strictly in harmony with the uniform teaching of the fathers, namely: "the eminence of Mary shines forth above all the saints."†

The dogma recently defined is not strictly an addition to the ancient faith, because it was implied in the mystery of the Incarnation of which Mary was always acknowledged to be the holy instrument. That this precise privilege resulted from it, was not authoritatively declared, although it was virtually admitted by all who reposed in the faith and worship of the Church. As the belief in Jesus Christ the Son of God was in substance the same as the solemn formulary of Nice and Constantinople, so also in saying that the Son of God "was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary," the early Christians virtually professed her perpetual virginity, her dignity as Mother of God, and her high sanctity. The declaration of two natures in the one Divine Person, and the definition of two wills, divine and human, in Christ, where made in councils of the Church at Ephesus, Chalcedon, and other places, in accordance with Scripture and tradition, and under the light and guidance of the Holy Spirit. These authoritative judgments rendered belief of these articles necessary, without adding anything to the deposit of revelation. "It was necessary," as the Protestant Bishop Pearson remarks, "we should believe our

* P. 356.

† C. in l. 1 Reg. x. c. 1, n. 5.

Saviour conceived and born of such a woman as was a most pure and immaculate Virgin."* It does not add to this article, but explains it, that she was not only intact as a Virgin, but altogether stainless. When, at the close of the fourth century, she was declared a perpetual Virgin, in opposition to the error of Helvidius, the faith previously professed received no addition, but was further explained, or more distinctly; and now that the term immaculate is applied to the very first moment of her existence, it adds nothing to the faith always cherished, which essentially regards her divine maternity. "The peculiar eminency and unparalleled privilege of that Mother,"† is the chief voucher for the special immunity we claim for her.

Pearson acknowledges her high dignity, and says: "Far be it from any Christian to derogate from that special privilege granted her, and incommunicable to any other." In connection with these remarkable passages, we may be permitted to observe, that the feast of the "Conception of Virgin Mary," is still remarked on the calendar in the Book of Common Prayer, published at Oxford, which simple fact is a memorial of the ancient observance of the festival in England, where it prevailed from the eleventh century, and may serve to incline the nation to recognize it the more readily should the movement towards the Church be continued. Already has one of its poets greeted the Virgin in terms of highest honor:

AVE MARIA! Thou whose name
All but adoring love may claim.

Many will regard the definition of the Immaculate Conception as a triumph of the theory of development, since it may appear that the doctrine was the result of reasoning on the mystery of the Incarnation, and was finally declared, when, in the judgment of the Chief Bishop, all doubt was dissipated, and the privilege made manifest in the light of the Holy Spirit. We are averse to embarrassing the acceptance of the decision by any theory or to revive a controversy which the prudence of the illustrious author has suffered to die away, but as the Pope in the Constitution which defines the dogma, adopts the language of Vincent

* Pearson, On the Creed, Art. III.

† Ibidem.

of Lerins, we can have no difficulty in repeating it. "The Church of Christ, careful guardian and defender of the dogmas deposited with her, changes nothing in them, diminishes nothing, adds nothing, but with all industry, by faithfully and wisely treating ancient things, so studies to limit and perfect their expression, that these ancient dogmas of heavenly faith, may receive evidence, light, distinction, but may still retain their fulness, integrity and propriety, and may increase only in their own kind, that is in the same dogma, the same sense, and the same sentiment."*

Doctrinal development, if confined to the distinct enunciation of doctrines virtually contained in the deposit of revelation, although not originally propounded with distinctness, can scarcely be denied by any one conversant with the history of the Church. We object only to such development as would add to the original deposit doctrines not really contained in it, but apparently derived from it by reasoning, even supported with the approval and judgment of the highest authorities. We do not think that the Church can, by any exertion of her power, make of faith that which of itself does not appertain to the deposit of revelation. We do not then regard the definition of this dogma in the light of a theological conclusion accepted and confirmed by the judgment of the Chief Bishop. He declares it a revealed doctrine, having divine authority. As we are free to regard the revelation as implicit, rather than express, we do not feel called on to point to the proofs of a distinct revelation of this privilege, yet the Scriptures, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, bear testimony to the dignity and excellence of the Virgin. "Certainly the parallel," says Dr. Newman, "between the Mother of all living and the Mother of the Redeemer, may be gathered from a comparison of the first chapters of Scripture with the last. The only passage where the serpent is identified with the evil spirit occurs in the twelfth chapter of Revelations; now it is observable that the recognition, when made, is found in the course of a vision of a 'woman clothed with the

* "In eodem dogmate, eodem sensu, et eadem sententia." This is not fully or accurately expressed in the translation of the Bull, "in the same sense and the same belief."

sun and the moon under her feet:’ thus two women are brought into contrast with each other. Moreover, as it is said in the Apocalypse, ‘the dragon was wroth with the woman, and went about to make war with the remnant of her seed,’ so it is prophesied in Genesis, ‘I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. He shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.’ Also the enmity was to exist, not only between the serpent and the seed of the woman, but between the serpent and the woman herself; and here, too, there is a correspondence in the Apocalyptic vision. If then there is reason for thinking that this mystery at the close of Revelation answers to the mystery in the beginning of it, and that the woman mentioned in both passages is one and the same, then she can be none other than St. Mary, thus introduced prophetically to our notice immediately on the transgression of Eve.”*

“The mystery of the Immaculate Conception,” Mgr. Malou remarks, “appertains to the class of divine truths implicitly revealed in other truths, and to the class of truths *directly* but *obscurely* revealed.” We cordially agree with the learned prelate in his views regarding the implicit revelation of the dogma. His exposition of the force of what he terms the living tradition of the Church, is able and eloquent; and he justly relies on the intimate sentiment and devotional feeling of the faithful at large, as well as on the general sentiments and acts of the prelates, for evidence, that the Holy Ghost always teaches and maintains the high privileges of the Mother of God, and especially her exemption from all stain or infection of sin. We cannot too highly recommend his admirable work, in which this whole subject is handled in a masterly manner. His argument, taken from the perpetual infallibility of the Church, is closely allied to the former, and well worthy the attention of the reader. It is on these arguments our main reliance must be placed, for, however weighty be the testimonies adduced in so great number, we must still regard the question as in itself obscure until viewed in the light of the living tradition of the Church, and determined

* Essay on the Development of the Christian Doctrine, by John Henry Newman; p. 179 American edition.

by her unerring judgment. As St. Augustine said with regard to the validity of baptism administered by heretics: "Since the sacred Scripture cannot deceive us, whoever fears to err on this obscure question let him consult the same Church, which the holy Scripture points out without any obscurity."* The traditional testimony concerning the eminent holiness of the Virgin is indeed very strong, and implicitly vouches for her exemption from original sin; but it loses nothing of its force by being presented in conjunction with the manifestations of the sentiment and living tradition of the Church, and with her divine authority.

There is no reason why we should hesitate to acknowledge that a degree of obscurity enveloped the question, even when it appeared rapidly advancing towards its final settlement. Gregory XV., in the year 1621, when pressed by the king and bishops of Spain to define the dogma, answered them that the Holy Ghost had not yet laid open the recesses of this mystery. This was said, probably, because the objections had not lost all plausibility, and the proofs, although satisfactory, did not present that high degree of evidence which might warrant an immediate definition of the fact of revelation. It is not pretended that any new revelation has since been made; but the ever-increasing devotion of the faithful to the mystery, and the general sentiment and judgment of the bishops throughout the world, have taken from the objections all coloring of difficulty, and determined the Pontiff to declare the revelation, which before was open to some doubt, or hesitation.

It will surprise many that a controversy, which at times raged violently, should be left for six centuries undecided; but ages are as days in the Church. She did not leave the truth without a witness: she did not give an uncertain sound: she did not suppress the festival, or qualify its object; but accepting from the contending parties the professions of submission to her authoritative judgment, she prudently deferred a solemn decision, until she could pronounce it with a fair prospect of its general acceptance. In the mean time the festival was celebrated with solemnity ever increasing; and although the public discussion of the topic was for a time forbidden, the restriction was soon

* L. 1 contra Cresconium, c. xxxiii.

confined to the opponents of the dogma, and the pious sentiment was left free to be proclaimed without hesitation or contradiction. Although during a short period the teaching of the Church on this point could scarcely have been called express, definite, or authoritative, the difficulties and objections were elucidated in the schools: the sentiment was devoutly cherished by the faithful at large, who could not bear it to be called in question; nations became impatient for the definition of the doctrine, which learned and holy writers proved to be capable of being defined. In the end the Pope, after consultation with the bishops throughout the world, has pronounced his solemn decision in accordance with the universal persuasion of the faithful, the long usage of the Church in celebrating the festival, and the ancient faith and tradition. His judgment does not rest on the abstract reasonings by which the exemption was supported, or on the miraculous facts believed to have taken place, through the use of the Medal of the Conception. It rests absolutely and wholly on the mystery of our Lord's Incarnation as revealed in relation to the Virgin Mother.

The form of proceeding in this matter was peculiar. Hitherto the definition of doctrines usually took place in councils, convened for their examination, or was made by the Pope after mature deliberation, with such aid of counsellors or examiners as he selected, and then promulgated with strict injunctions, that the bishops throughout the world should signify their acceptance by subscribing them. In the present case no council was assembled, but letters of inquiry were addressed to all the bishops, inviting them to report the tradition and sentiment of the various local churches, and their own judgment in regard to the expediency of issuing a definition. The answers may be considered almost unanimous, for of five hundred and forty-three, four hundred and eighty-four urged the definition; ten others suggested an indirect definition; eighteen deemed it inopportune, of whom six or seven arrayed themselves in direct opposition to it, although they acknowledge the prevalence of the sentiment, even in their dioceses. On the strength of testimony and judgment so harmonious, the Pontiff determined to proceed to the final act, and took on himself its whole responsibility. The *projet* of a Bull

was submitted to nearly two hundred prelates, who assembled on his invitation, to witness the very solemn decision of a long-pending controversy; which, however, had been virtually terminated by the general sentiment and devotional feeling of the Christian world. Printed copies of all the letters of the bishops on this subject and of various other documents were furnished to each of the prelates. The observations freely made by them, in the conferences held in the great hall of the Vatican, were reported by the presiding Cardinal to his Holiness, and were received with great consideration, so as to give occasion to the remodelling of the document, with some delay in its publication. The definition itself, although expressly reserved to the Pontiff, and consequently not made the subject of discussion in the assemblies, was in a slight degree modified at the private suggestion of some prelates; and was promulgated, after the bishops had closed their deliberations by expressing their desire and prayer that the Pope would console the Church by giving the seal of his supreme authority to a sentiment so consonant with piety and the great mysteries of faith. Persons attached to modern theories might have thought that the rights of the prelates, as judges and guardians of the faith, should have been exercised in a more direct form; but as they all had given written testimonials of the sentiments and wishes of their respective churches, there was no room for questioning the propriety of issuing a decision in conformity with their own suggestions. As no council had been called, it would have been improper to give an accidental assemblage of bishops the rights which belong to their colleagues equally with themselves, though there was great propriety in asking the expression of their sentiments on the arguments and language of a document which was intended to support the definition. All was done with great condescension on the part of the Pontiff, great reverence for his authority by the bishops, and resulted in an act which has edified and consoled the whole Church, all recognizing the voice of Christ our Lord in the judgment of His Vicar.

The words are taken from the Constitution of Alexander VII., published in 1661; his declaration of the object of the festival and of the ancient devotion of the faithful to the mystery, being now presented in the form of

an authoritative definition, under penalty of anathema. Thus does the Holy See show the strict conformity of its teaching with that of former ages. When the Constitution of Alexander was published it was deemed an indirect decision of the controversy. Already in the time of Urban VIII., in January, 1627, a decree of the Holy Office declared that nothing remained but to pronounce a final judgment, or to adopt measures equivalent to a decision. The latter mode was chosen by Alexander VII., but nearly two centuries passed before a formal decree enjoining the belief of the dogma emanated. This slowness of proceeding shows how little enthusiasm or attachment to a favorite sentiment influenced the final judgment. The decision implicitly affirms the universal taint of original sin, repeating only the exception made by the Council of Trent of the ever glorious and unstained Virgin Mary. It acknowledges that she was redeemed through the merits of Christ. Thus it pays homage to the great doctrines on which the whole plan of salvation depends.

ART. II.—*De L'Art Chrétien.* Par A. F. RIO. Paris, 2 vols. 8vo. Tome I. 1836. Tome II. 1855.

THE work of M. Rio is a general survey of Art, from the Catholic point of view. In respect of critical and professional merit, and for grace and charm of language, it is a model in its class. The first volume is in two Parts, of which the edition is long since exhausted, and the former part is not now within our reach. The second Part of the same, beginning with the consideration of Christian Painting, describes the different characteristics of the Byzantine and the Roman schools. The latter School, which is of a rank higher and more refined, received a large and new development, under the auspices of Charlemagne and the Popes. Charlemagne, the patron of learning and of every liberal art, not only encouraged the same in his own dominions, but also urged the artists to co-operate, by their works of painting, with the bishops, in the conversion of

the Saxons to Christianity; and, even in distant lands, labored to engage foreign sovereigns, with a kindred taste and zeal, in the cultivation of these resources, which are of so powerful an influence in the higher civilization.

Time has spared but little, as may well be supposed, of all that was achieved for the adornment of churches and palaces in those days; but there still remains one class of productions, which shows the hand of the artist, even to this day. These are the miniature paintings of the Manuscripts. After the lapse of a thousand years, after solid walls have tottered and crumbled to decay, we have still left, out of those ages which the moderns call ignorant, one thing;—and this is, their books: the joint labor of the scholar and of the artist. It has been scornfully remarked of those times, that the price of a book was more than equal to that of the horse and equipments of a cavalier. But if more time and patience and skill were lavished on the former, than were devoted to the service of the latter, it would be good logic to infer that the book was esteemed the nobler property, and that there was less contempt felt for books, then, than is oftentimes very justly felt for them now. When we consider the fineness and durability of the material of parchment or vellum, the perfect accuracy and symmetry of the penmanship, and the exquisite and lavish ornamentation of the letters, in gold and silver, and in all the colors of sea and land and sky, it seems not improbable that these monuments of a past age may yet endure and shine, after the books of this day are faded and mouldered to dust.

The retirement of the religious life was naturally most favorable for this branch of art. The masters of painting in general, during the earlier periods, were monks, or abbots, or bishops; and of one, the monk Thimon, M. Rio relates, that he was finally consecrated to the archiepiscopal see of Salzburg. But while the labors of the Manuscript were at all times executed chiefly and most successfully in the monasteries, it need not be supposed that this was exclusively a monastic art, for there were others, apart from the religious or the ecclesiastical state, who followed it as a profession; and, among these, some who attained to the first rank in the same, and to the highest honors. Of these, M. Rio mentions two, who, for their excellence, are found

recorded in the pages of Dante: Oderigi d'Agobbio, and Franco di Bologna.

O, dissi a lui, non sì tu Oderigi,
L' honor d' Agobbio, e l' honor di quell' arte
Ch' *alluminare* si chiama in Parigi?
Frate, diss' egli, più ridon le carte
Che pennellegia Franco Bolognese:
L' honor è tutto suo, e mio in parte.

Purg. canto xi.

But the quotation just given may do a double service, for it is chiefly to our present purpose to observe upon this passage, that it was only with the later periods of the art, that the word *alluminare*, "illuminate," began to be used, as if by a Parisian refinement; but previously, the whole was expressed by the plain terms of *scribere*, "write," "writers," &c. With this observation, joined with the brief notice we have taken of the art of letters by Manuscript, we are prepared to examine a passage in the life of Charlemagne, by Eginhard, which has been the occasion of no little scandal in the literary world, and a handle for much foolish declamation. The error has been already refuted, though but faintly as it would seem, and perhaps never at all in the English language; for it still continues to circulate, and to round the periods, sometimes, even of Catholic authors. The question is this: Did Charlemagne know how to write his own name?

Eginhard, his personal friend, in describing the scholastic accomplishments of Charlemagne, tells us:

"That he was in eloquence ready and copious; and could find expressions to set forth, most clearly, whatever he wished. Not content with his vernacular tongue, he studied also foreign languages; among which he acquired the Latin so well, that he used to say his prayers as readily in this as in his mother tongue: Greek, however, he understood better than he could speak it. So finished and elegant was his discourse, that he seemed a professor [*didascalus*]. The liberal arts he cultivated most assiduously, venerated the masters, and treated them with high honors. In grammatical studies, he received lessons from Peter of Pisa; in the other branches he had for his preceptor, Alcuin of Britannia, a man of most profound and varied learning. With him, he gave much time and labor to the studies of Rhetoric and Logic, and particularly of Astronomy. He learned the art of numbers, and [*intentione sagaci*] having a clear and retentive mind for the same, he calculated the movements of the heavenly bodies [*curiosissime*] in a manner the most elaborate."

One would think these no mean attainments for a soldier and a hard-working statesman, but unluckily for the literary pharisees, Eginhard adds :

"*Temptabat et scribere, tabulasque et codicellos ad hoc in lecto sub cervicalibus circumferre solebat, ut cum vacuum tempus esset, manum litteris effingendis adsuesceret ; sed parum successit labor præposterus ac sero inchoatus.*—He attempted also to *write*, and for this purpose used to carry about tablets and manuscripts, under his pillow in bed, that in his leisure moments he might practise his hand in designing letters ; but the untimely labor, begun late in life, was attended with only little success."

The pedant seizes joyfully upon this last sentence, and, in a mind furnished with nothing higher than the pot-hook associations of his green boyhood, he incontinently leaps to the conclusion, that Carolus Magnus could not write his own name. He heeds not all the praises of the context : it signifies not, that in another place Eginhard says distinctly, that he did write and commit to memory certain barbaric and ancient songs of martial exploits : such hints might help the truth, but they would not serve the purpose of him who seeks to blot out another's fame so that his own may come into notice, and who dares to darken the splendor of a great name, so that his own little rushlight may shine by contrast, and take lustre from the blackness. And this kind of process, it may be remarked, taken in a general sense and joined with a thin varnish of classic erudition, is sometimes regarded as a "revival of learning ;" when, in reality, it is nothing but a negative of knowledge, founded in error.

But to return to the words of the vexed passage : Eginhard says, first, in general terms, that Charlemagne tried to write [*scribere*], a word which signifies any kind of writing, or drawing, or engraving, on parchment, on wax, on lead, or gold. In the second place, it was said that he carried about with him "tablets and manuscripts ;" that is, the tablets for draughting, or sketching, and the [*codicellos*] sheets for his finished work. Or else, what was the use of tablets, if he had manuscript for *writing*, in the modern sense of the word ? or what was the need of manuscripts when tablets were all-sufficient for the mere purpose of making his letters ? Truly, the art of illuminating,

or of picturing a manuscript, was quite another thing from the spasmodic sweeps and flourishes of the modern penman. But in the third place, particularly and specially, all this apparatus was in order to acquire a skill and facility in figuring [eppingendis] or portraying letters: precisely in the sense of executing a picture, or statue, or any similar work of art. And therefore he carried it about with him in his bed, at home and abroad, in town and country, in court and camp; partly, perhaps, for the sake of privacy, in respect of his recreation, but chiefly out of that spirit of industry truly characteristic of the great mind, which will not remain unoccupied, and will not be caught unprovided with some means of filling up the time, nor without some resources of refined entertainment. A warrior, a statesman, a patron of the arts, and recognized as such in every kingdom of the known world: this was a man of universal genius. Whatever he might undertake, he was able to perform. It were absurd to suppose that he could not succeed in any work of common human capacity: absurd to suppose that he would wholly fail in any work that is appropriate to the most excellent capacity. It is not necessary to suppose he would succeed uniformly and equally in every instance; but in the scale of superior talents, if we rate the construction of an empire as first, and the composition of a miniature painting as last; and if we know that, of the two, the forte of Charlemagne lay in the former kind of talent, being a master in the art of government, then his skill in the latter kind of talent, we should very naturally expect to be of a less degree of excellence; not much above, nor yet much below mediocrity; one that would be, in all probability, worthy of little notice from a professional point of view, but curious as the product of a man of grand ability and of wide celebrity; in a word, one that would be marked, precisely as Eginhard describes it: by a "moderate success."

So much for the letter of the difficulty; but now for its motive, and the principle which prompts this and similar aspersions upon the great names of the Christian world. When man begins to depart from the state of innocence, a great field of knowledge seems to open before him. When he forsakes the simplicity of the truth, a thousand devious ways of error disclose themselves; and knowledge is felt to

be requisite for him, not only as a satisfaction for his intellect, but as an all-important means of maintenance and of guidance in his new stage of existence. This knowledge, which is not the one wholly good and supernatural, is the knowledge of good and evil; not of evil alone, nor of good alone, but of evil mingled with a certain good residual from his former supernatural state, and with the natural good, which is in some degree present in every existence, and without which, evil itself could not exist. Knowledge, too, even in the designs of a kind Providence, attends the loss of innocence, as the plank might be cast in the way of the drowning man; for after any loss whatever, the intellective faculties are commonly quickened in proportion, and if any remedy be possible, we hope with knowledge to discover it. Moreover, it is consonant with the justice of God, that fallen man should know his own loss and degradation: know better the value of what he has lost, and the worthlessness of what he has gained; and thus, even the inferior and earthly experience ought to serve as one motive at least for his conversion. But, unhappily, this design of Providence, like every other in the natural order, may be frustrated, and fail of any such good issue. For the sense of one's folly less commonly begets humility, than it puts to shifts and contrivances to conceal one's disgrace.

Thus since the great loss that men have suffered by their revolt from the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century, there has accrued for them a certain compensation of knowledge in the natural order. But this, which should be a motive of repentance and of return to the former obedience, is made a pretext of reproach and disdain for the Mother of souls; becomes the refuge of pride, and a fortress in which error is intrenched and fortified against the truth. In place of that divine wisdom which is not only the knowledge, but, in some sense, the possession of the true good, both charity and understanding in one: they who have lost the supernatural light boast themselves in a knowledge which is multiplex, fragmentary, compounded of good and evil, profane, exterior, material; one that takes its impulse from the sensuous faculties, and therefore having a stamp of servitude, that is much occupied about the things that are beneath and the baser necessities, and therefore shamefaced; not a pure good in any sense, but only relative, and

at the best, indifferent. And since this knowledge has no solid merit in itself, but only according as it is used, therefore to give it a show of greatness, it must be paraded with wealth and power, and must be set forth with all the weight of the secular influences. It is great, only as others are little, and therefore others must be disparaged and kept out of sight. If it should once appear that there is a sacred wisdom, of simplicity and majesty eternal and ineffable; which is the one thing necessary, of infinite virtue by the dignity of its prerogatives and by the importance of its consequences: then down falls all the secular knowledge, as a little thing in comparison, as a foolishness before it.

The object of the understanding and the essence of knowledge is truth. Where truth is mutilated or lost, some wretched copy, some hypocritical show of wisdom, must be brought in to supply the void. This will be to the understanding, not the superior and sovereign force which ought to rule and animate it, but an inferior and diminished particle of good mixed with evil, which the mind handles like a tool, or bends this way and that as if a slave. And then truth is made to obey and serve the understanding, and knowledge is assumed to be the substance before which truth is an accident. All things are reversed, flesh prevails over spirit, fallacy triumphs over right, and license over authority. Then an error will seem more reasonable than a verity, the argument of sense more mighty than that of faith, and an acquired knowledge will be more admired than the inspirations of Heaven.

After the first man had sinned, he hid himself; and to explain his ambiguity, he made an excuse of propriety and of advanced knowledge: "Because I was naked;" as if he knew better, and would appear better, precisely in respect of that in which he had defaulted, namely, in virtue. The first impulse of the transgressor, is to hide his fault, and where he knows there is a defect of purity, he displays an over-refinement of discretion and modesty: where the shame is greater, there the greater precaution must needs be used, to cover up and effectually conceal the shameful parts. Now the grand defect of these times is, that men have lost the truth in its divine and catholic unity and integrity; which is a wound for their intelligence, and the hurt is felt most especially in the intellectual part. Hence in their

efforts to fill up this want, to repair this disaster, they make desperate, and as it were, superhuman efforts to extricate themselves from the infirmities of the understanding. They think to make up their loss and cover their disgrace, by vast stores of learning in the physical sciences or of classical erudition, or of laborious, misguided, and barren metaphysical speculations. They boast that this is an age of knowledge above all others; that if they excel in any thing, it is in their superior intelligence of their age. Hence reading and writing are supposed to be necessary for salvation; or it is taken for granted, that, when all shall know how to read and write, we shall have a perfect world. That it is all important for the intellect to be cultivated, and according as the same is cultivated, one is like to God. That there is no degradation so low, as that of ignorance about the rudiments of secular learning; no ignominy, like the being destitute of knowledge in the physical order. That the school-house may, upon the whole, be deemed even more important than the church, the schoolmaster more necessary than the priest, and the black-board more salutary than the altar.

Just as the fig-leaves of our first parents, the token of their shame, have been converted to raiments of purple and gold, and have become a title to vainglory in the world, so the whole pomp of the secular knowledge is, at once, a memorial of innocence lost, a warrant of pride and a cloak for innumerable distortions and counterfeits of sacred truth. What the raiment is to the body, such is knowledge to the mind. The body is not made better according to the multitude or the beauty of its garments; so the mind is not necessarily improved by the amount, or by the quality, of its acquisitions. That which is necessary for the mind, is useful for it; that which is sufficient, is good: more than this, is not useful; more than this, is not good. There is one knowledge which is good for the laborer, another for the poet, and another for the soldier, the scholar, the artist. There is a reason and proportion of ornament for the mind, as well as for the body. It is true that none, even the humblest of our human studies, are despicable, for the Creator himself approved the practice and sanctioned the improvement of knowledge, when he provided the garment of skins, better than the garment of leaves; not enough

is bad ; more than enough, is not good. But to pour in mere knowledge, the raw material, indefinitely upon the mind : this is a gross covetousness, a foul stupefaction to the soul.

There are some who seem to think, that only to train and drill the mind, is a pure good ; that the mere play and exercise of the intellective faculties is the fruition of existence. Now, to suppose that the cultivation of the intellect is all-important and all-sufficient, is as if one should prune and manure his vine, without regard to sun or wind, to spring-time or harvest. To be sure, it is good to discipline the mental part, but this is not the sovereign duty of any man. It is good to till one's field ; but if he puts his vine against the north wind, if he plants his melons in the sunless shades of the forest, and sows his corn upon the barren sands : what profit will be all his labor and sweat ? If he holds in contempt the heavenly influences, he may boast his work, and prove his diligence : but where is the fruit ? where any good product ?

There is no question here of recreation ; the partisans of intellectual culture do not condescend to that, nor, in any feat of skill which may be referred to mental acuteness, whether it be a mechanical invention or a game of chess, are they ever willing to divest it of the high dignity of a *quasi*-divine achievement. If the powers of the mind were to be exercised that they might gain strength, this strength to be afterward put to a holy and better use, there would be reason in that ; but there they stop short ; that holy and better or supernatural end is not dreamed of. To suppose that their gifts are to be subjected to religion, and made to serve the glory of the divine Master, is not in their thought ; their edifice is to be their own, and to stand alone, and above all that may be imagined by the common mind. Since pride is a sin of the mind, and since knowledge is a quality which pertains directly to the mind, so when the Serpent would corrupt the first parents, knowledge was the vehicle he selected by which to convey to their souls the venom of his pride ; and what should be a natural food of the understanding, became the very means to disorder, and weaken it from its original prudence and perspicacity. If to spin or to rhyme, to delve or to do battle, without any purpose and for no object, would be insane, so the culture of the mind, without a reference to the eternal state, or an

aspiration to the heavenly wisdom, is no less insane, the insanity of pride.

There may be knowledge without malice, but there is no malice without knowledge. Suppose an action for homicide, the plea of insanity being brought in defence: if it should be proved that the assault was planned beforehand, it would be doubtful if the defendant were insane; if his plan was prosecuted accurately and pertinaciously, then it would be more than doubtful; if the same was contrived with cruelty to a purpose of revenge, that is, with a method of cause and effect, then it is certain that the culprit was a rational agent, guilty in proportion to his knowledge, and malicious because of his knowledge. Knowledge is a thing, in itself, utterly indifferent except according as it is used: if well used it is a gain; if badly used, a loss; if employed to no definite purpose, it is a folly.

And here is one reason why metaphysical science is often found to be involved in the profoundest obscurity. It is made a search for something which does not exist. That is to say, it is studied for its own sake, as if containing in itself a secret virtue, which is to be the universal solvent of absolute pyrrhonism; or, sometimes, with a far less innocent intention, is required to furnish a certain essence of absolute good, which shall transcend and supersede that wisdom "which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world." And because there is sought in it, something which it does not and cannot give, therefore is the search endless and fruitless, and equivalent to one that is without purpose and void of reason.* Philosophy is not an end, but a means; as the name implies, is not wisdom itself, but a certain regard or devotion toward it; bearing the same relation to truth, as does the grammar of a language, to the stores of thought that may be contained in that language. For it is not a superhuman, but a human science; not one for which man was made, but one that has been instituted for man; no clearer than the mind of man is clear, no fairer nor nobler

* Nothing is here said or intended against metaphysical study pursued by a rational method, for a right and laudable end. The censure is upon those who mistake such study as itself an end, and ask of it what it is not in its nature to give.—Ed.

than the rational soul is noble and well-favored. In a word, one that is not to be elevated over and above the human understanding, but that is to be made subject and subservient to it.

And in this manner, for the first time among the ancient philosophers, was it treated by Aristotle, who extricated it from those vague guesses at the truths of religion with which it had been involved by the pagan mind, and who reduced it to that fair basis of simplicity, order, and precision, where it has been held ever since by the schools. In the Middle Ages especially, it may be observed how well and justly this science was appreciated, from the fact, that the questions so much discussed, were not of its foundation, but only of detail. When the architect elaborates painfully a porch or shaft, we do not infer that he was unable to raise walls and frame roofs, but that he is able to do all and more than is necessary for mere utility; or when a professor writes a volume upon the Greek article, we do not conclude that he is ignorant, but that he is learned, in the Greek language. Even so that which is made a charge of dulness against those ages, is only an argument of their expertness and facility in the studies which are scarcely attempted in some modern colleges. As it has been in the former ages, so it is now, that according to his faith and to his attachment for the truth, the true philosopher, whose honorable vocation it is, not indeed to build, but to serve the temple of truth, has always this pure intention: to study how he may, with clearness of diction, singleness of purpose, and propriety of terms, resolve the inflated speculations of the day into the simplicity of truth, and bring them into harmony with the laws of reason and of Christian tradition. But the moment we depart from the Catholic discipline, we fall at once upon those visionary, undefined, and painful essays of the mind, so common in the pagan and infidel schools. While the docile and disciplined mind loves the plain truth, the unblessed and infidel mind imagines he can find something better and more genial; the one is strong to disentangle and simplify, the other perplexes and embroils, all things; the one is the Magister, who masters his science, the other is overmastered by his own philosophy.

It would even seem as if this embarrassment of the

intellectual elements in society tainted, as it is, with scepticism, affectation, and luxury, had caused a panic of the understanding; and that the capital science of human reason had become a certain preternatural and hostile influence, to confound the learned and to overawe the vulgar. And why is this so, but because the unbelieving generation have rejected the light of divine truth, and therefore they suffer loss in that which is the light of the understanding? They have disdained the guidance of holy Church, and they find themselves bewildered with their own audacity. They have set up their human reason above the Apostolic faith, have sinned in the pride of knowledge, and their punishment is in kind: for in their pride is the darkness of their mind and the confusion of their understanding.*

Retiring now from these lofty endeavours after the knowledge of abstract truth, and, as if repulsed and rejected in their aspirations towards the summit of the hill of science, the men of light are seen to be somewhat actively occupied about its base; and their enterprise is engaged mainly upon a production of knowledge, which shall give a better return in quantity, if not in quality. They have taken to their assistance the mechanic forces; and all that types, and levers, and steam can do, to propel knowledge in upon the human brain is set in operation, and urged, impetuously and incessantly, to this effect. We are told,† that, “from manuscripts to folios, and thence to octavos, the art of printing is now at last perfected in the limp, loose, sheet of the newspaper;” and so the grand result of the revival of learning is consummated in the perishable journal of a single day. When it is required that all shall read, there will also be required a subject matter which all can read, and naturally all will read what is provided equally for all alike: and so it comes to pass, that the long labors of the learned, and all the exploits of intellect, are to be

* It must not be supposed that the writer builds the science of reason on faith, or that he holds the light of supernatural revelation necessary to enlighten natural reason in relation to things purely natural, although occasionally it may do that, but that natural reason followed by itself alone, in opposition to the light of revelation, is sure to mislead and involve us in darkness as to our true supernatural end.—ED.

† By that oracle of the press—the *London Times*.

terminated in Dictionaries and Cyclopædias, and at last the collected wisdom of mankind is to be discharged upon the world, in a deluge of Newspapers!

In this age of cheap learning, it is thought to be enough to point to a newspaper, and you behold a light. Perhaps that sheet is a tissue of lies, and the contradiction of light, that is, a darkness. How justly the words of truth may be compared to thunders! Men accept some popular fallacy, elaborate and develop it into an axiom and a habit of life, till all doubts are lulled and all suspicions put to rest; and then, suddenly the bold enunciation of some well-known but disregarded truth, contradictory to their prejudices, startles them from their slumbers, like the peal of thunder, or as if the world were falling to wrack and ruin. Thus, it is well known, very generally admitted, and often publicly avowed, that journalism is an evil; that, even if it have some temporary advantages, still it is, on the whole, not a great and unqualified boon to the race. And yet, when upon a time, certain officers of the French army, boldly reasoning and freely speaking, call for "the extinction of journalism and of the journals," men tremble, are struck aghast, and are more deeply moved, than by any whatever blasphemy that has been uttered against Almighty God; more grievously disturbed than by any conspiracy or rebellion against authority and divine order, which has been revealed to their notice or wrought out in their presence.

We have remarked how the higher branches of knowledge have been prosecuted as an end rather than as a means. The same inordination may be observed, more recently, in the conduct of the lower and primary departments of learning. The attempt to popularize knowledge, whether it be regarded as a forlorn hope for the security of public morals, or as a substitute for the wisdom of the school of Christ, is a project which enlists the sympathies and energies of society, in the same intensity of purpose and devotion, that was once felt for the early and more imposing glories of the Renaissance. But if knowledge, under a higher cultivation, and with all the grace of a costly and exclusive refinement, could not redeem the destitution of an unbelieving society; assuredly, to make it cheap and familiar, to throw open the academic shades, and to graze the garden of knowledge as a public common, will not necessarily enhance its value

or argument its nutriment. As this is the most humble expedient of our men of light, so perhaps it is the last. It is the humblest, for there can be none lower in the field of knowledge; and if the last, it will naturally be urged to a desperate issue. Because popular education is common ground, it would seem that here all minds can meet, for the true good of the greatest number. As truth is one and the knowledge of truth is one, so among a diversity of religions, that unity which is denied to men in faith, it is fondly hoped they may find at least in reason and intelligence. And though we are conscious how slender is the bond which unites heads without hearts, and though an occasional collision of religious principles admonishes us sharply, how there alone, in the faith of one divine truth, is the seat of the only real unity as well as of charity: yet, no one seems to have a doubt, that some unknown great good is to be derived to the people, through the precious influences of orthography and syntax. Before the contemplation of a diffusion of knowledge, every mind, the most rebel and vagrant, is hushed and subdued; and those who take freely their laugh at religion, are filled with reverence and unction at the ameliorations of a diluted science. Some few may make a profit, perhaps; but the dividend in common will probably be in exact proportion to the cheapness of the outlay. One of our clever Irish boys, or girls, will acquire the rudiments, in a single winter's tuition, at the District School; and do all the "chores," or "house-work," besides. This is a gain for one who has a catechism to study, a garden of divine mysteries to cultivate; but without these, what is it that stands always ready to enter into that newly garnished mind, to fill that soul now swept and empty of a heavenly nourishment,—what, but the pride of the Serpent? the pride of a little learning? If mankind are taught reading and writing, mankind will know how to read and write; but that any higher good to the race than this, is necessarily to follow, does not appear. The statistics of crime do not show any connection between ignorance and vice more than between common schools and vice.

The popular education must, of course, be the common education, the milk and not the strong meat; and no art can ever make the common to be uncommon, the vulgar

to be excellent. We cannot make the milk to be both milk and strong meat at one and the same time. Therefore, having so little substance in itself, the diffusion of knowledge must be covered by a nominal and fictitious value, and when they are once committed to a cause so insignificant, its patrons are fain to overawe us with its unspeakable conventional importance, which, being too readily yielded, they are able, on the one hand, to hide a multitude of their own infirmities, and on the other, to obscure the virtues of a higher and better condition of society; for having once constituted their own standard of civilization, definitively, in a given mental accomplishment, the want of this accomplishment is made a decisive and overwhelming proof of intellectual degradation and barbarism. Thus, if it could be shown that the master mind of a Catholic age could not write his name: then he, and his works, and his age with all that was in it, are struck at a single blow from the rank of the enlightened. Hence, it is concluded, if a great name can be made to descend, can be put down in the dust beneath, it redounds to the honor of the cheap learning, and renders its dignity indisputable. Truly, here is a strange regimen, and a most insolent diet of vainglory, to poison the youthful or the popular mind!

A very amiable Catholic author* describes an illiterate youth, in the Middle Ages, inflamed with the desire of knowledge, and possessed with some mysterious yearning for a book in its actuality. Under this inspiration he braves the superstitious fears of his time, the gloom of the forest and the danger of death itself: and all this, not to win a crown of martyrdom, nor the philosopher's stone, nor the sangreal, nor fair ladie, but to seize upon a book, touch it with his hands, and feast his ravished sight with what can afford no possible satisfaction to his unlettered eyes. We have only to take this youth nearer home, bring him to one of our battered school-houses, and plant him among its roguish inmates, to see how quickly this insufferable affection and these coxcomical airs will be exploded, and he be found to plod his weary way in letters, as do boys now and then, in all the ages of the world. Surely, we have had learned blacksmiths enough in these days to prove,

* Hendrik Conscience, in the tale of "Count Hugo."

that not alone the rudiments, but a knowledge the most advanced, may be acquired by a mind unaided even by the ordinary helps which may be always had, and which it would be absurd and repugnant with common humanity to refuse. And in the Middle Ages, if not indeed in all ages, it was next to impossible that one should grow up, absolutely without some familiarity with the letters of the alphabet; for in their gateways, and on their walls, and in their churches on every side, not a day of one's life would pass but some title, or inscription, or sacred text, would meet the eyes and instruct the mind of the learned, or attract the notice and invite the inquiry of the unlearned. For why would they engrave sentences that were not to be perused? why would they make their manuscripts so beautiful, if they did not wish to inspire a love for letters? why so durable, if they were not to be used? or so legible, if they were not to be read? True it is, that, now in these days, it has been found necessary to enact laws prohibiting, for example, the servile class of our Southern States from instruction in reading and writing: but what reason is there to suppose that, in the Catholic ages, any difficulties were put in the way of the aspirant for knowledge? We do not find that harm was done then by incendiary tracts and libels; or that half-educated men abused their little learning to disturb order, corrupt society, and ruin souls, with an infidel, or radical, or obscene literature. And on the other hand, no labor and cost were spared to conduct the art of mere letters, or of caligraphy, to the last perfection; so that we find not only a fair text of prose, but verses of every measure, disposed in the same page acrostically and diagonally, in circles and squares, in birds, beasts, and fishes, and in every conceivable combination of imagery and sentiment, with an incredible industry and patience, and with an ingenuity altogether marvellous.

But to this kind of reasoning, it is now gravely replied: that those conceits were only a craft, that had its foundation in the times of "monkish ignorance." Leaving aside the bad philosophy which refers an art precisely as such, to ignorance, and taking it for granted that they intend to qualify those productions as trifling and unimportant, we will here join issue with the pretended friends of knowledge; and humbly submit that all the art of men is but a vanity;

that all the wit and science of the human race is but a shadow of the higher wisdom ; and, if the Apostle declares a knowledge more than natural, and a virtue of prophecy altogether miraculous, to be as nothing without charity, then, what signify the little learning of the popular mind, and the slender attainments of a childish capacity ? And why should the parent mind be distressed, and the tender understanding be vexed with the overweening, one-sided, ultra refinements of a knowledge that does not touch the heart, nor warm the piety of the domestic life ? And why should society be disturbed, and the Christian soul be distracted, with the ambitious and importunate demands of a science, which, taken out of its inferior rank and once obtruded in the scale of sacred virtues, divides the obedience, and confounds the duties, and darkens the intention for that pure and undivided good, which is the grace of the Creator, and the essential excellence of his reasonable creatures ? *

In the life of Charlemagne is exhibited a power greater than any mere knowledge—namely, that gift of wisdom which is constructive, which disposes, ordains, and distributes a system of sciences and arts, in their speculative and practical relations with the common and the private good, with the state in its head, its officers, and in all its members. This power of his was felt and confessed by the numerous peoples and nations in his dominion, and by virtue of it his name went forth in all the world as the master spirit of his time. If, therefore, the great king did not know how to write his name, then how little need had a mind like his for so ordinary an acquirement ? If he did know how to write his name, then how unimportant is the circumstance, if it has not left a trace nor marked an event in all his history ? If it be doubtful whether he did or did not know it, then this proves the doubtful value of an art which is feasible to the most vulgar capacity. Absolutely, did he or did he not know it, the genius of mind remains

* Our collaborator is not to be understood as depreciating the natural sciences in their place ; it is only in comparison with the divine wisdom he, following the Apostle, declares them to be nothing, and it is only when presented as a substitute for the sacraments that he condemns education. He is a Catholic, and knows that the supernatural supposes the natural, and even saves and protects it.—ED.

intact by its inherent greatness, but the human arts are found to be variable as the times, and utterly void of any but a relative merit. The history of Charlemagne is one of those great facts so weighty and oppressive to a feeble understanding that the pedant cannot entertain it; nor can he appreciate the comparative insignificance of his own little circle of meagre elements, and specious fallacies, and diminished truths; nor does he ever suspect, nor would he ever credit the prerogative of genius, which, without waiting for his credentials, transcends measure and means, and attains its ends intuitively and spontaneously.

There is one more aspect of knowledge that might be noticed, though it is not worthy of consideration, except as it suggests some apprehensions for the welfare of society; which apprehensions, moreover, must remain somewhat undefined, by reason of their remote issues in some obscure emergency of the future. Knowledge justly deserves a certain homage, and naturally the teacher is revered, in so far as he is furnished with a fund of instruction and qualified to teach. On the other hand, the desire of honors is a common temptation to pursue knowledge, for the sake of this great ostentation of regard which it procures to itself. But according as science is followed for the outward respect which it commands, so all its results will be outward and on the surface; and while we already see how large a portion of its conclusions are applicable only to the animal good of society, can we suppose that at last the whole will be terminated in some mere sensuous product, and that thus the science of men will expire in those exhibitions of mechanic skill which are common to them with the brute creation? This would be the death of human science; and thus would perish all that ennobles the rational mind, and gives it a dignity above the creatures that have no existence but in time and sense.

Here is the end of the diffusion of knowledge under a material administration. But not such is the higher and ancient wisdom, revealed in the science of the Cross. This forbids man to allow himself to be inflated with the vanity of human learning, but admonishes him to find nourishment in the study of his own ignorance, to remain at home and contemplate the things invisible; does not allow him to weary and enervate his powers with the itch of curiosity,

but restrains him from every shameful heat, and disciplines him to angelic purity. And as poverty, accepted for the love of God, is a blessing, so ignorance of the earthly wisdom, if assumed for the same high motive, is not so much a loss as a gain. For if God pities the poor, and, for compassion of their poverty, is pleased to recompense them more abundantly hereafter, why may we not believe that he has compassion on the humble mind? and, that the one destitute of worldly graces, and dull to the acquisition of the secular learning, if watchful to the sacred inspirations of virtue, he will reward in a future state with a higher mansion of knowledge and with a grace of wisdom all the more abundant. If one know every thing but can do nothing, if he have neither the ability nor the will to act, he is only a learned fool. Mere knowledge constitutes one a pedant, judgment or ability makes him a wise man, but the will makes him a master. With knowledge he may be a "savant," with ability a doctor; with the will alone will he be found a hero.*

The kingdom of heaven is taken by violence; that is, by the violence of an heroic will, and not by the virtue of mere intellect. In his secret soul, does not man remember well, how all that is truly deserving of praise among his acts, has been the effort of his will? how all that gives him value in the eyes of God, and in his own eyes, is the magnanimity, the patience, or the fortitude, which may have been called up at his volition, set forth and established at the fiat of his free will? The will of God is the cause of all things; the perfect act of the created will constitutes one a Saint, and makes him to be God's best and greatest work. A multitude is mighty when it is united; now no knowledge is able to unite their minds, but the action of will is able to render them one spirit in an instant of time. How small a part of the man, then, is the knowledge of a man!

* And yet knowledge must precede the act of the will, unless we suppose to will is instinctive. Our collaborator is right; but we admonish the reader not to misapprehend his meaning, and to imagine that he is advocating ignorance. He is simply showing the worthlessness of human science without the divine wisdom revealed to us, and contending that if we are wise with that wisdom—wise unto salvation—we have the only real wisdom, although we may have very little secular knowledge, a truth this age is prone to forget.—ED.

and how humble a part does it bear in the march of events, and in the mighty changes which pass over nations, and empires, and souls of men! Even supported by the fame of his illustrious name, the learning of the Great King may not have left a trace after him; and yet his acts of virtue are fixed as monuments, and his lofty purposes and heroic resolves remain, and are continued in the tradition of ages.*

E. P. W.

ART. III.—1. *Sermon on Ecclesiastical Seminaries.*—Preached by the Rt. Rev. M. J. SPALDING, D.D., Bishop of Louisville, in the Cathedral of Cincinnati, on the 1st Sunday of Lent, March 13th, 1859.—2. *Vie de M. Olier, Fondateur du Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice.* Paris, 1843.—3. *Ecclesiastical Seminaries, Dublin Review*, January, 1839.—4. *Considerations on the Sacred Ministry.* Translated from the French, by Rev. B. S. PIOT. Baltimore, Kelly, Hedian, & Piet, 1859.

THE question of education has been so often and so ably discussed of late that any further remarks may seem superfluous. Yet the discussion has been mainly confined to one point—the education of the laity, the training of our Catholic youth of both sexes to be useful members of lay society. There remains another branch of this important subject to which attention has not been directed in the same degree, that of the education of the clergy. If our Catholic Colleges and schools claim the serious consideration of all true friends of Religion, if their present condition and future prospects are subjects of anxious inquiry, then may the Seminaries of the United States challenge, for more urgent and holier reasons, the sympathy and support of the Catholic Body. Colleges prepare the soldiers of the Lord for the battle-field of the world; Ecclesiastical Seminaries prepare those who are to be their leaders in the

* The following article from another collaborator should be read in connection with this.—ED.

strife. The education of the general must be more scientific and complete than that of the common soldier. In like manner the education of the priest ought to be more profound and varied than that of the layman.

Seminaries, in their present form, are of comparatively modern institution, dating from the Council of Trent, held in the middle of the sixteenth century. The clergy of the first ages received their secular education in the schools and universities of the Pagan Roman Empire. They stored their minds with whatever was solid and beautiful in the literature of Greece and Rome, rejecting what was false in doctrine or pernicious in morality. Yet they took care not to rest satisfied with the learning of the heathen world. That learning was beautiful, but it was lifeless; it was a fair corpse. It needed to have a Christian soul breathed into it. The study of Sacred Scripture, pursued either in private or under the direction of a wise and holy priest or bishop, prayer and mortification, they were the Christian elements of clerical education, the soul that vivified Pagan science.

We find, however, some Ecclesiastical schools at an early period in the history of the Church, in which both secular and sacred knowledge was imparted. Such was the catechetical school of Alexandria, in Egypt, founded in the middle of the second century, by Pantænus, who had been converted from a proud Stoic philosopher into a humble Catholic by one of the disciples of the Apostles.

This school produced St. Clement of Alexandria and Origen, two of the most learned of the Fathers. When somewhat later the wants of the time made a special theological education more necessary, other schools arose at Antioch, Edessa, and Cæsarea. Bishops began to draw their clergy around them and to lead a community life with them, so that the Episcopal Palace became an Ecclesiastical school or Seminary. When the Roman Empire fell, in the middle of the 5th century, monasticism, which had been established two centuries before, began its development. The monks were men who left the world and all that the world could offer, to serve God in retirement, on the top of savage mountains, in the hollows of swampy valleys, or amid the burning sands of an African or Asiatic desert. Sometimes a number of monks combined to lead

a common life in one large convent, or in a number of huts grouped together in the form of a village. These monastic communities which sprang up in the declining periods of Roman greatness, increased and flourished during the Middle Ages and have come to our own time. They resemble but are not Ecclesiastical Seminaries. Convents are the nurseries of the religious clergy; Seminaries of the secular priesthood.

The elevation of Charlemagne to the Imperial dignity in 800 inaugurated a happy era for learning; it was the beginning of the age of Universities. Cambridge, Oxford, Bologna, and Paris attracted tens of thousands of students, both lay and clerical. But Paris was the Queen of Universities, she was then what Rome is now. She ruled the world of intellect as she has since ruled the world of politics and fashion. Young men destined for distinguished posts in the Church were sent, even from Rome, to Paris to pursue their studies. Some returned accomplished scholars, but unhappily not always filled with the plenitude of the ecclesiastical spirit; others remained as professors in the University, whilst some, perhaps the minority, went home, wiser and holier for their stay in the French Capital. The University was not and could not be an Ecclesiastical Seminary. It wanted the air of sanctity and peace which the Levite of the sanctuary should breathe from his earliest years. "In Paris," says the writer of Stephen Langton's life, in the series of the *Lives of the English Saints*, "all the evil attendant on a disproportionate development of the intellect was rife in the University. Self-reliance and independence of mind, the pride of science which forgets God,—the conceit of attainments and vanity of display, which contemns men—with the meaner passions of jealousy, envy, and detraction, were evils most prominent." This was no place to rear the humble Ecclesiastic. So the Church thought, and set herself to the task of providing institutions where a knowledge sanctified by the charity which edifieth, not a knowledge that puffeth up, should be imparted to the clerical student.

The glory of establishing Ecclesiastical Seminaries on their present footing belongs to the Council of Trent, the last general Council of the Church. In the 18th chapter of the 23rd session of that memorable and holy assembly, held

on the 15th July, 1563, it is ordered that Seminaries for the education of young persons aspiring to the priesthood be established, if possible, in every diocese, under the supervision of the Bishop. The Council enumerates the studies to be pursued and the exercises of piety to be performed by the inmates of the Seminaries, and to provide for their support, levies a tax on the Ecclesiastical revenues of the diocese. In this, as in most missionary countries, the Church has no established revenues. She has no landed estates, no benefices. She depends entirely on the offerings of the faithful for her temporal maintenance. Her clergy are forced to make frequent appeals to them to aid in the establishment and support of orphan asylums, hospitals, churches, and seminaries. These necessary institutions could never exist here but for the generosity and piety of a devoted Catholic laity. The laity have nobly responded to the call of their Bishops and Pastors, and the Church in the United States can boast of some Colleges and Seminaries that would do honor to any diocese in Europe.

The history of the establishment of Ecclesiastical Seminaries in France is one of the most deeply interesting in the annals of Catholicity. The French clergy in the beginning of the seventeenth century were not as exemplary as they might have been. There were serious evils prevalent amongst them, arising in many cases from a neglect of proper ecclesiastical training in youth, and this neglect resulted from the want of Seminaries. But God raised up men, in that age, the like of whom France has scarcely seen since; St. Vincent of Paul, Cardinal de Berulle, Father Condren, and the venerable John Olier. These men mourned over the degeneracy of the clergy, and applied themselves, with burning zeal, to the work of reformation. They established religious congregations of men and women to meet and supply the multifarious wants both of soul and body, and changed the face of France. The persevering exertions of the venerable Olier succeeded in carrying out in France the wishes of the Fathers of Trent, in regard to Seminaries. He founded a congregation for the one great object of training youth in clerical piety—the Congregation of St. Sulpice. This order and the Seminary that he established in Paris still exist, monuments of his

saintly wisdom, well-springs of ecclesiastical knowledge and piety for France and the world. We are glad that the life of M. Olier has just been or is soon to be published in England, by Mr. E. H. Thompson, one of the distinguished English converts to whose literary labors Catholics both on this side as well as on the other side of the water are deeply indebted.

Dr. Newman has beautifully deduced the office and duties of a university from an analysis of the word itself. Let us follow the same plan with our present subject. Seminary is a word of Latin origin—*seminarium*, from *semen*, seed. It means a place where seed is kept or sown. An ecclesiastical seminary is an institution in which the seeds of sacred and profane science are sown in the intellect, and the seeds of virtue in the hearts of candidates for the sacred ministry. It professes, however, to do more than merely cast the seeds. It fosters them until they have come to maturity, until they have sprung up into strong stately trees that can bravely weather the storm either of the world's praise, or the world's censure. The Seminary is an Alma Mater in a sense far more sacred than any mere literary institution. She loves her children with a love like that which Abraham had for Isaac, or our Lord for his Apostles. She knows that they are to be the spiritual fathers of a great multitude, as countless as the sands of the sea-shore, or the stars of heaven. She looks upon herself as another Noah, from whom the human race is to receive a new birth through her children. But she is loath to see these children depart from beneath her maternal wing until they have given proof by some years' practice that they have understood and that they love the lessons she has taught. Many an adventurous little bird essays to fly from the parent nest before its wings are strong and steady, and falls helpless to the ground. The Seminary fears this fate for her children. She would not have them wing their flight into the world until their souls have reached the age of spiritual manhood. She cares not if they be young in years, provided their youth be like that of the eagle's; for she knows that "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age." Let them be men in soul, and she is content.

She gives them her motherly blessing, and bids them go in peace, and teach all nations the things they have learned by her mouth from Jesus the Prince of Pastors.

Colleges and Universities may fit a man to be a good and useful member of natural society, or even to be a leader among his fellow-men. A *Catholic* college or university may do more than this. It may teach a man to save his soul, and by his good example, by the faithful discharge of his duties, to save the souls of others. But to a Catholic Ecclesiastical Seminary belongs the glory of preparing men to be the leaders of the hosts of the Lord, lights of the world, cities placed on mountain-tops, the salt of the earth, the successors of the Apostles, official saviours of souls, in a word, priests of Jesus Christ.

What is a priest? He is another Christ, clothed with Christ's authority, doing the work that Christ did upon earth, "As the Father hath sent me so I send you." The priest baptizes and forgives sins and says mass not as man, but as the representative of Christ. As that representative he is the mediator between God and man. Justly is he who has the plenitude of the priesthood called pontiff. The word means a bridgemaker. Every priest participates in the eternal priesthood of Christ, every priest is a bridge joining heaven and earth. Through his ministrations God comes to the soul, through his ministrations the soul goes to God. His hand it is that unlocks the door of the Church for the soul in baptism; his hand it is that unlocks for it, in the administration of the last Sacraments, the gate of heaven. A priest remains man and yet he is elevated higher than the third heaven. He is taken up into the secrets of the Divinity, into a brighter cloud of glory than encompassed Moses on the summit of Sinai. He is clothed with stupendous powers to such a degree, that God seems to have abdicated His omnipotence in his favor. A weight of divinity rests upon him that angels never bore. The gifts of heaven are hung round him in such lavish profusion that the wonder is, his human nature is not crushed beneath the load. He walks about the earth another Christ, the rays of spiritual beauty flashing from the impress of Holy Orders in his soul.

But it is impossible to realize, much more to describe, the dignity of the priesthood. *Sacerdos alter Christus*,

the priest is another Christ, said one of the Fathers. When we have measured the height and depth of all contained in the sacred word Christ, then only can we understand what it is to be a priest of God.

It is this idea of the awful sublimity of the priesthood that the Seminary labors to stamp in indelible characters on the souls of her Levites. Every exercise of piety,—every study, every recreation is directed to this. She makes everything centre in the Altar of the Mass and the Adorable Victim of that Altar. The priest elevating the Sacred Host to heaven, the Blood of Christ glittering in the chalice before him, this is the picture she holds up to the contemplation of the Seminarian, from the moment he enters the sacred precincts of the house of God, to the moment when he goes forth a priestly missionary to do the work of Christ.

And what are the means by which the Seminary accomplishes her arduous task? True men and a system. A system by itself is good for nothing, because it is dead; but a good system carried out by the right kind of men is all-powerful. Men of the most brilliant talents and purest intentions working without system do only one-half of what they might. The fruit does not correspond to the labor. But a system acting by itself, resembles the spasmodic workings of a galvanized corpse. It wants a soul.

First then for the men. There are few situations in the Church more holy and responsible than that of a superior or professor of an Ecclesiastical Seminary. His office resembles that of St. Peter. He must feed the sheep, who are afterwards to feed the lambs; he must instruct and sanctify the pastor, who is afterwards to instruct and sanctify the flock. *Imposuisti homines super capita nostra.* His soul is burdened with the charge not of one parish but of many, because to him has been confided the formation of the priests of a diocese, perhaps of a province, perhaps of a nation. We venture to go farther. We compare the Seminary priest to our Lord Himself. Those engaged in active pastoral duty are doing the work of the Apostles; he is more directly doing the work of Jesus Christ. Our Lord, when on earth, went through comparatively little exterior labor, even during the three years of His public ministry. He confined His own personal ministrations to

the Jews. "I am not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel." To His Apostles he left the more brilliant task of converting the world. "Go ye therefore and teach all nations. He that believeth in me the works that I do he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." The humble God-man devoted most of His time and attention to the instruction of the Apostles, to the education of the first bishops and priests of the Church. Even when He spoke to the multitude, much of His discourse was directed more particularly to the Apostles. To the rest He spoke in parables; to them He unfolded the meaning of each parable; to them it was given to know the secrets of the kingdom of heaven.

So with the Seminary priest. His is the happy privilege of more closely imitating his Lord. His mission is confined to the walls and grounds of the Seminary. They are to him what Judea was to Christ, what Ireland was to St. Patrick, what India was to St. Francis Xavier, what the world was to the Apostles. Let him do what in him lies to sanctify the few dozens inhabiting that little spot, and he is performing a great work in the Church, he is laying up for himself a never-fading crown of glory in the heavens. To his disciples, to those whose minds and hearts have been formed by his teaching and example, he leaves the *greater* works of the ministry.

Christ instructing His Apostles is the model of the priest engaged in Seminary duties. Like Christ, he must be a man of prayer and solitude, a man who lives at home in his own soul. His position requires of him to present in his daily life a model of what the perfect priest ought to be. The voice of God has called him to the sacred duty of educating the Levites of the sanctuary. How else can he do it, but by example? How impart to others a spirit that he has not? *Cæpit Jesus facere et docere.* To do and to teach—such is the mission of an instructor.

An ecclesiastical Seminary is of a twofold nature. It aims at imparting both knowledge and virtue. It combines in itself the religious noviciate and the secular college. A noviciate is devoted primarily to spirituality, or the cultivation of the heart; a college, to science or the cultivation of the intellect. A seminary educates both the intellect and the heart, and hence the system on which it is to be conducted must compass both ends.

“The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth,” was the commandment that God gave to the priests of the Jewish dispensation. The streams of all knowledge were to flow from him as from their fountain; to that fountain all who thirsted for the waters of truth were to repair. The same commandment binds the priest in the new law. The obligation is more pressing in the latter case than in the former. The priest is the *light* of the world. To him the nations look for instruction and guidance, and they do so instinctively, because they consider him as the representative of God, the source of all truth. The earliest annals of the earliest nations represent the priesthood as the ruling caste, its members as the makers and guardians of the law, the instructors of kings and nobles, the protectors of the poor, the promoters of civilization, and the medium of every blessing here and hereafter. When a nation has no priesthood, or when it loses its reverence for what it has, leaving out of question the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of that priesthood, it is on the high road to ruin. The priesthood is the spiritual element in the government of the world, the instrument of God’s supernatural Providence, elevating a nation’s natural destiny to the supernatural order. The natural cannot, in man’s present condition, be separated from the supernatural. The State is meant to promote the social or temporal well-being of the individual, but in subordination to and dependence on the Church. The Church enables him to work out the ultimate or supernatural destiny for which he was created.

The priest belongs to the supernatural order. He is the mouth-piece of an infallible Church, declaring, in her name, to man, the mysteries of God’s being, and of His dealings with the human race. How can he speak, unless the light of those mysteries is beaming in his mind, unless the love of those mysteries is warming his heart? Only by solitude, prayer, and study, can he bring the fire from heaven and scatter it on the earth. The Seminary teaches him the sweets of solitude; it teaches him how to pray and study, and thus prepares him to fulfil his priestly mission.

To say that a priest must possess all the sacred knowledge that, in his circumstances, he can acquire, is to say, he must be a priest. The soldier must understand war

the sailor navigation, and the priest the science of the supernatural. This science of the supernatural is not confined to Scholastic and Moral Theology, and Sacred Scripture. Mystic Theology or Ascetics is its most sublime, yet most neglected branch. Scholastic Theology teaches the truth of the faith, Moral Theology gives the confessor rules for distinguishing between good and evil, between leprosy and leprosy, sin and sin. Mystic Theology is the science of the saints. It is to be learned more by the teaching of the Holy Ghost than by the instructions of any human master or book; yet, it has its principles and rules as fixed as those of any other science. Its province is to lead the soul to an intimate union with God. Suppose the soul just cleansed from sin, by a good confession. The director, skilled in ascetic Theology, conducts it wisely and gently through the purgative way, showing it how to cleanse itself of all stain, to root out bad habits,—in a word, to lead a life of grace. Then he introduces it into the illuminative way. The light of inspiration shines more brightly round it, and many a mist that obstructed its gaze into the supernatural world, fades away. It is coming very near to God. It enters the third stage of the journey, the unitive way. Then God reigns supreme in the soul, and it may say with St. Paul: I live, not I now, but Christ liveth in me. All this is the work of God, but he uses the learned and holy priest as his instrument, one whose soul has been the scene of the same divine operations.

The observant minister of the Sacrament of Penance soon finds out that human nature has, in spite of its terrible corruption, many good points. Beneath a mountain-load of sin, he often discovers a precious jewel, some natural virtue that needs but a little care to be made a medium through which grace may leaven the soul. Time and again he meets innocent souls, who scarcely have matter for absolution. Now, what is his duty to these? To leave them as they are, on the principle of letting well alone? No! the zealous minister of Christ labors to make good better, and better best. He is appointed, like the prophet Jeremiah, to root up and to plant, and to pull down and to build—to root up sin and plant virtue, to pull down the throne of the Devil, and build the temple of the Holy Ghost in the Christian soul. His duty is positive as well

as negative. If unacquainted with mystic Theology, he fails—his clerical education is defective. The seminary is the place to acquire this knowledge, the Holy Ghost is its teacher, but he instructs through prayer, spiritual books, and the words and lives of those who direct the Seminary.

But the priest's learning must not be confined to the supernatural order; his ministrations lead him into the lower or natural order. He belongs to two spheres, to heaven and earth, to God and man. He must understand and speak the language of both. Moses was skilled in the knowledge of Divine things, but he was skilled also in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. The same should be true of the Catholic priest. He must not be a stranger to the science and literature of the world, or else the world will despise him as ignorant, and turn a deaf ear to the message that he delivers from heaven. St. Paul preached not in the Areopagus as he preached in the Synagogue. He held a different language to the Athenian philosophers from that in which he discoursed to the Jews. With the latter, he argued from the Law and the Prophets, with the men of Athens from the altar of the Unknown God, the works of creation, and the song of a heathen poet.

One of the standing charges against the Church is, that she loves and favors ignorance, that like a night bird, she is at home only in an age of intellectual darkness. Facts to the contrary are the best answer to the calumny. Her clergy must take the lead in the march of intellect. They may never boast as a Western itinerant preacher, that their coat-tails never brushed the walls of a college. They must aim at being men of profound and varied learning, prepared to listen and speak intelligently on any question of science or literature, with the most illustrious members of the Republic of Letters. A highly educated body of men, banded together for any object, religious, political, or social, invests the work on which they are engaged, with a dignity which wins for it respect, if not love. The Catholic Church has not yet taken her proper position in this country, because immediate and pressing spiritual wants have prevented our prelates from giving candidates for the priesthood that long and thorough course of instruction, necessary to make polished scholars. But now those wants have been in a great measure supplied. The Church has taken firm root,

and her growth has been rapid and vigorous. A more numerous clergy, more numerous colleges and seminaries afford opportunities for a longer and more extensive course of ecclesiastical studies, and the venerable prelates of the American hierarchy are gratefully availing themselves of them.

Nil scibile a me alienum esse puto, should be the motto of the ecclesiastical student. No department of knowledge is foreign to his sacred profession. Theology is the Queen of Science, and she should have a queenly attendance. Her throne should be adorned with everything beautiful in art; the investigations of all the sciences should be conducted beneath her eye, and their discoveries laid as loving tribute at her feet. The mind of the theologian should be a sanctuary of wisdom, and his heart a sanctuary of beauty and goodness. He is the representative of God on earth, and should copy, as far as creature can, God's omniscience as well as his holiness.

Knowledge without virtue, says one of the Councils, makes a man proud; virtue without knowledge makes him less useful. The Seminary teaches both, because it is the well-balanced union of the two that constitutes the perfect priest. To effect this union is more difficult than we might at first suppose. Some men are all intellect and no heart; others are all heart and no intellect. The priest must be neither one nor the other. In him the moral and intellectual virtues should be admirably blended. His knowledge should be vivified by the unction of piety; his piety should be elevated out of the region of mere sentiment by a robust, manly intelligence.

The Seminary is emphatically the school of piety. It is the solitude in which Christ speaks to the heart of the young Levite; it is the upper-room in which the Holy Ghost descends upon him in forms of fire, that his tongue may glow like the tongue of Peter; that his heart may burn like the heart of John.

There are different kinds of piety: one contemplative, soft and gentle, like that of a cloistered nun; another active, sturdy and energetic, like that of all great missionaries. The piety of a secular priest should be of the latter kind. He has to rough it in the world. He is a soldier set up in the field of the world to fight the battles of Christ against fearful odds. Now charging with the headlong

impetuosity of the French Zouave, now receiving a charge with the dogged obstinacy of a square of English infantry, ready to die, but refusing to move, now victorious, and now defeated—such is the life of the missionary priest. He must have a will of iron and a triple armour of holiness around his heart to lead such a life and yet die the death of a saint. God teaches him in the Seminary how to make his will like iron, and how to steel his soul with priestly sanctity. He must be told, in the Seminary, of the enemies that lie in wait for him on his entrance into the ministry, and the weapons with which he is to meet and vanquish these enemies. Nowadays every man lives abroad. It is an age of publicity, of exteriority. Newspapers, magnetic telegraphs, and steam-engines have made it so. Few stay at home in their own souls communing with conscience, with God speaking by the voice of conscience. The priest is necessarily a public man. He is a leader amongst the people. He must keep the run of the news, build churches and asylums and school-houses, organize societies and confraternities, &c. &c., and get money for all these works. In spite of himself he is drawn out of himself, and yet he must live at home, be master in his own house, ruler in his own soul. He may unavoidably be drawn into politics or business; but he must recollect that he is not a politician or a broker, but a priest of Christ, whose every thought and word and action must be directed to one great end, the salvation of souls. Truly if the priest has to do the work of an Apostle, he must have the holiness of an Apostle. Every Seminary must propose to itself as model that Seminary over which our Lord presided for three years, with twelve Galilean fishermen for his pupils.

The Seminary cannot accomplish its twofold mission in three or four years. It must begin its work when the candidate for Holy Orders is young, yet not so young as to be unable to understand the step he takes when entering a seminary and the sanctity of the state to which he aspires. The young heart is more susceptible to the impressions of virtue and the young mind more quick in apprehending and retaining the lessons of knowledge. We would propose a separate institution, where young persons aspiring to the priesthood might be thoroughly grounded in the languages, rhetoric, natural science, history, and the elements

of Christian doctrine. Let this institution be distinct from the theological Seminary, as is the case in France. *Le petit Séminaire* is, as far as we know, distinct from *le grand Séminaire*; the latter is reserved for the sacred sciences, properly so called. The same is the case in some dioceses of the United States; Baltimore has the preparatory Seminary of St. Charles, Louisville that of St. Thomas. These preparatory seminaries should do their work thoroughly, so that the student when promoted to the theological Seminary may be competent in every respect to pursue the study of the higher branches of clerical education with ease and success.

Nothing so promotes a spirit of noble emulation in any society or service as several grades of standing, rising regularly in importance and dignity. Why not have such gradations in our system of seminary instruction? In fact, we have them separate, all we need is to combine them. Our scheme would be as follows: 1. The preparatory Seminary of the diocese; 2. The theological Seminary of the diocese; 3. The provincial or metropolitan Seminary; 4. The national Seminary of the United States in the United States, and the American College in Rome. We have already two or three preparatory Seminaries, several diocesan Seminaries, one provincial Seminary, Mt. St. Mary's of the West, Cincinnati, and the American College in the Eternal City is on the eve of opening. Merit, both intellectual and moral, might be the title to translation from one seminary to the higher, and then at the end the seal of Holy Orders would be stamped by Christ upon the soul of the virtuous and learned Levite as the choicest token of his divine approbation of years of honourable toil.

One great difficulty is to find fit subjects for the Seminary. They only should enter who have an ecclesiastical vocation — who are called by God. Divine Providence generally proportions the number of priests to the wants of the faithful. This proportion may not be established in the beginnings of the Church in any country, but it will be, sooner or later, unless human agency interferes with the work of Heaven. Statistics, we think, will bear us out in saying, that the number of the priests in the United States does not at all correspond to the number and wants of the faithful. We can no longer expect to recruit the ranks of

the clergy by missionaries from Europe; we must depend upon vocations amongst the youth of our own country. God's Providence will take care that there shall be enough, but will those called answer the call? The prospects of gain and honor are so tempting here, the atmosphere is so thoroughly impregnated with worldliness, that the great majority of young people rush with precipitate eagerness from the peaceful retreats of college life into the noisy arena of politics or business; from the platform of the graduate, delivering his valedictory, to the stump or the rostrum; from the sanctuary of the college chapel to the gaudy shrine of Mammon. Oh! it is a sight over which angels might weep to see noble talents and noble impulses, that God destined for his purposes, prostituted to the vile service of filthy lucre; tongues that God meant to preach his word with the eloquence of a Basil, a Gregory, a Bossuet, or a Bourdaloue, spouting trashy politics; hands that God meant to break the Bread of Angels to hungry souls, employed in counting dimes and rolling cotton bales. To one who will not listen to God calling him to the service of the sanctuary, we say: Young man! happiness is not for you either here or hereafter. God destines every individual soul for a particular work. Every man has a vocation, every man has a particular road to travel, if he would reach heaven. If you refuse to follow your vocation, if you choose a road of your own, God's blessing is not with you. You will not succeed in life, and you run imminent risk of damning your soul. If God made you for a priest, then you can be nothing else but a priest.

Parents and teachers, parish priests and professors of colleges, these are the persons whose business it is to study the character of the youth, to endeavour to cast the horoscope of his future life, such as God, from eternity, destined that life to be. They must study the child's vocation, foster it, develop it, and start him in life on the right road, with his face fronting to God. A heavy responsibility is on their shoulders, and they must answer to Christ, the Judge of men, by the *lex talionis*, soul for soul.

There is one point upon which we feel a delicacy in touching — the connection between an ecclesiastical seminary and a secular college. Should the two institutions be united, making each support the other? There is consid-

erable difference of opinion and practice on the subject. The advocates of the separation argue thus: Institutions that are distinct in origin and end, and mode of action, should be kept distinct. When united there is danger of the one interfering with the functions of the other. The one, by mere force of circumstances, will get the upper hand of the other. They cannot progress *pari passu*. If the collegiate branch of the institution take precedence, the Seminary suffers. Clerical education becomes practically less important than secular, the clerical student inferior in rank and attainments to the collegian, and by a legitimate deduction, the priest becomes inferior to the layman. If the Seminary take the lead, the college becomes a mere diocesan high-school. They add that the union was the result of necessity; was an expedient adopted for the purpose of enabling a Seminary to support itself in the absence of endowments from Ecclesiastical revenue, or the contributions of the faithful. The necessity does not exist now, at least in the same degree, and with the removal of the cause the effect should cease. The indiscriminate intercourse of secular youth with young men destined for the priesthood benefits neither party. The collegian sees many things in the seminarian that tend to diminish his reverence for the ecclesiastical state. In moments of unguarded freedom a thousand trifles, in themselves innocent, appear in the conduct of even the most exemplary seminarian, that boys should not see. M. Olier, founder of St. Sulpice, speaks thus of the idea he had of the priesthood when a child of seven years: "I imagined, when I saw a priest at the altar, that he could live only the life of God. I was astonished to see him turn his head or spit." A friend informs us that when young, he thought the boys who served Mass had none of the passions of humanity about them, that they were perfect angels. The same feeling in regard to the priest and everything connected with him, exists more or less in the breast of every Catholic child. The longer he retains it the better; unhappy for his practice, if not for his faith, if he should lose it before the inexperienced judgments of youth can be corrected by the maturer dictates of manhood's reason.

Non aliunde, says one of the Councils, *clericalis ordinis dignitas gravius fuit offensa quam a nimia laicorum*

familiaritate. The seminarian, they argue, is exposed to the danger of forgetting who he is and at what he aims, by associating with seculars. There is a vein of boyish levity in the soberest man, which the candidate for holy orders, no matter how young, should never indulge. We must all become like little children in simplicity and frankness of character, but not in levity, not in the capriciousness and foolishness of thought and word and work that generally belong to childhood. This is the danger to which too much familiarity with children exposes persons of more advanced age.

It is argued by the other party, that the connection of a seminary with a college greatly benefits the former. Seminarians acquire, by being employed as college tutors and prefects, an active, energetic turn of mind, that admirably fits them for the sacred ministry. Their novitiate is one of action as well as of study and prayer. They are initiated into the world whilst yet in the retirement of the seminary. They are charged with the responsibility of attending to the instruction of others whilst obliged to attend to the education of their own minds and hearts, precisely what they must do in after-life, as missionary priests.

But whether the seminary be a separate institution or connected with a college, our duty is plain. We must co-operate, heart and soul, with our venerable prelates and clergy, in establishing institutions for clerical education on a firm and permanent foundation, in cherishing ecclesiastical vocations, and elevating to the highest possible point the standard of ecclesiastical learning. Our wants exact, and our numbers and means render practicable henceforth, seminaries that may well compare with the very best to be found in other lands. All we need is courage, zeal, liberality, and perseverance.

W. I. B.

ART. IV.—*Divorce and our Divorce Laws.*

“Let not man part what God hath joined.”

ALTHOUGH it is chiefly from the religious point of view that we should consider the subject of divorce, since, if prohibited by God, there ought at once to be an end of the toleration accorded to it by human laws,—yet, we have not the slightest objection, for our own part, to seeing it tried and judged upon the single issue of its social effects, believing, as we do, that it is utterly indefensible in every aspect under which it can be viewed, whether human or divine. We propose, therefore, in the first place, to examine its effects upon the married, and adults generally, children and the parental relations, and society at large, and afterwards to glance at the Scriptural doctrine on this subject.

If people would approach without prejudice this important question, and in a spirit of candor reflect on that wonderful disposition of our nature to make the best of what cannot be helped or remedied—that disposition, by which it is enabled to accommodate itself so cheerfully to all the varying circumstances of clime and situation, nay, even of pain, privation, and hardship, to which it may be exposed, they might easily find, it seems to us, a sufficient ground for believing that, after all, no surer means could possibly have been devised, for increasing the general sum of married happiness, than that of making marriage permanent and indissoluble. For, whatever the nonsense with which those, who defend divorce, delude themselves or beguile their dupes in relation to the so-called “spiritual or passional affinities,” and other fanciful inventions of a like sort, there is yet one fact, which can never be got over; one stubborn fact, rooted in the experience and confirmed by the testimony of six thousand years, and which is in irreconcilable contradiction to all their theories, namely, that never from the days of the first radiant pair, who came forth fresh from the hand of God, down to our own degenerate times, has there yet been united a couple, however perfect, congenial, or deeply enamored of each other, whose mutual imperfections have not

in return called for as much mutual forbearance. In the face of this positive fact, of the known infirmity of human nature, what can be worse than to keep constantly before the eyes of all married people the tantalizing assurance, that, in order to be freed from a bond that occasionally will chafe, they have only to set up a plea of "incompatibility of temper," or other equally transparent and frivolous pretence? What can more effectually do away with the chief inducement to forbearance, that can have influence with our fallen nature, and place a temptation and a snare before even the best intentioned? And, while the one may be cloyed with possession, and the other faded, ailing, perhaps a little peevish withal, but all as a very consequence of marriage, what effort is likely to be made to bear with what may for the moment be trying, and to resist the temptation to separate?

And, yet, this is but one of the many evil consequences likely to flow from a policy favored by our legislation. Another, and even a worse consequence, is to destroy, little by little, the delicate flower of chastity in the heart of the married. It is a sad mistake, to suppose that the fires of concupiscence are quenched by marriage; the truth is, that the married have need to exercise almost as vigilant a guard over their eyes and thoughts as the single, in order to preserve their conjugal fidelity, perfect purity of feeling, and continence from lawless desire. If the married are permitted to feel that they are not in the least debarred from the hope of a future possession of the attractive and engaging among the other sex, into whose company they are daily and hourly thrown, it is but natural that they should occasionally seek to please them, or thus, that new loves and longings should insensibly grow up, laying the very foundation, perhaps, for all that pretended "incompatibility of temper" which may afterwards be falsely pleaded, as no less the originally subsisting cause, than present motive, for dissolving a union, which, previously, may have been just as harmonious as any other. And, gradually, as the example spreads, the facilities for divorce are increased, and public opinion becomes more depraved. May it not come, next, to pass, that even young girls, who should ever be the representatives of all that is most pure in society, and whom we now expect to see spurning the attentions of a married man as an outrage upon their maiden dignity, will then, instead of repelling,

be themselves the first to encourage them? For, what should hinder them from seeking after a union with the men of their choice, when the world applauds, and no more serious obstacle intervenes, than that, become so trifling, of only a wife to be first repudiated?

But, as tendencies of such a nature, and so encouraged, can eventuate in nothing else, we must expect to see them result, at length, in a universal corruption of morals, and no less appalling license of conduct. For, we may rest assured, that, if so far be weakened the only restraint which has ever yet proved effectual to check the wild flood of human passion, the latter is, sooner or later, and with an irresistible force, certain to break down, and utterly sweep away, whatever else men may seek to oppose to it, until, after purity in woman, continence in man, and the conjugal virtues of faith and constancy shall have wholly disappeared before it, marriage itself, too, will have become a mere empty name!

The very right of possession, which every man is now acknowledged to have in his wife, a natural right everywhere as yet so carefully guarded by human laws, would, if we took no steps to arrest this inevitable progression, soon cease to be respected, or even recognized. And as in our day we have heard proclaimed, "*que la propriété, c'est un vol,*" might our children live to hear some new Proudhon lay down the beastly maxim, that "marriage, too, is an outrage upon our kind,—a robbery by one, of that which should belong to all men in common." For the more powerful, rich, and artful among men would then help themselves to any woman over whom they could prevail, regardless if she were wife or maid; or as wife, how tenderly she might be loved. Whence, savage broils and ceaseless discord would be certain to ensue, such as no human measures could prevent or allay in the absence of that great natural and divine law,—in the very disuse, or attempted repeal of which by man, might be traced the fatal and abounding source of all this mischief—

"Nam fuit ante Helenam (mulier) teterrima belli
Causa,"

the wise old Roman quaintly remarked, near nineteen hundred years ago; and as then, and before, so even yet, is there no other quarrel in which man will so fiercely, or so

readily embark, as in one concerning women, who, of all the gifts of Heaven bestowed on him, has been ever the one most dearly prized.

We are alike admonished then by everything known to us, either in regard to man's nature or his history, that it is a most slippery precipice that which on every side surrounds the eminence on which God had raised marriage; and that, as one downward step, if adventured upon, will surely betray us into another, so will each draw us nearer to those low and abject depths of humanity where marriage ceases to be, or, in the words of the same great poet, where

“Quos venerem, incertam rapientes, more ferarum,
Viribus editior cædebat, ut in grege taurus.”

Another equally well-established fact is, that where man has commerce with many women, his posterity is apt to be enfeebled and himself enervated by it; and that, where woman lends herself to many men, her fruitfulness is thereby much impaired. Hence, another of the bad effects of divorce is, that it will insensibly lead to a deterioration of the human race. This effect it may also produce in another way, by the greater neglect of their health and physical requirements, which children are sure to suffer, where deprived of the care of one of their parents, or committed to the colder charities of a step-parent, who can be scarcely expected to feel any of that pitying sympathy for them, and could hardly hope for any of that tender return of love, which, occasionally, spring up on either side, where the child's natural parent, instead of having been supplanted by a rival, has been carried off by death. It is clear that the development of their mental faculties will, in such cases, be even more neglected.

But, wherein the children of divorced parents are likely to suffer the most, is in the more defective moral training which they must receive. For, not to speak of the pernicious example so forcibly thrust before their eyes, nor of the improper feelings apt to be engendered in their minds against one of their parents, and even supposing the other to be all that a parent should be to them, it is none the less an acknowledged fact, that very few women are capable, by themselves, of governing unruly boyhood; and that there are still fewer men, who, even if their daily occupations did

not take them constantly from home, are yet sufficiently endowed with the delicate tact, so necessary even to a mother, who would acquire any effective influence over the wayward and susceptible heart of girlhood; and to which even the mother must add such unceasing vigilance, would she preserve her tender charge from the contamination of improper associates. But, it is not often that we should be warranted in admitting so much as this, when one of the most ordinary effects of divorce is, undoubtedly, to weaken that sentiment of duty towards their offspring, which God has implanted in the hearts of parents. For, the fact is so; nor will it appear too surprising for belief, if we will but consider, that it is no less an axiom founded in natural justice, than an essential even if implied condition of every marriage contract, that the trouble, anxiety, expense, and responsibility, which attach to the possession of children, should be equally shared by both their parents; each contributing that full part, which the difference in their sex has made respectively appropriate. And such being the case, there can be neither any thing singular nor unreasonable in the repudiated children most keenly resenting the injustice of those human laws, which, not content with having interfered to part those whom nature at least, if not God, had joined, must needs lend their unauthorized aid besides, to cast on one of those the burden which nature as well as God had assigned to the other. As much as we may condemn the feeling, even if prompted by this just resentment, which could visit on one's own children the sins of their other parent, we, at least, cannot be surprised at it, when every day's experience shows it to be so frequently the case.

Not only the sentiment of duty, however, but also the parental affections are diminished by this cause. For experience likewise teaches us, that as well those who feel their children to be an impediment to the fruition of new loves and the formation of new alliances, as those who see growing up around them the favoured offspring of a newer and more cherished bed, are alike apt to be warped occasionally from the feelings commanded by nature and justice. And where this happens, children will never be slow to discern it; whilst the effect which we may look to see produced upon them, by their discovery of it, will be almost

invariably, that of so hardening, and so embittering their dispositions, that all the good seeds of virtue, which might otherwise have been implanted in their young hearts, would be likely to fall then as idly as might natural seed on a stony or a thorn-choked soil.

But, it may be asked, are not some of these last-mentioned consequences as likely to flow from any second marriage, whatever be the cause by which the former was terminated, be it death or divorce? Perhaps so: but it is to be remarked, that under the state of things which we are now supposing, second marriages would be much less frequent in the former case; since the very fact, that death alone was able to separate the parties, would, in itself, be proof of a strong mutual attachment between them; the very reverse of which is indicated by divorce. The inclination to re-marry must, therefore, be greatly less, when it is death with its hallowing influences upon the memory, instead of divorce with its embittered recollections, which has intervened to dissolve the first marriage.

And, even though this were not so, yet must we bear in mind, that, not only was the Divine permission to re-marry given in this case, "*Quod, si non se continent, nubant,*" (1 Cor. vii. 9,) exclusively confined; but that the very ground on which that permission stands,—considered under the purely natural view of the subject, which we are now taking, as, in some sort, a necessity for it,—is, as well as all excuse for it, absolutely wanting in the case of divorce.

But then, if both those who take advantage of the liberty afforded them by the divorce laws and their children are equally, though in different ways, injuriously affected by them, it must be evident that the latter will be doubly so, if, after growing up, they likewise avail themselves of the same fatal privilege; and that with each succeeding generation, the evil must thus go on augmenting, in something like a compound proportion, until, of necessity, society shall have grown rotten to its core.

Any elaborate attempt to prove the pernicious effect of these laws upon society at large, then, would seem to be almost superfluous, when so much has been already said of the mental, moral, and physical degeneracy which their licentious nature is sure to bring about in the individual man. To avoid prolixity, therefore, we shall content our-

selves with briefly pointing out, in a simple way, some of their most marked results of this kind.

In the first place, will we but take notice, that if one of the most ordinary effects of divorce, as well as of the change occasioned by it in the parental feelings, is to lessen the natural reverence and affection of children for their parents, we must immediately perceive, that the injury thus done to the parental authority is one that can hardly fail to react in a most sensible manner upon society, by diminishing that respect which men have been accustomed to entertain for all legitimate government. For, it is certain that the principles of submission to constituted authority is one by no means inborn in the human heart. Taking its root, on the contrary, in the child's sense of inferiority, and absolute dependence upon its parents,—consecrated by its affection for them, and growing stronger only in proportion as it is properly cultivated,—it develops itself at first, in the single sentiment of filial submission. And it is from that stock only, that it afterwards branches out,—first, into a feeling of respect for the authority of ecclesiastics and teachers, and finally, into one of deference and obedience towards all, who are clothed with the powers of civil government.

The family, moreover, is not only the primitive germ, but likewise the great constituent element of society, as well as, in some sort, the hot-house, nursery, or preparatory school, in which the tender plant of humanity is nurtured, tended, and trained for society. Whatever then tends to break up the family relations, must, necessarily, inflict the same injury upon society, as he who should gash or poison the roots of a tree, would inflict upon its trunk and branches. As society rests upon the family, even so does the family rest upon marriage, from which it derives, just as society from the family, not only the origin of its life, but the very continuance of its existence. And, therefore, anything done to lessen the marriage bond must contribute as much, even though indirectly, to break up society in the end, as it does, directly, to undo and scatter the family itself. Since, then, the interests, well-being, even the very existence of society, are so intimately blended with those of the family, and, with them, bound up in the sacredness and permanency of marriage, it clearly follows, that the

war waged by society upon marriage, by means of the divorce laws, is not only an unnatural and a sacrilegious, but at the same time a most suicidal war.

The history of mankind will be found to abound in illustrations of the above truths; and even that of nature is not far behind it, in this respect. For, wherever in the lower creation, whether among the birds, the animals, or the fishes which compose it, we happen to meet with the most striking examples of a tender, conjugal affection, there also, as a general rule, may we almost rest assured of finding a proportionate exhibition of the parental virtues, and, to some extent at least, a corresponding aptitude for, and inclination to, a feeble imitation of the social state.

Observe, for instance, the birds of the air, which, mating for a whole season, and, for aught we know to the contrary, for life, are of all the inferior creation those whose devotion to their offspring is the most unselfish and beautiful; whose social disposition, too, is, perhaps, among the most perfect. With what assiduity, what skill, and affectionate foresight, do they not provide a home for their expected young,—lining even with their own softest feathers the warm and downy nest they prepare for them. And, when their little brood is hatched, with what a total oblivion of self and of all the world beside, do they not immediately devote themselves to it; the male bird even condescending to alternate, in many a maternal office, with his mate, or warbling his sweetest songs to beguile the tedium of those reserved by her. How industriously they will search for food;—when found, how eagerly will they not urge their swift-winged flight back, to bestow it upon their nestlings; having, apparently, lost all sense of their own natural wants in their absorbing, parental love. How inimitable, how truly wonderful, are the love-inspired artifices, with which, if danger threaten, they will confront, and usually succeed in conjuring it away! And when, at length, their little ones approach maturity, with what tenderness and care may they not be seen teaching them to fly, and otherwise educating them for the miniature world of life, on which they soon must enter. Who has not been witness to some one of these charming exhibitions of parental love? Who, on the other hand, has ever witnessed, or even heard of an instance, of one of these tiny creatures abandoning a chosen

mate and helpless little brood, for the sake of some new love? No one, we undertake to reply; for, divorce is unknown to the law of their nature, and that law, they know not how to violate.

If we turn to the brute tribes, addicted to a chance, or polygamous intercourse, how marked the contrast which we observe in them! Take even the horse, otherwise among the noblest and most intelligent of the animal kind, and how unlike he is in this respect! For with no such tender forbearance for his mate, with none of this mild, paternal sway, does the wild stallion rule; but rather, as an absolute lord over a herd of female slaves,—tolerating nothing like equality, exhibiting nothing like affection,—savage and cruel, even in his moods of passion for them, and ever on the alert to punish the least, faint symptom, on their part, of any thing like defection. Equally jealous and suspicious of those of his own sex and kind, he can so little brook their society, that, should one dare to stray upon his secluded pasture-grounds, he will fight him even to death: whilst to his own progeny, in fine, he is utterly indifferent. And there are other brutes, which, surpassing in ferocious instinct even the horse, are possessed of such a mortal, and well-nigh inconceivable aversion for their offspring, as, without distinction of sex, to mangle and kill them wherever met.

Yet, to which of these opposite natures will it be pretended that man's should assimilate the most,—to that of the grovelling beast, or of the bird which soars towards heaven? Surely no reader of the Sacred Book, at least, could hesitate for a reply, when reminded of what he must there have learned, that, of all the infinitely various forms of animated being which God has created, there are only two under which He has ever deigned to reveal himself to man:—that of man himself, created to His own image and likeness, and that of the dove,—the immemorial type of constancy, and symbol of a chaste, married love! Thus, God Himself has instructed us, that there are points of similarity between the nature of these two, as He fashioned them, and still would have them be, in respect to which He has set them apart from, and exalted them above, all the rest of His vast creation.

We have also appealed to history, as practically enforcing

all that reason teaches us on this point, but, in order to be brief, will content ourselves with citing to this effect, a single memorable illustration; taken, however, from that familiar and every-way finished picture, which historians have left us of the rise and fall of the colossal Roman power.

For full five hundred years, we are told, even though their laws permitted it, did this remarkable people continue to set their faces resolutely against divorce: and it was precisely during the same period, as we know, that they so steadily advanced in power, dominion, and glory,—that they were so preëminently distinguished for sobriety, frugality, and patriotism,—and, in one word, gave to the world all those astounding examples of what, even to this day, men are accustomed to call “Roman virtue.” For Scævola and the elder Brutus, Cocles, Cincinnatus, Curtius, Camillus, Curius, Fabricius, and the almost superhuman Regulus, with Clelia, Lucretia, Virginia, and a host of others, equally illustrious, all lived and flourished within that period. Whilst it is from that of the Cæsars, when divorce had come into general use, that we are compelled to date the wane of Roman power, the decadence of morals, and spread of a frightful sensuality; as well as the long succession of the Neros, Caligulas, Domitians,—the Messalinas and Agrippinas, whose names are still by-words of infamy among men, and will be handed down, no doubt, to the very latest time, as the everlasting reproach and disgrace of their kind. So true is it, that divorce laws but pave the way for polygamy and the grossest sensuality; and that these in their turn will bring sure ruin on even the most flourishing empires and best-ordered societies which it is in the power of man to create.

And here we must pause to ask of the many who fancy that, within what they call “reasonable limits,” the permission of divorce is rather conducive to morality, or that any bounds can afterwards be set to it, if once permitted, just to mark, if it so please them, how completely the subsequent history of the Roman people has given the lie to these sensual fallacies.

We have seen, that for 500, or, as others have it, 523 years, there had been no example of a divorce in Rome; we are also enabled to judge of the shock given to public opinion by the first one which occurred, that of Spurius

Carvilius Ruga, from the very fact of his name's having been transmitted down to our own remote times, coupled with such an unenviable notoriety. But we know too, that, once the fashion set, it quickly began to spread, and that simultaneously with it morals commenced decaying, and patriotism also to diminish, until, in the comparatively short space of less than a century and a half, the masters of the world had become so changed, and fallen so lamentably low, that lower they could not fall, without sinking into the slaves they soon were made.

For, meanwhile, we behold in rapid succession the sedition of the Gracchi, the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, Sylla's absolute dictatorship, the conspiracy of Catiline, the struggle between Cæsar and Pompey,—and finally the downfall of the Republic! And what the state of morals had got to be at this last epoch, we may readily ascertain from the history of the Julian law, passed shortly afterward for the repression of adultery, as well as of the crime against nature; and which proved so wholly ineffectual, as we find, in checking the spreading corruption of either. For, to speak only of the latter of these two criminal practices, so universal and shamelessly public did that soon become, notwithstanding and in defiance of the law, that the great poets of the succeeding reign, even the courtiers and friends of Augustus, are known to have made matter of song of their own habitual indulgence in it; until Augustus himself was at length driven to make another impotent effort to crush it out, under cover of a law, compelling the Roman men—to marry women! So soon had the carnal practice of divorce thus begun to bear its legitimate fruits, even to the perversion of the sex and the violation of nature.*

* Startling, and even incredible as may seem this assertion, 'tis none the less true; and there is, perhaps, no truth more susceptible of proof, than that excessive indulgence in women, whether under cover of divorce or polygamy, will insensibly create in man a feeling of contempt for her, so great, as to extend even to his carnal use of her.

"Qui le croirait," exclaims Montesquieu, whom this truth has not escaped, "*la pluralité des femmes mène à cet amour que la nature réprouve.*" And Ferrand, a philosophic writer of the last century, adds, after quoting this passage. "*C'est une vérité démontrée par les faits; et cette dégoûtante passion n'est nulle part plus effrontément répandue, que parmi les Turcs.*"

But not to take up too much space with citations as to this point,

A little later, under the reign of Nero, Seneca, the philosopher, and friend of St. Paul, as some allege, but himself a Pagan, traces the following picture of the effects produced by it among the women of his day: "Is there any longer one," he exclaims, "who blushes at being repudiated, now that even ladies of the highest distinction count their years, not, as formerly, by the number of Consuls, but by the number of their husbands? And when young girls show themselves in public, only that they may succeed in getting married, and marry, only that they may afterwards get divorced? They shrank from it, indeed, so long as it was little practised, but now, that there is no record which is not full of divorces, they have also learned to do that, of which they had heard so much. And is not even the very shame of adultery gone, since things have reached that point, when all that women care for in marriage, is to secure a cover, under which they may better excite and carry on a commerce with adulterers? The sign of some deformity, nothing else, is chastity now."*

A little later still, Juvenal, satirizing the same practice, gives us reason to infer that there would have been no sort of impossibility in a Roman matron's then changing her husband as many as eight times in the course of five autumns; nor, after divorcing each of the eight in turn, in her returning to her first spouse.† Whilst Martial, writing about the same time, furnishes a still stronger illustration of the lengths to which the permission to divorce might be carried, adding his sarcastic commentary thereon:

"Quæ nubit toties, non nubit; adultera lege est."‡

A remark which is most worthy of note; as showing that not even the licentious Romans were blind to the true nature of this corrupting practice; but that even, whilst grossly rioting in it, they well understood and even frankly admitted it to be, what it really is—mere licensed adultery!

Finally, St. Jerome shows us, three hundred years later,

we will content ourselves with referring the reader for proof of the reality of the fact, at least as among the Romans, to the 6th Satire of Juvenal. (See v. 34, *et passim*.)

* Sen. de Benef. L. 3, ch. 6.

† Sat. 6, v. 223-9.

‡ Lib. 6, ep. 7.

that the Pagans of the empire practised it as extensively as ever; even to the extent of the same woman's legally prostituting herself, under the name of wife, to no less than twenty-two different men in succession. Nor can we hear of any change, or discover the least improvement in this respect, until after the edifice of the Roman civil power had been laid in ruins by the Barbarians, and God, at length, had firmly seated upon the throne of the Cæsars that Church which by His command has interdicted divorce wholly and for ever. So completely thus, will both history and the nature of mankind invariably be found to contradict the assumption, either that it is practicable to restrain divorce within any bounds, or that there is any better, or surer way of serving the cause of good morals, than that of making marriage permanent and indissoluble.

But, as the Divine authority for this dogma of the Church has been disputed by Protestants, let us now briefly examine the Scriptural evidences for it.

We find, in the first place, that when God made the first woman to be the spouse and help-mate of the first man, out of no different material did He create her, not even of the same of which He had already fashioned Adam; but, as if expressly to symbolize the inseparable union which He meant to establish between them, taking one of Adam's ribs, that rib did He build into a woman, and give to Adam for a wife; thereby giving it to their posterity to understand, that man's wife is to be regarded as the very "bone of man's bone, and flesh of his flesh." And, that they might be in no doubt as to His intention, He even adds an express declaration to this effect, and lays upon them, at the same time, His everlasting command, that "For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two, *in one flesh*." * "Wherefore," adds our Saviour, "they are no more *two*, but *one* flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." †

And when asked, "Why, then, did Moses command to give a bill of divorce, and to put away?" his reply is, "Because of the hardness of your hearts, Moses permitted you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it

* Gen. ii. 24. Matt. xix. 5.

† Matt. xix. 6—9.

was not so." And He from that goes on to lay down the law as it originally stood, and as He thenceforth willed it to stand for ever : " And I say to you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery : and he that shall marry her who is put away, committeth adultery."

Why any dispensation from the rigor of the original law should have been granted to the Jews, can be none of our business to explain ; even if that be true, which we are not disposed to admit, that it was God, and not Moses, in his secondary capacity, and as a mere human legislator, who granted them such a dispensation. To explain such an apparent anomaly, if it existed, would, we repeat, be none of our business ; since it would be simply folly in us, creatures whose limited intellect is confounded even by the wonders of Creation, to undertake to sound the depths of all the mystery and inscrutable counsels of the Allwise and Great Creator. We know, however, from their own history, even as related by themselves, that the Jews were one of the most carnal races that have ever dwelt upon this earth ; that they were a people so grossly sensual, that not even the recollection of the intolerable servitude which they had undergone in Egypt, could restrain them from sighing after the leeks and onions, and flesh-pots of that land of bondage. We know, too, that their very best and greatest characters, even the chosen progenitors of our pure Redeemer, the patriarch Juda, the royal prophet David, and Solomon, the wisest of mankind, were so far possessed and carried away by the lust of the flesh, as through it to have committed incest, adultery, the basest murder, and even idolatry ! And, knowing this, our human reason tells us that it would have been almost vain to expect that such a people would ever have kept the rigorous law imposed upon Adam's race before the Fall, unaided, as they yet were, by Sacramental grace. Moreover, the custom of divorce was already very prevalent, as well as very deeply rooted among them ; which makes it still further questionable whether Moses, had he even made the attempt to do so, could by any possibility have succeeded in wholly suppressing it. We cannot blame him, therefore, if, as well to make a virtue of necessity, as to prevent greater violations of the law, he partly consented to this one, or rather abstained from com-

bating it; nor can we doubt that, by bringing the practice under strict regulation, as he did, and restraining it within such bounds as he might reasonably hope the Jews would not transgress, he effected all that it was possible to effect under the circumstances. Yet, it is worthy of remark that even in doing this he no longer speaks in the name of the Lord, as he had done before, but in his own name, and apparently of his own sole authority.

Though, whether or not he had God's special sanction for what he did, is, after all, a matter of not the least consequence; since, if ever given, we know that it must have been subsequently withdrawn, as the practice has been denounced by God himself. For, in regard to this point at least, we are left in no doubt; since, not only in the passage of St. Matthew, above cited, and in answer to the questioning of the Pharisees, but previously to that, in His Sermon on the Mount, our Saviour most distinctly and emphatically repudiated the legislation of Moses on this subject, in these words: "It hath also been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. *But I say to you*, that whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is put away, committeth adultery." *

Before proceeding further, it becomes us to examine closely into the exception made, as to fornication, in these two passages of St. Matthew; since it recurs nowhere else. If, as has been generally maintained by Protestant divines, it is to be understood as an exception from the general prohibition to contract a second marriage after separation, and as therefore authorizing, in the case of fornication, a divorce *à vinculo matrimonii*, then, not only is it in direct contradiction to the text of the other Evangelists, but even with that of St. Matthew himself; for if, on this ground, a divorce *à vinculo* be in fact lawful, it stands in reason that he who should "marry her that is put away" on that account, would really not commit adultery, as our Saviour has so positively declared. To accept this construction would therefore be to make our Saviour falsify His own words, which of course we cannot do. But if, on the other

* Matt. v. 31.

hand, we understand with the Catholic Church, this exception as taken, not from the prohibition to marry another after divorce, but as only an exception from the recognized prohibition of any and every species of divorce, even of that milder form of it called by lawyers *à mensâ et thoro*,—which, not assuming to dissolve the bond of marriage, consists merely in “putting away,” or living apart from one’s wife or husband,—then, not only will the whole difficulty be instantly cleared up, and the text of the different Evangelists be reconciled, but we shall, moreover, find the correctness of this interpretation fortified and confirmed in various other passages of the Sacred Scriptures.

What, for example, could be clearer than the following testimony of St. Paul to the fact of the general unlawfulness of such separation: “But to them that are married, *not I*, but *the Lord* commandeth, that the wife depart not from her husband: And let not the husband put away his wife.”* He even explains the reason of this command; which, though flowing necessarily from the Divine precept that man “shall cleave to his wife,” and from the Divine declaration that “they are no longer *two*, but *one* flesh,” is yet more distinctly enforced by him, as follows: “The wife hath not power over her own body, but the husband. And in like manner, the husband also hath not power of his own body; but the wife.” Wherefore, he bids “the husband render the debt to his wife; and the wife also in like manner to the husband:”† and forbids them both to “defraud one another.”‡ Which not only accords with, but makes beautifully clear, the last cited passages of St. Matthew: “But I say to you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, *causeth* her to commit adultery.”

Passing on now to the other Evangelists, we shall find St. Mark’s version of our Saviour’s language to be as follows: “*Whosoever* shall put away his wife, *and marry another, committeth adultery against her*.”—“And if the wife shall put away her husband, *and be married to another, she committeth adultery*.”§ Whilst St.

* 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11.

† 1 Cor. vii. 3.

† 1 Cor. vii. 4, 5.

§ Mark x. 11.

Luke's version runs thus: "*Every one that putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and he that marrieth her that is put away from her husband, committeth adultery.*"* From this it is apparent: first, that in no case is permission to contract a new marriage, after divorce or separation, given to either of the parties; and next, that the first contract is, notwithstanding their separation, affirmed to be subsisting yet in all its original force: else why such strong and repeated use of the word "adultery," which, if the first marriage be supposed dissolved, would certainly have been a misnomer as cruel as unjust?

To the same effect as the Evangelists writes St. Paul, as follows: "*A woman is bound by the law, as long as her husband liveth: but if her husband die, she is at liberty: let her marry to whom she will.*"† "Wherefore, *whilst her husband liveth, she shall be called an adulteress if she be with another man:*" "but if her husband be dead, she is free from the law of her husband: so that she is not an adulteress if she be with another man."‡

Now, faultless and incontrovertible as may seem to us this doctrine, it sounds, nevertheless, very strangely in the ears of Protestants; and to their minds the precept appears a very hard one, to say the least, if not absolutely impossible to fulfil. But then the same doctrine, at first, sounded just as strangely in the ears of the disciples, as we know, since, as St. Mark relates, they privately questioned our Saviour further about it; § and to their as yet unregenerated hearts, the precept must have appeared no less difficult than it now does to those of Protestants, since on hearing it they were driven to exclaim, "If the case of a man with his wife be so, it is not good to marry!" || Yet, for all this, does it appear that our Saviour abated any thing from the rigor of the law as first laid down by Him? Not one particle: and, perhaps, has He nowhere else so explicitly, or so positively re-asserted it, as when He condescended to explain His full meaning to the questioning disciples. ¶ There is, then, no fact, which tells more strongly against Protestants, than their very incredulity on

* Luke xvi. 18.

† 1 Cor. v. 39.

‡ Rom. vii. 3.

§ Mark x. 10.

|| Matt. xix. 10.

¶ Mark x. 10, 11.

this point ! If anything is provable from the New Testament, it is that our Lord declares the marriage bond indissoluble.

But difficult as may seem to carnal minds the due observance of this precept, the truth is, that our Saviour has made it very easy for those who will avail themselves of the means which He has provided to this end. For by raising marriage to the glorious dignity of a Sacrament,—and of “a great Sacrament” too,—as well as by the institution of the Sacraments of Penance and the Holy Eucharist, He has supplied us with such a rich, unfailing fount of supernatural grace, as no man can draw from without feeling himself sufficiently strengthened for the performance of every duty enjoined upon him by the Christian law. This all good Catholics know: this the disciples afterwards found true, despite their first unfavorable impressions upon the subject; this, too, might Protestants be certain of would they but try. But whether or not disposed to try the virtue of these supernatural graces, which the true Church would so gladly dispense to all mankind, at least is it certain, that they cannot possibly impugn her doctrine on this point, without, at the same time, rejecting the teaching of our Saviour and the Scriptures themselves. For, positively, no language can be clearer, no command more peremptory than those there found. Our Saviour will permit a divorce *à mensâ et thoro*, that is to say, a separation between man and wife, in the case of the adultery of either; but even in that case will he admit of no sundering of the indissoluble bond, having declared, in words the most unmistakable anywhere to be found in the Scriptures, that either of the two, no matter what the cause of their separation,—for he here makes no exception,—who should enter into new married relations with a third person, would, as well as that third party, be guilty of undoubted adultery.

Before testimony so direct, so forcible, and so conclusive, as is that of the three Evangelists, and of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, as to these points, it seems to us that even sophistry itself should be reduced to silence; and that they who could still cast about for an escape from the irresistible conclusions thus forced upon the mind must, unquestionably, be of the number of those, the “stiff-

necked and uncircumcised of heart," who seeing, see not, and hearing, hear not, neither will they understand. Unless, therefore, we can bring ourselves to the point of denying the authority of the Supreme Legislator to impose a law, or lay a prohibition upon us, we cannot help but acknowledge marriage to be an irrevocable union, which makes of two one flesh, whom death alone can part. Whilst before this stern injunction, "Let not man part what God hath joined," it must be equally clear to us that all the human divorce laws which ever were made, are absolutely null, and positively criminal, and all they who have recourse to them declared adulterers; for the Lord God, himself, hath said it.

But if, already, quite enough should have been said to convince any reasonable mind that the long-continued, and general practice of divorce is eventually sure to result in injury to man individually, as well as to the human race, that it is essentially destructive of the family relations, as between man and wife, parent and child, and therefore, in a measure, of all good and free government, by the way in which it weakens the principle of authority among men, and even of society itself,—that it is injurious to the growth and prosperity of nations, and more or less fatal to any system, whether moral, pseudo-religious, or political, which adopts it; and if, in addition to all this, as we now see, it turns out to be banned and forbidden by the great God who made us, what more can be urged in its favor, or how can we tolerate it for an instant longer among us? For tolerated unfortunately it has been, until its sad first-fruits are becoming, each day, more visibly manifest among us, in a looser private morality, in an almost total decay of public virtue,—and, may we not add, in no less patent a fact, than the rise and progress of the Mormon heresy? For that this sect originated, and is still recruited where the custom of divorce is most prevalent, and that, lapsing almost immediately into polygamy, it has from the first been animated by a spirit of relentless hostility to the civilization and society in which we live,—is as certain as that, after a few vain attempts to abide among us, it went forth like a new Ishmael, into the wilderness of Utah, where its hand is even yet "against all men, and all men's hands against it."

Now, though we may justly congratulate ourselves on finding that our body politic is still of a constitution sound and healthy enough to have so successfully thrown off this first cancerous eruption, we should yet be guilty of inexcusable folly did we let our satisfaction blind us to the fact that the lurking seeds of the disease too must, every one of them, be thoroughly extirpated, if we would hope for any radical cure. And as, among these, our divorce laws are of the very first in point of dangerous importance, it is almost needless to add, that they should, also, be among the first attacked.

We have by no means exhausted the subject, and we are well aware that it will take more than one essay in a review to arouse the American people to a sense of their own danger. Already is the physical man degenerating amongst us; and already is chastity of person, to say nothing of chastity of thought, looked upon to a fearful extent as no sin, at best as simply an imprudence, or as a bad calculation. Already we have a party more numerous than is commonly suspected, who have even gone beyond divorce, and unblushingly advocate the abolition of marriage altogether, leaving the sexes to cohabit together when and where they please, and for a longer or shorter time as may seem to them good. The principal end of marriage, the procreation and rearing of children, is wellnigh lost sight of, and the prevention of conception or the destruction of the offspring before birth, real child-murder, is prevailing even among married people to a most alarming extent. The family, in its old sense, is disappearing from our land, and not only our free institutions are threatened, but the very existence of our society itself is endangered. It is time for every one of us to take the alarm, and try to arrest the evil before it is too late. To do this we must begin at the source, and protect the family by consecrating anew Christian marriage, recognizing its indissolubility, and repealing all laws which authorize divorce from the marriage bond. This must be done, but it can be done in this country only by correcting public opinion on the subject, and bringing up the public conscience to silence the importunate demands of lawless passion.

J. A. G.

ART. V.—*The Condition of Women and Children among the Celtic, Gothic, and other nations.* BY JOHN M'ELHERAN, M. R. C. S. E. Boston: Donahoe, 1858, pp. 393.

THE volume before us, by the late Dr. M'Elheran, a man who had gained some notoriety by his ethnological lucubrations, is not a work we can conscientiously commend, or even one that we think worth the labor of a serious refutation. The author, we have been assured, was an amiable and estimable man, a sincere patriot and an earnest Catholic, but the book seems to us to be written in a very bad spirit, disfigured by the most bitter and unwarrantable prejudices, incapable of serving either the cause of religion or science, and fitted only to stir up evil passions, and to injure the cause it espouses. We have introduced it, not to review it, but simply to use it as a text for some remarks we wish to offer on the theory which it favors—that Catholicity is Celtic, and Protestantism is Germanic: a theory which is very widely defended by Protestant Germans, Englishmen, and Americans, and sometimes by Irish and French Catholics.

We have in previous numbers of the *Review* shown that the key to modern history is not, as some would have it, a struggle between the Papacy and the Empire, but a struggle between two systems of civilization; the one the Romanic, or that which obtained in the Roman Empire under the Cæsars, and thence called by us Cæsarism, and the other the Germanic, or that which the German conquerors of the Empire brought with them, or which was developed among them after the Conquest, under the influences of Catholicity. As we gave the preference to the Germanic system, we have been accused by some of our Celtic friends of placing the Germanic race before the Celtic, and the Anglo-Saxons (so called) above the Irish. By systems of civilization, it has been asserted, we meant simply men; and by the struggle of two orders of civilization it is assumed that we meant a struggle of races. This was not our meaning; and our main purpose was, by showing the struggle has been one of systems of civilization, simply to show that the theory that either Catholicity

or liberty is the monopoly either of the Celtic race or of the Germanic race, has no historical foundation. This theory, that Catholicity is adapted to the Celtic nations, and Protestantism to the Germanic, which for the Protestant is to the glory of the Germanic race, and for the Catholic is to the glory of the Celtic race, underlies the whole of Dr. M'Elheran's book, and is indeed a theory which we have occasion almost every day to combat, either against the Catholic or against the Protestant. To a Catholic born in this country, where the majority of his countrymen are or believe themselves of Germanic, Gothic, or Teutonic origin, and the majority of his Catholic brethren are or believe themselves of Celtic origin, this theory is a constant annoyance, in fact a real embarrassment. For the American Catholic to accept it, is to confirm the majority of his countrymen in their prejudices against his religion, and for him to undertake to refute it is to arm the prejudices of the majority of his Catholic brethren against himself. It is impossible for the Catholic publicist to do his duty if he passes it over in silence, for it not only confirms Protestants by all the prejudices of race in their Protestantism, but it prevents the mass of our Catholic population from making the proper efforts for the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, and tends to keep them a foreign colony in the Union.

Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant advocate of this theory seems to be aware of its real character. The Catholic who defends it shows that he regards his religion as a Gentile or heathen religion, and that he does not hold it to be Catholic. The essential or characteristic feature of Gentilism, under the present point of view, is that religion goes by races, and that each people or nation should have and adhere to a religion of its own. Gentilism stands for national religions as opposed to the one Catholic religion, and is, as we often say, the primitive apostasy, originating in the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the consequent division and dispersion of the human race. Religion is catholic only on condition that it teaches all nations and races, or is equally necessary for the Celt and the Teuton, the Greek and the Barbarian, and alike adapted to the nature, the condition, and the wants of all men. That Protestants, who bear to the Christian Church the

relation borne by the ancient Gentiles, with their idolatries and superstitions, to the Patriarchal religion as preserved in the Synagogue, should hold that religion goes by races and nations, is not to be wondered at, for it is in accordance with its genius, and the necessities of its nature; but that a Catholic should so hold is not a little marvellous, for it is simply a denial of the religion he professes. A Teutonic or Celtic, an American or a European, an English or an Irish religion were necessarily a Gentile and not a Catholic religion. By advocating such a religion, the Catholic renounces his own religion by denying its Catholicity, and the Protestant confesses his to be Gentilism, and therefore not Christianity, which we suppose it will be conceded is opposed to all Gentile religions.

The theory we are considering rests on the assumption that Catholicity is restricted in the main to the so-called Latin nations, which are said to be Celtic, and that Protestantism is confined to the confessedly Germanic or Teutonic nations. But it is not certain that the so-called Latin nations are really Celtic nations; and if they were, the theory would not be sustained, for Catholicity is by no means confined to them. The Germanic nations were all, for ages, the leading Catholic nations of the world. The Church has never had more faithful or more devoted children than the German Franks and Anglo-Saxons, from the seventh to the eleventh century. About one-half of the Germans in Germany proper are still Catholics, while among nations and races not claimed as Celtic, Catholicity counts a larger number of children than she has in the so-called Latin nations themselves, including among those nations the Irish. The so-called Latin nations cannot give more than about eighty millions out of the two hundred millions who acknowledge the authority of the Church, and these eighty millions ought to be reduced by nearly one-third for the non-Catholics, unbelievers, and Protestants contained in these same Latin nations.

Protestantism, again, is by no means confined to nations or individuals of the Gothic or Teutonic race. It owes more to France than to Germany, for they were the French kings, courtiers, and writers that prepared the way for its birth, and it was France that, by leaguings with Sweden and the disaffected princes of the Empire, preserved it

from being extirpated, at least deprived it of its political *status* in the early part of the seventeenth century. It is not too much to say, that, if there is a Protestant nation in Europe to-day, the world owes it to France, to France that goes to war to sustain the Crescent against the Cross, and to subject to the anti-papal policy of her Emperor, the principal Catholic empire of Europe. France has at present, indeed, less than a million of inhabitants that profess Protestantism, because it is the French fashion to follow Voltaire and Rousseau rather than Luther and Calvin; yet the real organizers of Protestantism, the Protestantism that has saved the pretended Reformation and perpetuated its heresy and schism, were Frenchmen, and for aught we know men of Celtic origin, we mean John Calvin and Theodore Beza. But for Calvinism, purely French in its origin, the Lutheran movement would hardly have survived Luther himself. The Provinces of France where Protestantism at first most prevailed, and where it still has its strongholds, are precisely those in which the Germanic element is weakest, and the Celtic, or Aquitanian, is the strongest. France owed, under God, her escape from becoming a Protestant nation principally to Lorraine, and the Lorraine princes, the Guises, of Germanic not Celtic descent. Even to-day the most Germanic are the most Catholic Departments of France. The French Canadians, for the most part Catholic, are descendants from the Norman and therefore Gothic, as well as from Breton and therefore Celtic ancestors. The Scotch, our Irish ethnologists assure us, are a Celtic people, and there is not a more thorough-going Protestant people on earth. The English are a leading Protestant nation, but Dr. M'Elheran contends that the English are for the most part of Celtic origin. There are no fiercer Protestants to be found than the Irish Protestants, both in and out of Ireland. The great body of the people of the United States are as staunch Protestants as are to be found in Scotland, England, or Prussia, and Dr. M'Elheran, it is well known, claims the American people as a Celtic people, and professed to demonstrate by diagrams in this city that they retain the Celtic type of face and skull. The Magyars also are by no means of German origin or character, and yet the great body of them are Protestants.

Were we to forget that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and that Catholicity is catholic

not Gentilistic, we should be disposed to take the reverse of this famous theory, and to maintain that the Celtic people by their natural genius and temperament are far less fitted to be Catholic than are the Germanic or Teutonic nations. The German genius and temperament, it seems to us, are naturally far less averse to Catholicity, than the so-called Celtic. An Irishman or a Frenchman by the grace of God becomes and remains a good Catholic, none better; but his nature is always not only *un-Catholic* as all nature is, since Catholicity is supernatural, but *anti-Catholic*. French and Irish literature, whenever it is not formally religious, dogmatic or ascetic,—whenever it falls back into the natural order, is not merely below Catholicity, but is opposed to it. The French mind, the leading Latin mind of our day, conceives very generally of the two orders, the natural and the supernatural, as two mutually antagonistic orders. It opposes faith to reason, grace to nature, and seems always to take it for granted that the one can exist only by the destruction of the other. Hence it tends always either to Jansenism or to Rationalism,—to grace without nature, or to nature without grace. Hence again we find with the French and even the Irish, far more Catholic piety or sentiment than Catholic principle, and a greater horror with the latter of eating meat on Friday than of lying or stealing, and with the former of misplacing a genuflection than of rejecting a dogma. With both their Catholicity seems to us to be embraced, retained, and submitted to in spite of their natural repugnance to it, in the very face and eyes of nature, not by its aid, or in accordance with its dictates. We say not this as a disparagement of the Catholicity of either, for it is really no disparagement at all; but as a conclusive proof that the Celtic or Latin nations, if Catholic, are not so in consequence, as the theory we are combating assumes, of their natural genius, temperament, and tendencies. As far as we can judge, the contradiction between the Church and German nature is far less striking than the contradiction between her and Celtic nature. We find in German and English popular literature, for instance, far more that is in accordance with Catholic principle, though not with Catholic dogma, than in the popular literature of nations said to be Celtic. The most corrupting and licentious

poetry in our language we owe to the Irish Catholic Thomas Moore, in whose honor societies are formed and festivals held by Catholics in this country, and who threatens to be in the affections of his countrymen in America, a formidable rival to St. Patrick. As far as we are acquainted with it, the most immoral popular literature, literature that is the most dangerous to purity, honesty, and even faith, to be found in the whole civilized world, is that of France and Italy. What must we think of those good, pious Abbesses who used the *Decameron* for spiritual reading in their convents? M. Audin makes a great ado about the coarse, low language of Luther, but Luther's language was refined and chaste in comparison with the contemporary habits, customs, language, and deeds of the polished Italians in Rome and Florence, to say nothing of other parts of Italy. Certain it is that the so-called Celtic or Latin nations are not Catholic by force of nature; and their long and steady adherence to Catholicity, in spite of their natural repugnance to it, is really, if duly considered, a most convincing argument that it is really from God and sustained by His supernatural providence. The Catholicity of Ireland is to us a standing miracle, for the Irish are the last people in the world whose nature would lead them to accept and adhere to the Catholic Church.

It is necessary, then, both for Catholics and Protestants, to give up their theory which reduces the Catholic question to an ethnological question, and explains the differences of religion by the differences of race. There are and can be no real differences of race, for God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and we are all His offspring. All men, white or black, yellow or copper-colored, are of the same race, have the same nature, and are descended from the same original pair. Pretended science, we know, attempts to controvert this; but we know also that it attempts it without any real success. Everybody knows that difference of color, even in the animal and vegetable world, indicates no difference of species. The ewe brings forth twins, the one white and the other black. Who pretends that a bay horse must needs be of a different species from the horse that is black? Science, to overrule tradition, or the dogmas of faith, must be science, not conjecture, a guess, an opinion, a plausible hypothesis, or even

a probability. It must be real science, absolutely certain, leaving no possible room for doubt or cavil. We do not say that science has as yet demonstrated, we do not know that it will ever be able to demonstrate, the unity of the human race, or that all men have sprung from the same original couple; but we do say, that whatever its pretensions, it has established nothing to the contrary; that, if it has not demonstrated the truth of revelation, it has proven nothing against it; and knowing as we do *aliunde*, that the revelation is from God, who is Truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, we dare assert that it never will. We accept science, whenever it is science, but we know beforehand that whatever professes to repugn the truth of revelation is not science.

A remarkable instance, in proof of this, may be found in what has been called metagenesis, or in the process of reproduction, a change of species. The aphid, it was said, produces an animal of a different species from itself; this produces still another, whose product returns again to the aphid. When we first heard one of our scientific friends state this, we assured him that it could not be true, for we knew theologically that God has created all things after their kind, and each species reproduces its like; and, therefore, there can be no metagenesis in the case, and what has been so called must be simply a peculiar process of reproduction. This the late Dr. Burnam, of Boston, who died all too soon for science, found in the case of the aphid by long and patient observation to be actually the fact. Science has never yet possessed itself of a well-authenticated case of metagenesis. When between the alleged scientific discovery and a real Scriptural doctrine there is found a discrepancy, we are not to conclude that the Scriptural doctrine is untrue, but that our science is incomplete, has rushed to a too hasty induction, and further observation or experiment is necessary. We, therefore, leave science to take its course, and rest perfectly satisfied with the Christian doctrine or the teaching of the Holy Scriptures, that all men have originally sprung from the same Adam and Eve, are made of one blood, brothers of the same family. The brotherhood of the human race, however abused by philanthropists and French Jacobins, is a Christian dogma, and hence the Christian religion, in opposition to Gentilism, is Catholic, and if adapted to one man, equally adapted to all men, in every age and nation.

We do not accept under any form the modern doctrine of races, which is only a reproduction of ancient Gentilism, exploded by the Christian religion, and always condemned by the Catholic Church. There are and can be in the human family no radical differences of race. All have the same nature, and that nature is one, invariable, and indestructible in all. Whatever differences we find between nation and nation, or people and people, are differences not of nature or race, but of development, manners, customs, and usages, and pertain to the category called by the Peripatetics *habitus*, not to that of substance. We recognize different orders of civilization, but not different races. There is, moreover, no such broad line of distinction between the Celtic and Teutonic families as is just now pretended. It is even yet a moot point whether the people called Celts or Keltæ, inhabiting ancient Gaul, and the people called Germans by Tacitus, dwelling beyond the Rhine, were not one and the same people, though divided into different nations or bodies politic. Peloutier, in his learned and elaborate *Histoire des Celts*, and after him Beaufort, in his *La Republique Romaine*, contend that the Germans were Celts; and some learned German authors with superior erudition and equal ability contend that the Celts against whom Cæsar fought in Gaul were Germans, and go far to prove it from the names of persons and places, all of which, so far as they have been transmitted to us, are significant in German, if not indeed pure German names. How the fact may be it is not for us to decide; but this much we hold to be certain, that the Celtic people belonged to the great Indo-Germanic or Aryan family of nations. This their language, which is undeniably Aryan, would seem to place beyond question.

The Celts and Germans have both migrated from the same old Japetic homestead in Upper Asia, whence have migrated all the Western or European nations. The Celts, probably, were not the oldest migration; they were most likely preceded by the Pelasgi and the Iberians; the former settling a part or all of Asia Minor, Greece, insular and continental, Epirus, Illyricum, and Southern Italy; the latter the north coast of Africa, whence they crossed over into Spain, and extended themselves to Ireland, perhaps also to Britannia. The Celts came later by a more

northerly route, ascended the valley of the Danube, extended themselves through the ancient Noricum, reached and crossed the Rhine, and peopled the country which the Greeks called Keltica, whence they made excursions into Spain, where they mingled with the Iberians, and hence were called Celtiberians, passed or repassed the Alps, and founded settlements in Northern Italy, now Lombardy, and in what the Romans called Cisalpine Gaul. They probably added to their possessions the British Isles and Ireland. The Germans followed at an unknown interval of time, passed into Europe by the Thracian Bosphorus, the Crimea, and north of the Euxine, spread themselves through Southern Russia, the Danubian principalities, up the valley of the Danube, south to the Rhætian Alps and the Rhine, north to the Carpathian mountains and the Vistula, and west to the Ocean, as Plutarch tells us, in several places overlapping or driving out their Celtic predecessors. They extended themselves up the Northern Ocean, and occupied all Scandinavia, which would seem to have become the principal seat of the Gothic branch of the family. The name of *Germans* was recent in the time of Tacitus, and perhaps has never been applied till quite lately to the whole family. As has been maintained in the *Conversations of Our Club*, they are the people called by the ancient historians Scythians, who migrated eastward and southward as well as westward and northward, and are mentioned under the names of Asi, Sagetes, Assagetes, Massagetes, Gettæ, Guttones, Gottones, Teutones, that is to say, Goths, Teutons, or Teutscher, Deutscher, Dutch, or Germans. They are probably the people who under the name of Gotti or Scoti invaded Ireland, and gave it the name of Scotia, for the Scots, according to Irish tradition, were Σκύθαι, Scythians, so that the Irish Milesians were Goths, Germans, *Saxons*, by origin!

The difference between the Celts and Germans is doubtless owing to the different epochs at which they respectively migrated from the old homestead in Asia. The Celts migrated at an epoch nearer than the Germans to the time of the Dispersion, and, therefore, at an earlier stage in the development of the Japetic civilization, which they were forced to continue in circumstances and under influences different from those of the mother country. Differences of

language, manners, customs, usages, would inevitably spring up, and in time make the colonists seem a different people from the family that remained at home, especially if there was kept up little or no communication between them. So, notwithstanding the constant intercourse kept up between us and the mother country from the first, the American character is very different from the English, and there are great differences, even where the words remain the same, in the English language as spoken by the two nations. How much greater would have been the difference, if all intercourse, social, political, commercial, and literary, had been broken off from the first? The Celtic migration, though subsequent to the Iberian, was evidently before the family, whence the sept or clan, had been fully developed into the nation, and when the divergence between the Japetic and Semitic dialects had only commenced. That of the Germans came after both had far advanced. Hence, we should expect to find the political development of the Celts less than that of the Germans, more traces with them of the original patriarchal order, and more resemblances in their dialect than in the German with the Semitic family of languages. And such we believe is the fact. These differences between Celts and Germans, be they greater or be they less, however, militate nothing against the identity of the origin of the two families.

Dismissing, then, the theory that differences of religion are to be explained ethnologically, or by differences of race, we must still meet another branch of the same theory, namely, that liberty is Germanic and despotism Celtic, whence it is concluded that Protestantism is the religion of liberty, and Catholicity the religion of despotism. The Hon. George P. Marsh, formerly American minister to the Sublime Porte, and whose death has been lately announced by the newspapers,—a most estimable man, and really one of the most erudite men in New England, maintained this with great ability and learning, some years since, in *Three Lectures on the characteristics of the Northern or Gothic nations, which he contrasts with the Southern or so-called Celtic nations*. Mr. Marsh, if we recollect aright,—for his lectures are not just now within our reach,—maintains that the Gothic nations are marked by a strong sense of individuality, self-reliance, and in-

dependent thought and reflection, while the Southern, or Celtic nations, lack individualism and self-reliance, look to the external rather than to the internal, tend rather to the sensuous than to the intellectual, to feel rather than to think, and seek the approbation of others rather than of themselves, are, as we may say, vain rather than proud. Hence, the Celt finds the Catholic religion, with its imposing forms, its pompous and splendid ritual, its strong appeal to the senses and the imagination, its definite creed, and absolute authority, more congenial to his nature than Protestantism; while the Goth finds the stern simplicity and rigidly intellectual and deeply spiritual character of Protestantism more to his taste and judgment. The strong sense of society, of authority, characteristic of the Celtic nations, favors a monarchical organization of the state, and even despotic government; the deeper interior sense, the greater self-reliance, and the stronger individualism of the Gothic nations favor liberty, and make for them free institutions or self-government both desirable and practicable. Dr. M'Elheran, without accepting all of Mr. Marsh's reasoning, comes very much to the same conclusion, as do not a few of our Celtic Catholics, only they consider the conclusions honorable to the Celt and to the Catholic religion, while Mr. Marsh considers it more especially honorable to the Goth and to Protestantism.

We have already disposed of this theory, so far as Catholicity is concerned. It, moreover, is based to a great extent on a misapprehension of the real character of Catholicity. Catholicity, in its external service, its rites, and its ceremonies, is fitted to enlist in the worship of God, as it should be, the whole man—the senses and the imagination, as well as the intellect and the heart; but to suppose that it is purely external, capable of satisfying only the senses and imagination, or the purely æsthetic wants of man, without supplying food for his deeper spiritual wants, or to suppose that it refers merely to the external authority without making any appeal to reason or the witness within, is to mistake wholly its real character. The Gothic or Northern nations tend, perhaps, more to mysticism in both a good and a bad sense, than the purely Celtic nations, if indeed any such nations there are; but the profoundest German mystics that have ever meditated or writ-

ten have been Catholics, and they have found Catholicity supplying all the food for contemplation and meditation they could desire. Mr. Marsh also mistakes, as do many others, the character of Protestantism. Protestantism has less than Catholicity to strike the senses and the imagination, does less to meet our æsthetic wants, but it has also less to meet the intellect and the heart. Protestants have rejected much that Catholics have, but they have retained nothing in any order that Catholics have not. Protestantism is less intellectual than Catholicity, as well as less beautiful, and affords less scope for deep thought, for the higher exercises of reason and the profounder meditation of the soul. This is the testimony borne by every one who knows equally well both religions. While, therefore, we should in the main agree with Mr. Marsh, in his estimate of the characteristics of the Northern nations, we should conclude against him, and maintain that they accord better with Catholicity than with Protestantism. Protestantism, in our judgment, is hardly less anti-Germanic than anti-Catholic.

The conclusion, as it affects the religious question, we reject without further remark ; but as it affects liberty and despotism, something more needs to be said, for it directly or indirectly sets forth the only objection to our religion that has much real weight in our day with intelligent and fair-minded non-Catholics. The conclusion that the Celtic tendency is to despotism, what we call Cæsarism, and the Gothic or Germanic tendency is to liberty, it is attempted to support by facts. It is assumed, in the first place, that the so-called Latin nations are Celtic nations, an assumption which Dr. M'Elheran is as ready to make as the Honorable Mr. Marsh, and then from this it is concluded that the Celtic race tends to Cæsarism, because, as a matter of fact, Cæsarism does actually predominate in all or nearly all the so-called Latin nations. The order of civilization that actually obtains in these nations makes the state or society absolute, and hardly retains, in the political order, a vestige of real individual liberty. In them prevails, in a greater or less degree, that huge system of centralized despotism we find in imperial Rome, both before and after Constantine the Great. On the other hand, the freest states, the only free states, in Christendom are of Germanic origin, and what for the

Catholic is still worse, are Protestant, or at least non-Catholic, as Great Britain and the United States. Our Celtic friends agree with our German opponents that the so-called Latin nations are Celtic, and that the order of civilization that obtains in them is Celtic civilization. Hence, when we condemned the Latin civilization, under the political point of view, our Irish friends unhesitatingly accused us of making war on the Celtic in favor of the Anglo-Saxon civilization, and cried out against our excessive Anglo-Saxonism.

Now, for our part, we are disposed to defend the Celtic family against the calumnies of its own members as well as of its enemies. We are not prepared to concede, as an ethnological question, that the Southern nations, that is to say, the Italians, the French, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese, are, properly speaking, Celtic nations. The Celts may have had settlements in Spain, but the peninsula was never Celtic. It was Iberian, as were the original Irish, or the people the Milesians found settled in the island, and whom tradition says they conquered. The original inhabitants of Southern Gaul were Aquitanians, an Iberian family, not Celts, and the Belgæ, who possessed the northern part of Gaul in the time of Julius Cæsar, and who had conquered both Britain and Ireland, were in all probability a Germanic or Teutonic people. Helvetia and part of Italy were Celtic, but the original inhabitants of Central and Southern Italy, with Sicily, were, it is pretty certain, unless we except the Rasennians or Etrurians of unknown origin, Pelasgians, and the Greeks of Magna Grecia, as well as the Hellenes in Greece proper, and the Romans, belonged undoubtedly to the Germanic, not to the Celtic family. But be this as it may, all these countries had been subdued by the Romans, and completely Romanized long before the Germanic conquest. The Celts of Brittany are not the original Gauls, but Celts who escaped from Albion, now England, during the period of the Saxon conquest of that island, and belong to the same family as the Welsh, a different people from the Irish. After the Roman conquest and four hundred years of Roman possession and despotic rule, these countries were all overrun and subjugated by the Germans,—Burgundians, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, and Franks; and in them all the governing

people from that day to this have been of Germanic origin. It will not do then to call them Celtic nations. There may be Celtic blood remaining in them, but the Germanic and Romanic elements predominate.

But conceding that these nations are really Celtic, the political and civil order which obtains in them is not Celtic; it is, abstracting what is due to Germany and the Church, Græco-Roman. If our Celtic friends go further, and contend, as some of them actually do, that both the Greeks and Romans were Celts, we still deny that the civilization which obtains in the so-called Latin nations is Celtic. That civilization is in the main resuscitated imperialism, which the Romans themselves did not originate, but borrowed from the East, and which is of Chamitic, not Japetic or Celtic origin. There is not a trace of that huge system of centralized despotism, brought to its perfection under Diocletian, who re-organized the empire, to be found amongst any purely Celtic people, ancient or modern, that we have ever heard of. The tendency of the Celtic people has never been in that direction, but usually in a contrary direction. The misfortunes of the Celtic family in all times have been due to their lack of unity—to their disunion, their divisions, their disintegrating spirit, to their devotion to the sept or clan instead of the nation. We see this in the ancient Gauls, who struggled so heroically, but so unsuccessfully, for their liberty against the Romans under Cæsar; we see it also in the struggles which the Irish have continued for seven hundred years for freedom and independence against the Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Normans. The resistance offered by the Scotch to the union of Scotland with England, the struggles of O'Connell for a repeal of the legislative union of Ireland with Great Britain, and for an independent Irish parliament, were directly in the face and eyes of the Roman system we have condemned, and precisely in the spirit of that Germanic order or Carolinian constitution we have defended. In fact, there were not a few points of resemblance between the spirit and institutions of the Celtic and Teutonic families, and much that we commend to-day in the British and American laws and Institutions was common to the original Celts and Saxons,—a fact, which, misinterpreted, has led some Irish writers to contend that the

British order of civilization was borrowed by the Saxons from the Celts of Ireland. Nowhere have we found the Celts, whenever un-Romanized, the friends of despotism ; and we have always found them fighting bravely, heroically, if unsuccessfully, for independence and for personal liberty. To pretend that the huge system of centralized despotism established by imperial Rome, a system which deprived the nations subjected to her dominion of their autonomy, reduced the vast populations of the empire to slavery and misery, and rendered them an easy prey to the Barbarian invader,—to pretend that that system is of Celtic origin, is to pronounce a censure on the Celtic family which they have never deserved, which nothing in their history warrants. It is a foul injustice. Indeed, no people have more often occasion to prefer the petition, “ Save me from my friends,” than the Celtic.*

* The Celts having emigrated while the family remained in force, or at least before the sept, clan, or tribe had expanded into the nation, we find that the sense of nationality was always very weak among them, or wholly wanting. The Celts, or Gauls, as the Romans called them, could often form confederacies under a popular chief, and carry on distant military expeditions, as in their conquest of Rome, under the leadership of Brennus, Brens, *Prens*, *Prins*, or the Prince, but they seem never to have fully developed the principle of nationality, and hence they were seldom able to retain their conquests. When attacked by Cæsar they were not a single state, they were not, properly speaking, a nation, but were an agglomeration of distinct tribes or clans, confederated by a sense of common danger, against the common enemy. If they had been a nation, organized into a single state, with a really national spirit, they would have been amply able to have defended themselves successfully against the Romans, whom they equalled in bravery, and far surpassed in numbers. We meet the same thing in Great Britain. When invaded by the Romans, the Britons were distinct peoples or tribes, not a nation. So find we it in Ireland when invaded and subjected by the Anglo-Saxon Egbert, and even when, the Irish having emancipated themselves from the Saxons, their island was invaded by the Anglo-Normans. The Irish were divided and distributed into a vast number of septs, clans, or tribes, each virtually independent and owning no superior. They were not one state, one people, one nation. There was the unity of the clan, but no unity of the nation. This is wherefore the Saxons and the Normans so easily conquered them, and why England has held them, even under the most unfavorable circumstances, in subjection. After the reduction of the Saxon Heptarchy, England became a nation, and had a real political unity, and a real national spirit ; the same may be said of Scotland, after the accession of the Bruce, if not before ; but this is not, and never has been true of Ireland. Ireland has never yet been moulded into one political people, with a true national unity

That imperial system, that Cæsarism which proved the ruin of Rome, is historically of Asiatic origin, and would seem to owe its birth to Nemrod, a descendant of Cham, one of the three sons of Noah. We are informed in Genesis, that the sons of Cham were "Chus, and Mezraim, and Phuth, and Chanaan. . . . Now, Chus begot Nemrod; he began to be mighty on the earth, and he was a stout hunter before the Lord. . . . And the beginning of his kingdom was Babylon, and Arach, and Achad, and Channe, in the land of Sennaar. Out of that land came forth Assur [or he came forth from the land of Assur], and built Nineveh, and the streets of the city, and Chale, &c."* The system originating with Nemrod was established in Assyria, the first of the four great monarchies mentioned by the prophet Daniel. From the Assyrians it passed to the Medes and Persians, under Cyrus the Great; from the Medes and Persians it passed to the Macedonian Greeks, under Alexander the Great; and from the Macedonian Greeks it passed to the Romans, over whom it reigned in the West for five hundred years, till overthrown by the Germans, then the only living representatives of the Japetic civilization. Though overthrown in Western Europe, it was not absolutely annihilated. It survived in Constantinople till the Eastern Empire fell entirely into the hands of the Ottoman Turks. It came very near recovering its power under the German Cæsars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and has finally recovered its former glory in Russia, Austria, France, Spain, and Italy. It was not Celtic in its origin, or even Greek or Roman, and is now confined to no one family of nations. It finds itself as much at home in Sclavonic and Teutonic or Germanic nations, as in the so-called Latin nations. Austria is as despotic as France or Naples, and Spain or Portugal is as free as Prussia or Denmark. It, no more

and spirit, and this is the reason why in all their attempts at independence they have failed. But in this they show their kindred with the Germans. The Germans are and always have been, save for a time under the Frankish sovereigns, simply an agglomeration, not of clans, indeed, but of nations, rather than a single nation with a single national spirit. German unity remains to be created, for as yet it exists only in the song of the poet and the dream of the enthusiast. The German *Vaterland* must be made one: Europe demands it,

* Gen. x. 6. 11.

than religion itself, goes by races, and civilization is just as little a question of races as of Catholicity.

But these same Latin nations were at one time free nations, and the Germanic system was common to them and all the Teutonic nations. They were nearly all included within the States of Charlemagne, and each of them had its estates, its parliaments, its various checks on power, and an effective voice in the management of its own affairs. The Germanic order, though greatly weakened by Feudalism, which made every feudal lord in some sense a Cæsar, and terribly shaken by the efforts of monarchy to subdue the feudal nobility, still survived in some force in all the so-called Latin states till almost our own day, and was in fact wholly extinguished in none of them till the French Revolution of 1789 swept as a hurricane over Europe, toppling at once palace and castle, throne and altar. Notwithstanding the centralizing efforts of Richelieu and of Louis XIV. in France, Cardinal Ximenes and Philip II. in Spain, both France and Spain contained before the breaking out of that revolution the elements of the Germanic system, and either might have made them the basis of a free parliamentary state. Jacobinism and its armed soldier Napoleon I. have done much to efface them and to prepare the way for Cæsarism pure and simple; yet even in France, the most hopeless case of all, we believe there are still Germanic traditions not yet lost, sufficient, with wise and prudent management, to serve as a *point d'appui* for the reorganization of constitutional liberty. When these Latin nations were free states, under the Frankish constitution of Europe, they were as Celtic in their blood as they are now, and this fact proves that the theory that the Celt tends to social despotism and the Teuton to individual and national independence, is unfounded. It is true the Latin nations have in great measure lost their Germanic liberties, but this is equally true of the greater part of the Germanic nations themselves. It is clear, then, that we must seek the cause of this modern resuscitation and triumph of Cæsarism elsewhere than in the pretended Celtic blood of the so-called Latin nations.

This cause, a very respectable class of modern writers tell us, is to be found in Catholicity. Mr. Marsh and

writers of his class maintain that the Celtic nations are Catholic because they are despotic, and the Teutonic nations are Protestant because they are devoted to freedom. But this is not true, because some Teutonic nations are as despotic as any of the so-called Celtic or Latin nations, and because the Teutonic family is nearly equally divided between the two religions now, and was for centuries entirely Catholic. This is conceded by the other class of writers we allude to, who maintain that the Latin nations have lost their liberty because they have adhered to the Catholic Church, and the Teutonic nations have recovered their freedom through Protestantism. Hence they contend that Catholicity favors despotism and ought to be rejected, and Protestantism favors liberty and ought to be sustained. This is the pretence of the majority of English-speaking Protestants.

But the very facts we have adduced to prove that neither Catholicity nor the Roman despotism is Celtic, disprove also that the Latin nations are despotic because they are Catholic. The Latin nations were once, and for a long time, free nations, and were then, to say the least, as Catholic, as submissive to the Catholic Church, as they are now; and furthermore, several Protestant states are as despotic and allow their subjects as little political liberty as any Catholic state. Prussia, a state that owes its very birth and existence as a kingdom to Protestantism, was till within a very few years, if in fact it be not now, as pure a despotism as ever was imperial Rome. In addition to this, the non-Catholic or even Protestant states that really are free, date their freedom from Catholic times. The United States are simply an offshoot of England, to whom they owe the best part of their freedom, and English freedom dates from Anglo-Saxon times, when all the world was Catholic. Holland, or the Dutch Netherlands, was as free in the Middle Ages as now, and became Protestant only because Philip II., a Catholic indeed, but not the Church, wished to enslave them, in his insane attempt to make Catholicity his stepping-stone to universal monarchy. These facts prove that the despotism we complain of is due to some other cause than Catholicity, and that the liberty we find in some Protestant states is due to some other cause than Protestantism, for it is older than

Protestantism, and may be found in Catholic, as despotism may be found in Protestant states.

We concede that, at the present moment, the freest states in the world are not Catholic, and that the Catholic states are generally more or less despotic. But as these Catholic states were, when as Catholic as now, once free states, and as despotism exists in its greatest perfection in non-Catholic and even Protestant states, where nobody can pretend it was the product of Catholicity, and as the freest Protestant states were as free as now before they became Protestant, it is evident that liberty and despotism depend on causes operating alike in Catholic and in Protestant states, irrespective of the religion of either. The class of writers we allude to, fall into the old fallacy: *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. A sound philosophy of history ascribes neither the liberty found in some Protestant states to Protestantism, nor the despotism found in Catholic states to Catholicity, for neither is ever found inseparably connected with the other. Protestantism, regarded as a religion, has never favored liberty; but regarded as a political movement in behalf of the Germanic system threatened by the old Romanic Imperialism, it may have, and we think actually has had, in certain states, some influence in preserving the old liberties of the nation. Indeed, so strong was the centralizing tendency in the sixteenth century, in the Empires, France, and Spain, that without some political movement of the sort, the old liberties of every European state would have been lost. As a purely political movement Protestantism, we are willing to concede, was not wholly indefensible. Its error was in coupling the political movement really necessary, with a religious movement quite uncalled for; in supposing that to retain and defend the old Germanic civilization it was necessary to break the unity of faith and make war on the Pope, both as temporal sovereign of Rome, and as the spiritual head of Christendom. The Pope, both as the vicar of Jesus Christ and therefore the defender of religious liberty, and as temporal sovereign of a small state and therefore the natural defender of the rights, the freedom, and autonomy of states, was the natural chief, if they had but known it, of the Reform party, regarded as a political party. If they had rallied to him and sustained him against

the Kaiser, the kings of France, Spain, and England, they might have gained all they really cared for, without falling into schism or breaking the unity of faith. By not doing so, by directing their first and hardest blows against the Pope, both in his spiritual and temporal sovereignty, the reform party forced the Pope to throw himself on the protection of the great princes of the time, and to make with them such terms for religion as he could. Indirectly the Protestant movement, for a time at least, favoured Cæsarism everywhere; in Protestant countries, by giving to the Protestant princes supreme authority in spirituals, and in Catholic countries by compelling the Church to submit to the centralizing and despotic tendencies favored by the great princes who professed to adhere to her and to be her protectors. It thus made up a false issue before the world, and which has not even yet been corrected. So by coupling heresy and schism with its political aims, the Protestant movement has probably done more harm upon the whole to the Germanic order, than benefit by its assertion of the autonomy of nations, and must in point of fact be deplored even by those who take no interest in the religious question involved.

The most the facts in the case authorize any one to say is, that liberty has survived under Protestantism, and that Cæsarism has been able to revive under Catholicity; that there may be liberty under Protestantism, at least for a time, and that Catholicity is not of itself alone able to prevent the state that professes it from becoming despotic if it chooses; but we cannot say either that Protestantism as a religion favors liberty, or that Catholicity favors despotism or Cæsarism. If we argue that where Protestantism is there must be civil and political liberty, or that where Catholicity is there must be civil or political despotism, undeniable facts are against us. Tyranny may creep in, in spite of the Church, and liberty may, at least for a time, coexist with Protestantism. Still as Catholics it belongs to us to explain, in accordance with our doctrine, that the Church does not favor despotism, and is perfectly compatible with free institutions, nay, favorable to them, as most English-speaking Catholics at least maintain, in opposition to Louis Veuillot, and the late lamented Donoso Cortes, how it happens that nearly all, if not indeed all, the Catholic States of Europe have in fact lost their former liberties and fallen under real

or virtual Caesarism, that this fact can be explained without any reproach to our religion, or our Church, is certain, but that it can be without more or less reproach, of some sort, to Catholics, even churchmen as well as laymen, we are not prepared to assert, and are not called upon to maintain. Many Catholics seem to imagine that whatever is done by Catholics is Catholic, and to be defended as such, and all non-Catholics proceed on the assumption that every Catholic always does all that his Church requires, and never does anything but what she commands, or at least approves. We wish it was so, but so it is not; and we are under the necessity of distinguishing always between what the Church commands, imposes, or approves, and what individual Catholics do, even when not unsound in the faith, or neglectful of the precepts of their Church. We must make a distinction also, often neglected by Catholics, and always by non-Catholics, between the traditions of Catholics in matters pertaining to the supernatural order, and their traditions in matters that pertain solely to the natural order. In the former case, the uniform and constant opinions and practice of the faithful, even though supported by no express declaration of Scripture or positive definition of the Church, have great weight, and can seldom, if ever, be safely controverted; but in the latter case, Catholics and non-Catholics stand on the same footing, and the opinions and practices of the one have no more authority, and are entitled to no more respectful consideration, than those of the other; for in these matters the Church has received no special revelation, and the faithful, whether of the clergy or the laity, have no supernatural guide.

Let us understand, then, in the outset, that the Church was not instituted to provide society with a perfect civil and political organization, and that her mission is the spiritual, not the temporal government and discipline of mankind. Her mission is to evangelize, not civilize the world, any further than its evangelization necessarily involves its civilization. The Church has from God plenary authority to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, or the eternal and supernatural destiny of man; but she has not been instituted for the temporal government of natural society in relation to its natural and temporal ends. There are in the Catholic view two socie-

ties—natural society, propagated by natural generation; and supernatural society, propagated by the election of grace. The Church is the supernatural society, and operates solely in the supernatural sphere, or to a supernatural end. As the supernatural presupposes the natural, the Church has plenary authority over the natural, in relation to the supernatural end, but, for the same reason, she can have over it no authority in relation to natural ends. To give the Church plenary authority in the natural, in relation to purely natural ends, would be to absorb the natural in the supernatural, and to deny that the supernatural supposes the natural; or, as say the theologians, *gratia supponit naturam*.

Now, as civilization lies in the natural order, and has sole reference to the natural rights, powers, and ends of natural society, it does not, as civilization, fall within the province of the Church, and she, therefore, is not, and cannot be held responsible for it. The temporal government of the Ecclesiastical States by the Pope as temporal sovereign, and by ecclesiastics under him, is not government by the Church, and is as purely a temporal government, as purely within the order of natural society, as that of Louis Napoleon, or Francis Joseph. This has always been conceded, and Canonists have always held, that Catholic princes could declare war against the Pope as temporal prince, in like manner as against any other prince. Neither the Pope nor the Cardinals and prelates claim infallibility for the Pontifical government in the Ecclesiastical States, or that, as a temporal government, that government is not a purely human government, standing on the same footing as any other human government. If we may say this of the Pontifical temporal government, surely we may say as much of the authority of the Church in relation to the temporal order, and therefore to civilization, elsewhere. We do not forget what we have never ceased to assert, the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal, of the Church over the state; but this supremacy, as we have always maintained, is always spiritual, never temporal, for the state has no superior in its own order, in relation to purely temporal ends, or, as we say, the natural ends of natural society. Civilization, then, which has relation to purely natural or temporal ends, and is the proper work

of natural society, is not within the province of the Church, as supernatural society, and the traditions of Catholics, and the opinions and practices of the faithful, even of Popes and Bishops, in relation to it, stand on their own merits, and can never be cited as those of the Church, or as partaking of her authority. As a Catholic, I am under no special obligation to defend the temporal administration of the Papal Government in the States of the Church, and am as free as any Protestant, if I see reason for doing so, to censure the temporal policy of Cardinal Beaufort, Cardinal Ximenes, Cardinal Wolsey, Cardinal Richelieu, Cardinal de Retz, Cardinal Dubois, or even Cardinal Antonelli; and in my judgment, all these, even the last, may be accused of great political blunders. If we may say so much of churchmen,—some of them bishops and archbishops, we are not obliged to spare Catholic kings or kaisers. Henry II. of England, Charles of Anjou king of Naples, Philip the Fair, Henry IV., Louis XIV. of France, Maximilian I. and Charles V. of Germany, Philip II. of Spain, I may judge as freely and as independently as Elizabeth Tudor, James Stuart, or the late king of the Netherlands. As a Catholic, I am by no means bound to defend them, and am perfectly free to censure them as far as I think I have good reason to do so. In my judgment, Francis I. and Henry II. of France, to say nothing of Catherine of Medici and her profligate sons, were far inferior as sovereigns, to Henry VIII. and his daughter Elizabeth, of England; and I am not able to persuade myself that Isabella Segunda of Spain is a better Queen than Victoria of England. Count Cavour is no better than my Lord Palmerston, and the late Sardinian Parliament made no great show by the side of the English Parliament, or even the Congress of the United States.

This being understood, we can approach the question with entire freedom, and conclude at once that the Church is not implicated in the fact, unless she has officially enjoined or sanctioned Cæsarism, and made support of it a condition of salvation. This nobody can pretend she ever has done. She may require submission to Cæsarism, where it is dominant, as a less evil than revolution; she may also forbid her children, in their capacity of Catholics, or in her name, to undertake to revolutionize the state,

when it in fact leaves her free to pursue her supernatural mission; for her business is not, as we have seen, that of providing for the civil and political organization of natural society. But as she presupposes natural society, and demands the exercise of the natural virtues, the observance of natural justice by kings and rulers, she can abrogate no right of natural society, and absolve rulers from no duty or obligation imposed by the law of nature or by natural justice and equity. As despotism, since it is the government of power without justice, will without reason, is essentially repugnant to justice, she can never sanction it, or take away the natural right of society to resist it. The teaching of all her great doctrines is to this effect, and as it is only through her doctors she teaches, we may say that the Church herself does not favor despotism, but asserts principles which lie at the basis of all true liberty. The fact that Cæsarism prevails in Catholic states, then, must be explained so as not to implicate the Church, however much it may implicate Catholics, or even churchmen.

Furthermore, it is certain that the Church, as represented by her Sovereign Pontiffs, has always opposed the resuscitation of Cæsarism. The Popes have done it, both as temporal sovereigns, and as Vicars of Jesus Christ. As temporal sovereigns they have done it, and been obliged to do it, because Cæsarism is as much at war with their temporal power and independence as with the autonomy and freedom of nations. The Kaiser claimed to be Emperor of Rome, and supreme temporal sovereign of the whole earth. It was contended by him and his lawyers, well versed in the Theodosian and Justinian codes, or the Roman law, that St. Leo III., in raising Karl der Grosse, or Charlemagne, to the imperial dignity, as his coadjutor in the temporal government of the Ecclesiastical States, and armed defender of the Holy See, had revived the Western Empire and transferred it from the Romans to the Germans. This claim, which has no historical basis, and is really unfounded, the Popes had to resist, and in resisting it they necessarily resisted Cæsarism, and favored the Germanic constitution of Europe, under the Frankish Emperors, which, in our view of the case, was favoring liberty. The Kaiser also claimed, as heir of the Roman Cæsars,

the authority in spirituals which the Roman Cæsar had possessed in his quality of Pontifex Maximus, or rather he claimed full authority in the temporalities of the Church, denying to the Church the right to the government and management of her own temporal goods, or goods given to God, of whose rights she, not the state, is the divinely appointed guardian. In this the Kaiser struck the rights of the Church, and the Popes were obliged to oppose him not only in their capacity of temporal sovereigns of Rome, but in their capacity of Vicars of Jesus Christ, or Spiritual Head of the Church, the supernatural society. In defending this right, they defended in principle the right of property, and even vested rights, without which there is, and can be, no freedom or liberty in natural society. The Popes, and the Church in the Popes, therefore, did resist the resuscitation of Cæsarism, and favor liberty, by struggling to maintain the Germanic constitution of Europe.

But the Popes, we grant, failed, and after Boniface VIII., were no longer able to oppose an effectual barrier to the resuscitation of Pagan Rome in the political order; and whatever resistance the monarchs afterwards encountered, was the resistance offered by the feudal lords, in the defence of their own privileges. The Popes had maintained the struggle, upon the whole, successfully, save in the Byzantine Empire, from the seventh to the fourteenth century, the most glorious period in the history of the Church since the German conquest; but as has been shown in a previous number of the *Review*, they failed when Philip the Fair and his uncle of Naples, the false friend of the Pope, resumed the work abandoned by the German Kaiser. The French undid virtually all the Franks had done, and in proportion as the hegemony of Europe passed from the Empire to France and to French princes, the power of the Papacy to serve the cause of freedom was diminished. If the Franks were the best friends, history will warrant us in asserting, that the French have often been, with all their devotion to Catholicity, the worst enemies of the Papacy. It was the French princes on the throne of England that introduced and fostered anti-papal doctrines in that once thoroughly Catholic kingdom, and it was to no small extent French intrigue that lost it, and prevented its recovery to the Church. It is only in proportion as France is humbled,

that the Papacy recovers its freedom and independence. We know that there is much genuine Catholicity in France, and we know not where to look for Catholics equal to true French Catholics; as we know not where to find, upon the whole, so polished, so able, so amiable, so attractive, so charming a people as the French, whom one cannot dislike if he tries, and whom he must love and respect, even in spite of himself; and yet it cannot be denied that France stands at the head of the anti-Catholic world, and leads the anti-Catholic army now on foot. Her chief influence as a nation on surrounding nations is anti-Papal, nay, anti-Christian. "Paris," a distinguished French nobleman writes us, "is the centre and focus of the best and the worst influences of our day." It was French arms that prevented the Thirty Years' war from putting an end to Protestantism in Germany; it is French as well as Russian influence, that prevents the restoration of German unity, and the restoration of Catholicity throughout Germany, as it is French influence that, on the one hand, convulses all Europe with Jacobinism, and drives it, on the other, into Cæsarism as a refuge from anarchy.

But the causes that have tended to revive pagan Rome, not only in Catholic but also in non-Catholic Europe, and that have enabled the sovereigns to resist the Popes and to rivet Cæsarism on the greater part of the European States, are not very recondite or difficult to discover. The Roman system prevailed in the Eastern Empire till its downfall, and Russia naturally inherited it, as she received her religion and her civilization from Constantinople. In the West as well as in the East, the first political relations and associations the Church formed, after emerging from the catacombs, were with Roman Cæsarism. She had to adapt herself to the exigencies of a despotic state, and so much in her constitution and discipline as is human and dependent on time and place, was cast in the Roman mould. The civilization of the faithful was the Roman. The clergy even made their humanities in the imperial schools under pagan professors, and all secular literature in which both the clergy and the laity were trained, the manners, customs, and usages of society, all were Roman; and *Roman* and *Christian* became synonymous, as in Ireland and our country are *Irish* and *Catholic*. In adapting her canons

to the evil relations of her children, the Church adopted and incorporated the Roman law so far as applicable to her purpose. Naturally, the Christians of the Empire, then almost the only Christians in the world, accepted and carried with them Roman habits of thought, feeling, and action; in a word, the Roman civilization, the only civilization they knew. To them the German invaders were not only heretics or pagans, but they were barbarians, men without manners, without civilization; and in laboring to convert them to the true faith, they naturally and unconsciously labored to form them to the Roman civilization, which in their minds, and in their habits, was intimately associated with their religion. An Italian, Frenchman, Spaniard, German, Englishman, Irishman, or American, would act, and does act, on the same principle to-day, whether it is to the Catholic religion or the Protestant he wishes to convert an unbelieving and barbarian people.

Moreover, though conquered by the German invaders, the Western Empire did not all expire at once. In some sense it has never been absolutely dead. The conquerors had to a great extent served in the Imperial armies, and had become half Romanized. Roman art, science, and literature, were adopted and cultivated by the conquerors, as well as continued by the conquered, and have formed the basis of all liberal culture down to our own times. The first Germanic States formed within the limits of the Empire, were modelled after the Imperial Constitution. The Roman law was intimately blended with the canon law, and was, as it is to-day, if I may so speak, the civil law of the Ecclesiastical Courts. It remained always the law for the Roman people, whether in the city of Rome or in the provinces, after as before the conquest; and except perhaps in Lombardy, where a fusion between the conquered and the conquerors took place at a very early day, the Germanic laws governed only the Germanic or Barbarian population. By the twelfth century the Roman or civil law had become, in some sense, the law of all classes, not only within the States formed out of the Roman Empire, but even in the Germanic states, with the exception of England, outside of it, superseding the Carolinian Capitularies, and commencing a successful rivalry against the feudal law. To the continuance and final triumph of the Civil Law, or the old

Roman Law as finally perfected by Theodosius and Justinian, we may ascribe, more than to any thing else, the revival and subsequent predominance of the Roman order in Catholic and Germanic Europe. M. Savigny, a learned Prussian writer, a descendant from a French Huguenot family, in his learned and able work on the influence of the Civil Law during the Middle Ages, attributes to it no little of the progress of European Society since the Conquest. He maintains that its influence has been as salutary as great. But this is only because he finds in the Roman his ideal or standard of civilization, as do all the Civil lawyers, and the greater part of the European, and even American publicists.

We take no exception here to any of the provisions of the Civil Law or to the practice of the courts under it. It certainly embodies the best results of the jurisprudence of ages, and is admirable for its systematic unity and simplicity. To a logical mind it must appear immensely superior to the complications of Feudal Law, and even to our somewhat anomalous English Common Law. But to our minds its very systematic character, its strict logical unity and simplicity, are among its chief defects. In religion, which is divine and supernatural, and which is administered by a divinely assisted and protected court, logical unity and simplicity are in their place, are marks of truth, of divinity; but transferred to the constitution of the State and the civil code, where absolute truth and justice can never be expected, they are the worst of all tyrants. Our grand objection to the Civil Law is the principle from which it proceeds, which pervades it throughout, and to which it owes its unity and simplicity; the principle laid down by the old Roman jurist, and which we have often cited, namely, "*Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem.*" This maxim makes the prince a God, as the Roman Emperors claimed to be, in the temporal order, and presupposes absolute Cæsarism. Unlike the English or Common Law, the Civil Law emanates from the prince, and is held to be imposed by him on the nation, not accepted by him from the nation, and binding both ruler and ruled. Under the Civil Law only the prince is a freeman, under the Common Law the nation is free, and in its freedom all its members are freemen.

There is no doubt that the clergy have usually preferred the Civil to the Common Law, not because it is more favorable to despotism, but because it is the one they have most studied and the best known, and because having been the law of the first Christian Empire, it is that which best accords in the practice of the courts under it with the practice in the Ecclesiastical courts; but we think their preference for it has been a great mistake, and has had a bad effect on modern civilization, although we find no fault with it so far as it has been incorporated into the Canon Law. The clergy, true to the primitive or Semitic civilization, rely usually on moral and religious restraints on power, and therefore have seldom felt much interest in the purely political organization of society. Hence the despotic principle that pervades the Civil Law has escaped their attention, or been considered by them of little importance. It has sufficed for them that the greater part of its positive provisions are wise and just. It has never been in accordance with their habits of thought to seek, in the political constitution of the State, a limitation to the power of the prince; they have, indeed, always opposed arbitrary power, but they have considered that we should seek to temper and restrain it by the spiritual authority of the Church, and by appeals to the conscience of the sovereign.

In the primitive ages, under the patriarchal constitution of society, the power of the patriarch was absolute, but it was understood that its exercise would be so tempered by his affection as a father, and his conscience as a priest, that it would never or seldom be abused. As long as the love of the father, and the conscience of the priest, were sufficient to prevent the excesses of the kingly authority united with them in the same person, this order was good, and no doubt far better for mankind, than the Gentile or national organization which has succeeded it among the descendants of Japhet. But when the love of the father for his children, and his conscience as a priest, waxed feeble, and no longer sufficed to restrain the kingly authority, the patriarchal order became an intolerable burden, and the Semitic civilization had to give way to the Japetic, and Japhet has dwelt in the tents of Sem. So while men have a deep sense of religion, and kings, even in civil matters, listen with docility to the voice of the Church, the moral and religious limitation on authority

suffice to prevent Cæsar from greatly abusing his power. But even then they do not always suffice for wise and good government. The private virtues, even the heroic sanctity of the prince, cannot always suffice for that. Edward the Confessor of England was a good man, a great saint, but he was not a great king, and he left his kingdom in such a state, that it became an easy prey to the ambitious William of Normandy. St. Louis of France was a just and conscientious man, an eminent saint, but an indifferent king, and a worse general. It was for his sanctity as a Christian, not for his wisdom or greatness as a ruler, that Boniface VIII. canonized him; that is, the Pope canonized the man, not the sovereign. Even among the Popes, the most distinguished as temporal sovereigns have not always been those most eminent for their private virtues and personal sanctity. The private virtues, the truly Christian virtues in both prince and people, are certainly of great public importance, and the private vices of the monarch injure more than himself; but great eminence in the virtues essential to the salvation of the soul, does by no means necessarily secure eminence in the qualities essential to the statesman. The restraints of religion and morality, of the spiritual power, are indispensable, as has been proved over and over again in this Review; but the history of modern Europe proves that they are not alone sufficient; for, notwithstanding them, the Catholic nations have lost their Germanic constitution, and fallen under Cæsarism.

The mistake of the clergy, under the political point of view, has been, it strikes us, in relying on these restraints as sufficient, without any regard to the purely political organization of the state. Power will ordinarily run to abuse, if able. The prince who is restrained only by the spiritual power, finds himself practically not restrained at all. If he is prepared to say with Macbeth, if we can make sure of this world, we will jump the world to come, he can do very much as he pleases, for he can count usually on the support of the greater part of the national clergy in spite of Papal interdict or excommunication. A statute of *Præmunire*, as in England, will silence their opposition, and enable him, if necessary, when they have great wealth, to push them even to open schism and avowed heresy. Even in the legitimate discharge of their duty, the clergy, if not strictly

on their guard, may open the way for Cæsar. Their duty is to detach the faithful from the world, to wean their affections from earthly things, and to place them on things above, on the unseen and eternal. In proportion as they succeed, they render the faithful indifferent to this world and its government, and occasion the throwing of the administration of the state from the good into the hands of the worldly, the ambitious, who seek power, and care little for society and less for religion. These things explain why it is the clergy, engaged in saving souls, have not always been on their guard, or instant to put the people on their guard, against the defects of the civil law, the organization of the State, and the encroachments of power on the rights of society.

Although the Germanic constitution was in the main wise and good, it practically, as fixed by Charlemagne, left the central power too weak, and under the feeble princes who succeeded him, it tended to dissolution, and Germanism lapsed into feudalism, worse for the people as distinguished from the nobility than Cæsarism itself. The Franconian Emperors and the Hohenstaufen were wrong in warring against the Papacy and the free cities of Italy, but they were not wrong in seeking to strengthen the Imperial power. They were wrong in seeking to revive the Roman Empire, but religion, society, humanity required them and other lords paramount to aim to acquire power enough to bring the feudal nobility under the national authority; up to a certain point, centralism was a want of all the Germanic or Germanized States, for the original defect in the Germanic, as in the Celtic nations, was the want of unity, and an efficient central authority. But every system tends to become exclusive, and to reign alone. The reaction against feudalism and in favor of monarchy, aided by a just social sentiment, by the interests of both religion and humanity, and directed by the unity and simplicity of the old Roman Law, did not stop, and could not be stopped at its proper limits; but, like all reactions, continued till it had reached the opposite extreme. The law of action and reaction in the political, as in the physical world, is the same. Defect on the one side leads to excess on the other; the necessity of remedying the defect of Feudalism paved the way for the excess of Centralism.

The same result was also aided by the false principles adopted by the friends of republican liberty in the Middle Ages. As the Imperialist labored to revive imperial, these sought to revive republican Rome. The former labored to resuscitate the pagan Empire, the latter, the pagan Republic. Arnoldi da Brescia, Rienzi, the last of the Tribunes, and the Florentine Machiavelli, were political and very nearly religious pagans, and sought to re-establish an order which was repugnant to all the beliefs, usages, and habits of their time, and their failure only strengthened the hands of Imperial Centralism, just as the failure of Jacobinical Centralism in our day has resulted in the establishment of the imperial centralism of France and Austria.

These, in our view, are some of the causes which have permitted and aided the revival of the Romanic civil and political order in Catholic Europe. There is nothing in them that implicates the Church, or affects in the slightest degree her character as the supernatural society, although they may not sustain all the claims which some Catholics have made for her as natural society, which she is not, and has never professed to be. They prove that if she received the mission of civilizer, or of founding a perfect civil and political organization of society, and maintaining in the natural order, wise and perfect government, she has not fulfilled her mission; but that mission she did not receive. Her mission was wholly supernatural, in relation to the salvation of souls, or the supernatural destiny of man. This mission she has faithfully fulfilled, and in fulfilling it she has undoubtedly rendered immense services to civilization. The private virtues she has enjoined and cultivated, the humane sentiments she has inspired and fostered, the purity of life and manners she has required and enabled men of good will to live, have elevated the general tone of society, have softened the asperities of power, and saved the people from falling, even under the most galling Cæsarism in a Catholic nation, to that low moral, or even physical degradation, in which she found the populations of the old Roman empire; and as much as we detest Cæsarism, and as much as we are devoted to what is called self-government, we must have studied the condition of the people in modern society to no purpose if, upon the whole, the people in the most despotic Catholic State are not less unhappy,

and have not more pure and rational enjoyment than the people of Great Britain, or of our own great republic. The Church secures many compensating advantages for the loss of political liberty; and if, under Cæsarism, there could be any adequate guaranty of her freedom and independence, the condition of the people in the worst governed Catholic nations would not be altogether intolerable, providing the people could be persuaded to be contented with what they have, and not to crave what they have not. But we must take the world as we find it, and man as he is. Men cannot be forced to be happy in a way contrary to their own. A system which seeks to make men either virtuous or happy by repressing their natural aspirations and their natural faculties, will never succeed, and never ought to succeed, as we may certainly hold since the Church has condemned Jansenism as a heresy.

Man is never contented and ought not to be contented to remain for ever an infant, to be always in leading-strings, to be dressed out in bib and tucker, and fed with a spoon in the hands of the nurse. He would go alone, feel his own strength, and enjoy the play of his own faculties. The slave on a Southern plantation is often, as to his animal wants, better provided for, and has far less care and anxiety than the poor laborer at the North; but the poor laborer at the North, after all, is a man, feels that he is a man, and owns himself. "Massa," said his man John one day to a friend of ours, "I want you to price me." "Why, John, are you not well taken care of, kindly treated, well fed and clothed, and not overworked?" "Very true, massa; but you know a man wants to feel that he owns himself." The feeling belongs to all men, and instead of seeking to repress it, or to extinguish it, we should seek to govern men in accordance with it; that is, to govern them as men, as rational beings, not as flocks and herds. The government of men should be a moral government, recognizing and respecting the free-will, the rational nature of the governed, and resorting to force only in exceptional cases. Man is a rational animal, and being rational, he is a political animal: and that is an abnormal state of society which deprives him of all political functions, and leaves him no space to govern himself, and prove that he is a man. The clergy, engrossed with their spiritual duties, are perhaps prone to

think too little of this fact; and pious Catholics, rapt in sweet contemplation, feel not its importance; and hence, in spite of the Church, in spite of Catholicity, Cæsar possesses himself of this world, and eviscerates the people of their manhood. The faithful should be made to feel, that as our duties to God are for the most part payable to our neighbor, it is detracting nothing from their piety and devotion, to keep an eye on Cæsar, and to study so to organize the State, that the ruler shall find it difficult to abuse his power or to oppress the ruled. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and Quietism in the political order is as little enjoined by Catholics as Quietism in the religious order. The Japetic civilization is that alone which comports with the European families of nations. We cannot return to the Semitic if we would, and rely on moral power alone to secure political liberties; and we can never prosper under the Chamitic. The Japetic civilization may tend to make too little of moral power, but it demands liberty, it places the nation above the prince, and the man above the government. As true Conservatives we must retain this character of modern civilization. There is no reason in the world why Catholics should not study to organize free States, and earnestly defend them. And if they wish to maintain the freedom of the Church, recall the world to their religion, and provide for the true and orderly progress of society, they must do so.

ART. VI.—*The Roman Question.* By E. ABOUT. Translated from the French, by H. C. COAPE. New York, Appleton & Co. 1859. 12mo, pp. 219.

M. ABOUT must excuse us from entering into any serious examination of the very grave charges which, in his very flippant and disingenuous book, he brings against the Roman Government. His tone and manner are ill fitted to inspire confidence in either his judgment or his veracity, in both of which he appears to be more than ordinarily deficient. His charges can affect us only as we are interested in the cause of historical truth; to us as

Catholics, it is of no special consequence whether they are true or false. For the only argument deducible from them against our religion rests on the assumption, that we must hold the Pope has the same infallibility in his temporal government, that we claim for him when deciding *ex cathedra* a question of faith or morals. Every Catholic knows that this is not true; Catholics claim infallibility for the Pope or the Church not even in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs; certainly not, then, in matters of purely secular government.

The Roman States are the patrimony or possessions of the Holy See, and the Pope, as the incumbent of that See, governs them by a sacred and divine right. To attack his right to govern them is to attack the rights of the Church, and to incur the guilt of sacrilege. But the administration, whether by ecclesiastics or laymen, is human; just as human as the administration of any other government, and to be judged like every other, on its merits. In governing his estates in temporal matters, the Pope has, as any other sovereign, only human science and wisdom on which to rely. The special assistance of the Holy Ghost promised him as successor of Peter, is not granted him as temporal ruler, and is assistance only in the supernatural order; aids and protects him only as the visible head of the supernatural society. We can very consistently hold, that through that special supernatural assistance, he may be infallible in supernatural things, or in matters pertaining to our supernatural destiny; and yet that, in the natural order, in relation to natural ends, respecting which the Church has received no special revelation, he has the ordinary infirmities of our nature, and is not one whit wiser or better than other temporal princes.

For ourselves, we believe very little of what M. About or others say against the Roman government, and by no means all that some of our over-zealous friends say in its favor. We have no doubt that there are abuses under it, as there are abuses under every government, except the direct government of God; and we have just as little doubt that its administration is for the most part intelligent, humane, paternal, and does all for the people that an absolute government well can do. The Roman people, we apprehend,

have little reason to complain of the neglect or the tyranny of their government. The objection is, not that it does not do enough for them, but that it does not leave them to do enough for themselves. The great objection to the absolute governments of Europe is not that they tyrannize over their subjects, or do not seek to make them contented and happy. But it is in the power of no absolute government to make any people, not brutalized, either contented or happy. The more the absolute sovereign does for his people, the more he elevates them in the moral and intellectual scale, the more discontented and unhappy they become, because the stronger becomes their desire, and the less their freedom, to do for themselves. A grown man is unwilling to be treated always as a nursling; he would sometimes, at least, be trusted to himself, and be permitted to act spontaneously, from and for himself. The Roman government does all a government with its means can be expected to do for its subjects, but in the political order it permits them to do nothing for themselves, not even so much as to express in their own way, their honest opinions and wishes. It renders them a political nullity.

In former times, when the Pope was at the head of the political as well as religious world, the Roman States held a central position, were connected with the whole European system, and could take part in all the great events of the day. The Roman people had a career, scope for their activity, and opportunities of acquiring distinction. But since the political idea has supplanted the religious, and state policy usurped the province of the law of God; since the Pope, deprived of his political importance, has been reduced politically to a petty sovereign of a petty state, all this has been changed; the Roman people are no longer a leading people in the affairs of Europe; they have lost their career, and find their sphere of action circumscribed, and the avenues to distinction closed. This change in their condition they attribute chiefly to the sacerdotal and neutral character of their government, and they fret and chafe under it, and feel as the Israelites did when they came to Samuel and said, "Give us a king to judge us, as other nations have." In all this they may be very unwise, very wrong; and certainly we are far from believing that the change they seek will bring

them the blessings they expect; but so they do feel, and so they will feel, whatever the wisdom, justice, and paternal kindness of the Papal government, so long as they find themselves debarred from taking part in the stirring events of this age of action, and feel that they, the descendants of the conquerors and rulers of the world, are and can be nothing but Church vassals. Our Maguires and Nelligans may assign most excellent reasons to prove that they ought to be,—nay, that they really are, a contented and happy people in their present condition; but contented and happy they do not, and will not believe themselves till they acquire a political entity of their own. Perhaps then even less than now.

Much of the trouble the Roman government has with its subjects is caused by the interference of emissaries, conspirators, or disaffected persons from other Italian states, as well as from every nation in the world. Italy is the lost pleiad of the constellation of European states. She has been struck from the political firmament, and she and all the world have suffered in consequence. The Italian people feel it, and are ill at ease in a position which renders them politically null, or forces them to be idle and dissipated, to be dilettanti or conspirators; and are struggling in all manner of ways to effect the political and civil regeneration of their common country, and raise her, by union or federation, to the rank of a great Power. Europe suffers more than it is easy to say, by the loss of the Italian and Spanish Peninsulas from the number of great Powers. Their existence and rank as great Powers are essential to the proper working of the European political system. That system now lacks its balance, and runs not at all, or runs awry. All European statesmen of any name see and admit it, and no one more clearly or distinctly than the present Emperor of the French, whatever may be the policy he finds it convenient or necessary to adopt in order to secure his dynasty on the French throne. But the Italians, endowed with a rich nature and rare capacity as statesmen and warriors, see very well that to the elevation of Italy to her proper rank and influence, it is necessary to reorganize her as a state or as a union of states on liberal principles of government, and that this is impossible without a liberal constitution of the Roman

States. Italy without Rome is like the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out. Without Rome and the States of the Church, Italy can be united neither as a consolidated state nor as a confederation of states; and unless united as the one or the other, so as to act as a unit in all common and external interests and relations, as is the case with our American Federal Union, she will not be strong enough to free herself from foreign domination, and to maintain her autonomy and independence in face of her great military neighbors. The knot of the Italian question is, then, the Roman Question, and the solution of the difficulty depends very much on the policy of the Roman government.

This is the chief reason why the Roman States are filled with the disaffected of all nations, and especially with Italian patriots, real and simulated, from all parts of Italy, conspiring against the Papal government, and using all means, fair or foul, to change or modify the constitution and policy of that government, so as to render practicable the union of all Italy and the civil and political regeneration of the whole Italian people. The Roman government, in the hands of the reactionary party since the overthrow of the Mazzinian republic, a party that believes nothing in the modern spirit, and holds that concessions to what is called the Italian cause will do no good to Italy, and can result only in strengthening the hands of the enemies both of society and the Church, plants itself on its rights as an independent state, resists all changes in its constitution, and refuses to take part in the national movement. This maddens the more advanced and excitable patriots against the Papal government, as in their view anti-national; and some of them, forgetting to distinguish between the Sovereign of Rome and the Chief of the Spiritual Society, in which they are backed by the Jews and infidels of all Europe, by the Protestant Alliance of all nations, by Prussia, and the Palmerston-Russell ministry of Great Britain, extend their rage, as Gavazzi, to the Papacy itself, and wish to depose the Pope not only as temporal sovereign, but also as sovereign Pontiff. This is amply sufficient to explain the unmeasured declamations against the Papal government in which M. About's book, and the Anti-Popery press abound, and which we hear in the British Parliament and elsewhere, without supposing that the Papal adminis-

tration is peculiarly objectionable, or that the abuses under it are even as great as the abuses which every day take place under either the British administration or our own.

The ability of the Italians, with their excitable and vindictive temperament, their chronic divisions, and hereditary quarrels, to form and sustain a free and united Italy, is doubtful even with intelligent men who wish them well, and see and feel the deep want of such an Italy, both for herself and for European politics. But since the late war, undertaken ostensibly for Italian nationality and independence, and since both France and Austria have, in their Preliminaries of Peace signed at Villafranca, admitted the principle of Italian nationality, and pledged themselves to encourage an Italian Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope, they have offered them an opportunity to prove whether the world has judged them hastily or not, and we permit ourselves to indulge the hope, that they will create an Italy capable of sufficing for herself. Both France and Austria would find an independent Italy, able to maintain herself in the rank of a first class Power, for their respective interests; and a free and liberal Italy, representing in Catholic Europe true constitutional liberty, would be of great advantage to the Church, for it would unite, in one Catholic country at least, the living civilization of the day with the only living religion there is or can be in the world. If France and Austria are really agreed on an Italian policy as great Catholic Powers, and really mean to aid in carrying out the principles they avow, the Italian people can now, if the thing is in them, enable us to see a real Italian nation under an independent and efficient though liberal government, and an end put once for all to these ever-renewed abortive Italian conspiracies, and the unceasing clamors of Italian refugees and exiles, which serve only to disturb the peace of the world. It is possible that we have underrated the capacity of the Italians for self-government, and it is also possible that they have really profited by their misfortunes, and are far better prepared for the part Italy ought to play in the world than heretofore, or than is commonly believed.

The solution of the Italian question, it seems to be agreed on all hands, must be a Confederation of the several Italian States as free and independent states. The

union of all Italy in a unitarian or centralized democratic state, with its capital at Rome, and the people both temporarily and spiritually installed in the place of the Pope, as dreamed of by the Mazzinians, is both impracticable and impious; its union in a single monarchical state under the house of Savoy, no more Italian than the house of Hapsburg, as contemplated by Count Cavour, more Piedmontese than Italian, is also impracticable. It would be alike incompatible with the Pope's temporal sovereignty of the Roman States and the independence of the Church; it would, also, never be assented to by either France or Austria; and it is not improbable that one of the reasons that induced Napoleon to make peace, when and on the terms he did, was that he saw he could not longer continue the war without permitting the Count to carry out that policy, and thus make Sardinia a state too powerful for the interests, if not ultimately for the safety of France. The Italians are equal, if not superior, in military capacity to the French, and Italy with Savoy has elements of strength, if ably combined and fully developed, that might cope successfully with the power of modern as well as of ancient Gaul. The union of the several States, some absolute, some constitutional, in a Confederation under the mere honorary presidency of the Pope, would be no real union at all. It would lack efficiency and strength, and tend only to perpetuate the old disunion, and to generate new quarrels. A Confederation of even constitutional States, the Pope being deprived of his temporal power, the plan suggested and not unlikely to be insisted on by the Palmerston-Russell ministry, backed up perhaps by Prussia and Russia, would fail, because the Pope must retain his *status* and independence as a sovereign. Divine Providence will take care of that. The confederation of the governments only, like that illusory thing called the German Bund, and which seems to be all that France and Austria at present contemplate, will answer only as a provisional organization. If the Confederation is to be anything more than a sham, if it is to be really effective, and to elevate Italy to the rank of a great Power in the European family of nations, it must be a Federal Union of the people of the several Italian States, like our own, or that of Switzerland; with a strong and efficient Federal government, elective, under the

perpetual presidency or moderatorship of the Pope, by Federal representatives, in one house at least, chosen by the people of each State, not simply of representatives appointed by the governments. The several States must be each organized on monarchical principles, with a large infusion of the democratic element persistently active in the administration; for the people of Italy are monarchical and democratic, rather than oligarchical or aristocratic. If neither the Italian people nor France and Austria are prepared for such an organization of Italy, as the definitive settlement of the Italian question, it is idle to talk of the civil and political regeneration of the peninsula, or the elevation of Italy to the rank of a great Power with which European politics must count.

Many in Italy and out of Italy, think such an organization incompatible with the spiritual position and functions of the Pope; and one party, therefore, cry out against the Papacy, and another against the proposed organization. But we see no incompatibility of the kind alleged. The Holy Father may judge, that, under given circumstances, the interests both of religion and society require of him the neutral policy for a long time adopted by the Sovereign Pontiffs; but the pretence that the Pope cannot, as temporal sovereign, have an Italian policy without prejudice to his functions as Father of the faithful, is by no means admissible. All through the Middle Ages, the Popes had an Italian policy, were eminently national, and the acknowledged head of the national party; and in spite of the German Kaisers, and the Ghibelline princes and nobles, they maintained the Italian cause, till Charles of Anjou perverted and betrayed the national party, and Philip the Fair threw the whole weight of France into the scale of the foreign party. Even after their return from the Babylonian captivity, or residence at Avignon, the Popes resumed their Italian policy, and maintained it with more or less success till the changes in the routes of commerce had diminished the relative greatness and power of the Italian Republics, especially Venice and Genoa, and the growth and consolidation of the great military States of modern Europe had changed the whole system of European politics. In none of those ages do they seem to have considered it incompatible with their spiritual functions to

have an Italian policy, and to defend against both foreign and domestic enemies the independence, the rights, and the interests of the nation in which they have their See.

Pius IX., now happily reigning, seems also to have had no doubt on this subject. On acceding to the Papal throne in 1846, he saw that the interests of the Church and of society suffered from the condition in which he found the Ecclesiastical States, and the people of Italy generally; and he inaugurated his reign by adopting, generously and bravely, a policy which promised the independence of the peninsula, and the civil and political regeneration of all Italy. It is true, he refused to join in the war waged by Charles Albert—who aspired to be the sword of Italy—against Austria, although Austria had actually invaded his dominions without his consent; but he evidently did it, not because he had doubts of his right as sovereign of Rome to join in a national war, if he judged proper, but because he doubted, under the circumstances, the expediency of doing so. He knew his predecessor, Alexander III., had not scrupled to head the League of the Lombard Cities against Frederic Barbarossa, and that Julius II. had not thought it incompatible with his duty as Supreme Pontiff, to head himself in person his troops against the French invaders of Italy, and to do his best to hurl them back over the Alps into their own country. The pretence that the Pope as Sovereign of Rome cannot be Italian, and consult the true interests of the peninsula, if necessary, has no historical foundation. The Roman States are only a part of the Italian nation, not isolated from the rest, or a complete nation in themselves; and as the Pope has and must have, as temporal sovereign, all the rights and powers of any other temporal sovereign, we should like to know by what law, human or divine, he is forbidden to govern his subjects in relation to their best interests, not merely as distinguished from, but as united with, and forming an integral part of, the whole Italian people?

Whether the Pope judged wisely or unwisely in refusing to let his States join in the war against Austria, waged in 1848 by Charles Albert, ostensibly for the independence of Italy, it is not for us to say; although the policy of revolution and annexation favored by that prince was not less to be dreaded than Austrian domination; but this much we

know, he had an Italian policy, and that he favored the reorganization of the Italian States on constitutional and liberal principles. He therefore gave, *motu proprio*, liberal institutions to his own States, worthy to serve as a model for all the States of the peninsula, and proved himself willing to give his people a share in the political power and in the administration of the government. But, unhappily, the time was inopportune; the revolutionary fever had run too long, and had become too high throughout Europe for his concessions to do more for the moment than to diminish slightly its force. On the heels of his concessions, before he had time to consolidate anything, the revolution in France broke out, speedily followed by a like revolution in almost every Continental capital, giving to the Red Republicans, those worthy successors of the old French Jacobins, —then banded together in secret societies, and terrible by their secrecy—so great an accession of force and fury, that, opposed as he was by the princes, and by the whole anti-constitutional party, who regard innovation in politics, unless in the sense of Cæsarism, with as much horror as innovations in faith, he was unable to maintain his ground. The revolutionists, aided by the secret wishes of more than one Machiavellian prince, by the leading Protestant Powers, the Protestant Alliance, and the whole anti-Popery party throughout the world, who thought the time had come to make an end of the Papacy, were able to pervert his liberal intentions, to turn his constitution against the interests of religion and society, to drive himself, like so many of his glorious predecessors, into exile, and to erect in his capital the miserable Triumvirate, misnamed the Roman Republic. Men of firm nerves and decided liberal tendencies were alarmed for society, joined with their whole souls in the reactionary movement, welcomed the successes of Austria in repelling Charles Albert and suppressing the formidable Hungarian Insurrection, and were not sorry to see the Roman Government returning to the policy pursued before the accession of the present Sovereign. But we do not think the failure of 1848 should induce any one to despair of the future success of constitutional and representative government in the States of the Church, for that failure evidently was owing to a combination of untoward circumstances, which does not exist to-day, and is not likely to occur again,—at least, not for a long time to come.

No doubt there are, and always will be, practical difficulties in the way of constitutionalism in the Roman States, but we see *only* practical difficulties, and these do not seem to us enhanced by the fact that their sovereign is the divinely instituted Chief of the Spiritual Society. We can see no difficulty of principle. The sovereign has all the freedom of action that he would have were he only a temporal sovereign. The Roman States were given to the Church, as property is every day given to her by the faithful, and the Pope holds his right to govern them by a title than which none can be firmer or more sacred. But the people of these States are not the property of the Church, and it does not follow that she has a right to govern them as property, because she has by divine constitution the right to manage her own property, and to govern her own temporalities. Constantine, Pepin, Charlemagne, the Countess Mathilda, could give the Church all they possessed, and when given, she would hold it by divine right, as the right of God, of which she is the guardian; but they could not give her the Roman people as property, for they never themselves held them as property. All they could give was what they themselves had, the right of sovereignty, that is, the right to govern them as people, as men, as free moral agents. This, also, is all the right the Church could acquire, if she assumed the government of these States from necessity or charity, because she found them abandoned by their legitimate sovereigns, and in need of a governor, and, above all, of a protector. She could in that way acquire only the ordinary rights of temporal sovereignty. However absolute under God, in the spiritual order, by divine constitution and the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost, given him as the successor of Peter, may be the authority of the Pope,—in the natural order, as temporal sovereign, he has only the rights of temporal sovereignty in general, and holds his right to govern subject to all the limitations and conditions imposed by natural justice or the natural rights of man and society.

The right of the temporal sovereign is the right to govern his subjects according to their nature, for their common good. But as these subjects are men, his right is to govern them as men, and only as men. Men are rational beings, endowed with a political nature and political facul-

ties. The sovereign must govern them as such, not as brute things, or irrational animals, which man may possess in full right of property. He may govern man's political nature, and regulate the exercise of his political faculties, but has no right to suppress either. We must say this, or assert Cæsarism, and deny that power is a trust held for the public good, and go against the uniform teachings of the great doctors of the Church, and the express declarations of the most eminent Pontiffs that have ever sat in the chair of Peter. The Pope, then, as temporal sovereign, can no more be Cæsar than Cæsar can be Pope, and we can no more defend Cæsarism in the States of the Church than in the States of France, Austria, or Russia. The Church submits to Cæsarism where a change is impracticable, and the people are neither able nor disposed to sustain free institutions, but we have found no instance of her approving it, or declaring it in accordance with natural right or justice.

Assuming, then, that the rights of the sovereign of the Roman States, though originating in the fact of his being Pope, do not derive from his spiritual sovereignty, and are precisely what they would be were he not chief of the Spiritual Society, and that the rights of the Roman people are precisely what they would be, neither more nor less, in case their sovereign held no spiritual jurisdiction; we can see no reason, if desirable and practicable, why the Pope should not concede his temporal subjects a constitution, and govern them, not as an absolute, but as constitutional monarch. His subjects are shorn of none of their natural liberty by his spiritual prerogatives, for the supernatural supposes the natural. He holds his estates, it is true, in trust for the Church, and must by the very nature of his office administer them for the interests of religion, of which he alone is supreme judge; but he, as temporal sovereign, holds them as a trust for the people, and is bound, like every temporal sovereign, to administer them for their common good, of which they are judges with him, since they are rational beings, and since that good is in the temporal order, and in respect to which the Church does not claim to have received any special supernatural revelation. If the interests of religion in his judgment imperatively demand it, the Pope can alienate his temporal

sovereignty as he can alienate or condone any other species of Church property: and if, in his judgment and that of his subjects, a constitutional or representative government will be for the public good, he can concede such government, and recognize the right of the people to share, through representatives chosen by themselves, in the administration. Of course such government cannot be extorted from him by force, for that would be sacrilege, and to be legal it must be a concession made, as the Papal documents say, *motu proprio*. This conclusion is logical, and follows from the principles of temporal sovereignty recognized by the Church herself; it is in accordance with what our Holy Father did in 1848, and with the well-known fact, that formerly the provinces and municipalities of the Papal States did, in all local matters, govern themselves, subject only to the approbation of the Pope as superior authority.

We have good reasons for believing that the Holy Father has not changed his views as to the proper constitution of his States, and that he is ready whenever circumstances permit, to renew the policy with which he inaugurated his Pontificate, and which has been in abeyance since 1850. But, if the results of the recent bloody war are to correspond at all to what is pretended, if we may place any reliance on the professions and pledges of the peace of Villafranca, the chief obstacles he has hitherto had to contend against are removed, and that policy is now practicable. Whether it will in fact prove to be so, is more than we can pretend to say. The present English Whig ministry will oppose it, because placed in power by Catholic votes; and pretty secure of the Catholic constituencies of Ireland, they must, in order to secure the support of the Wesleyans and Evangelicals, oppose, or at least make a show of opposing, everything likely to be useful to Catholicity in countries nominally or truly Catholic. Sardinia will reluctantly favor any measure likely to preserve the temporal power of the Pope, or make peace between the Holy Father and his Roman subjects, because she at present is angry with the Pope, and wishes all Italy to become Sardinian as all Greece became Macedonian. But if France and Austria are really determined to sustain the Holy Father, and to favor and protect the civil and political regeneration of Italy, the opposition of these will have to give way.

In the loyal intentions and good faith of the Emperor of Austria we have full confidence, and if he has really come to the conclusion that the peninsula may be more useful to Austria as a strong and powerful ally, as a protection for her rear against France, than as a possession or dependency, which we hold to be the fact, he will do all in his power to create and sustain an independent and united Italy. We have less confidence in that man of surprises, who for the present rules the destinies of France and sports with the peace of Europe. But we think he is too solemnly engaged—and it is evidently for his interests to keep his engagement—for him to desert the cause for which he professed to wage war. France, like Austria, is stronger with a free, independent, and powerful Italy as an ally, than with Italy as a possession or a dependency. Moreover, if the Emperor of the French now fails to sustain the cause of Italian independence and union, he gives Francis Joseph the chance to exchange parts with him, to make himself the champion of a free, independent, united, and powerful Italy, and thus transfer the regards of the Italians from France to Austria. It is as much for the interests of Francis Joseph to strengthen Italy as a barrier for Austria against France, become a great maritime power, as it is for Napoleon to strengthen Italy as a barrier for France against Austria. Italy should serve the same office between France and Austria that Germany does between France and Russia. Napoleon has shown judgment and tact in making peace at the opportune moment. Let us hope that in regard to Italy he will prove himself a real statesman, and justify the admiration of his friends.

At the time we write, the definitive treaty of peace, if signed, has not reached us. We necessarily, therefore, write in the dark as to many things, but the most we have said is of a general nature, and will remain unaffected by the treaty, whatever its terms. We have strong Italian sympathies, but we have not full confidence in the Italian people and movements in our day. We hope, however, that some progress has been made by recent events in settling the Italian question, and we are sure the peace of Europe and the interests of the Church require that it should be settled. The Emperor of the French is an able man, and quite too much for his brother sovereigns. He

does not seem to us anxious to bring any question to a final settlement, except that of permanently settling his dynasty on the throne of France, and keeping France in a condition to make war with, or without reason, on any European Power when it pleases her sovereign. He is now creating an occasion for interference in Germany, in hopes of being made protector of the small German States, and it will not surprise us, if, instead of deposing the Pope, as he intended, he makes the efforts of Lord John Russell to strip the Pope of his temporal power, one of his pretexts for avenging Waterloo on Great Britain.

LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

ART. VII.—1. *The Book of Job and the Prophets. Translated from the Vulgate, and diligently compared with the Original Text; being a revised Edition of the Douay Version, with Notes Critical and Explanatory.* By FRANCIS PATRICK KENRICK, Archbishop of Baltimore. Baltimore: Kelly, Hedian & Piet. 1859. 8vo. 799 pp.

THE Author, in this and his preceding volumes, embracing the whole New Testament, and a very considerable part of the Old Testament, has proposed to himself only a revised and corrected edition, with critical and Explanatory Notes, of the Douay Bible, not by any means a new translation of the Holy Scriptures, either from the Vulgate or the original Hebrew and Greek text. As a revised and corrected edition of the Douay version, it is well done, and all that could be asked; and we have no hesitation in giving it as our opinion that, as far as completed, it should be adopted in every new edition of the Douay Bible. The Archbishop has corrected numerous errors of the press that had crept into the ordinary editions, supplied their many omissions, restored various renderings of the Douay translation exchanged for less felicitous renderings by modern editors, and added some new renderings of his own of very great value. This edition, as far as completed, is in general far superior to our ordinary editions of the Douay Bible, and if we are not to have a wholly new translation, should be adopted as the standard English text.

But we suppose no one would be more ready to agree with us than the learned Prelate himself, that the Douay version, even as he has revised and amended it, is not precisely what is demanded. That version, made before that authorized by King James, was made under many disadvantages, by men exiled from their native land, living in a foreign country, and more in the habit of expressing their thoughts and feelings in foreign idioms than in their native tongue. This version was in the main, accurate, but it bristled with foreign terms, idioms, or forms of expression, by no means pleasant to English taste, or intelligible even

to the ordinary Englishman, acquainted with no language but his own. Its influence on English Catholic literature has not been wholesome, and has separated it much further from the current literature of the language than is necessary in order to preserve purity of doctrine, and to edify the faithful. The ordinary editions of the Douay Bible, which are now issued by our publishers, have, by successive editors, been relieved of some of the Latin forms of expression and terms which marred the beauty of the original edition; but they still retain too many of them, and are inferior to that in vivacity, energy, and power. The excellent Bishop Challoner, a holy man, and one who, during his long life, rendered valuable services to the English-speaking Catholic world, seems, in his revision of the Douay version, and which is in the main what is now published as the Douay Bible, to have done all that mortal man could do to render it spiritless, tame, and feeble. Archbishop Kenrick is repairing much of the literary mischief he did, but he has not repaired it all; and a good English translation of the Holy Scriptures, conforming in all doctrinal matters to the Vulgate, and embodying the latest results of Biblical studies, we think, is still a desideratum.

Dr. Newman, it is understood, has undertaken to supply such a translation, and has, we are told, already collected the necessary materials for prosecuting it. If the habits, associations, and prejudices of the existing generation of English-speaking Catholics be not insuperable obstacles, we would urge the learned divine and consummate English scholar to take the version made by order of King James as the basis of his proposed version, instead of adopting the Douay, or making an entirely new translation. The Protestant version has two classes of faults, the one, the errors of the original Hebrew and Greek text from which it was made, and the other, the errors of the translators themselves, sometimes unintentional, and sometimes evidently intentional, for the purpose of making the Holy Scriptures appear to favor Protestantism. It is agreed on all hands by the learned, that the Received Text from which it was made is not pure and authentic, and that in most cases, where it differs from the Vulgate, the Vulgate is the better authority. For Catholics the Vulgate, in all matters bearing on doctrine, or in all controversies touching faith or morals, is authoritative, declared to be so by the Council of Trent. Let the readings of the text adopted by the Protestant translators be corrected in all such matters by the Vulgate, and in all other matters by the best Biblical criticism, and let their own errors, whether voluntary or involuntary, be amended, and we shall have, probably, the best representation of the Holy Scriptures in our mother tongue that we can ever hope to obtain. What we propose is, not that we adopt the Protestant version bodily, but simply that it be made the basis of an amended version, and departed from only for some reason,—doctrinal, philological, scientific, or critical reason of some sort. There is nothing in the decree of the Council of Trent, that requires our English translations to be made from the Vulgate, or that in matters not involving doctrine, that even requires us to follow it, providing Biblical criticism, the testimony of recensions and manuscripts, &c., authorize a different reading; and a translation made directly from the original tongues into English will always be fresher, and represent the sense with its delicate shades far

better, than a translation made from them through the Latin. This is especially true in relation to translations from the Hebrew, which has far more affinity with the English than it has with the Latin tongue, further removed than other of the Indo-Germanic languages from the Semitic. The Protestant version was not only made at a time when the English tongue was in its best stage of development, but by men who thoroughly understood it, and fully appreciated its capabilities. In a literary point of view it cannot be surpassed or even equalled, and it is hardly possible for one who is not familiar with it to appreciate all the beauties of English literature, or even to write the English tongue like a native. Most of our Catholic English literature has, at least to one not brought up a Catholic, something of a foreign air, lacks the peculiar graces of the English idiom, that home character which is one of its greatest charms. We do not think, moreover, a translation, taking the Protestant version as its basis, conformed to the Vulgate, and made with taste and judgment, would find any great difficulty in gradually becoming acceptable to all English-speaking Catholics, or, with a large body of Protestants, even in superseding the Protestant Bible. It would prepare the way for introducing a common version; or the use of the same version by both Catholics and Protestants; for the learned of all denominations are pretty well agreed that the Vulgate is, upon the whole, the most authentic representation of the Autographs that we have or can expect to have.

Archbishop Kenrick has introduced a change in the mode of spelling Hebrew proper names, which we like very much. Instead of writing *Isaias*, *Jeremias*, &c., with the hissing Greek termination, he writes *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, &c., with the soft Hebrew termination. We think he might advantageously carry the change further and conform all Hebrew proper names as near as possible to the Hebrew orthography and pronunciation. We know no reason why we should write *Amalecites* instead of *Amalekites*, or *Habacuc* instead of *Habakkuk*, *Noe* instead of *Noah*, or *Melchisedech* instead of *Melchizedek*. These are small matters, but they create unnecessary trouble for the convert. It can hardly be essential to one's orthodoxy to follow the orthography, as to proper names, of the Vulgate; and as Protestants have given the form and coloring to our English language, it seems to us good policy, and, in fact, a sort of literary duty, to conform to them, when nothing in faith or morals or piety requires us to depart from their usage, as in Latin we conform, or try to conform, to classical usage, wherever our religion permits. The classical writers of our language are Protestant writers, as the classical writers of Latin and Greek were Pagan or Gentile writers. The Catholic who aims to be classical will follow the usage of the Protestant authors, where his religion does not require him to depart from it. We know that it is sometimes pretended that the more eminent of our classical authors have been Catholics, as Shakspeare, Crashaw, Dryden, and Pope; but we are by no means satisfied that Shakspeare was a Catholic; the evidence is not very strong, and is rendered very weak by his classing the Papist and the Puritan together, and ridiculing both. Dryden was a convert, and had been educated as a Protestant; Pope was only a sorry Catholic. But all these men wrote the language according to the usage of their times,

and they departed from that usage not by introducing Catholic phraseology, but, so far as they departed at all, by development. Our language, of course, was originally formed under Catholic influences, but it has, since the Reformation, been developed and brought to its present state under Protestant influences, and we Catholics who write it to-day must take it as those influences have fixed it. None of us who do not make ourselves familiar with the general literature of the language, which certainly is not Catholic, can write classical English, know the resources of our mother tongue, or write it with its natural freedom and ease, its native vigor, or its idiomatic graces. Most of our Catholic writers educated abroad and in a foreign tongue, even when they write our language with purity and propriety, rarely write it as their mother tongue. Their thoughts flow in Latin or French channels, and have a perpetual tendency to clothe themselves in Latin or French forms. Indeed, French literature exerts too much influence on all our writers, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, and nothing does so much to keep our literature English, and prevent its total corruption, as the Protestant version of the Scriptures. Its assiduous study is a great preservative against French influences, and also against the German influence, which recently has done so much to destroy the naturalness, simplicity, and perspicuity of English style.

The part of the Archbishop's work which we prize the most are his critical and explanatory Notes. His natural modesty prevents him from making many suggestions of his own, and we will not say that he has made many absolutely new contributions to Biblical criticism and exegesis, but he proves that he is familiar with the most advanced results of Biblical science, and his Notes, though brief, always throw light on the text, and aid in understanding its literal and sometimes its mystical sense. They show an immense amount of Biblical erudition, and that very little of what is known that can throw light on the sacred text has escaped his attention. His revised and corrected edition of the whole Bible, annotated as are the portions already published, will be highly valuable, and will create, we hope, among our Catholic students, a race of real Biblical scholars. It is true, we know what is our faith from the teaching of the Church, and could know it and be good Christians without reading or being able to read the Holy Scriptures at all; but there is very little in our faith not explicitly or implicitly contained in the Inspired Volume, and he who would have a strong faith, a robust piety, a piety founded in principle, not in mere sentiment, must read and meditate it daily. The abuse which sectaries have made of the Bible, and their principle of private interpretation, has, we fear, in some instances, led to a partial neglect of the sacred pages. The sectaries have not exaggerated the value of the Sacred Volume, or insisted too strenuously on the importance of reading, nay, thoroughly studying it. Their error has been in opposing it to the Church, or in contending that it is sufficient without her teaching, and that private reason, or private illumination, suffices for understanding it. But avoiding their error, reading it with a devout spirit, in submission to the authoritative teaching of the Church, we cannot read it too much, or meditate it too often, or too profoundly. It is God himself speaking to us; and, read with humility and reverence,

his spirit will illumine our understandings, as well as warm our hearts and fire our love. It is the best of all spiritual reading, and will do far more to enlighten and edify, to elevate and strengthen the soul for the battle of life, than the weak, watery, sentimental, little devotional books now poured in upon us from France and Italy. It was the study of the Holy Scriptures, constant reading and meditating the sacred text, that made the great Doctors and Saints of the early ages—the Basils, the Chrysostoms, the Gregories, the Jeromes, the Augustines; and by following their example, we may even in our day rise to their level, for we are placed in circumstances not unlike theirs, and have as fierce struggles and as deadly battles to wage for the faith as they had.

2. *The Suspense of Faith. An Address to the Alumni of the Divinity School of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., given July 19, 1859.* By Henry W. Bellows. New York: Francis & Co., 1859. 8vo., pp. 44.

THIS very able and striking address seems to have made a deep impression upon the public mind, and has been commented on very freely both by Catholics and non-Catholics. The high personal character of the author, and his social position and influence, give it more than ordinary importance, and force all fair-minded and earnest Protestants to listen to it with interest and respect. We have read it with attention, but without surprise, for we have always regarded the author as a sincere and earnest lover of truth, honest in his convictions, and brave and manly enough not to shrink from their free and frank avowal. The address accords with the promise of the author's youth, and proves that he will not belie the expectations of those who warmly loved him in his college days, and with great joy saw him enter the Unitarian ministry. He was a good scholar, and is a learned man, who masters his learning, and is not crushed under the weight of his erudition. He reads, he observes, he thinks, he reflects and speaks. No man better knows the tendencies of the age in which he lives, for he has observed them, studied them, felt them, and interprets them by his own conscious experience. The description he gives of these tendencies is faithful and finished. Not a word needs to be added; not a word to be retrenched. No one who knows the age, and sees whither, so far as it is not Catholic, it is tending, can gainsay a single statement the author has made.

Dr. Bellows understands Protestantism,—few Protestants understand it better or so well. He sees that the Unitarian body is but the advanced guard of the Protestant world, and that its tendencies are the real logical tendencies of Protestantism itself, and the end they indicate is the end to which the whole Protestant movement, in so far as pushed to its logical consequences, does and must tend. These tendencies he sees, and with a manly courage avows, are away from God, faith, worship, towards no religion or *un-religion*, in which, if pushed to their logical term, they must ultimately end. They have been pushed very far, and the present state of the Protestant world is that of a suspense of faith,

which, in our view, asserts the total failure of Protestantism as a religion. Yet it must not be supposed that the learned author, and they who among Unitarians, or other denominations, agree with him in arriving at this conclusion, have risen out of the Protestant sphere, or above the humanitarian circle in which they confess all Protestantism revolves. They have arrived at a certain consciousness of their actual position, of the tendencies they have been following, and the end they must reach, if they continue on. They have come to a pause, to a suspense of faith, not to a positive denial or a positive affirmation. They can, in the language of Carlyle, pronounce neither the "everlasting Nay," nor "the everlasting Yea." The author gives no evidence that he has as yet attained even to the belief that faith is necessary to the eternal salvation of the soul, or to a distrust of Protestantism in its influence on the destiny of the soul in the world to come. His faith in the sufficiency of Protestantism to save religion, morality, good order, and to secure the virtue and happiness of men in this world, is indeed suspended. The future of religion, society, humanity, troubles him, but we cannot discover that he has any misgivings as to the future of the individual soul, or that he thinks that this suspense of faith, which he establishes as a fact of the non-Catholic world, may have an unfavorable effect on the condition of the soul in the world to come. He does not appear to have reflected that without faith it is impossible to please God, and that they who do not please God, displease him, and cannot be happy with him.

The author's Protestantism is evident from his seeking always for religion a subjective basis. It is man, not God, he consults. He suspends his faith in Protestantism, because it leads from God, and does not meet the need of the soul to worship. To worship is a want of the soul, and that want Protestantism, taken strictly, cannot supply. Protestantism can give only self-culture. This is no doubt true. What, then, shall they who see and feel it do? Go back to the Catholic Church? Some of the best heads in Christendom, it is conceded, have done so, and the author honors their courage, and values the testimony they have given to the worth of the fundamental idea of Catholicity. But Catholicity, however indispensable the mission it had to perform in its day, and however great and essential the portion of truth it still holds, is virtually dead, dead at least to the age, which goes on without or against it. The Catholic Church unites man to God through the assertion of God's condescension to man, but loses by the exclusiveness of her view man in God, as Protestantism by asserting the freedom and independence of man loses God in man. We cannot, then, go back to the old Church, any more than we can continue to go forward in the direction Protestantism requires, for in that direction we have come to the end of our road. We can push our Protestantism no farther, for there is no *farther*; and it is evident that without a church organization, we cannot save Christianity, or secure its practical efficacy in meeting the wants of the soul and the necessities of society. What is to be done? We must raise and discuss the Church question, and in some way get the Church. Whence are we to get the Church? We are to develop it from man. "Man is a domestic, a social, a political, an *ecclesiastical* being." "There is a Church, as there is a

family, a society, or a state in humanity,—a Church which has always been developed, and has always been the principal source of the religious life of humanity. Christianity takes advantage of a previously existent institution, which was not simply Jewish, but human, when she pours her life through the Church.” That is, Christianity uses the Church to pour her influence through the Church!

Now, it is clear from this summary, that the excellent author still revolves in the Protestant sphere, and regards religion and the Church even, only as developments of human nature and means of self-culture, in which he says all Protestantism ends, and, therefore, is no true worship. His Church, what he calls the Church, and on which he strenuously insists against no-Church Protestants, is contained virtually in human nature,—“man is an ecclesiastical being,”—and is developed from man, and, therefore, the effect as well as the instrument of self-culture, at least of human culture, and terminating only in the worship of self, or of man, humanity. It is clear, then, that the author, though he has some noble presentiments, has in no sense broken with the Protestant world, or risen to the proper Christian order of thought. Let not his Protestant friends be alarmed; we Catholics may take a deep interest in his noble struggles to free himself from a false position, but we cannot claim him as having passed over to our side. His Protestantism obliges him to take a false point of departure, and induces him to demand faith, worship, religion to satisfy the wants of the soul or the necessities of human nature, that is, as the condition of “self-culture,” soul-worship,—the very thing he would get rid of. He can relieve himself of the contradiction only by changing his point of view, and contemplating worship, not as a want of the soul, but as a duty the soul owes to God, and which love joyfully and promptly pays. All this talk about religion being a want of our nature, and of the fitness of Christianity to meet the wants of our nature, save when intended merely to answer the objection that it is opposed to nature, and seeks to suppress it, as is the case with Calvinism and Jansenism, is unchristian, and reduces religion to the natural order, and presupposes Christianity is a development of human nature, or the mere instrument of human development, that is, self-culture. The Christian religion was never given because a want of our nature, or needed by our nature as nature; but was given from the excess of the Divine bounty, because the Divine Goodness would confer on us a good infinitely above nature, above what our nature by its own powers could attain to, conceive of, or even receive. Our natural capacity has to be enlarged by a supernatural faculty, so to speak, has to be elevated by the *ens supernaturale*, before it is capable of the good that Christianity was given to confer on us. It was not given to develop our nature, to perfect our nature, to supply the wants of our nature, but to raise us to a supernatural sphere, and to secure us the supernatural good, “which eye hath not seen, and which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive.” We miss in Dr. Bellows the recognition of this purpose of God in Christianity, in the Redemption of man through the Incarnation of the Word. If the author recognizes the supernatural at all, it is simply the supernatural granted to heal, develop, perfect, or sustain the natural, that is, as the instrument of “self-culture,”—the last word of the Protestant movement.

Dr. Bellows will permit us, we hope, to suggest, that he would find it serviceable in seeking to come out, or to bring the world out of the suspense of faith of which he speaks, to contemplate faith a little more on its objective side. With Protestants faith is regarded chiefly on its subjective side, as a psychological fact, and, nowadays at least, is rarely considered from the ontological point of view, or the point of the object, or the *credendum*. Faith certainly requires subjective conditions, but it is as impossible without an object to be believed, as without a subject to believe. Without the *revelatum* or revealed object, immediately present to the mind, there is and can be no faith. The mind does not and cannot create its own object, and therefore there can be faith only where the credible object is objectively presented, for, "How can they believe unless they hear?" And if that object be supernatural truth, there can be faith only as God himself supernaturally reveals or presents it. The primary question, then, is not what the soul needs, or what the soul has the capacity to believe, but what is it that God himself presents and requires us to believe? The first question is as to the *credo* or creed, faith as the object. What has God revealed? what is the creed He enjoins? Till this question is answered, till the creed or the divinely revealed truth we are to believe is found and determined, the suspense of faith cannot be removed, for till then there can be no positive affirmation, and no positive denial. The great mistake of Protestants, especially the advanced Protestants of our day, is in considering faith on its subjective side before considering it on its objective side, settling what it is to believe, before settling whether there is an object to be believed, and if so, what it is.

Dr. Bellows sees clearly, and it is to his credit that he does, the necessity of the Church, and that without it Christianity is nothing. This is much, and is a noble protest against pure individualism; and it may be the grain of mustard-seed planted by grace in his heart, which one of these days will germinate and spring up into a tree, on the branches of which the birds of heaven will perch. God forbid that we should say aught to break the bruised reed, or to quench the smoking flax. But we must say, that beyond the necessity of the Church, he has not given utterance to any real Church conception. The Church he speaks of, and which he says is in humanity, is no doubt a reality; but it is only the natural capacity of men to associate for religious purposes, and belongs to our general capacity of association. It is a noble capacity, but it is not the Church in germ, or *in potentia*. The associative power in itself is the same, whether the association be for moral, philanthropic, scientific, literary, social, or political purposes; and therefore it is not psychologically just to regard the power to associate for religious purposes as a distinct and peculiar power of the soul. It is, moreover, not historically true to say that Christianity availed itself of a pre-existent Church, or institution, through which to pour its influence. It did no such thing. It did not avail itself even of the Synagogue, for it made an end of the Synagogue. And it certainly did not avail itself of any sacerdotal institution or organization of the Gentiles. To say that it simply availed itself of the associative capacity of human nature, is to say that it developed and formed the Church, not that it availed itself of a pre-existing Church or institution.

Furthermore still, this the author cannot say, for he considers that Christianity is nothing without an institution. "Christianity," he says, "*nothing till an institution*, seized the Church as the pre-established channel or organ of her influence and transmission." Being nothing it could not act till an institution, and therefore could not have developed the Church from the latent ecclesiastical capacity of human nature. He holds the Church to be a visible institution, or organization, and therefore must hold that it already existed at the service of Christianity. What, or whose, was that organization, that visible Church on which Christianity seized, and without which it was and could be nothing?

We have no space to pursue our criticism farther; but the author, who knows our high regard for him, will permit us to suggest, that he must accept either the Protestant no-Churchism, that the Church is merely an aggregation of individuals, associating for mutual convenience and advantage, or the Catholic doctrine, that our Lord gave us his religion embodied in the Church, as a Church organism, with the making or constituting of which man has no more to do than he has in revealing the creed he is to believe, or in enacting the laws he, as a Christian, is bound to obey. Man can neither build nor develop the Church, and between no Church and a Church instituted by God himself, and provided for men, there is no possible alternative. This is the lesson that Protestantism itself teaches. All Protestantism tends invariably and inevitably to no-Churchism, for it cannot withdraw itself from the law of its nature. Dr. Bellows sees this, and sees that Christianity without the Church is a mere abstract idea, a sheer nullity. He would have the Church, but not a Church formally and positively instituted by God himself, but developed from the nature of man or humanity. He is not willing to accept the Catholic Church, for he thinks she was always one-sided, and is now dead. He may get a religious association that will embrace a larger or smaller number of members, and continue operative in its way for a longer or a shorter time, but he will not get the Church. We do not doubt his good intentions, and we blame not his effort. But the Church he will not recover; for she depends on the Incarnation, out of which all in Christianity grows, and which most Protestants misapprehend, and all Unitarians deny. Without the Incarnation, there can be no Church in any sense in which Christendom has hitherto understood the term.

3. *Aguecheek*. Boston: Shepherd, Clark & Brown. 1859. 12mo. pp. 336.

THIS is not a volume to be read through at a sitting; but taken up at odd moments, when one is in the mood to be amused, and, read a few pages at a time, it will be found to be pleasing, interesting, and even provocative of thought. The author is witty, a capital punster, a genial lover of fun, but at the same time warm-hearted, earnest, and serious. His tastes and judgments in matters and things in general are those of a literary coterie in Boston, with which we have little sympathy, and we took up his book with some unfavourable prepos-

sions ; but we have found it, not a great book indeed, not a miracle of genius certainly, yet, upon the whole, a notable book, written with ability, in a genial spirit, and though now and then a little affected, a little conceited, worthy of commendation. The sketches of foreign travel are slight, and indicate no great depth of thought or powers of philosophical observation or reflection, but are pleasing and unhackneyed. The fault we find with the author is, that he is so charmed with Continental Europe that he ceases to be American, and forgets the merits of his own country. No American who has his eyes open, and is not hopelessly wedded to early prejudices, can travel on the Continent of Europe without feeling that the people there have much that we lack, and are free from many of the peculiar annoyances we suffer at home. In the art of living, in domestic and social economy, we are certainly far behind them, even if you confine your observations to the higher and even middle classes. They are more advanced in civilization than we are in this country, where almost every man who has a fortune has made instead of inheriting it ; we are less polished, less cultivated, and have more of a *parvenu* spirit ; yet our worst faults come from our unsuccessful attempts to do precisely what Mr. Aguecheek would have us do, that is, to imitate the Continental nations, especially the French. What we most lack, as a people, is self-confidence, we feel and act as provincials or colonists, who never trust their own taste and manners, and render themselves ridiculous by striving to imitate the metropolis. The imitator seldom succeeds in doing more than to copy the defects or deformities of his model. A nation to be great, to be respectable, easy in its carriage, graceful and attractive in its manners, must have the courage to be itself, and to seek improvement by development from within rather than by loans from abroad. What we gain by trying to imitate foreigners we may see in any of our fashionable gatherings, fashionable boarding-schools, and especially by walking up and down Broadway, during the hours of fashionable promenade. Let us first learn to be ourselves.

Nobody can know the French without liking them, and French taste and French manners are the best in the world—for Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, and the worst for Englishmen and Americans. You cannot make Frenchmen of Americans, their very *physique* forbids it, and an American lady loses all her native charms when educated and dressed after a French model. Most of the things the author complains of in his own countrymen proceed from the fact that they try to be like foreigners, and, as far as they can, to follow English or French fashions. We have nothing to say against those fashions themselves, but we should study to have fashions of our own, fitted to our own shape and character, to our climate, and our general pursuits. We think, then, those young gentlemen who travel on the Continent, learn a little of Continental life and manners, and come home and urge upon us to borrow from the Old World, do us the greatest possible disservice ; for the rage for borrowing once broken out, we shall not only borrow what will not fit us, but shall soon come to live by borrowing altogether, and so end by having nothing of our own.

We shall not quarrel with Mr. Aguecheek for his idolatry of the uncrowned Emperor of the French, since on that point he is known to

labor under the fatuity of his great ancestor, so celebrated by Shakpeare. He is no philosophical statesman, and sees not very far ahead. Disliking the Democracy of his own country, like most literary Bostonians, he is predisposed to be pleased with power that really makes itself felt. We believe Louis Napoleon seeks earnestly the material interests of France, and we believe that he governs France as well as an absolute monarch can govern any country. We have never regarded him as a bad man, or in any respect an ill-disposed man; what we quarrel with is neither the man nor the sovereign, but the Napoleonic system, which seeks to confine the thoughts and the aspirations of men to their material interests, or to military glory—to make *civil* rights pass for *political* rights, and to establish, not the equality of liberty, but the equality of slavery. Mr. Aguecheek must not expect to beat us out of our dislike to this system by the usual cant of courtiers, old fogies, or the upholders of arbitrary power. We know something of human nature, for we happen to have a human heart under our left breast; and we know, and if we doubted it Italy would remove our doubts, that man has wants and aspirations which no material or æsthetic goods will or can satisfy. These wants and aspirations are as powerful with Frenchmen as with any people on earth, and therefore it is, that unless Napoleon keeps his promise, and permits liberty to crown his work, the imperial *régime* will never be permanent in France. No doubt Mr. Aguecheek finds in France, under the present government, the precise advantages he misses in his own country, and that he is there freed from certain things which annoy him under the reign of our great Unwashed Sovereign. Every form of government has its peculiar advantages and disadvantages, and we have yet to be convinced that we should do well to exchange even our present Democratic President for the Emperor Napoleon III. We do not, for ourselves, like Democracy, but we like it better than Cæsarism; and we would rather brave the excesses of liberty than the excesses of power. We cannot sympathize with the convert who thinks loyalty to the Church requires him to praise everything French or Italian, and sneer at everything English or American; and we confess we cannot understand what Dr. Cahill, the great Irish letter-writer, hopes to gain for his country or his religion from the invasion and defeat of England by the French army, which he seems to predict, and ardently to desire. We like not British supremacy, but we like French supremacy no better; and the world cannot yet afford to see Great Britain fall to the rank of a second class Power. Raise up Italy, make her a Constitutional State, and a Power of the first class, restore Spanish liberty, and elevate the Spanish Peninsula also to the rank of a great European Power, and then you can preserve free institutions in Europe, although Great Britain should grow relatively weaker. But instead of seeking to humiliate England, the only bulwark of free institutions in Europe, Catholics, we think, should study to detach Catholicity from Cæsarism, and render it impossible for England any longer to exert an influence, in the name of freedom, hostile to the Church.

4. *A Defence of the Claims of the Catholic Church, in Reply to several recent Publications.* By Edmund Maturin, A.M. Halifax, N.S. 1859. 8vo. pp. 284.

THE author of this work was a minister of the Church of England, highly esteemed for his learning, his ability, and his personal virtues. He is now a member of the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, and promises to prove an able and zealous defender of the true faith. We read with great interest and edification, *The Claims of the Church*, vindicated by him in a calm, well-written, and well-reasoned Letter, addressed to his former parishioners, a defence of which is published in the work before us, which treats of the Rule of Faith, the general principles of religion, and the authority of the Church; the Supremacy of the Pope, and other articles of Faith. A review of this work at some length may be expected hereafter; but we have space now only to say that it is a valuable contribution to our controversial literature, and as well adapted to circulation in the United States as in the British Provinces, where the author resides. It is temperately written, calm and serious in tone, close and compact in its reasoning, proving the author to have a real Catholic spirit, and to be master of every point in the controversy in which he is engaged. We commend the work to our readers, and we hope they will show their zeal for the faith they profess, and their sympathy with the recent convert, who has sacrificed his profession and all worldly prospects at the bidding of conscience, by obtaining the work both for themselves and to put into the hands of serious-minded Protestants. It may be ordered through our Publishers.

5. *Florine, Princesse de Bourgogne, ou une Page de l'Histoire de la première Croisade: Roman Historique*, de W. B. MacCabe, traduit par M. de la Gracéri, Paris, Putois-Cutté, 1859. 12mo. pp. 345.

THIS is an excellent translation into French of Mr. MacCabe's *Florine*, heretofore favorably noticed in the *Review*, and familiar, we trust, to all our readers. We have in our English-speaking world few more deserving Catholic writers than Mr. MacCabe, author of "*A Catholic History of England*." His whole heart and soul is devoted to his religion, and to Catholic literature, to which he has made so many valuable contributions. Those of our readers who read French will find *Florine* no less pleasing in that language of beautiful prose than in its original English; indeed, we think they will even prefer it in French. We hope the excellent author will soon let us hear from him again in some new work.

6. *A Catechism of Irish Geography and Topography, Physical, Social, Historical, and Biographical, for Schools and Families.* By John H. Greene. Cincinnati, 1859. 8vo. pp. 200.

THIS work is accompanied by a good map of Ireland, and contains considerable information on the Geography and Topography of the mother country of a very considerable portion of the American people,

by an author of whom we know nothing, and who has written it without the possibility of a single glance, as he says, at the works indispensable to its composition. He has evidently laboured under great disadvantages, and that we suppose justifies him in charging \$1. 75 for a thin octavo, on poor paper and worse type.

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7. *A Manual of Prayers and Instructions for persons seeking the True Religion.* New York: Dunigan & Brother, 1859. 18mo. pp. 372.

THROUGH some mistake this valuable compilation is lettered *Manual of Prayers*, instead of *Manual of Instructions*, its proper title. The volume is compiled by the Rev. G. W. Doane, of Newark, N.J., and is well adapted to the purpose for which it is intended. It contains a reprint of Mr. Wilberforce's *Reasons for submitting to the Catholic Church*, addressed to his parishioners on the occasion of his conversion, several articles from the *Clifton Tracts*, together with the Catechism. It is an excellent volume to put into the hands of Protestants who really wish to know something of our religion.

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8. *Les Principes de la Société au XIX^e Siècle*, par M. l'Abbé C. de Piétri, Aumonier du Sénat. Nouvelle édition. Paris: Louis Colas, 1858. 16mo. pp. 360.

THE author of this work has been so obliging as to send us a copy of it, and we have every disposition to speak well of it; but it is not precisely what its title would lead one to expect. It is a good book, but it is devoted rather to proving the existence of God and the truths of the Christian revelation, than to indicating and establishing the principles and organization of society in the nineteenth century. The author is certainly right in insisting on a religious basis of society, but he seems to us to neglect the proper distinction between natural society and the supernatural, the distinctively Christian society or the Church, and to fall, in regard to society, into a mistake analogous to that into which the Traditionalists fall in relation to philosophy. The natural may be created for the supernatural, but is not created by it, for the supernatural presupposes the natural; yet natural society cannot exist without God, for without God as final cause there is and can be no law properly so called, and without law there can be no morality, and without morality no society. The excellent author then does well to begin his demonstration of the principles of society by demonstrating the existence of God, the preamble to the demonstration alike of natural and supernatural society; and, as natural morality has not any adequate practical support without Christian morals, he does well also to enter into the proofs of the Christian revelation. We cannot say that society is founded on the religious idea, for man is naturally social; but we can say, and must say, that without religion to protect and to direct it to an end above itself, it will never attain fully its own proper end; that is to say, he who lives for nature alone shall lose nature itself.

“He who would save his life shall lose it.” “Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” With the exception we have indicated, the book is a good one, and directs the thought of the age to the fundamental principles and conditions of all society.

9. *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects.* By John Henry Newman, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1859. 16mo. pp. 387.

WE regret that we have not space to speak of this work at the length its rare merits demand. It proves that the selection of Dr. Newman to be the Rector of the new Catholic University of Dublin was a wise one, for no man better understood what a University should be, or is better able to secure the practical adoption of his views. When shall we have a Catholic University in our own country, and such a man at the head of it? The Dublin Catholic University, we presume, though located in Ireland, is intended to be not merely provincial, but national, for the whole British Empire; and as such the Catholics of the British dominions, it seems to us, should be united in its support, and lose no time in securing it ample endowments. It may easily be made the first University in the world; and Ireland may once again, in her strange history, see students from various lands flocking to her schools to finish their education. Since we have read this volume by Dr. Newman, we have a deeper interest and greater confidence in the ultimate success of the University. We hope there is, and will be, but one opinion respecting it among Catholics of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

10. *The Sermons, Lectures, and Speeches delivered by his Eminence CARDINAL WISEMAN, Archbishop of Westminster, during his tour in Ireland in August and September, 1858; with his Lecture in London, on the “Impressions” of his Tour. Revised by his Eminence. With a connecting Narrative.* Boston: Donahoe, 1859. 12mo. pp. 372.

It is never, in case of one of Cardinal Wiseman's works, necessary to do more than simply to announce it. Not only his high position and sacred character, but his merits as a man, a scholar, and a writer and orator, are sure to command with all who have any taste or judgment, attention and respect. His late tour in Ireland, where he was not supposed to be remarkably popular, was one continued ovation, such as we might expect for a conquering hero returning from his victories, but such as we are little accustomed in our days to see offered to a Prince of the Church. The enthusiasm excited wherever he went, the crowds that flocked to see him and that hung on the words from his lips, the high honors paid him by men of all ranks and conditions, were a noble homage of the Irish people, paid to the representative of the Church, and to the religion for which they have suffered so much, and which, after all, is their glory, and prove that they are really Catholic,

and Catholic above everything else. The Irish people have never been presented in a light more highly honorable to them, or better calculated to secure to them the respect and the love of Catholic hearts. We regard the volume before us as a noble monument to the lively faith and ardent devotion to the Church of the Irish people in the nineteenth century. As such let it be received and preserved. It strengthens one's faith and warms one's heart to read it. It proves that there is, even in our age, a brighter side to things that we do not enough contemplate. It is a volume of which every Catholic, especially every Catholic of Irish birth or descent, may well be proud.

11. *The Spirit of Christianity, or the Conformity of the Christian with Jesus Christ.* By the Rev. Father Francis Nepveu, S.J. Translated from the French by Charles B. Fairbanks. New York : Dunigan & Brother, 1859. 16mo. pp. 333.

A VERY good ascetic work, very well translated.

12. *Considerations on the Sacred Ministry, with a Rule of Life for Pastors of Souls.* Translated from the French by Rev. B. S. Piet. Baltimore : Kelly, Hedian & Piet, 1859.

A VERY excellent little work, we presume ; but as it is designed specially for the clergy, we do not think it becomes us to express any judgment on it one way or another.

13. *Life of Madame de la Peltrie, (Magdalen de Chauvigny,) Foundress of the Ursuline Convent, Quebec, written expressly for the Pupils of that Institution, and inscribed to them.* By a Member of the Community. New York : Dunigan & Brother, 1859.

THIS is a well-written sketch of the life of a Noble French Lady, who deserves the gratitude of all lovers of religion and friends of education, in founding the Ursuline Convent at Quebec ; an Institution which, while it is one of the oldest, is one of the best of the sort in the northern part of the continent.

14. *Catechism of Perseverance ; an Historical, Doctrinal, Moral, and Liturgical Exposition of the Catholic Religion.* Translated from the French of the Abbé Gaume, by Rev. T. B. Jamison, 31st edition. Baltimore : Kelly, Hedian, & Piet, 1859.

THIS work is too well known, and too highly esteemed, to need or to permit any comment from us.

15. *A Natural Philosophy : Embracing the most recent Discoveries in the various Branches of Physics, and exhibiting the Application of Scientific Principles to Every-Day Life.* By G. P. Quackenbos, A. M. New York : Appleton & Co., 1859. 12mo. pp. 450.

As far as we have examined it, this is a very excellent work of its kind. It contains a great amount of information on the subjects it treats, clearly and succinctly presented. We might object to some of the author's definitions, however. For instance, he defines matter to be "whatever we can see, hear, feel, taste, or smell," and adds, that "every created thing consists of matter." Does the author contend that the human soul is matter; or does he deny that the soul has been created? Materialism is out of date, and pantheism is not yet demonstrated. The author, we presume, will amend his definition in the next edition.

16. *Theodore Parker's Experience as a Minister, with some account of his Early Life and Education for the Ministry; contained in a Letter to the Members of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society of Boston.* Boston: Rufus Leighton, jr. 1859. 8vo. pp. 182.

In reading the title of this book, we are struck with the fact that it does not state of what or of whom Mr. Parker is a minister, or for what ministry he was educated. As Mr. Parker can hardly be said to believe in God, since he formally denies the Divine Personality, thereby reducing the Divinity to a mere force or necessity, and as he would disdain to be called a Minister of the Gospel, which he discards, or of Jesus Christ, who he holds was ignorant, superstitious, and sinful; we can conceive of nothing of which he can be the minister but himself. He is his own God, Mediator, and Saviour; and we can find nothing but himself in which he believes or confides, and only his precious self that he worships. He has been true to what Dr. Bellows tells us are the logical tendencies of Protestantism, and seems disposed not only to follow them till they reach Nowhere, but even further still. His experience is a sad one, and we have read it with deep sorrow of heart for one with whom Almighty God has dealt bountifully. We regret to see so much talent, learning, effort, and not ignoble sentiment, not only thrown away, but employed in doing positive injury to society, as well as to the souls of men. To those, however, who know how to read it, the volume may not prove uninteresting.

17. *The Atlantis: A Register of Literature and Science.* Conducted by Members of the Catholic University in Ireland. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & Roberts. Periodical, Half-yearly, Nos. I. II. III. January, 1858, to January, 1859. 8vo.

This is not a Review, in the sense of *The Edinburgh* or *The Quarterly*, but in the sense that it is a Review of Literature and Science, of which it is both a Review and a Register. Each number, containing upon an average 250 pages, is filled with elaborate essays, which swell almost to entire treatises, by the President and Professors of the Catholic University of Ireland. The three numbers which we have received we have found ably written, learned, and truly scientific, and prove that its authors, in every branch of literature and science, are masters and not mere learners. The periodical is highly creditable to the Uni-

versity, and proves, if proof were wanting, that this New University has all that is requisite in the way of scholarship and science, to place itself on a level with the oldest and most renowned Universities in Europe. Till we get a University of our own, we think it would be well for American Catholics, who have the means, to send their sons, after graduating at our Colleges, there to attend the University course. In fact, we claim some share in it, for we contributed liberally of our means to establish it, and one of the first provisional Professors named by its distinguished Rector was an American; and it is the only Catholic University in the world in which our mother tongue is the language of the houses and of the lectures; we think we might do it a service and benefit ourselves by sending it our sons. We doubt if any University in the world can surpass the present corps of Professors; and its Rector, Dr. Newman, is a man whose greatness and worth, rich native endowments, profound and varied attainments, will be admired and esteemed the more in proportion as he is known. We have in this country no right to be indifferent to its success, and we need, hardly less than our English and Irish brethren, that it should succeed. In it we must prepare a corps of Professors for ourselves, when the time comes, as come it must before many years, for establishing a Catholic University of the United States. To send an American student to the Catholic University of Dublin, is not sending him abroad into a foreign land, it is more like sending him home; and we need not fear that his nationality will suffer, or that he will return de-Americanized. We earnestly urge upon Catholics in this country, whether originally of Irish descent or not, as they contributed of their means to found this university, they continue to patronize it by availing themselves of its services for their own sons. At present, it is the only Catholic University for the English-speaking world, and should receive the liberal patronage of the whole English-speaking Catholic community. The Professors are, some English and some Irish, and seem to have been selected on broad Catholic principles; and we trust no prejudices of nationality, and no distrust that may have been created by discussions in this *Review*, or elsewhere, will have the slightest weight in deterring our Catholic parents from availing themselves, for their sons, of the learning and science of its able and most excellent Professors, and of the various other advantages it cannot fail to offer.

18. *Remarks upon Alchemy and the Alchemists*: indicating a method of discovering, the true Nature of the Hermetic Philosophy, and showing that the Search after the Philosopher's Stone had not for its Object the Discovery of an Agent for the Transmutation of Metals. Being an Attempt to rescue from undeserved Opprobrium the Reputation of a class of Extraordinary Thinkers in Past Ages. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co., 1857. 12mo. pp. 306.

19. *Swedenborg a Hermetic Philosopher*: Being a sequel to "Remarks on Alchemy and the Alchemists." Showing that Emanuel Swedenborg was a Hermetic Philosopher, and that his Writings may be interpreted from the point of view of Hermetic Philosophy. With a Chapter comparing Swedenborg and Spinoza. New York: Appleton & Co., 1858. 18mo. pp. 352.

WE have delayed noticing these two remarkable volumes by the same author, in the hope of finding leisure to brush up our former reading on the old Alchemists, and to discuss with some thoroughness the subject they in some sort revive. But we must still leave them unnoticed, further than to say that the author has, in our judgment, proved, not that the Hermetic Philosophy is true Philosophy, and a substitute for Christianity, which he has not undertaken to do, but that the old Alchemists were not engaged in those material researches commonly supposed, and that Swedenborg, the Founder of the New Jerusalem Church, and in some sense the originator of Modern Spiritism, was a Hermetic Philosopher. The so-called Hermetic Philosophy does not lack a certain depth, or in its terms a certain plausibility; but a little examination proves that it is pantheistic, and we have never been able to acquit Swedenborgianism of Pantheism, though we should be sorry to believe that all who adhere to the New Church or the New Jerusalem are really Pantheists.

That there were men who took the Philosopher's Stone in a literal sense, and really sought to form a material composition which should enable him who possessed it to transmute even the baser metals into gold at will, we do not understand the author to deny; but he contends that these were false Alchemists, ignorant pretenders, who took the symbolical language of the true Alchemists, in a literal sense. The composition of the Philosopher's Stone with the true Alchemists was the solution of the problem of human life, and its possession symbolized the attainment to true intellectual and moral perfection. In this we think the author right, and we think no one can read the more important and renowned Alchemical works without coming to the same conclusion. Those old Alchemists were, moreover, hard thinkers, and we are ready to believe men of austere lives. To a very great extent they represented outside of Christianity the better elements of the ancient Gentile wisdom, and sought to attain to the solution of the problem of human life and destiny, and to the highest moral perfection, without the recognition of Christian revelation, or the aid of the grace of Christ. They aimed at doing what the rationalists of our day are aiming at, and with a like success. They profess to have a great secret, but that secret they do not, and confess they cannot communicate even to their most trusted and most docile disciples. It cannot, they all tell us, be written or even spoken by mortal tongue. All they do, or profess to be able to do, is to prepare the disciple to receive it; but when they have so prepared him, or taught him how to prepare himself to receive it, or for the last initiation, they leave him. We suspect that it is because they really have no secret, and have been following a vain shadow which does and for ever must elude their grasp, for it is ungraspable. They need at the last moment a miracle, a *Deus ex Machina* to extricate them.



APPENDIX:

CONTAINING LITERARY NOTICES.

OF

WORKS OF CATHOLIC INTEREST.

Lettres Inédites de la Princesse des Ursins, réunies et publiées, avec une Introduction et des Notes, par M. A. GEFFROY, Professeur d'Histoire à la Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux. Paris: Didier, 1859. 8vo.

IN 1852, M. Geffroy, Professor of History at Bordeaux, was sent by the Minister of Public Instruction to Scandinavia, on a mission of inquiry as to what manuscripts relating to the history and literature of France are preserved in the libraries or archives of the kingdoms which are comprised in that department of the globe. The result of that gentleman's researches was given to the public in an elaborate volume,* replete with most valuable information for the historian; and this was preceded by a small *brochure*, containing twenty-four inedited letters, autograph of Charles XII., and most characteristic of that great warrior, addressed to his sister Ulrica Eleonora, which had escaped all former inquirers into his life and times. But the most important, perhaps, of M. Geffroy's *treasure-trove*, are the *one hundred and eighty letters* of the Princess des Ursins contained in the elegant volume before us, all previously unknown; copies of the great majority whereof, addressed either to Madame de Noailles or Madame de Maintenon, are preserved in the Royal Library of Stockholm. These, illustrated with a lucid introduction, and most carefully annotated, are now, thanks to the acumen and diligence of Professor Geffroy, accessible to the learned world, and form an indispensable pendant to the *Memoirs* of St. Simon and other chroniclers of the reign of *le Grand Monarque*.

Anna Maria, daughter of M. de La Trémouille, duke of Noirmontier, was born in 1635, and married in 1659 to Adrien Blaise de Talleyrand, prince de Chalais. The loyalty of her father, and her own talents and beauty, at once placed her in the foremost rank of the brilliant society of Paris. An unlucky duel having caused the exile of her husband to Spain, a residence

* Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits concernant l'Histoire ou la Littérature de la France, qui sont conservés dans les Bibliothèques ou Archives de Suède, Danemark, et Norvège. Par M. A. Geffroy. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1856. 8vo. pp. 512.

there of several years laid the foundation of those friendships and ties, which at a subsequent period recalled her to that country, where she was destined to play so prominent a part. The health of her husband requiring a change, they departed for Italy; and during her absence at Rome to make preparations for his reception, the Prince de Chalais died at Venice, leaving her a childless and almost unprotected widow, at about the age of thirty-five.

In her exceeding grief she retired to a convent; whence the soothing influences of time, and the attention paid to her by members of the pontifical court, gradually led her into the first circles of Rome, where her future ability for political intrigue was fostered and developed. Cardinal d'Estrées, perceiving her devoted nationality, drew the attention of Louis XIV. to her zeal and talents; and this sovereign, ever vigilant to secure fitting instruments for carrying out his distant policy, did not fail to act upon the information received. From this moment she was marked out to be an active agent in the matter of the Spanish succession; for which act an illustrious alliance was sought for the fair widow, the negotiation of which has hitherto remained unknown to the historian, until detected by the acute eye of M. Geffroy, among the archives of Prince Odescalchi, at Rome, in the shape of a confidential letter addressed to M. de Pomponne, Minister and Secretary of State, about the end of 1674, setting forth the treaties relating to the future marriage of Prince Orsini, duke of Bracciano, "under the auspices of the most Christian king."

The first marriage of this prince had proved sterile, to the great regret of all who desired to see the perpetuation of that illustrious family; but, in the year just mentioned, the death of his duchess left him free to contract a second alliance, and enabled the political matchmakers of the period to unite the two houses of Noirmontier and Bracciano. The curious details of matrimonial diplomacy are elaborated in the Odescalchi MS., and summarized by M. Geffroy.

Immediately on the elevation of Mme. des Ursins, she launched into a dashing career of extravagant gaiety, surrounded by the noblest society, French and Roman; and, by marrying her sister to her brother-in-law, the duke of Lanti, strengthened her influence in extending her circle. But the marriage, equally unproductive with the former, does not seem to have been a happy one: the most part of her time was spent at Paris or Versailles, and she only returned to Rome in 1698, to be reconciled to her husband on his deathbed, and to administer to his property, heavily burdened with debts, which her fashionable flights had contributed not a little to enhance.

The rest of her life was spent in political intrigues, which her situation as principal lady in waiting upon Maria Louisa, queen of Philip V. of Spain, whose marriage she had arranged, enabled her to direct and command. Her disgrace ensued on that monarch's second marriage, with Elizabeth of Parma, in 1714, and she died eight years thereafter, at the advanced age of eighty-seven. The clear, sharp outline of her domination, which prepared the reign of Charles III., is felicitously drawn by M. Geffroy, and well filled in by the letters so fortunately found and gracefully edited.

Etudes Archéologiques, jointes à la Description du Portail de l'Eglise St. Pierre de Moissac. Par l'ABBÉ J. B. PARDIAC, Membre de la Société Française d'Archéologie. Bordeaux : Lacaze, 1859. 2 vols. 16mo.

THE Abbey of Moissac long enjoyed a marked position in the south of France, and shines in memory as a finished model of the great mediæval monastic establishments; not only because of its having been the ruling or chief house of the Cluniac order in Languedoc, but by reason of the large extent of its territorial property, the number of other monasteries, both in France and in Spain, that were subject to its jurisdiction, its sanctity established by the many privileges and immunities bestowed upon it by successive Pontiffs, and the exquisite architecture of its various buildings. By some early historians it was considered to owe its foundation to Clovis; but others, with more probability, ascribe to St. Amand that honour, which carries it back to a date between the years 630 and 640. The same calamities of disturbed periods affected it in common with other like institutions; but it was finally restored and reconstructed during the abbacy of Durand de Bredon, and solemnly dedicated, with almost unexampled pomp and ceremony, in December, 1063. At the close of the thirteenth century, the abbey was at the height of its power and greatness: its superiors were not only mitred abbots, but potent feudal lords. In 1618 the abbey was secularized, and the Cluniacs replaced by canons-regular of St. Augustine, who continued to govern it until the accursed Revolution, which swept away churches and abbeys, as it chopped off the heads of princes and priests.

The porch of the abbey, which forms the groundwork of the instructive and erudite prolusions of the Abbé Pardiac, was, in the opinion of that distinguished ecclesiastic, erected or rebuilt towards the middle of the thirteenth century. Considerable dubiety on this point exists among the several archæologists who have discussed it, but a careful balancing of their respective views has induced M. Pardiac, with much apparent accuracy, to arrive at his conclusion. The eminently industrious M. Jules Marion, who has contributed an ingenious and elaborate essay on the abbey to the *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, is, however, opposed to this, and is inclined to assign the construction to a much earlier period, namely, during the rule of Aquilinus or Ansquetinus, between 1100 and 1108.

Be that as it may, the porch—to employ the words of the latter gentleman—presents the aspect of “a real museum of Romanesque sculpture,” by the great variety of subjects represented in its respective details, all emblematic of the Christian dogmas and teaching of the Church. Each portion of the porch, then, forms, as it were, a text for the learned abbé, upon which he engrafs minute expository illustrations, forming in the whole a complete hand-book of ecclesiology, as well as a guide to the history of mediæval manners and customs. His unpretending little volumes contain infinitely more information than many others of higher assumption, and are especially valuable for the painter and architect, as well as useful to the historical student and Christian philosopher.

An account of the church, with handsome cuts, representing some of the piers and capitals, and a beautiful engraving of the cloister of St. Pierre de Moissac, has been contributed to the Society of Antiquaries, by Mr. John Henry Parker, of Oxford, whose zeal and industry has thrown so much light on mediæval architecture, and may be seen in the thirty-sixth volume of the *Archæologia* of that learned body.

ΠΑΗΘΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΗΣ ΤΑ ΣΩΖΟΜΕΝΑ.—*Pléthon Traité des Lois, ou Recueil des Fragments, en partie inédits, de cet Ouvrage. Texte revu sur les MSS. Précédé d'une Notice historique et critique, et augmenté d'un Choix de Pièces justificatives, la plupart inédites, par C. ALEXANDRE, Membre de l'Institut, &c. Traduction par A. Pellessier, Agrégé de Philosophie, Professor de Logique au Collège de Sainte-Barbe. Paris : Firmin Didot Frères. 1858. 8vo.*

UNLESS to the student of the history of philosophy, the name of George Gemistus, better known by that of Pletho, is probably little familiar nowadays; albeit, in the period during which his long life extended, it had no less an influence than renown of its own. Born at Constantinople about 1355, of a family not destitute of distinction, he appears early in manhood, for causes that do not appear, to have left his native city, and sought an asylum in Adrianople, at that time the capital of the Ottoman Empire, where he connected himself with an influential Jew there of the name of Eliseus, whose addiction to the occult sciences finally brought him to the stake. On the incrementation of his circumcised friend, Gemistus removed to Misitra, the ancient Sparta, then under the rule of the Palæologi, where he spent nearly the remainder of his existence, engaged in literature and philosophy, and, it would seem, towards the close of his career in the discharge of high judicial functions. By the various writings which he composed at the commencement of his abode in Misitra he laid the foundations of his subsequent fame; his treatise on *The Virtues* being probably the earliest of these books, the sentiments of which were altogether opposed to those of his advanced age. His reputation as a scholar became rapidly extensive; he numbered among his pupils Bessarion, Cosmo de Medicis, and Marsilio Ficino; and by his efforts and example, a taste for the Platonic philosophy was created among the learned of the West. He was consulted by the Emperor John Palæologus on the great subject of the union of the two Churches, and he accompanied that sovereign to the council of Florence in 1437, where that highly important question was under consideration. Yet, strange to say, his religious orthodoxy was at that very time more than suspected, and Gennodius expressly stated his conviction of the sceptical tendencies of Pletho, and the existence of writings by him adverse to Christianity. George of Trebizond—his violent opponent, but whose testimony on that account may not be deemed partial—states that he heard him predict, during the very session of the council, that “ere long one religion alone would be universally taught

and adopted, which should neither be that of Christ, nor of Mahomet, but one differing little from that of the ancient Greeks." His residence in Italy may therefore be justly considered as having been turned to account for his own glory, rather than for the good of the Church. It was about this time that he wrote his treatise on *The difference between the Doctrines of Aristotle and Plato*, which first aroused the controversy between the two schools, and excited the movement which first shook, and two centuries later overthrew, the scholasticism of the Middle Ages. On his return to Greece, he devoted such time as could be conveniently abstracted from the controversies into which he had rushed, to the composition of the work on *Legislation and Laws*, of which the fragments are now for the first time carefully published. He died about the year 1452; and Tiraboschi informs us that in 1475 his remains were disinterred and removed to Rimini, by Sigismond Malatesta, one of his admirers, and interred in the church of S. Francis in that city.

The treatise on *Laws* was devised as a complete code of social, political, moral, and religious reform. "The great idea which prevailed over all was that of a supreme Deity communicating his essence, in a manner more or less mediate and by constantly-descending degrees, first to the inferior deities, themselves divided into several classes, then to other immaterial substances, and next to things corporeal. This scale of beings recalls the *Eons* of Gnosticism and the *Séphiroth* of the Cabalists, and we find in it the insanity common to all philosophies remaining in an infant state, of seeking to fill up the space between God and the finite creature by a number of intermediate beings, who are all emanations diverging from, and more and more impaired from the central Deity—a sort of radiating pantheism, very different from that which, since Pythagoras, has been perpetuated under various forms to our own times, and which, diffusing life in the mass, without placing the centre anywhere, logically reverts to atheism." A most accurate and philosophical analysis has been given by M. Alexandre, to whom literature is indebted for the text of this singular and dreamy hypothesis. Like merit is due to M. Pellessier for his very faithful translation, and the thanks of all scholars to the fostering liberality of the classical house of Didot.

The Ancient Poem of Guillaume de Guileville, entitled "Le Pèlerinage de l'Homme," compared with the "Pilgrim's Progress" of John Bunyan.
Edited from notes collected by the late Mr. Nathaniel Hill, of the Royal Society of Literature, with illustrations and an appendix.
London: Pickering, 1858. 4to.

THE late Mr. Hill had for several years been engaged in tracing the resemblances that exist between portions of the "Pilgrim's Progress," by Bunyan, and many of the mediæval works of fiction. Declining health interrupted, and death put an end to the prosecution of his researches; but his notes, falling into the hands of a lady of much benevolence, have,

for the benefit of his widow, been now published in the present very handsome form, under the care of this accomplished and friendly editor. Had Miss Cust (the name, so modestly withheld, ought not to be concealed, for "a good heart is like the sun") sought literary reputation for herself, she might have employed these collections of Mr. Hill as the basis of an independent volume, from which, so far as taste and industry are concerned, she could not fail to have derived infinite credit; but she has preferred to be the anonymous renderer of merit to the deceased, and benefactor to the living, restricting herself to the arrangement of those necessarily crude materials, which her tact and perseverance have made most agreeable and instructive.

So far as we remember, although numerous sources have been presumed to be suggestive to Bunyan of his extremely popular fiction, it was left to Mr. Hill to mark the singular analogy which the work of the Puritan of the seventeenth bears to that of the monk of the fourteenth century. Mr. George Offor, who is ever ready to insult the Catholic religion, amidst the pompous parade of erudition prefixed to his edition of the "*Pilgrim's Progress*," printed for the fanatical Hansard-Knollys Society, not only seems to be ignorant of the great poem by Guileville, but that Lydgate is the author of the metrical version of it which he quotes; and, while enumerating the several imitations of Bunyan, wholly omits mention of that by an amiable authoress, whose writings for the instruction of youth have had a large circulation among her co-religionists—the "*Indian Pilgrim*" of Mrs. Sherwood.

William de Guileville was a Cistercian monk of Chalis, in the *Orléanois*, and was born towards the close of the thirteenth century. The first portion of the work by which he is known to posterity was composed in 1330, when he had been a regular twenty-five years; he was engaged upon its last part twenty-eight years later.

The "*Roman des Trois Pèlerinages*" is tripartite. The first pilgrimage is that of man on earth; the second that of the soul after it has "shuffled off this mortal coil;" the third that of our Lord and Saviour upon this world of suffering, being a condensation and incorporation of the four gospels. Originally written in verse, and afterwards in prose, it was early printed in both forms—the earliest in 1485; and its great popularity at the time is proved by the numerous editions which it underwent, and the variety of translations made from it. Of these, that which is most germane to its text, and to our liking, is the metrical one of his brother-monk, of the major rule, John Lydgate, of Bury St. Edmunds.

It is a painful and ungracious duty to censure the opinions of an amiable, though mistaken individual, even in his lifetime; but when he is no longer amenable to human criticism, charity perforce restrains the amount of censure which those opinions would in other circumstances have provoked: not that in saying this we would excuse error or impede justice. We therefore merely advert to the fact, that Mr. Hill seems to have been what is termed in Exeter-hall parlance a "*Bible Christian*"—an appellation significant of weakness and obstinate prejudice—and we therefore fail to be surprised that, while tracing the parallel between Bunyan and De Guileville, he should be so warped as to "premise that the allegory, which becomes in the hands

of the former a fascinating narrative, full of vitality and Christian doctrine, is in the work of the latter only a cold and lifeless dialogue between abstract and unembodied faculties." For the reason already assigned, we pass from this topic, merely remarking that while on the ears of some men the most exquisite music falls unfelt or discordant, whilst on those of others, in all, save in this particular respect, their equals, the same strains exercise the most elevating and refined influence—so the doctrines and mystic imageries of the Church, fraught with interest, beauty, and soul-sustainment to the believer, are gross and repulsive to the torpid and carnal heart which grace has not brought within its pale.

It would be more agreeable, if we had time or space for such speculative research, to express how far Bunyan was indebted to others, or whether his similitudes flowed from his own spontaneous and original imagination. It may be that some manuscript of Lydgate's poem, a Caxton's "*Pilgrimage of the Sowle*," or some other of the numerous imitations or versions of De Guileville's volume—which in its original language must have been to him unknown—solaced his long confinement in the gaol of Bedford. Or the memories of boyhood's legendary learning, during this enforced opportunity for reflection, and his own high fancies combined, may have created this ever-popular "*Progress*."

Once more thanking the fair editor for introducing De Guileville to the Protestant public, we may add that to the individual who, with common sense and unprejudiced disposition, calmly peruses it, even this volume contains a sufficient amount of instruction to guide him into the bosom of the ONE CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

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1. *The Librarian's Manual: a Treatise on Bibliography, comprising a select and descriptive List of Bibliographical Works; to which are added Sketches of Public Libraries. Illustrated with Engravings.* By REUBEN A. GUILD, A.M., Librarian of Brown University, Providence, R.I. New York: Newton, 1858. Sm. 4to. London: Trübner.
 2. *A Critical Dictionary of English Literature, and British and American Authors, Living and Deceased, from the earliest Accounts to the middle of the Nineteenth Century, containing 30,000 biographic and literary Notices, with forty Indexes of Subjects.* By S. AUSTEN ALLIBONE. Vol. I. A—J. Philadelphia: Childs, 1859. Imp. 8vo. London: Trübner.
 3. *Trübner's Bibliographical Guide to American Literature: a classed List of Books published in the United States of America, during the last Forty Years, with bibliographical Introduction, Notes, and alphabetical Index.* London: Trübner, 1859. 8vo.
 4. *Memoirs of Libraries: including a Handbook of Library Economy.* By EDWARD EDWARDS. London: Trübner, 1859. 2 vols. 8vo.

Next to Biography, which treats of the lives of individuals, Bibliography which chronicles the exercise of their brains, approaches in utility and interest; and that knowledge of books which is understood by the term

bibliography is acquired by means of descriptive catalogues, either classified or reduced to alphabetical order, with critical and other remarks, which afford information as to the most important volumes in every department of human science or study.

This science has been cultivated in most countries of Europe—with greatest success in France, Germany, and Italy, but with less, comparatively, in Great Britain. The labours of Brunet, Panzer, Watt, Dibdin, De Bure, Van Praet, Antonio, and numerous others, have long held possession of the field, and served as examples in their respective qualities. It is only, however, in times extremely recent, that an account of the literature of the New World has been systematically sought to be described; and the active progress which literature is daily making in America, in all branches, necessitates the development of these productions by well-arranged and carefully-prepared manuals. Accordingly, three of the volumes, the titles of which we have prefixed to these remarks, appear in most fitting time and place; and, taken together, are as instructive to the student as they are creditable to their compilers.

The volume by Mr. Guild is to be viewed somewhat as a morsel of dilettantism, and the gentleman by whom it has been prepared as the *quasi* Dibdin of the West. Its toned paper, antique type, somewhat Ritsonian orthography, grim woodcuts, and restricted number of large-paper copies, at first induce a smile. Yet we do not dislike to see "Brother Jonathan" come forth in this pleasant guise; and if the rest of his countrymen, in their several paths of life, would comport themselves in corresponding taste, we should be better pleased, and more inclined to "cotton" to them.

The first part of Mr. Guild's "Manual" consists of a descriptive list of four hundred and ninety-five separate bibliographical books considered of indispensable use in a library. Of each of these the title is given at length, with a note explanatory of its arrangement and value. The second division gives an account of fourteen of the largest public libraries in America and Europe, with notices of the most remarkable features of those establishments. It is a useful, and, as we have indicated, a "right pleasant concealed" tome.

The next work, that by Mr. Allibone, is one of a very different and much higher character, the fruit of immense diligence and labour, evidently of much love. The plan is at once original, comprehensive, and notably useful. Brought down to the very latest moment of composition, not a single work of any merit which has been published in England or America is omitted; and many distinguished only by their rarity are included. The prominent features of the book are its alphabetical arrangement; its comprehension, as embracing the works of authors strictly not English, yet by reason of their writings essentially entitled to have a part and portion in British history; its succinct biography of the author, where his position in the world's eye or his rank as an author commands it; and its recording of the opinions "of great men upon great men," by select specimens of their criticism—all made the more serviceable and convenient by the addition of a minutely-classified index. To individuals in every walk of life Mr. Allibone's dictionary is invaluable. The statesman (we have few, Heaven knows, nowadays entitled to the name), as well as the mechanic,

will find it a safe guide and instructor. The expenditure of one thousand or fifteen hundred pounds would not procure for those who might wish to acquire them the volumes thus carefully examined, and whose contents, digested by the unwearied diligence of Mr. Allibone, are rendered accessible to all at a cost not approaching to three guineas.

But highly as its merits entitle it to consideration, it is only to a general survey of literature that Mr. Allibone's work pretends: the volume by Mr. Trübner takes the form and subject of a *national* bibliography alone, and comes, as such, peculiarly acceptable to the world of letters. It not merely affords at a glance the entire productions of the American press for the last forty years, properly classified, but its elaborate introduction presents a lucid and elegant history of the rise and progress of learning in America, from its infancy as a colony to its present state as an independent confederation. In such history is comprised all that properly belongs to it;—the introduction and improvement of the art of typography, the remuneration of authors, the book-trade and its extent, periodical and newspapers,—even to the details of letter-foundry, paper, and binding. To this is appended an equally careful account of the public libraries in the United States, showing in all their force the literary statistics of that Continent. For this most excellent and truly modest survey, a large debt of gratitude is due by the student to M. Trübner.

Most of us have heard of the “Smithsonian Institution,” of which the “Contributions to Knowledge” contain so much that is of the first interest to science; but few, perhaps, know anything of the history of its founder. It may be well, therefore, to extract Mr. Trübner's brief account of that individual. How few noble bastards “light up” so well!

“James Lewis Macie (afterwards called Smithson) appears to have been a natural son of Sir Hugh Smithson, Bart., who was created Duke of Northumberland in 1766 (and shortly afterwards ‘vice-admiral of all America’), after his marriage with the heiress of the Percies. Mrs. Elizabeth Macie, his mother, is said to have been of the Wiltshire family of Hungerford. Little is known of his life, save that he was educated at Oxford, that he cultivated a knowledge of chemistry, was well acquainted with Cavendish, and contributed to the ‘Philosophical Transactions’ several analytical papers on chemical subjects; that he was proud of his descent, yet keenly sensitive on the score of the ‘bar sinister’ in his escutcheon; ambitious of leaving a name that, to use his own words, ‘would live in the memory of men when the titles of the Northumberlands and the Percies are extinct or forgotten,’ yet willing to make his purpose wholly contingent on the birth of no child or children to a nephew who survived him; that he passed most of his life on the Continent, and died at Genoa in 1829, unmarried, leaving a fortune of about £120,000 sterling.

“Mr. Smithson is said to have been a man of reserved manners and sensitive feelings; but an anecdote (almost the only one which has survived of him) shows that he must have possessed considerable coolness and strength of nerve. ‘Happening to observe a tear gliding down a lady's cheek, . . . he submitted it to reagents, and detected what was then called microcosmic salt, with muriate of soda; and, I think’ (Mr. Davies Gilberts, President of the Royal Society, is the narrator), ‘three or four more saline substances held in solution.’

“The will of the founder of the Smithsonian Institution bears date
APPENDIX TO BROWNSON'S REVIEW.

23rd October, 1826. In it, he describes himself as 'James Smithson, son of Hugh, first Duke of Northumberland, and Elizabeth, heiress of the Hungerfords, of Audley, and niece of Charles the Proud, Duke of Somerset.' After bequeathing an annuity to a former servant, he leaves the whole of the income arising from all his property, of what nature soever, 'to Henry James Hungerford, my nephew, heretofore called Henry James Dickinson, son of my late brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lewis Dickinson,' for his life; and then directs that, 'should the said Henry James Hungerford have a child or children, legitimate or illegitimate,' such child or children should inherit the whole of his property of every kind absolutely and for ever. Failing such issue (as proved to be the case), he bequeathed the whole—subject to the annuity already mentioned—'to the United States of America,' in the few words cited above, and without farther detail of his intentions."

The "Memoirs of Libraries," by Mr. Edwards, is an *A per se A*. It contains an account of all the public libraries in the world, ancient and modern; notices of many private collections, dispersed or existing, a description of the various systems employed, or proposed to be employed, in cataloguing books; the general principles on which libraries are, or ought to be, conducted; the construction of such; their internal administration and public service; and a sketch of the history of book-binding. Of the industry bestowed on this extensive compilation, and of the marvellous condensation of facts which it supplies, it is difficult to speak in terms of proper commendation: even to the most accomplished bibliographer it cannot fail to be of great service; but how much more to the tyro or ordinary bibliophile? It seems a singular fancy that induced the author, a publisher, to have it printed in *Savony*: to the type or form we do not demur, but we decidedly object that matter so good should be printed on paper so villanously detestable as only to be fitting for application to the basest of uses.

Louis XVI. et sa Cour. Par Amédée Renée. Deuxième Edition, revue et enrichie de Nouveaux Documents. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1858. 8vo.

THIS volume, which has reached a second edition considerably enlarged, is one of the several very clearly-drawn sketches of historic characters and events which we owe to the accomplished pen of M. Amédée Renée, and the ever-teeming presses of the justly-esteemed brothers Didot. What adds to the grace of M. Renée's composition is the impartiality—so far as it is possible for men to be impartial—which prompts it; and even if his reader should be at issue with him on some of his views, it is impossible but that he must respect the position from which he feels disposed to dissent. It is this evidently truthful spirit that makes the writings of this gentleman so deservedly popular. In treating of the unfortunate sovereign in whose guiltless person were avenged the crimes of many of those who surrounded his throne, and the inevitable course of events wherein these melancholy parts were played, M. Renée has handled his materials with a delicacy of touch as meritorious as it is rare. In our present Appendix,

we are able to do a little more than direct the attention of our readers to this thought-suggestive volume; but there is one passage so interesting in relation to the last of the Bourbons who occupied the throne of that great nation, now so beneficially governed, that we cannot resist extracting the note of its author, detailing an interview which he had with Louis Philippe, and having reference to the character of *Egalité*, as drawn in a letter by one who knew him well, the Prince de Ligne.

"When," says M. Renée, "I had the honour to present to his majesty this volume, which completed the History by Sismondi, Louis Philippe was induced by its subject to speak to me of Louis XIV., of Marie Antoinette, and especially of his father, the Duke of Orleans.

"The letter of the Prince de Ligne, above quoted, was unknown to the king: he read it in a loud tone of voice, seemed surprised and much moved by it; he then, with marked emotion, began to speak of his father. He commended the portrait which I had drawn of this prince, saying, that it was the most accurate which had been written of his unfortunate parent. He recalled various particulars of his education, the fatal examples of the period, and dwelt at considerable length on the qualities and dispositions of mind attributed to the Duke of Orleans by the Prince de Ligne.

"I then remarked, that the majority of contemporaries who had seen the Duke of Orleans closely, had preserved for the individual sympathies which political feelings had been unable entirely to destroy: they appear, like the Prince de Ligne, even more disposed to pity than to hate him. It is true, replied the king, with very much emotion; mark, when I was here, in this very place, in private conversation with Charles X., he seldom failed to speak to me of my father, of his private character, his sociable disposition, and of their friendship; he exhibited towards his old companions a partiality which cruel events, fatality itself, had not succeeded in effacing. Charles X. admitted the wrongs which had been done to my father; he deplored the amount of evil which unprovoked hatreds, treacherously inflamed, had brought upon the two branches. But, added his majesty, when Charles X. was in presence of his circle, he held a very different language. (Here the actual expression of the king was: 'There was a change in the scenery.')

"Louis Philippe spoke also of Louis XVI. I had ventured upon some opinions favourable to the administration and political knowledge of this prince, who was in character so little of a king. I had read various papers on foreign affairs, accredited on the autograph of Louis XVI., and which testified at least to his application and to a certain comprehension of these matters. I quoted several manuscript letters. But the opinion of the king had long before been decided: to his eyes, Louis XVI. was as destitute of mind as of character. It was obvious that Louis Philippe had been educated in a contempt for this unfortunate prince, and that he had on this point preserved all the impressions of his youth. Besides, he had seen Louis XVI. on his least advantageous side, the external; he had been struck with the little royalty of his appearance, his negligent costume, his rough voice, with what they called at court his cross, disagreeable replies. On this head, Louis Philippe had his memory stored with traits and anecdotes; he told them very well, and among others the following: At the opening of the States-General, the king, queen, and all the princes went in procession to chapel at the head of the three Orders. A crowd of sight-seers had naturally been attracted by this spectacle. The king perceived there one of the officers of his household, incumbent of one of those absurd places in the ancient court—he was master of the greyhounds. Louis XVI. stopped abruptly, interrupted the progress of the procession, and, loudly

addressing the gentleman, asked him what brought him there, why he was off duty at that time, and both by word of mouth and gesture ordered him to return as quickly as possible to the kennel. Such were the preoccupations which engaged Louis XVI. at the solemn moment of the States-General. Such incidents must have deeply impressed the young prince; so when Louis Philippe related the story, he imitated the loud voice and undignified manners of the monarch.

"Similar impressions of his early youth remained in the mind of Louis Philippe in regard to Marie Antoinette: he had drawn them from the Palais Royal; from the conversation of M.M. De Lauzun, De Liancourt, De Sillery, De Laclous, and many more courtiers interested in these family dislikes, who went about retailing the lies and epigrams of the day upon the queen. It was plain that Louis Philippe had succumbed to the inevitable influence of such a circle. When I expressed myself with sympathy towards that princess, praising her generous and high-spirited character, her courage, her natural gifts, and sometimes eloquent emotion, the king listened to me with a very significant silence, that contrasted strongly with his ordinary want of reserve, and which seemed to imply that he knew much more of that subject than any one else.

"Influenced by truth and historical justice, I endeavoured to show that there had existed against the queen an organized conspiracy in the very heart of the royal family itself, in the higher ranks of the nobility obstinate policy of disparagement and falsehood, which, after the affair of the necklace and the trial of Cardinal de Rohan, extended to the very clergy, and ended in exciting the whole nation against the queen. King Louis Philippe, without explaining himself, otherwise than by his attitude and the working of his countenance while listening to me, cut short this delicate conversation by some suitable remarks as to the indulgence which history should show towards a king and queen who had experienced such great misfortunes."

A person so thoroughly prejudiced well deserved the fate which he himself met.

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1. *A Letter to the Parishioners of Lawshall, telling them why he left them and became a Catholic.* By EVAN BAILLIE, M.A., late Rector of Lawshall, Suffolk. 16mo. Burns, 1859.
 2. *Romanism and Protestantism: or, Who is the Aggressor? A Question respectfully submitted to the Inhabitants of Tiverton.* By EVAN BAILLIE. 16mo. Burns, 1859.

MR. BAILLIE, after some eighteen years of dubiety as to whether Her Majesty's establishment is a branch of the Church Catholic was, at length, happily for himself, convinced of its baseless pretensions and destructive fallacies. His perception of these was increased by the decisions in the Hampden and Gorham cases, which, if any other motives than the mere carnal ones of eating, drinking, and begetting, actuated her "pastors" must have instantly removed their hallucinations, and driven every honest man amongst them out of the parliamentary meeting-houses; and, in the conduct of his discussion, saw ample evidence of the Mammonism and time-serving debasement of these creatures of the premier of the day. In flying from the ecclesiastical Gomorrah, Mr. Baillie informs us that he barred the

avidous patron of his living from selling it ; a parting kick which others, who may follow in his footsteps, ought to imitate. The account of his "experiences"—as the Maw-worms call them—forms the agreeable little book, number first of the heading.

Number second narrates the impertinent interference with Mr. Baillie, on his retirement as a layman to Tiverton, by the rector, Mr. Gilbert (evidently a very shabby personage), and the notorious foul-mouthed Cumming. Their united offensiveness, and paltry tract-distributing tricks, have been attended with the ordinary result in such courses,—the directing of the public attention to Catholicity ; and a happy increase to the field of the Church in Tiverton is sure to be the product of this very Protestant manuring.

The Roman Catacombs ; or, some Account of the Burial-places of the Early Christians in Rome. By the REV. J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE, M.A. Second Edition, with considerable additions, both in matter and illustrations, and the whole re-arranged. London : Catholic Publishing Company Limited, 1859. Sm. 8vo.

THIS very accurate little volume, justly admitted to be the best "Hand-book" to the "Catacombs," has met with such general favour as to induce its reverend author and the publishers to increase the second edition, now before us, very considerably. The whole is brought down to the latest discoveries in that marvellous city of departed saints ; and the calm analytical explanations by Mr. Northcote extinguish the ignorant misconstructions of Maitland and other prejudiced pretenders. Even the *Edinburgh Reviewers* have been obliged, in their notice of the first edition, to bear unwilling testimony to the worth of the manual and the integrity of its author. The new illustrations are of much service to Christian archæologists.

The Manual of the Holy Family ; containing a Triduum in Honour of St. Joseph : to which is added, a Selection of Devout Exercises ; Devotions for Mass, &c. Compiled and translated from approved sources, by AGNES M. STEWART. London : Catholic Publishing Company Limited, 1859. 12mo.

IN general we are not particularly disposed to countenance devotional manuals compiled by members of the laity, whether male or female. Nevertheless, Miss Stewart is so favourably known by her excellent stories, and her own personal reputation, that we cannot hesitate to recommend this fresh effort to edify and assist the piety of the faithful. The selection evinces much correct taste : the introduction of the prayers of St. Bridget giving a distinctive character to it, which will be appreciated by those who hold in honour the beatified Princess of Sweden ;

and may be appropriately used by all who desire to see the removal of intolerance to Catholicism from that obstinate nation,—the first step in the way of freeing it from heresy.


Three Sermons on the Foundations of Religion. By the REV. N. RIGBY, of Ugthorpe. Second Edition. London: Catholic Publishing Company Limited, 1859. 8vo.

ALTHOUGH, in point of fact or argument, there is nothing new in these discourses by Mr. Rigby, yet their earnest tone and convincing style have very justly rendered them popular, and highly suitable for distribution among such of "our separated brethren" as desire to investigate the grounds of Catholic faith. It is to be hoped that they may have influential operation on the eyes of those visionary individuals, who think that the possession and reading of the Bible alone constitutes a Christian on earth, and gives him a passport to Heaven, without knocking at the gate, or trusting in the portership of St. Peter. The pitch to which this particular insanity is carried is truly marvellous, and but for its fatal effects would be amusing. In Scotland the *mere book* is regarded as the Ark of the Lord; and an Israelite would as soon have thought of plucking from the breast of the high-priest the Urim and Thummim, as these northern pietists would think of touching the very boards of the Scriptures without an inward prostration equivalent to the most abject of Pagan idolatry. When will these people comprehend the ordinary elements of religious principle?









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Brownson's quarterly review
[London ed.]

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